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A History of The British Army

BY

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HONORARY FELLOW OF TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE

VOL. XI

1815–1838

Quae caret ora cruore nostro?

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BOOK XVI

CHAPTER I

THIS history has now reached a point at which the historian's difficulties are very greatly increased. Throughout the eighteenth century, and up to the year of Waterloo, he has had to deal with many wars, indeed, and with not a few gradual changes in the Army. But, in the matter of domestic policy the Britain of which he has treated has been, in all essential matters, much the same, from the peace of Utrecht to the second peace of Paris, from 1713, that is, until 1815. It was an accepted matter that the Government of England should rest with the country-gentlemen, and that they should rule it, in the main, through the Parliamentary system which had come down to them from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The said country-gentlemen were, it is true, divided into two factions which had come to blows during the Civil War; the main difference between them being that one party desired to maintain a king over them, while the other desired to be kings themselves. After many vicissitudes the struggle had finally ended in the exclusion of the Stuart dynasty after the death of Queen Anne, and in the accession of a king who, being totally ignorant of the English language, abandoned his right to a voice in the general direction of affairs by the Sovereign in Council. Thus neither faction exactly gained its object; but, with time, the real points of difference between them rapidly disappeared; and, when Charles Edward Stuart subsided finally into alcoholism after the abor- 1816.

1816. tive rising of 1745, and the last of the male Stuarts was known to be a Cardinal of the Roman Church, Jacobitism died a natural death; and there was no real distinction between a Whig and a Tory. The former did indeed talk loud nonsense about liberty and the glorious revolution of 1688, and the Tories talked equally loud nonsense on the opposite side; but both were firmly convinced that the country-gentlemen were the proper and legitimate rulers of England, and both were intensely jealous of any intrusion into their sacred circle.

None the less, from very early times rich merchants had purchased the estates of country-gentlemen in pecuniary difficulties; and these in a generation or two settled down as legitimate members of the ruling caste. Interlopers came also from the Empire without, especially rich planters from the West Indies, who bought close boroughs, and so brought about colonial representation in Parliament. No Prime Minister dared reckon without the "West Indian interest," as it was called, for, at its strongest, it commanded some eighty votes in a division. Yet for some reason—possibly because many of them came of good old county families—the West Indians in the Commons seem to have evaded odium. Far otherwise was it with those who came home with money made in the East Indies. The presence of the "nabobs," as they were called, was fiercely resented, and found vent in the disgraceful impeachment of Warren Hastings and the persistent persecution of Clive. The descendants of yet another nabob, William Pitt the elder and the younger, were able to take care of themselves.

The domestic and imperial policy of the country-gentlemen was simple—protection for the agricultural industry at home and close trade within the Empire, the latter being an inheritance from Cromwell, himself, as he protested to one of his parliaments, by birth a gentleman and a country-gentleman. Close

trade within the Empire, as enforced by the Acts of Trade and Navigation, was, whether the fact be recognised or not, the underlying cause of the revolt of the American Colonies ; but it was not abandoned after the loss of these possessions, though the Empire was thereby reduced (apart from India) to a handful of West Indian Islands. British West Indian planters had of course received protection for their produce against the competition of alien planters, and it was continued to them. As to the protection of British agriculture, there had been many changes since 1688, but the general principle was that a duty, varying in amount according to the price, was imposed upon imported grain, and that, when the price fell below a certain figure, the export of grain was not only permitted, but encouraged by a bounty. The object of this, of course, was that agriculturists should be eager at all times to raise as much corn as possible, without apprehension of losing their profit by producing more than might be necessary for the home-market. During the course of the war bad harvests had compelled very large importations of wheat in certain seasons, even as late as in 1810 ; but, since that year, owing to the investment of enormous capital in agriculture and steady advance in the science of cultivation, the country might be said to have become self-supporting. With the economic merits or demerits of this system of protection, the present writer is not concerned. It may or may not be a good thing, economically, to shield an industry that is literally vital to the nation by enabling the people not only to produce their own nourishment, but to breathe fresh air, and to live a healthy and inexhaustibly interesting life. From a military point of view, at any rate, the policy was sound, for it ensured the continuance of a vigorous race of fighting men, and lessened the strain upon the navy by rendering the country independent of foreign supplies of victual. An island that can feed its population is a fortress that

1816.

1816. cannot be reduced by hunger, but must be taken by assault.

As regards colonial produce, which in those days was practically synonymous with tropical produce, the situation was complicated by the question of labour. The West Indian Islands were cultivated by negroes imported from the West Coast of Africa ; and for generations British merchants had made vast profits by supplying these slaves, at so much a head, not only to British but to foreign colonies. But in 1807 the slave trade was abolished by Act of Parliament ; and the group of earnest and devoted men who had secured its abolition were working strenuously to sweep away slavery itself within the British Empire. In these days such an ideal seems so natural and right that no one would hear a voice raised against it. Many now contest the position that man is by nature a fighting animal, and revolt from the very thought that he is equally, by nature, an enslaving animal ; though history, ancient and modern alike, seems to teach that he is both the one and the other. A century ago people were by no means so unanimous against slavery. Chiefly, no doubt, its champions were swayed by self-interest, having enormous sums of money invested in an industry which depended upon servile labour. Even if the legislature should compensate slave-owners by redeeming their slaves for money, such compensation could not make good their prospective losses. For it was very uncertain whether negroes, being able to support life by very little exertion, and having few desires except to lie in the sun, would toil voluntarily for wages. There was always, therefore, the possibility that the white man might be driven from the West Indian Islands by sheer want of labour to carry on his work, and that the British Antilles might fall, as Hayti had fallen, wholly under the domination of the blacks. History does, indeed, teach that a servile population is the most dangerous of populations, and so far was

against the slave-owners ; but it is also not altogether silent as to the peril of a suddenly emancipated host of negroes to their former masters. The question was, therefore, by no means so simple as it now appears to us to be. It is probably no exaggeration to say that the ultimate issue to be decided was whether the black man or the white should be master of British tropical possessions. Temporarily, no doubt, the rule of the whites could be upheld, as in the past, by British soldiers ; but the doubtful point was whether the produce of the islands might not become so much reduced, after emancipation of the slaves, as to give no adequate commercial return for the expense of maintaining protective garrisons. 1816.

Here, therefore, were two high problems of domestic and imperial policy which could not in any way be solved without reacting strongly upon the military situation of the country. And these were by no means all. England had begun the war with, practically, no empire, apart from India, except a few tropical islands ; for Australia had been only a tiny penal settlement, and Canada, though vast in extent of territory, was but very thinly peopled. She had ended it with the acquisition of a large province, Demerara, on the mainland of South America ; with two additional posts in the Mediterranean, Malta and the Ionian Islands, watching the overland route to India ; and with, to all intent, every existing port that guarded the way overseas to India, being now mistress of the Cape, Mauritius and Ceylon. All of these places required garrisons. The importance of Malta and the Ionian Islands was purely military. Slavery existed in Demerara and the Cape of Good Hope. Ceylon had a teeming native population ; and the mountainous centre of the island was not only not British, but hostile to the British. At the Cape, too, apart from the fact that the Dutch settlers were slave-owners, there were native tribes which had been dispossessed of much territory, and were incessantly

1816. striving to regain it. The Cape Colony, in fact, presented features altogether new in British colonial experience. There, as in North America, the white man could thrive and breed. But in North America the Red Indians had been too few and too weak to give serious trouble; and the most powerful of them had been crushed between the French hammer and the British anvil; whereas in South Africa the Kaffirs were far more formidable, alike in numbers, in bravery and in military skill. Moreover, they showed so far no tendency to die out, like the Red Indians, under the blight of the mere presence of the white man. Lastly, in Australia the penal settlement was growing to serious numbers. The garrison consequently needed augmentation; and it was a question whether that vast island was to be given up wholly to a few thousands of men, most of them of really bad character, and all rendered to some extent reckless and desperate by severe penal discipline.

Again, our possessions in India had been enormously extended by the conquests of Lake and Wellesley. The power of the Mahrattas, our most formidable rivals for the mastery of the Peninsula, had been in the main broken; but the Mahratta chieftains chafed under their humiliation and dreamed of a day of revenge. Central India was in a state of anarchy, a prey to hordes of banditti, which the chieftains aforesaid made no effort to check, seeing in them fit instruments for their own ends. Moreover, all along the northern frontier, there was unrest. Ranjit Singh had risen to great power in the Punjab. From Nepal the Gurkhas were encroaching upon British territory on the plains. Far to north-east the Burmese were threatening eastern Bengal from the banks of the Brahmaputra. And India, having been taken by the sword, must be held by the sword.

Once more, there was the complicated web of England's relations with foreign powers in an exhausted and unsettled Europe. A treaty of general

pacification had, of course, been signed and dignified by the title of the Second Peace of Paris ; but the peace, as ever in human history, was but a name. The Emperors of Russia and Austria, and the King of Prussia had bound themselves to a Holy Alliance for the government of themselves and of their peoples according to the dictates of Christianity ; but the secret societies, which had played so great a part in guiding the course of the French Revolution, were still active all over Europe, preaching resistance against the injunction to render unto Caesar the things that were Caesar's. Across the Atlantic, the United States were embittered by their fruitless and costly war with England, which had caused them heavy losses, and gained for them nothing ; while South America was confounded and ruined by the revolt of the Spanish Colonies against their mother country, which was not only sapping their own strength, but depriving the world at large of its supply of precious metals, and raising unspeakable problems as to the medium of commercial exchange. 1816.

Lastly, to end with matters of purely domestic concern, there was the eternal trouble with Ireland. There were certain real and immediate grievances which might be removed ; but there was also, as always, that unquenchable hatred of England which has condemned the Irish to be, in the words of the most conspicuous Irishman of our own day, a futile and disagreeable people. There was also a civil penal code in England itself, so savage and so obsolete as to need recasting from top to bottom. There were reforms, long overdue, which cried aloud for accomplishment in the Courts of Law, in the Church, in every department of the State. For the best part of a generation all administrative improvement had been suspended owing to the protracted struggle for national existence. The difficulties of the situation were increased rather than diminished by the fact that the material progress of the British Isles during

1816. the war had been very remarkable. The population had arisen from fourteen to eighteen millions. Imports, exports and tonnage had been doubled ; and the annual revenue from taxation had mounted from nineteen millions sterling in 1792 to seventy-two millions in 1815. Against this were to be set the facts that the purchasing power of money had been halved ; and that the national debt had swollen to the appalling figure of eight hundred millions. Altogether the general situation was one which would have strained the genius of a William Pitt or a Benjamin Disraeli in the flower of their age and at the topmost height of their intellectual powers. But William Pitt had been dead ten years, and Disraeli, as yet but a child, was doomed to wait for half a century before he should be Prime Minister.

And now, before going further, let us take stock of the Army at the beginning of the peace ; and let us begin with the private soldier. The recruit was attracted to the service by a sum of money, varying in amount, which was called bounty. No character was, as a rule, required of him, though the practice of regiments varied in this respect ; and, as the recruiter received fifteen shillings " bringing money " for every man that he produced, he naturally did not disturb himself about anything more than the recruit's physical fitness. Hence there were too many men enlisted who were of the criminal class or mentally deficient. But the majority seem to have been respectable, docile, country lads ; and countrymen were always preferred by officers to townsmen. The State had not yet taken the regulation of manufactories in hand, the humane among the British legislators devoting, for reasons best known to themselves, more attention to negroes over sea than to white men, women and children at their doors. There was much that was brutalising in the life of the manufacturing hands, and therefore much good cause for discontent among them. More-

over, in the towns they had plenty of companions against whom to sharpen their wits, and no lack of agitators to work upon their worst feelings. For every reason, therefore, the lad who had been brought up by careful, thrifty parents in a decent cottage home was most heartily welcomed to the colours. 1816.

The influences to which the recruit was subjected at the outset were not, however, as a rule, the most salutary. Drunkenness was the besetting sin of all classes at that time ; and, if he enlisted in any great recruiting centre, there was generally an interval of some days between his acceptance of the shilling and his entry into the barrack-yard, which was passed for the most part in drinking. First, he was treated by the receiver of the bringing money ; next, the day of attestation put half-a-crown into his pocket ; then he received daily pay until finally passed into the service by a district tribunal ; and at the close of that ceremony he was presented with ten shillings, after which nothing more was given him until he joined the head-quarters of his regiment. Then came the day of reckoning. The so-called bounty was discovered to be merely an allowance for provision of the necessary articles of his kit, and, as a matter of fact, too small a sum to pay the whole cost of it. The recruit, therefore, almost invariably began his military life in debt to his captain ; which debt could only be discharged by instalments from his wages.[1] The pay of a private of the infantry of the line was seven shillings a week, of which by regulation three shillings and sixpence were intercepted for his messing, one shilling and tenpence halfpenny for the maintenance of his "necessaries" and for his washing, and the balance, if he were lucky, was paid daily in instalments of twopence halfpenny into his hand. The general result of the insufficiency of the bounty was that the recruit received often not one penny of wages for months, sometimes

[1] C.M.P., 212. Hansard, vol. lxvi., Capt. Layard's speech, 27th February 1843.

1816. even for more than half a year. Such an arrangement was not calculated to endear the Army to him ; and although, when enlisting, he had the choice at that time of limited or unlimited service, the temptation of an additional sixteen shillings in the great majority of cases induced him to commit himself for life.

On being passed into barracks, the soldier found himself infamously housed. The principle that governed design in these matters was that as little money as possible must be spent upon the building, and as many men as possible crammed into it. Three hundred cubic feet of air, or even less, were considered amply sufficient for the soldier ; and the overcrowding was almost incredible. There were no ablution-rooms, no recreation-rooms, nothing but the sleeping-chambers. In 1832 there were hired barracks in Knightsbridge where seven or eight Guardsmen were stuffed into rooms not seven feet high ;[1] and there were instances of chambers from thirty to thirty-two feet long, twenty feet broad, and twelve feet high, with but five inches of space between the beds, and but nine inches from the foot of the beds to the eating-table ; and here twenty men ate, drank, slept, and did everything but drill. Yet even this state of things belonged to a later and more favourable date than 1816, for as yet beds were not. The men were huddled together by fours in wooden cribs, actually by fours, though even during the Wars of the Roses it had been considered unseemly to pack soldiers of a superior stamp more closely than two in a bed. The sanitary arrangements were unspeakable, and contributed very considerably to poison the atmosphere of the barrack-room ;[2] and unfortunately the pre-

[1] Hansard, xiii., 1254, Mr. Kennedy's speech, 2nd July, 1832.

[2] The only urinals for barrack-rooms were wooden tubs, the stench of which was appalling. Moreover, the same tubs, when emptied, were the only vessels furnished to the soldier to wash in. The author's father heard a serjeant speak of a promising recruit as "a smart, active boy, always first in the urine-tub in the morning." Report of Sanitary Commission, 3158.

judices of the class from which recruits were drawn made them strongly hostile to fresh air. Scanty provision, if any, was made for ventilation ; but any aperture that existed, unless out of reach, was immediately sealed up by the men. The result was that the air became so foul as to be positively unbearable by any one entering the room from without, and that pulmonary disease found riotous living in every barrack. 1816.

Nor were other disorders wanting, owing to other causes. In the first place, the barrack-rooms were shared by the wives of soldiers married "on the strength," the proportion of wives allowed in barracks being six to every hundred men.[1] It was to these rooms that the soldier brought his newly-wedded partner for the honeymoon, and it was in these that his children were born, all in the presence of half a dozen comrades. If infectious sickness showed itself among the children—and there were swarms of them with every regiment[2]—it was carefully concealed by the unhappy mothers, lest they should be turned out of their only shelter, for they could not afford to hire another. Next, the sanitary arrangements of all barracks were, as has been already remarked, quite infamous ; open cesspools adjoining the buildings, and soil soaked with foul sewage, being the rule rather than the exception. Furthermore, there were in certain places even more objectionable features. Thus at the Tower of London prejudice dictated that the ditch should be kept more or less wet for purposes of defence ; but it is needless to say that it was made the receptacle for all the refuse and filth of the adjoining houses, and was so noisome that until 1849 typhus was of frequent occurrence among the Guards

[1] The washing for the soldiers was done by these women in due rotation so that all might share in the profits of their labour.

[2] About 10,000 children accompanied the British Army in its wanderings about the Empire. Macaulay's speech, 9th March 1840, Hansard, lii. 1081.

1816. quartered in the Tower. In that year alarm of cholera compelled the draining and cleaning of the ditch, whereupon fever at once diminished.[1]

The water-supply, again, was in practically every case defective. At the Tower men drank the filthy water from the shore below the fortress, but in most barracks there was a single pump, or conduit, for a whole battalion, with, in a few fortunate cases, one or two buckets. To this pump, in many instances, the men resorted, summer and winter, for their ablutions, emerging from the fetid and oppressive atmosphere of the barrack-room into the cold, and splashing round the pump in scanty raiment which often was wetted through in the scramble. Then, when the keen wind had chilled them to the bone, they returned once again to the foul air of their dwelling. Night-duty was almost equally trying from the like causes. The men absolutely refused in cold weather to allow any fresh air to enter the guard-room ; and the relieving sentries passed out of a very close atmosphere into cold wind or rain, in a greatcoat which protected them against neither the one nor the other, to pass in once more and lie down in their wet clothes when their watch was over.

In a general way their clothing itself was bad. The coatee, or swallow-tailed coat, was in itself an ill-designed garment ; and the cloth alike of coatee, trousers and greatcoat was of poor quality. For underclothing the men preferred cotton as more easily washed ; and flannel shirts were almost unknown. In summer, white duck trousers were worn, in itself the chilliest of materials, and all the worse because the trousers were cleaned with pipe-clay, and frequently put on by the men while still damp. The pack was hard, rigid and quadrangular ; and was so adjusted as to arrest circulation. Round the neck was worn a stiff black leathern stock, which the men rather delighted in for its smart appearance, though they always took

[1] Sanitary Commission Report, p. xx ; Evidence, 9549.

it off and hung it in their musket-stocks when hard work was in prospect. The boots were made of hard, stout, unyielding leather, so well chosen to resist wear that they generally outlasted the soldier's endurance, even on a short march, and brought him to a standstill. 1816.

The feeding of the soldier is the next point that calls for notice. His ration, fixed in 1813, was one pound of bread and three-quarters of a pound of meat daily, for which sixpence a day was stopped from his pay. The barracks provided no cooking utensils nor appliances except two coppers, one for the meat and the other for potatoes, to each company. The men of the company took it in turns to cook, and seem, most of them, to have mastered the art with little difficulty. In truth, not very much was required of them, nothing more indeed than to boil the flesh meat, serving up the liquid portion as broth and the solid portion as boiled beef. There was no variety, for there was no means of roasting or baking the meat. The soldier of 1815, and even of forty years later, was literally expected to subsist for twenty-one years upon an unalterable diet of beef-broth and boiled beef. Not unnaturally his stomach soon revolted against the monotony, and consequently he was underfed. To make matters worse, he had but two meals a day, breakfast at half-past seven in the morning and dinner at half an hour after noon, leaving him for nineteen hours without any food at all. Occasionally on foreign stations there were happy days when salt pork was substituted for beef, but this was only because the pork was in danger of perishing if kept longer in store, not from any idea of varying the soldier's diet.[1]

If the soldier in all these circumstances fell sick, he was sent to hospital. There were three general hospitals in the United Kingdom, at Chatham, Dublin and Cork, besides several others which were merely accumulations of regimental hospitals, as large or

[1] Sanitary Commission Report, 3369.

1816. larger. The chances were, therefore, that an invalid found himself under the charge of his regimental doctor, which so far was to his advantage. But a hospital differed little from a barrack. At Chatham the overcrowding was not quite so outrageous as in barracks, though still too great even for men in health ; but drainage, in spite of many protests from the medical men, did not exist. The rations, as in barracks, were always boiled, the one small oven being wholly occupied by puddings. As to washing, men went to the pump if their health permitted, but, if not, enjoyed the luxury of a hand-basin. Other hospitals were no better, and many much worse.[1] So insanitary was the hospital at Galway that the surgeons dared not perform any operation from fear of gangrene.

Such were the conditions under which the soldier lived, and his countrymen were well content to let him live. It must be borne in mind that sanitary science was as yet in its infancy, and that the standard of cleanliness, comfort and decency was very different a century ago from what it is now. Nevertheless, the mortality among the soldiers in Great Britain was later found to be very much higher than that of their peers among the civil population, and that of the Guards in London appallingly higher. The absence of statistics no doubt contributed to the general neglect of the soldier, the extent of his sufferings being hidden from the humane. And yet it is difficult without indignation to read of the sympathy and the money lavished by a certain school of pious men upon negroes and savages, while they calmly overlooked the abominations that were destroying their own countrymen under their eyes. There was work for a John Howard in the Army, yet England could produce only a William Wilberforce.

Of the treatment that the recruit received at the hands of drill-serjeants, it is impossible and indeed

[1] The hospitals of the Guards, as shall presently be told, were a brilliant though solitary exception.

unnecessary to speak. There were then, as now, drill-serjeants who were patient, long-suffering and considerate, and others who were overbearing and tyrannical. A great many adjutants at that time were officers who had risen from the ranks ; and such men, whether in the army or in any other calling, while endowed with many good qualities, are disposed to be exacting towards their inferiors. Still, by all testimony officers at large, and commanding officers in particular, invariably showed kindness and thoughtfulness towards recruits. But with the best of good will, their powers were limited. The Army both in Great Britain and Ireland was split up into small detachments. There were as many as four hundred and forty military stations for twenty-four thousand troops in Ireland alone; and this necessarily meant that commanding officers could exercise but little control over those set under them. 1816.

Moreover, it was after all with the men, their own comrades, that the recruits had to live, and circumstances did not make it easy for them. It is not difficult to understand that, living always in foul air, the soldier can never have been quite in good health ; and it is a matter of daily observation that even highly educated men, trained to the highest degree of self-control, find it difficult to repress the irritability generated even by slight physical disorder. Now the classes from which recruits were drawn have, as a rule, little self-control. Over the slightest difference of opinion their voices wax loud and their demeanour grows violent. Moreover, in the overcrowded barrack-rooms there could hardly fail to be one or two quarrelsome individuals, or even one or two downright bad characters, who corrupted the weak and made the lives of the steady and respectable a burden to them. There was no escape from these plagues. Commanding officers, knowing the mischief that they did, might and did long to rid the regiment of them ; but a soldier was a soldier. Men who in barracks were wild and unruly might prove

1816. to be fine fighters on active service; and to send every troublesome individual about his business would be simply to intimate to the rest that, if any man were weary of the service, he had only to misbehave himself persistently in order to obtain his discharge.

The life of the soldier was, therefore, a trying one. As two out of three recruits were illiterate, it is not likely that they felt any suffering from intellectual privation; but, if a man could read and desired to improve his mind, he could find no place of quiet within doors. He had nothing but his barrack-room, crowded with idle comrades who would find congenial occupation in disturbing his peace. In the dark days the allowance of light was limited to two tallow-dips to every room of twelve men; and six or eight soldiers could be seen huddled round a comrade and trying to hear him as he read aloud by the wretched illumination of one such dip.[1] Out of doors, no effort was made and no facilities were given by the military authorities to provide the rank and file with amusement. There was, of course, no such thing as football, which, indeed, in those rough days would probably have led only to free fights with a heavy casualty-list. The soldier was therefore left to get through his leisure as best he might, with such assistance as was afforded to him by his daily pay. In the cavalry, having his horse and saddlery to look after, as well as himself and his kit, he had not so many idle moments, and was, moreover, brought daily into contact with his officers at stable-duty as well as on parade. This was the principal reason for the better behaviour and the generally higher character of the cavalry-trooper, which still—unless matters have changed very recently—leads him to look down upon his comrades of the Foot. But in the infantry the soldier had a great deal of leisure, and no very wholesome means of occupying it. In London, under a regulation of Charles the

[1] Sanitary Commission, 3154, 4267.

Second, soldiers were excluded even from public parks and gardens. There was no inducement towards thrift, for, if a man saved his money, he had nowhere to keep it except in the barrack-room, where it could not be safe. There was no special reason for good behaviour, for promotion was closed to the illiterate, there was no such thing as good-conduct pay, and at the end of their term of service the ill-conducted equally with the well-conducted men were without discrimination entitled to a pension. The entire system of discipline, so far as the supreme command was concerned, was based less on reward for the good soldier than on punishment for the evil-doer. 1816.

Now a principal amusement of all ranks and classes of men in the British Isles at that time was drinking. The wealthy could, of course, diversify it with field-sports, but for the poor there was only the unmixed delight of intoxication. It should seem also that since 1802 heavy taxation of beer and malt, together with other legislation affecting brewers, had so raised the price of beer as to drive the poorer classes to the consumption of spirits.[1] There is no reason to suppose that the soldier was better or worse in respect of this vice than his fellows in civil life ; but he stood upon a different footing. The ordinary workman could take, so it pleased him, his chance of dismissal, if he came drunk to his labour in the morning ; and he was free to go home drunk every night of his life. But a soldier in barracks must, in theory, be ready to turn out fit for duty at a moment's notice ; wherefore drunkenness in his case might be not only a vice but a crime, and a crime that could not, from the nature of his service, be punished by his discharge. This being so, it might have been supposed that his master, the State, would so far as possible have removed all temptation from his way ; but on the contrary the State, from motives of the meanest and most abject parcimony, did just the reverse.

[1] See the evidence of Joseph Hume, C.M.P., p. 63.

1816. The origin of regimental canteens is obscure. No doubt they came into being from the adaptation to the needs of peace of the regimental sutler, who, in European campaigns, was an essential part of the regiment's service for supply. It is, indeed, likely enough that the first canteens were set up by sutlers who returned with the regiments from active service In time, canteens were placed under regulation by the Board of Ordnance, and hired out to contractors by tender for terms of three years. The highest tender was always accepted ; and the contractor gave sureties for payment of rent for the buildings and for a further sum, also fixed by tender, for every ten men who occupied the barracks ; because the greater the number of the men, the greater, of course, were the profits. In early days it had been found almost impossible to prevent men from smuggling spirits into barracks, and it had therefore been decided, as the lesser of two evils, to permit the sale of spirits in the canteen. Rents were high ; the Board of Ordnance was exacting ; and the result was that contractors offered sums for canteens which they could not hope to make good by honest trade. They charged exorbitantly ; and, though the commanding officer was nominally vested with certain powers over them, he could not prevent extortion. But, far worse than this, in return for their high prices they sold to the men such vile and fiery poison as made them not merely drunk, but mad. The result was that any man who was discontented or out of temper resorted at once to the canteen for comfort, and drank himself into a state of uncontrollable frenzy, under the influence of which he defied all authority, assaulted non-commissioned officers, and had to pay for his misdeeds at the halberds. Nearly every act of insubordination—and the crime was very common —was committed in the barrack-yard, and most frequently after a visit to the canteen. The system was utterly vicious and indefensible ; but the letting

of the canteens brought to the State annually the magnificent sum of some fifty-three thousand pounds, which made a fine display upon the estimates. Unfortunately there was no figure to show the cost of good soldiers ruined in health, in character and self-respect, through the sale of spirits in canteens, which is probably underestimated at half a million sterling every year.[1] 1816.

Of course, it was not only in barracks and at their own expense that men obtained drink. In the towns there were always women lying in wait to treat them ;[2] and it was common for soldiers to start abroad without a penny in their pockets and yet to return in a few hours scandalously drunk, at the expense of some persons unknown. But, knowing that to enter barracks in a state of intoxication meant certain punishment, most probably with the lash, they frequently waited for one or more days till they had recovered from their debauch, and then presented themselves ; when they became answerable for the less serious offence of absence without leave. But, speaking generally, drink was responsible for most of the crime in the Army ; and this excess was directly encouraged by the State through bad housing, a pernicious canteen-system, want of encouragement for good conduct, and a fourth principal cause, which must now be somewhat closely examined.

So far we have dealt with the soldier at home ; but the greater part of his life was not spent there. The government had fixed the proportion of service abroad at ten years to every five years in the British Isles. This, according to modern notions, was not a very liberal allowance of home-service, but even so it was not faithfully observed. Not a few regiments had been twenty or more years abroad without relief ; and companies of artillery were sometimes exiled for even

[1] Hansard, vol. xc. p. 952, 5th March 1847.

[2] Venereal disease was very prevalent. In the Guards, about 1857, the cases numbered 25 for every 100 men.

1816. longer. General Ferguson quoted in the House of Commons the case of three companies of gunners which had been kept at Fort Charles, Jamaica, one for fifteen, a second for twenty-one and a third for twenty-seven years.[1] This fort had the sea upon three sides and a marsh upon the fourth ; and the unfortunate garrison was driven to misconduct by sheer dullness and despair, so much so that three hundred men had within two years received among them fifty-four thousand lashes. The foreign stations, of course, varied very greatly in climate and healthiness, those in Canada, Australia and the Cape being, of course, the best ; the Mediterranean coming next, with the Ionian Islands at the bottom of the list ; then Bermuda and Mauritius ; then St. Helena ; then, with a deep downward plunge, Ceylon, the Windward Antilles and India ; then, with another terrible fall, Jamaica ; and finally Sierra Leone. The rates of mortality, taken for the twenty years from 1816 to 1836, varied from thirteen in the thousand at the Cape and fifteen in the British Isles to twenty-eight at Bermuda, seventy-one in the Windward Antilles, and one hundred and twenty-one at Jamaica. The West Coast of Africa was, of course, nothing more nor less than an open grave to the white man, where the annual death-rate ranged from seventy-five to eighty in the hundred.[2]

These figures, however, must not be taken as positive standards of actual climatic salubrity or insalubrity, being subject to modification by various conditions. For instance, the Sixtieth, the African Corps and certain other kindred regiments with such titles as the York Rangers, were what was known as "condemned battalions," or in other words penal corps, to which were relegated all the worst and most

[1] Speech of Sir R. Ferguson, Hansard, xxxvi. 515 *sq.*, 12th May 1817.

[2] Lord Howick quoted the following statistics in 1837 (Hansard, xxxvii., 7th April 1837):

Troops in West Africa, 1825, 571 ; deaths, 441.
" " " " 1826, 471 ; " 342.

desperate characters in the Army. Occasionally a commanding officer was found who, in virtue of remarkable character and personality, could not only control these gangs of ruffians, but even make them into docile and serviceable soldiers. But naturally no good officer would have to do with a "condemned battalion," if he could help it; and the off-scourings of the Army under the sweepings of its officers made up a dismal assembly. In such regiments, where the majority of all ranks were hard livers and hard drinkers, the death-rate was bound to be high, whether they were quartered, as actually they were, at Sierra Leone, in the West Indies or at the Cape. 1816.

The nature and situation of the barracks, again, must have made a considerable difference to the mortality; but of the actual buildings it is now extremely difficult to speak. Forty years ago I rambled over most of the deserted and decaying military buildings in the Windward Islands, and can testify that the barrack-rooms were dark and low, though the barracks themselves were in most cases planted, with the forts, upon lofty headlands in the full blast of the trade wind. But these buildings were mainly of later date than 1815, and had supplanted others still worse. In any case it is certain that there was the same overcrowding as at home, and that the men were kennelled, as in England, four in each crib. How they fared during the summer in India, or even during the hurricane months in the Antilles, is almost more than the imagination dares to conjecture. It is trying, even with every modern luxury, to go through a night during the hot months in the West Indies, with the air dead still, the rain pouring down in a steady grey sheet and the thermometer standing at ninety degrees Fahrenheit. But even this was hardly the worst in torrid climates. When once the parade at or before dawn was over, the men were confined to their barracks by the sun, and had nothing to do but sit and look at each other. They had no proper clothing for the

1816. tropics, and no adequate protection against sunstroke even during the cool months in the plains—and there were no barracks then on the hills—of India. In Canada, on the contrary, they had to face a very severe winter, and to suffer hardship from extreme cold. Fur caps, gloves and moccasins were imperatively necessary for every man ; and, for his greater encouragement, the price of these articles was deducted from his pay. In Canada there was consequently much desertion. But it is small wonder if from sheer dullness, weariness and discontent soldiers on all foreign stations took refuge in drink.

Nor did they lack opportunity. In India arrack was to be purchased cheap ; and old soldiers made such a habit of priming themselves with their morning dram that they were weak, nerveless and helpless until they had drunk it. Many of them became attached to the country and, when their regiment was relieved, contrived to exchange into the relieving battalion and so to remain in India until they died, which was not as a rule at a great age. According to one group of statistics the mortality among British soldiers in the East Indies swelled from sixteen in the thousand between the ages of eighteen and twenty, to thirty-four in the thousand between twenty-two and twenty-four, and to fifty-five in the thousand between twenty-four and thirty.[1]

Evidently few British soldiers survived ten years' service in India, though as yet they had not been subjected to any terrible visitation of cholera or of bubonic plague.[2] In the West Indies, on the other hand, hardly a year passed without an epidemic, more or less severe, of yellow fever, which in those days, and indeed till very late in the nineteenth century, baffled all medical skill. The assembly of a certain number of white men in a small space seemed to make

[1] This was in the year 1837. Hansard, xci., speech of Mr. Fox-Maule, 30th March 1847.

[2] The first appearance of cholera was during the Pindari campaign, as may be read in another chapter.

a hotbed for the fostering of this terrible pestilence, 1816.
which, though it did not altogether spare the negroes, nevertheless rarely attacked them in any strength.[1] But the men were weakened in resistance to any disease by the nature of their barracks, and still more by the cheapness of rum. Confined to their rooms from nine in the morning until evening parade at four in the afternoon, with nothing to do except curse the heat and scratch their mosquito-bites into ulcers, they went out in the evening to seek their only solace. In Jamaica they could buy a quart of rum for sixpence ;[2] in the Windward Antilles the price cannot have been very different ; and in Mauritius they could get drunk for a penny. But even this would not satisfy them. Bad characters would steal into the sugar-plantations and, probably with the connivance of the slaves, make their way into the factories, and hang about them for days swilling new rum.[3] Other places, such as Gibraltar and Malta, had their own fevers and their own temptations in the form of cheap liquor. At the Cape a bottle of wine could be purchased for twopence halfpenny, and spirits at an equally reasonable rate. At St. Helena the men received a pint of wine as their ordinary ration, and another pint if they were employed on the construction of roads, which gave them, practi-

[1] I remember a slight outbreak of yellow fever among the negroes in the gaol at Barbados in 1882 ; but it died out with eight cases, two of them fatal. There were at the moment no white soldiers in the island.

[2] C.M.P., Appendix, p. 97.

[3] I witnessed the effects of new rum myself in Barbados in 1882. Owing to an epidemic of yellow fever in 1881, white troops were withdrawn from the island for some months ; and it happened that the transport, which brought out a new battalion in December 1882, was wrecked by bad navigation on the coast of the island. The troops, who were mere boys, behaved very well during a very trying night of bumping on a coral-reef, and on landing next day through the surf (another heavy trial to their nerves) were met by the negroes (who had financial reasons for rejoicing over the return of the white garrison) with unlimited supplies of new rum. The road was literally paved with these unhappy children, who lay about by scores utterly helpless. Such scenes are, of course, familiar to many living officers.

1816. cally, the chance of getting drunk at the public expense. Everywhere, in some form or other, the same trouble was to be found,—the British soldier drank to excess —and everywhere, whether through the canteens at home or through licensed wine- or spirit-shops abroad, the State showed with pride in its accounts the money that it had amassed through his intoxication.

But this was not all. The State almost drove the soldier on foreign stations to drink by the nature of the food which it compelled him to eat. The commissariat, it will be remembered, was a civil department under the control of the Treasury—that is to say, of a certain number of civilian clerks who, through no fault of their own, knew nothing of military business, and conducted their duties, after the rule of all permanent officials, in the fashion that gave them least trouble. Their representatives abroad were persons who had no duty, other than the issue of rations, to perform, and who, owing to the defects of the system, were out of touch alike with the commanding officers and with the medical officers of the military. And hence it was that, by sheer force of official routine, the troops abroad were fed chiefly upon salt meat. In St. Helena fresh provisions were never issued to the men, with the result that the mortality among them averaged rather more than one in thirty-two ; whereas the figure for their officers was but one in sixty-three. In the West Indies fresh provisions were given upon two days only in the week, and on the remaining five salt beef, unpalatable, indigestible and thirst-promoting ; and hence the mortality in the islands to Windward and to Leeward averaged over ninety deaths in every thousand soldiers. Yet in Jamaica, at any rate, there was plenty of cattle, and in the other islands, Trinidad excepted, flying fish were often to be obtained cheaply.[1] In Mauritius fresh meat was

[1] For miles round Trinidad the water is discoloured by the outflow of the Orinoco, and flying fish are unknown. In Barbados I have heard of flying fish being laid on the soil for manure after a great catch. Flying fish are, of course, excellent to eat.

actually cheaper than salted. It mattered not. The garrison none the less received salt meat every other day ; the soldier's health suffered ; and he sought consolation in rum. 1816.

The explanation of the whole matter was that the commissariat was in the hands of a department which was concerned not with men but with money. To the clerks at the Treasury rations represented not the means of keeping soldiers alive, but simply a charge of pounds, shillings and pence against the national purse. Their method, therefore, was to take the average price of provisions in all the colonies, and to charge the soldier accordingly for his subsistence. Such a system might be defended in theory by the simple expedient of ignoring human nature, but worked strikingly ill in practice. In Australia, for instance, victuals were as a rule cheap ; but the soldiers were not allowed to profit by the fact. It might have been thought that some compensation was due to them for a six months' voyage half round the world, and residence in a penal settlement ; but this was not the view of the Treasury. They were, therefore, charged from twopence to threepence above cost-price for their victuals, in order that the garrisons, say, at Grenada and St. Vincent, might cost the nation a trifle less. Not unnaturally they resented this as an injustice ; and the cherishing of a grievance is not a thing that in itself makes for sobriety, especially in a very dull environment and under such a sun as that of New South Wales during the summer months. Moreover, after one of those appalling droughts which still periodically visit Australia, the conditions were violently altered. Then provisions would rise to famine-price, and the soldier's meals were cut down from three to two, one of which was restricted to oatmeal — a change which might be tolerable by Scots, but not by English or Irish. Thus, even in one of the best climates of the British Empire means were found for making the soldier's life unbearable,

1816. and of tempting him to forget it for a time by intoxication.

Here, therefore, was this evil of drink, not confined—the fact must again be emphasised—by any means to soldiers, but more serious in them because it led to crimes against the military code which no officer could overlook—insubordination, absence without leave, selling of necessaries and, among confirmed bad characters, theft from comrades. The State, as has been shown, was responsible for very much of it, but provided, practically, only one remedy, the lash. In a previous volume mention has been made of a beginning of protests in the House of Commons against flogging in the Army ; the tone of the protestants generally implying that it was a brutal punishment, maintained, for the sake of its brutality, by that brutal set of men, the officers of the Army. Two facts were carefully ignored by these gentry : the first, that flogging was as well known to the civil as to the military law ; the second, that, as all government rests in the last resort upon physical force, so all punishment rests in the last resort upon physical pain. There can be no doubt that flogging had, in the past, been frequently carried to extremes, especially in cases where men, having borne as many lashes as they could endure at one time, were brought up to receive the rest of their sentence when their backs were barely healed. Beyond question, too, there were officers who regarded the lash as a mere matter of routine ; and there was possibly, here and there, an officer, such as Marryat has sketched for us in his novel *Frank Mildmay*, who, being by nature a brute, delighted in flogging for its own sake. But, speaking generally, officers disliked the punishment, though they shrank not from inflicting it when necessary ; and not a few held it in such abhorrence that they would allow discipline to suffer rather than resort to it. Much of course depended upon the character of the individual commander. Some colonels could

govern their regiments without the lash, though such men would not have hesitated to use it, nor to take still stronger measures, if required. St. Vincent was the sternest disciplinarian in the Navy, but used to turn the most dangerous characters in his fleet over to Collingwood, who very rarely flogged a man at all, and never gave him more than a dozen lashes. But this same Collingwood would warn a bad sailor at the outset that, if he gave trouble, he would be "headed up in a cask and thrown overboard." Though the gentlest of men and one who endeavoured to rule by gentleness, Collingwood did not trifle with indiscipline. 1816.

The first man who attempted to curb flogging within reasonable bounds was, as might have been expected from the soldier's best friend, Frederick, Duke of York. By a confidential circular, dated the 25th of March, 1812, he forbade regimental courts-martial from awarding more than three hundred lashes to any man upon any pretence whatever, though leaving District and General Courts-Martial free to inflict severer punishment. Three hundred lashes might well seem enough for ordinary purposes; but a flogging in the Army, where the cat was wielded by buglers and drummers, was a very different thing from a flogging in the Navy, where a much heavier instrument was handled by boatswain's mates, and it was not common to give more than three or four dozen lashes. But it was obvious that no number of lashes could reclaim a confirmed drunkard; and the chief value of flogging for purposes of discipline was that it lay as a menace behind all minor penalties that might fail in checking crime. Without it, nearly all officers were agreed that the government of the Army was impossible. The men did not regard it as a degradation in itself. They were not necessarily hardened, but on the contrary were frequently improved, by a flogging; and the worst experience of an offender at the halberds was not equal in severity

1816. to the punishment meted out to a thief or to an insufferably bad character by his own comrades. In such cases the offender was first tried by what was called a "company court-martial"—a phrase later changed to "barrack-room court-martial,"—and the instrument employed was a musket-sling in the infantry and a double-buckle strap in the cavalry. The culprit was not stripped, the swivel and the buckles rendering this unnecessary; but there were few, if any, that came up for sentence by company court-martial twice over.

Altogether, the life of the soldier, so far as the State alone was concerned with him, sounds almost unendurable; and so indeed it might have been but for his officers. There were some evils, such as the sale of spirits in the canteen, which officers could not stop; but there were many ways in which they could and did widen the soldier's field of interest, occupy his time and elevate his ideals. In this work the brigade of Guards seems to have taken the lead, as was no more than natural, for the colonels of the Guards enjoyed far more independent powers than those of the Line, being under the direct command of the Sovereign. Their battalions also could be said to possess some fixity of residence in the capital; and lastly, the barracks in London were about the worst and the most overcrowded in the three kingdoms. Moreover, the Guards were still privileged to draw the pay of fictitious men for their hospitals and for other purposes—a system which, for the Line, had been abolished in 1783—and they took full advantage of it. They were quartered in the very centre of British medical science; they had a free hand to do as they would with their own hospitals, and they took a pride in making those hospitals as good as they could be. In them there was, for one thing, such variety of diet as was nowhere else to be found. Interest in sick men inevitably carried with it interest in the convalescent and in the sound; and the Guards

seem to have taken the lead in providing their literate men with books to read and, by an extremely happy idea, both the literate and the illiterate with gardens to cultivate. They also attempted to establish savings-banks, though these, for some unexplained reason, were a failure. However, it is certain that the officers of the Guards were mindful of the duties, as well as of the privileges, that were attached to their high station at the head of the British infantry. 1816.

The officers of the Line worked under far greater difficulties of exile in every part of the world, at a time when the unhealthy colonies were rich, prosperous and full of temptations, and the healthy colonies so primitive and so little developed as to offer nothing but dullness and discomfort. In regiment after regiment, however, the system of giving regimental medals and badges for faithful service and good conduct was established and extended ; and the hope of reward was, as a guiding principle, substituted in some measure for the threat of punishment. It occurred, moreover, to sensible officers that much of the drinking in the evening was due to sheer exhaustion, since the men had nothing to eat between dinner of one day and breakfast of the next ; and, by the institution of suppers and of facilities for obtaining such harmless beverages as coffee, they staved off many troubles and kept their men in better health.[1] With steadier habits the men saved their money, sometimes leaving it simply in the hands of the pay-serjeant, or, when the officers could establish a savings-bank, placing it there. But the great obstacle to all permanent improvement abroad was the want of any means of recreation in the shape of fives-courts and the like ; and, whether at home or abroad, all impediments were made doubly difficult by the dispersion

[1] A general order made this third meal imperative about the year 1840. The expense was stopped from the men's pay, but they were permitted to choose their tradesmen, and one of their comrades as caterer, for themselves.

1816. of the Army in small detachments. Resources which would have been possible for a whole battalion, even of no more than six hundred men, were quite out of the question for two or three companies of perhaps fifty men apiece. Even in England single battalions were squandered over an area of one hundred and twenty miles from station to station, giving little chance for officers to do anything for the men.[1] Abroad they were at their wits' end to give their soldiers occupation. Books they could and did provide for such of their men as could read ; and one enterprising colonel formed a theatrical company from among the men of the Seventy-second Highlanders at Capetown, who threw themselves into it with great interest, played their parts remarkably well and furnished amusement for all.[2] Except in a Highland regiment the number of illiterates would probably have been too great to make such a thing practicable ; but the point is that the rank and file, as a body, were quite ready to substitute any other form of recreation for drink, so only the opportunity were afforded to them. But for such opportunity they depended wholly upon their officers, who were not rich men ; for the State carefully swept the profits of the canteens into the Public Treasury.

Let us now glance at the condition of the regimental officer at this period. During the war, of course, commissions had been scattered broadcast, but, immediately upon its conclusion, tended to revert to the class which had generally held them, namely, the younger sons of the country gentry, both lay and clerical, young men possessing, as a rule, a little, though only a little, private income of their own. Commissions were obtained, of course, by purchase, a system which in these days is condemned because it offered advancement to the wealthy and denied it to the poor. But this was in reality the least of its evils. One general officer, Sir de Lacy Evans, in 1846,

[1] C.M.P., 220. [2] C.M.P., p. 163.

denounced the purchase-system in the House of Commons as a most oppressive usury and highly dishonourable to the successive governments which had allowed it to continue. But it was more than this. It was in its essence such a game of chance as should, long before its abolition, have brought it under the purview of the Gaming Acts. To all intent an officer invested a certain sum of money, varying according to the rank purchased, in the privilege of serving the King. It was reckoned that, after deduction of the interest upon this sum, of regimental expenses and of income tax, the annual net emoluments of an Ensign of the Infantry of the Line amounted to £73 : 5 : 10 ; of a Lieutenant to £85 ; of a Captain to £108 ; of a Major (notwithstanding his senior rank) to £93 : 15s. ; and of a Lieutenant-colonel to £114.[1] Of course, an officer could sell his commission and receive his capital back ; but meanwhile he forfeited the interest upon it ; or, if his pay be regarded as interest, a lieutenant-colonel with thirty or forty years' service might be said to enjoy the salary of a bank-clerk of five-and-twenty years of age. Moreover, it was a condition essential to the sale of a commission that the holder should be alive, for, if he were so imprudent as to depart this life, he forfeited its price to the officer who was fortunate enough to step into the "death-vacancy," and who upon doing so was entitled to sell the commission immediately and to appropriate the proceeds. On the other hand, a death-vacancy signified a windfall to the man who obtained it ; and similar windfalls came also occasionally when, upon increase of establishment, an additional company or 1816.

[1] The sum was thus worked out by Fox-Maule in the Commons, 11th March 1849 (Hansard, cix. 647, *sq.*):—Pay of a Lieutenant-colonel, £365 per annum. Cost of his commission, £4540. Interest on that sum at 5 per cent = £220; add regimental expenses, £20; add income tax, £11. Total, £251. Therefore £365 − £251 = £114. The other calculations were made on the same basis.

1816. two was added to a battalion. Then the senior subaltern took command of the new company without purchase, and thereby, through no effort or merit of his own, became the richer by some hundreds of pounds. Of course the irony of fate might mulct him of his new wealth forthwith by setting death to work upon him ; and such contingencies no doubt added not a little to the excitement of a military career. The purchase-system, therefore, had its attractions for a nation of gamblers, as the English are ; but the real reason for its endurance was that it saved the nation the cost of providing retiring-allowances for officers. Parliament would never have voted the funds necessary to compensate the thousands of gentlemen who had bought commissions ; and for commissions there was a continual demand, since the old feudal prejudice, which pronounced a military career worthy and a commercial career unworthy of a gentleman, was not yet extinct. There, then, the matter rested. The taxpayer had the privilege of grumbling at military expenditure ; and the officers had the privilege of discharging a great part of that expenditure out of their own pockets, without indeed earning the slightest gratitude from the taxpayer for their self-sacrifice, but with at least the satisfaction of getting a gamble for their money. Individuals from time to time, smarting under some cruel wrong, cried out against purchase ; but they received little sympathy. The system being utterly illogical, iniquitous and indefensible, commended itself heartily to the British public.

As regards the duties imposed upon the officer in return for the magnificent salary apportioned to him by the State, the first, after obtaining a commission as ensign, was to spend from £60 to £80, or roughly speaking one year's pay, upon his outfit. If he escaped a frequent recurrence of this expenditure he was fortunate, for George the Fourth, whether as Regent or King, was above all things a tailor, and looked upon soldiers as

so many dolls to be arrayed according to his caprice. 1816.
The restored dynasty of the Bourbons in France was likewise cursed with sartorial ambitions ; and it seems probable that the Regent was not a little stimulated in the matter of dress-regulation by the rivalry of his royal neighbours across the Channel.[1] Now began the era of tight coatees and heavy shakos for the infantry of the Line, who had the good fortune to escape more lightly than their neighbours, and for the cavalry such a series of bewildering and highly expensive changes as baffles description.[2] It can only be said that as a general principle the clothing was made as tight as possible, and covered with as much gold or silver lace as possible, that the head-dresses grew steadily to be of an extravagant height with still more extravagant plumes, and that the shabracque and other adornments of the saddlery waxed more and more gorgeous.[3] But the cavalry did no foreign service except in India, and was consequently sought after by the wealthy in general, and by the recently and suddenly wealthy in particular. It was a considerable satisfaction to these latter to see their sons clad in resplendent uniforms and mounted on superb horses, outshining the sons of great county families and the owners of proud and ancient names. But the constant alteration of the Regent's fancies tried the patience even of the cavalry at times ; and, whether as Regent or as King, he left to the Army an evil legacy of costly and unpractical clothing, of which even now it has hardly shaken itself quite free.

[1] I judge of this by the many drawings of British and French uniforms of this period in the Royal Collection at Windsor Castle.

[2] Hansard, xxxiii. 93. Mr. Wynn told the Commons (7th March 1816) that in some regiments officers had been obliged to re-equip themselves not yearly but quarterly ; and, to judge from the drawings above mentioned, this was no exaggeration.

[3] An old officer of the 7th Hussars told me that he commanded a royal escort in the early years of Queen Victoria—seven miles of dusty road at a fast trot in sultry heat, which ended in a thunderstorm. His jacket, pelisse and shabracque were ruined by heavy rain, which beat the dust into the cloth, and his first charger, which had cost him £350, caught cold and died. He reckoned the cost of that escort to himself at £700.

1816. Having equipped himself with clothing, the ensign joined his regiment at home or abroad, and sometimes, at any rate, was abominably housed. In the barracks at Barbados, for instance, where the men were crowded eighty or ninety in a room, no officer, except the colonel, had a room to himself.[1] This, in the West Indies, was an evil likely to cure itself rapidly, for yellow fever was impartial in its destruction both of officers and men ; but the fact is significant. In Australia officers, according to a statement of Sir Henry Hardinge in 1844, " lived in a state of wretchedness " ; and on the Kaffir frontier in Cape Colony unfortunate subalterns were stationed in small posts from two to three hundred miles up country, without a soul to speak to. There, in fact, were repeated the old conditions, which had obtained in North America after the peace of 1763.[2] In India, where officers were more comfortable, the Treasury contrived to get the better of them by crediting the rupee to them in London as worth two shillings only, and paying it to them on the spot as worth two shillings and sixpence, thereby subjecting them to a clandestine income-tax of four shillings in the pound.[3] At home officers escaped such trying duties and extortions as are above described ; but, as has been already mentioned, they were lucky if they spent five years out of every fifteen in the British Isles ; and, unless they actually went abroad with their regiments, they had to make the best bargain that they could for the cost of their passage, for there was no regulation laid down as to passage-allowances until 1842. Even at home married officers were, for some reason, placed at a pecuniary disadvantage. In barracks officers received an allowance for coals and candles ; but, if they lived in lodgings, this privilege was cut off.[4] It does not appear that

[1] Hansard, vol. ciii., Lord Drumlanrig in speech on Army Estimates, 19th March 1849.

[2] See Vol. III. of this History, p. 13.

[3] Howick's speech in Hansard, vol. lii., 9th March 1840.

[4] Hansard, lxxii. 556 *sq.*, Capt. Layard's speech, 4th March 1844.

there was any official disposition to discourage matri- 1816.
mony in officers, which, indeed, would have been a most dangerous policy ; nor can it be supposed (though the official mind is inscrutable) that the possession of a wife and children could, theoretically, enable a military gentleman to dispense with light and warmth. This rule, therefore, can only be traced to the usual source of absurd and iniquitous regulations — the natural craving of clerks to save themselves trouble.

So far for the hardships inflicted upon officers by the State. It is now only fair to mention the small benefits which, in compensation, the State vouchsafed to them, more especially as these were, in the course of the period before us, called in question by economists in the House of Commons. The first in order is the Guards' mess at St. James's Palace, for which was voted an annual sum of £6000. It need hardly be said that the Guards were a favourite butt of the enthusiasts for retrenchment, who loved to represent them as idle, pampered minions of the Court and an unprofitable expense to the country. As a matter of fact, considering the many calls upon them and the fact that they had to house themselves at their own cost, they were far worse off, in the matter of salary, than the officers of the Line. The pay of the subalterns of the seven battalions of Guards, say one hundred and fifty officers, amounted to £18,000 annually, which sum hardly sufficed to pay for their lodgings.[1] It was natural, however, that such an apparent luxury as the mess at St. James's should be attacked,

[1] Captain Lindsay on 28th March 1851 (Hansard, cxv. 808-9) gave the House of Commons the following table of the *net* pay of officers of the Guards and Line, after deduction of all allowances and necessary expenses, and of interest on the cost of commissions.

	Guards.	Line.
Lieut.-colonel	£38 3 9	£83 5 0
Captain	42 17 6	121 7 11
Lieutenant	31 6 8	83 12 6
Ensign	40 7 6	73 6 3

See also Sir H. Hardinge's speech in the Commons, 1st May 1822, Hansard, vi. 1181.

1816. though the unwary assailants could hardly have looked for the facts by which they were overthrown. It seems that originally captains in the Guards enjoyed the privilege of hiring out a certain number of their men to work for civilians ; and the proceeds of this fund, known as "outlyer's money," was devoted to the maintenance of the mess. When this source of emolument was withdrawn, the State paid for the mess in compensation to the officers ; so that the annual vote for its maintenance—£8000 in 1793, and £6000 in 1816—was not an act of grace but the discharge of an obligation. It was explained further that, if the subalterns of the Guards had been entitled to the same allowances as their brethren of the Line, their annual cost would have been not £18,000 but £30,000, a difference which was but very imperfectly made good by the grant of £6000 for the mess at St. James's.

It now remains, therefore, to expound the origin of the privilege which gave such advantage to the officers of the Line. By some chance it came to the knowledge of the Prince Regent that not a few officers, having no income but their pay, were obliged to deny themselves wine altogether and to content themselves with water at mess. "It was painful," we are told, "to see them pass the bottle" ; and the Prince was harrowed to the soul by this dismal picture, for it is fair to say that, whatever his failings, passing the bottle had never been one of them. He, therefore, suggested that the pay of the officers should be increased ; but, yielding to advice, he consented to make them such a moderate allowance as would enable them to drink at any rate two or three glasses. This concession became, therefore, known as the Prince Regent's allowance, and was continued in substance, though under another name, at any rate until 1914.[1]

Unfortunately, officers who possessed the means did not always confine themselves to these mild potations, and set anything but a good example to their

[1] Hansard, xxi., 3rd March 1834, speech of Colonel Wood.

men in the matter of sobriety. They must not, 1816.
however, be judged too hardly upon that account, for in drinking hard they simply followed the habit of their class, even as did the soldiers. The atmosphere of the House of Commons itself was always vinous after the dinner-hour ; and many a civil magistrate, who sat in judgment on the drunk and disorderly, hardly knew what it was to go to bed quite sober. As to the pursuits and general conduct of the officers, everything no doubt depended upon the tone of their regiments, and upon the quiet influence exercised by their superiors in command. It is likely enough that the general bent of the juvenile among them was not intellectual, and that their thoughts were occupied not a little with sport, horseflesh and women ; but this is only to say that they were young and English. Sometimes they varied the monotony by quarrelling and fighting duels, generally after some foolish controversy over their cups. But none the less, as we have seen, they did look after their men, and they also took pride in their profession ; and this, considering all the circumstances, was very greatly to their credit. Let it be remembered once more that, whether at home or abroad, they were scattered far and wide with a handful of soldiers under them, that even in England it might cost a commanding officer a week's hard riding to visit all the detachments of his battalion or his regiment, that a battalion field-day was a rarity, and such a thing as a brigade field-day (except for a short period in the Army of occupation in France) almost unheard of. Small blame to them if, to relieve the dullness of routine at home, they left their duty very much in the hands of their non-commissioned officers, and enjoyed the hospitality of the country-houses all round them. Small blame to the poor lads, imprisoned with seventy to one hundred and twenty soldiers in some tiny West Indian island, if they spent most of their time in the comfortable houses of the planters, playing whist and drinking rum-punch in the verandah.

1816. There they could not find books in any number, so that they could not read much even if they would. They had nothing to do, and nothing to look forward to except a hot morrow to each hot day, and the coming of "yellow jack" with the hurricane season, in preparation for which event measurements had already been taken for his coffin.[1]

If a regimental officer lived, there were three courses before him, to sell his commission, to retire upon half-pay, or to rise to be a general. Of the first of these enough has been said. As to half-pay, which was a retaining fee for future service, there was likely to be trouble, looking to the vast number of officers for whom no employment could be found after the peace. Parliament disliked paying for soldiers of any description, and grudged in particular the cost of officers who, through no fault of their own, did nothing for their pittance; for the half-pay of officers who had served at Waterloo was precisely the same as of those who had served at Blenheim. An officer of thirty years' service, whose pay was £600 a year, received £146 annually on retirement. A civilian clerk of the same standing and salary received £450. As to promotion, it was almost hopeless for those who could

[1] The author's maternal grandfather served as a subaltern at Jamaica in the first years of the nineteenth century, and used to tell a story that when he landed he saw a mysterious individual with a long wand, who looked at him up and down with extreme attention and seemed particularly interested in his height and build. He discovered that this was an undertaker, who was resolved not to be taken unawares, for burial of course must follow death very speedily in the tropics. It is almost painful to record that in this instance the undertaker's enterprise was unrewarded. The officer duly caught yellow fever, but with strange want of tact recovered from it. There is a curious, crude aquatint plate, published in October 1800, which sets forth in twenty-one scenes the career of "Johnny Newcome" in Jamaica. Nine of these scenes are devoted to his sickness and death through yellow fever. There is nothing military in any of them, but "Johnny Newcome" was the accepted name for a newly joined officer, and the artist signs himself "A. J. [Ensign Abraham Jones], 67th Regt."

not afford to purchase, and in the Artillery, where promotion depended upon seniority, most hopeless of all. In 1836 a captain of Artillery who had served in that rank in every battle of the Peninsular War was still a captain ; and Sir George Wood, who had been in supreme command of the Artillery at Waterloo, was twenty-one years after the battle only a major in the Royal Regiment. The average term of service required to reach the rank of first captain was forty years ; and there was more than one colonel whose age exceeded eighty. Moreover, officers of the Artillery and Engineers were ineligible for appointment on the General Staff. In the Navy the state of things was very similar. Midshipmen of ten years' service received £50 a year if they had the luck to serve at sea, and, if they were not so fortunate, no pay at all. There was even a case of a midshipman of twenty-five years' meritorious service who was married and a grandfather. But in the Army at least a brevet every six years helped to break the stagnation of advancement, though, as a matter of fact, a lieutenant-colonel, upon becoming a major-general, as a rule found himself worse off pecuniarily than before.[1] 1816.

The explanation of this singular fact is that until 1814 a general received no pay as such unless a special establishment were voted for one or more generals on active service, or on some other special duty, or on the staff at home or abroad. Organisation of the Army as an army did not really exist in time of peace ; but there were a number of regiments which, at a pinch, might be combined into an army. The regiment was everything ; and, excepting a small vote for what were called Guards and Garrisons, that is to say for fortresses, actual or obsolete, in England, all other ordinary expenses were presented as the pay of regimental officers and men. Hence the device of disguising allowances for sundry regimental requirements under the form of pay for fictitious men, who appear

[1] Hansard, xxxiii., Debate of military and naval promotion, 1836.

1816. on the muster-rolls as John Doe, Richard Roe and Peter Squib ; and hence once more such perquisites as "outlyer's money" to the captains of the Guards to meet certain special expenses. In such a system there was no room for paying general officers as such, and, in fact, it was common for a general to continue on the muster-rolls of his regiment as a major or even as a captain, and, though he did no regimental duty and a supernumerary officer was appointed to do it for him, to draw the pay of that rank and no more.[1] There were, however, two ways by which a general might gain greater emolument than was assigned to him by his regimental rank, namely by appointment to the colonelcy of a regiment, which entitled him to make a profit (if he could) out of the clothing of the men, or to the governorship of a fortress on the establishment of Guards and Garrisons, aforesaid, or to the governorship of a colony. But the number of these colonelcies and governorships was limited, whereas that of the generals had enormously increased during the war. There was no prospect, therefore, of providing for them ; and accordingly the Duke of York in August 1814 obtained the issue of a warrant providing a special rate of pay for the three grades of general officers, in lieu of the full pay or half-pay that they might receive in virtue of their regimental commissions. This was termed "unattached pay," and amounted in the case of a general to £693 : 10s. ; of a lieutenant-general to £593 : 3 : 4 ; and of a major-general to £456 : 5s. annually. These sums fell considerably short of the emoluments of a colonel of a regiment, which were valued at £1000 a year, but must have been very welcome to twenty-nine generals who at that date were drawing only the half-pay of major, and sixty-six who were drawing the half-pay of captain.[2]

So new and unusual a provision at once fell into

[1] Yet there is an instance in the eighteenth century of a major-general going on guard at the Tylt.

[2] Clode, *Military Forces of the Crown*, i. 374.

disfavour with the House of Commons, which complained of the expense ; and in 1818 the unattached list of generals was restricted to one hundred and twenty. In that year there were already sixteen generals whose sole remuneration was their regimental pay ; and, as the number receiving unattached pay exceeded three hundred and twenty, the prospects of the sixteen were not very bright. But even in the most favourable circumstances a general, under the purchase-system, was almost bound to lose money by his service. Officers of the Guards, thanks to their double rank, were most advantageously placed ; but it is not difficult to calculate that a lieutenant-colonel of the Guards, who paid £12,000 for his commission, commanded his regiment for twenty years for the magnificent sum of £38 : 3 : 9, as his annual net receipts, and finally, by great good luck came in for a colonelcy worth £1000 a year, might, financially, have done far better for himself. The truth is that the pay of the superior officers of the Army, with a few exceptions, was shamefully low. Since 1792 the salaries of all civil officials had been substantially increased, and rightly so, for the purchasing value of money had since then declined by one-half ; but those of the higher officers of the Army remained, like the half-pay, at the level of 1714. For the moment the army of occupation in France found employment for seventeen generals, and the colonies for nineteen ; but it was only a question of three or four years before that army should be withdrawn and the generals thrown upon the world. In the colonies likewise the coming of peace signified that two out of three generals would necessarily lose their appointments, though not a few would remain as governors or lieutenant-governors, and, receiving no staff-pay as such, would so far relieve strictly military expenditure. But the country cared for none of these things. 1816.

There remain to be considered such new creations of the late war as the Royal Waggon-train, the Royal

1816. Staff Corps, and the department of the Commissariat under the Treasury. Anything of the nature of a transport-corps was always sure to provoke hostile criticism in the Commons ; but Wellington insisted on keeping five troops of the Waggon-train with the Army of Occupation ; and therefore for the present it was safe. The Waggon-train had worked as an ambulance-corps incessantly for sixty hours after Waterloo, and this fact was sufficient to justify its existence, as well as a hope that it might be retained as a nucleus for expansion in time of need. The Staff Corps, the darling of the Quartermaster-general, was not likely to find favour with politicians. Composed entirely of artificers with highly skilled officers, it was in the main a training corps, and the nearest approach to a staff-college that was to be found in the service. But it was a novelty, neither horse, foot nor artillery, introduced for the direct purposes of war, and therefore, according to the civilian's logic, a mere excrescence in time of peace.

As to the Commissariat, the coming of peace tended to throw all power back into the hands of the Treasury clerks, and to allow the training and experience of commissaries, who had seen actual service, to go for nothing. Some of the results of this system have already been seen.

Respecting medical officers, veterinary officers, paymasters and quartermasters, there was every prospect that the service would soon be swamped by a number of useless and worn-out old men, for their retiring allowances were so wretched that they were practically bound to remain at their posts, efficient or inefficient, until they died.

With regard to the chaplains, the extreme subdivision of the Army into tiny detachments practically compelled the employment of local clergy, who knew nothing of the men. These, being called upon to perform nothing beyond a certain routine of prayer-reading for a miserable fee, naturally, in the majority

of cases, treated their charge, so far as possible, as a sinecure. Nor were they wholly without excuse, for their surroundings did not always aid them in the performance of their office. In London, for instance, divine service for some of the Guards was held in the cook-houses, while cooking was actually in process ; and the chaplain had to dispute the attention of his audience with the bubbling eloquence of the copper. Nevertheless, occasionally a chaplain was found who, for the sum of £18 a year, would throw his whole soul into the work of ministering to the sick soldiers and reclaiming the bad, and received in rich measure the only reward that he sought.[1] The Anglican Church, let men decry it as they will, is never without its saints. 1816.

Next, a word must be said as to the Militia and the Volunteers. For the present the ballot was regularly held for the Militia ; but the battalions were not, as a rule, embodied, with the result that a good deal of inconvenience and expense was incurred for no greater object than obtaining long lists of names upon a sheet of paper. The force was in fact doomed to death, and already speeding towards dissolution. The Volunteers, who were practically synonymous with the Volunteer Cavalry, better known as the Yeomanry, were on the contrary full of life and vigour, less as complete regiments than as troops and squadrons of tenant-farmers and their sons, acting under the command of their landlords and their landlords' sons for the preservation of internal order. Little though the fact is recognised, England owed much to the Yeomanry during the first trying years of the peace.

Lastly, the Duke of York happily remained in his old position as Commander-in-chief, though with administrative difficulties which became constantly more acute, owing to the number of other departments with which his duties were concerned. Apart from the

[1] Hansard, xci. 697, 12th April 1847 ; C.M.P., pp. 213-214.

1816. Master-general of the Ordnance, who was a kind of second Commander-in-chief over the Engineers and the Artillery, he had to do with the Home Department in respect of Militia, Volunteers, and even of regulars, when employed in aid of the civil power; with the Treasury in the matter of feeding the troops; with the Judge Advocate concerning questions of discipline; and with the Colonial department regarding many details of foreign garrisons. All of these were independent offices which transacted the particular business that came under their purview without reference to any central authority, and only in the last resort communicated their proceedings to the Secretary at War, who was the Commander-in-chief's representative in the Commons. In such circumstances the position of the Commander-in-chief became extremely trying. He was liable to constant attacks upon questions of detail in Parliament and knew not to whom to entrust his defence. Indeed a less capable man than the Duke would probably have lost his hold upon the Army, so eager were the politicians to encroach upon his authority. But no one could question his ability, his industry, or his public spirit. No one could dispute that the military forces of the country, when he first took them over, were confounded and corrupted by the jobs of politicians and the reckless experiments of civil empirics. It was he who had reduced chaos to order, restored discipline and, with discipline, confidence, and made the British Army the most efficient in the world. And he was still in his place at the Horse Guards with a staff which, thanks to his sound judgment of men, seemed, despite of all change of persons, never to lose ground in ability; diligent and painstaking as ever; always mindful that he was a servant as well as a master; and working as loyally for Ministers as for subalterns, officers and private soldiers. It must never be forgotten, in the troublous years that now lie before us, that the Duke of York, even though his name may

but seldom come forward, was, while he lived, an unassailable tower of strength to the Army, and that not in virtue of his exalted birth but of honest, patriotic service rendered, and of the trust that was reposed in him by all ranks from the private to the general. 1816.

Note to page 16.—I find that football was played in the Army in 1815, though apparently by the Guards only. See Lord Broughton's *Recollections of a Long Life* (London, 1909), i. 237:—"April 6, 1815. Arrived at Enghien. We walked to a neighbouring meadow, in which the grenadiers of a battalion of Guards stationed at Enghien were playing football. My brother [Captain Hobhouse of the 69th, killed two months later at Quatre Bras] observed that soldiers of the line never amused themselves in this way."

CHAPTER II

1816. However long the duration of hostilities, however deep the disturbance of normal conditions through a protracted state of war, the great majority of people always expect the blessings of peace to descend upon them by magic immediately after the signature of the necessary treaties. So it was in 1816. First the merchants, forgetting that the continent of Europe was to the last degree impoverished, flooded it with colonial produce of every description which no one could afford to buy. Next, the manufacturers tried the same experiment, with the same result ; while, as was inevitable in the circumstances, thousands were thrown out of work in England by the sudden stop in the production of warlike stores. Lastly, in spite of the protection afforded by the sliding scale of 1815, the price of grain fell between 1813 and 1816 by one-third to one-half ; and agriculture likewise was threatened with ruin. A miserable harvest in 1816 did not mend matters, for, though the importation of grain averted a famine, the profit went to the merchants and not to the farmers, who had lost their crops. There was universal distress, which in the manufacturing districts found vent in dangerous riots. These were repressed with a strong hand, for, whatever the faults of Liverpool's administration, weakness in the maintenance of order was not one of them. But to discover a remedy for the existing depression was not so easy. Parliament, which was not then an impotent registrar of Ministerial decrees, but, albeit unreformed, far

more independent in its opinions and formidable in its criticism than at present, did its best to probe the evil to the bottom, but in vain. The Whigs, who had been out of office for years and were casting about for some means of regaining it, were quite sure that Parliamentary reform was the true remedy. But, as they had not taken the trouble to think out what they meant by Parliamentary reform—for indeed the words signified nothing to them but such a measure as would restore their own particular clique of country gentlemen to place and power—this was not very helpful. Advanced thinkers, already known by the name of radicals, who had far clearer ideas on the subject, were also convinced that salvation was to be found in an extension of the franchise. Both were agreed that retrenchment in expenditure and reduction of taxation were imperative ; and, so far as taxation was concerned, they triumphantly carried the abolition of the income-tax, then standing at two shillings in the pound, in the teeth of Castlereagh himself. Ministers accepted their defeat and revised their estimates ; and the next battle took place over the retrenchment of expenditure. 1816.

It was natural, and indeed right, that the chief attack should be made upon military disbursements ; but there were not a few petitions and speeches in the Commons which showed a very jealous and unfriendly spirit towards the Army. It seems hardly credible in these days that the formation of the United Service Club should have been held up to Parliament as a national danger, likely to foster the military spirit and the professional pride of officers to the peril of the State. It was, of course, represented as a mischievous novelty ; but in reality, as was pointed out by a military member, military clubs dated from the days of William the Third. There had been a Flanders Club at that time, then a German Club, evidently of officers who had served under Ferdinand of Brunswick, then a new Flanders Club, recalling the

1816. days of Cumberland and Ligonier, then an American Club, then a Peninsular Club and an Irish Staff Club. Lord Lynedoch, better known to us as Sir Thomas Graham of Barrosa, had taken the whole of these bodies in hand and united them into a single club. The original idea had been that they should meet at dinner once a month; but this had been developed into the establishment of a permanent institution to which officers both of the Army and Navy could resort when in London, and where, to use the homely language of the time, "they could find a cheap ordinary."[1] This perfectly innocent and indeed meritorious design was none the less perverted into a military conspiracy.

Other objections brought forward at the same time in the Commons were the affectation of military dress, and the regulation of traffic in the streets by soldiers. The Prince Regent, it was complained, always wore military uniform for levees and on state occasions, a practice unknown to his father. The explanation, of course, was that a gentleman's best clothes in 1760 were far more costly in material than military uniform, and might be far more striking in colour; whereas in 1815 male attire had already begun to be simple and of sober hue.[2] But it seems that the Regent's levees at Carleton House were attended by many more folks than his father's had been, and that some measure for preventing confusion in the streets was absolutely necessary. Since there was no police, only soldiers could be employed to carry out this duty; and the

[1] The Guards' Club, as I have been told by veterans who remembered its original foundation, was formed for precisely the same reason—to enable officers to obtain a cheap meal. The original charge for luncheon, viz. as much bread, cold beef and beer as a member cared to consume, was sixpence.

[2] One set of George III.'s best buttons is still preserved at Windsor Castle. They are of dark blue enamel on a gold base, with a rim of pearls. Those of Count Brühl (the famous dandy who had 365 suits of clothes), which are (or used to be) shown in the Grüne Gewölbe at Dresden, are still more gorgeous.

incident was not absolutely new, for troops had been employed to guard the avenues to Westminster Hall during the trial of Warren Hastings. Not a word was said against the bearing of the soldiers. They had been perfectly civil and respectful ; but they had given certain noble lords to understand that they had orders not to let them pass, and that pass their lordships should not. And this fact had struck the said noble lords with not a little astonishment and dismay, for, though they had been accustomed to rail in their superior way at all things military in Parliament, they found suddenly that they had to obey a simple private of the Guards, who would enter into no debate but quietly pleaded his orders, without undue parade of a fixed bayonet. The truth, of course, was that the traffic in the streets of London already called loudly for proper regulation, and that the days when the Army should carry out the domestic police of the capital were numbered. 1816.

Another matter which gave offence was that officers, themselves in plain clothes, had been seen riding about London attended by an orderly dragoon in uniform.[1] Whether this were, from the military point of view, an irregularity or not, it is impossible, in the absence of further details, to say. General Blakeney, the hero of Minorca, had, as we know, gone to Court in a hackney coach with a private soldier standing, in lieu of a liveried footman, behind it ; and this, though sneered at, had not been condemned. But that an officer should be followed in the streets of London, not by a liveried groom, but by an orderly hussar, was construed as an attempt to overawe the King's peaceful subjects by sheer

[1] A generation has arisen which has never seen gentlemen riding about London to fulfil their political and social avocations, always attended by a mounted groom who held his master's horse when he entered a house. The last to stick to this old habit were, the author believes, his father and General Lord Mark Kerr ; but even they were driven off the streets by 1890 or shortly after, owing to the press of traffic and the dangers of the slippery wooden pavement.

1816. military arrogance and wanton display of force. It is strange how ready men are to write themselves down fools in the pages of Hansard's Parliamentary Debates.[1]

These trifles give some indication of the spirit in which some politicians, at any rate, were prepared to discuss the military estimates. These, as was to be expected at the close of a great war, were unquestionably high. They provided, in 1816, for the maintenance of some two hundred and twenty-five thousand rank and file, thirty-five thousand of which were paid by France, being the army of occupation, and the like number by India. According to the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer,[2] Canada and the Bahamas accounted for ten thousand men, the West Indies for thirteen thousand, the Cape, Mauritius and Ceylon for three thousand each, and the Mediterranean garrisons for eleven thousand, making in all forty-three thousand for the colonies, which, added to twenty-five thousand for Great Britain and thirty-five thousand for Ireland, made up a rough total of one hundred thousand, exclusive of France and India. Large reductions were promised within the next twelve months ; but none the less the debates on the Army Estimates lasted through ten nights. All the old commonplaces which had been employed in denunciation of standing armies since the peace of Utrecht were brought forward for the ten thousandth time ; and it was a favourite device with the opposition for the next thirty or forty years to contrast the estimates

[1] Hansard, xxxii. 930-939, 965-970, 1816.

[2] I have always my doubts as to the correctness of the figures given in Hansard's reports of debates on Army estimates, and in this instance there are serious discrepancies in the estimates as printed in Hansard and in the Commons Journals. Thus Vansittart set down the garrison of Ireland as 25,000 men, whereas Peel declared that since 1811 it had been 35,000 men. Moreover, in those days the artillery and engineers were included in the Ordnance Estimates, of which the ordinary historian takes no account. See Hansard, xxxii. 385 *sq.*, 922 *sq.*, 1816.

of 1792, at the beginning of the war, with those of 1816. 1816 at its close. It was vain to remonstrate that since 1792 the pay of the private soldier had been doubled—an increase which, it may here be mentioned, had no parallel since the Black Death.[1] It was futile to point out that a new empire had been won, that the tropical colonies were inadequately garrisoned, that the extra work thus thrown upon the men was a constant source of sickness and of death, and that, if the establishment at home were lowered, the foreign garrisons could not be relieved. Not even the plea that pensions and compassionate allowances to the maimed and bereaved helped largely to swell the expenditure could appeal to the malcontents. They reprehended the strength of the Army in Ireland, and provoked an answer from Robert Peel that a large force was necessary, first to prevent illicit distillation of spirits, and, secondly, to aid the civil power. "Surely," he said, "the midnight murderer and incendiary should be checked. The gentry in Ireland could not reside on their estates unless they were secure." The time was not yet ripe for entrusting the fate of Ireland to gangs of banditti.

Then the critics fell upon the Royal Military College, where one-third of the students were the sons of officers killed in action, alleging that such an education would encourage them to that military spirit which every good Englishman abhorred. Then they complained of the uselessness of the Waggon-train, which was resolutely defended by Palmerston. Brougham, seeking what he conceived to be a surer way of reducing expenditure, actually protested against keeping Malta, the Ionian Islands, and the Dutch colonies, namely, Demerara, the Cape and Ceylon. When a man of Brougham's very great ability could thus ignore the very existence of India, it is not difficult to imagine the nonsense that was

[1] The archers' wages at Agincourt (1415) were double of those at Crecy (1346).

1816. talked by the stupider politicians. Nevertheless, whatever our opinion of their intellects, their motives must not be too harshly judged; for the distress in the country was cruel. There were no markets for merchants and manufacturers abroad, for no one there had any money; and there were equally no markets for them at home, for farmers could pay neither their rents to their landlords not their wages to their workmen. Small wonder if members of Parliament, faithfully reflecting the general opinion of the country, raised their bristles and flew upon military expenditure as hounds upon a fox. Moreover, they did good, for they warned the military authorities to set their house in order, and to think out the means of securing the best possible administration for the smallest possible outlay.

1817. In 1817, for the first time, the estimates showed the numbers of the establishment not as rank and file, which signified corporals and privates only, but as including all ranks. Thus the convenient fiction, which had enabled the War Office for more than a century and a half to understate the strength of the Army by one-eighth, was finally abolished. Upon the whole, Palmerston announced a reduction of forty thousand men as compared with 1816, and of two hundred and twenty thousand men (including eighty thousand militia) since the end of 1814. The Artillery and Engineers, which at the height of the war had numbered over thirty thousand, were brought down to fewer than ten thousand. Moreover, the disbandment of certain foreign corps, enlisted for service in the West Indies, was also promised, which would reduce expense still further. None the less the old clamour against the excessive strength of the Army was continued, and called forth a vigorous protest from Castlereagh. Despite of all that might appear on paper, he averred that, after deducting three thousand men for relief of foreign garrisons, there remained in England only sixteen thousand

effective soldiers. The country, in fact, depended 1817.
on the Yeomanry, thirty-five thousand strong in the United Kingdom, at a time of dangerous discontent and turmoil ; and it was pointed out that long foreign service in bad climates drove soldiers to despair, drink and crime, and that crime, in its turn, led to flogging, against which more than one voice had already been raised in the Commons. But it was difficult to make members realise that they themselves, by constantly cutting down the numbers of the Army, were responsible for much of the evil which they condemned. Nor did they consider for a moment that the disbandment of soldiers by tens of thousands, at a time of unparalleled depression in trade and agriculture, must serve only to swell the number of wageless, masterless, hopeless men.

By 1818 the whole of the second battalions, formed 1818.
during the course of the war for regiments of the Line, had disappeared, though the Sixtieth still retained four battalions, and the Rifle Brigade three ; and Palmerston promised a further reduction of the Army by twenty-two thousand men. In that year, moreover, the army of occupation was withdrawn from France, not a little through the good offices of Wellington, who, though he had everything to gain in importance and emolument from prolongation of his high appointment in supreme command, worked indefatigably to bring it to an early end. Beyond doubt, he agreed with Castlereagh that to weaken France to excess would be to throw overwhelming power into the hands of Russia. Beyond doubt, it was as much policy as humanity which made him visit all excesses of his troops upon the French civil population with extreme severity, alike when invading France from the south in 1813 and from the north in 1815. But apart from that it seems to me that he felt real sympathy with France and honest admiration and respect for her greatness ; and an eminent French historian of our own time has testified that Wellington, in his

1818. dealings with France between 1815 and 1818, showed not merely wisdom but generosity.[1]

For the rest, the story of the British army of occupation need not detain us. Wellington and Harry Smith each kept a pack of hounds, dividing the country about Cambrai between them, and the officers hunted and coursed and rode races and steeplechases, according to their wont. They were not unfrequently embroiled with French officers, so often indeed that Wellington lamented the ignorance of fencing which compelled them to resort to the pistol as a duelling weapon.[2] Occasionally, too, they and their men were oppressive towards the people upon whom they were quartered; and then Wellington swooped down upon them in all his wrath. "We are Englishmen," he said, "and pride ourselves upon our deportment; and that pride shall not be injured in my keeping." Towards offences committed in the region of his own head-quarters at Cambrai he was specially merciless; for he felt that there he must make precedents for the guidance of all the contingents under his command. Although he was equally exacting towards the French authorities, when Frenchmen were in the wrong, this severity made him not altogether popular with his troops; yet still he was inexorable. The French undoubtedly had shown extreme arrogance in the countries which they had conquered; the Prussians did their best to rival them; and Wellington wished the British to present themselves in favourable contrast to both. As usual he had his will. In his farewell order to the troops of all nations, he reserved his notice of the British contingent to the last, and then thanked all ranks for their "uniform good conduct," and the officers particularly and specially for "the example they have given to others by their own good conduct, and for the support and assistance they

[1] Sorel, *L'Europe et la Révolution Française*, viii. 492.
[2] *Supp. Desp.* xii. 141.

have invariably afforded him to maintain the discipline of the Army." [1] 1818.

From the year 1819, therefore, the military position of the country tended to revert to the normal; but meanwhile there had been little or no permanent diminution of the general distress of 1816; and exceptional legislation was necessary in 1817 to check not merely local riots but a widespread movement of general insurrection. In Ireland also agrarian crime was so rife as to demand a special measure which, as establishing a new principle, is of the first importance to military history. This was the formation of an armed police which could be used by the Lord Lieutenant, either in large or in small detachments, for the preservation of peace and the maintenance of order. Robert Peel, the Chief Secretary for Ireland, was the author of its being, and by a happy masterpiece of tact selected green as the colour of its uniform. Thus came into being the germ of the force which for nearly a century was known as the Royal Irish Constabulary; and thus began the deliverance of the Army from the irksome and demoralising duties which had quite destroyed one regiment of cavalry, nearly ruined four more, and had been the root of the evils which Abercromby had denounced in his famous general order of the 26th of February 1798.[2] Even in 1816, as Peel told the House of Commons, the troops in Ireland were not merely distributed among four hundred and forty-one different stations, signifying as many small detachments, but from these again there were detached wandering parties to the number, during 1815, of nearly nineteen hundred. It is difficult to conceive how commanding officers, under such conditions, could have kept their regiments well disciplined and efficient.[3] 1819.

[1] *Supp. Desp.* xii. 826; *Autobiography of Sir Harry Smith*, i. 301-308.

[2] See Vol. IV. of this History, p. 573.

[3] Hansard, xxxii. 922, 1816.

1819. In 1819 the special corps, known by various names, which were kept for service in the West Indies, were finally disbanded, as also were two battalions of the Sixtieth ; and with them disappeared, practically, the last of the many foreigners enlisted during the great war in the British service. Two West Indian negro regiments were likewise broken ; and thus the burden of the West Indian garrisons tended to fall with more of its old weight upon the infantry of the Line. That infantry had by this time no regiment of higher number than ninety-three, though the old Ninety-fifth, since 1816 created the Rifle Brigade, two battalions strong, formed the extreme left of the order of battle. In the cavalry the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Light Dragoons still lingered on, though with small hope of survival. Altogether the establishment of the Army in this year was almost exactly one hundred and seven thousand cavalry and infantry of all ranks, one thousand engineers, sappers and miners, and five thousand artillery, including the corps of drivers. The Royal Waggon-train sustained a precarious existence with a strength of one hundred and twenty ; and the Infantry Staff Corps—that is to say, the Quartermaster-general's engineers as distinguished from those of the Master-general of the Ordnance—still kept nearly five hundred of all ranks. It was only in the teeth of bitter opposition that this establishment was voted by the Commons ; but in truth it was far too small. To check smuggling, the greater number of the troops at home were constantly employed on the coast ; and, as Lord Bathurst sarcastically remarked, when the force employed on preventive duty and for the protection of the dockyards was deducted, there remained only four thousand "for the enslavement of London."[1]

It soon appeared the Army was far too weak for the multifarious services required of it in these times. Whether through premature resumption of cash-payments or from what cause soever, prosperity, which

[1] Hansard, xxxvii., March 13, 1818.

had seemed to be returning at the end of 1818 and the beginning of 1819, suddenly gave place to renewed distress. Prices, within six months, declined by one-half; imports and exports fell; bankruptcies were multiplied; and the waged class, hungry and desperate, broke into furious rioting. Political agitators quickly came forward to take the lead of them, and to assure them that vote by ballot, universal suffrage and the like nostrums alone could heal the mischief; and thence-forward Parliamentary reform ceased to be a mere catchword of Whigs, weary of sitting in opposition, but a popular cry of steadily increasing volume. The temper of the nation was certainly menacing, not without reason, and it found vent in repeated acts of violence. Troops were in request in all quarters of Great Britain, and the Commander-in-chief had not a single battalion to spare. The government, therefore, called up eleven thousand pensioners, who were formed into ten battalions; while Yeomanry and Volunteer Corps were augmented or newly raised all over the kingdom. It seems in fact to be no more than the truth that, but for the Yeomanry, the trouble would have been very serious indeed; but the Yeomanry did its duty when ordered; the magistrates were not afraid to give them orders; and above all Ministers were not afraid to back the magistrates. There was of course wild clamour over the so-called massacre of innocent folk at Peterloo and elsewhere; and it may be that the repression of disorder was sometimes carried out with excessive sternness, though the howl of a baffled mob should never be accepted, without support, as evidence of the fact. Moreover, disorder, was of course only a symptom of deeper underlying mischief; and a physician who treats symptoms only, without care for the disease that declares itself through them, is rightly condemned. Force, we are told, is no remedy; but even if the aphorism be true, which is more than doubtful, there can be no question that popular violence is the worst form of force, and the

1819.

1819. least likely to prove of any remedial value. In any case Ministers dealt with the troubles in a masterful spirit. They passed the famous Six Acts to suppress revolutionary literature, seditious meetings and revolutionary training in arms, and they showed that they were ready to enforce them. In other words, the government governed, at a time when the slightest weakness might have proved fatal to the country, with resolution and without fear; and, whatever its mistakes, it deserves thanks for having had the courage to do its duty. "Here we go," said Lord Sidmouth, the Home Secretary, as he walked arm in arm with Castlereagh through the hootings of the mob along Parliament Street. "Here we go, the two most popular men in England." "Yes," said Castlereagh, "through a grateful and admiring multitude."[1] Every day they were greeted with the like amenities, and every day brought threatening letters and menaces of assassination; but they went their own way, quite content to bear the blame for the evils which, through no fault of theirs, had sprung from twenty-three years of war, but quite determined to uphold law and order whether they lived or died.

1820. As a matter of fact Ministers narrowly escaped destruction in a body in the spring of 1820 through the conspiracy of Thistlewood; and having survived that peril they were nearly wrecked, politically, by the open revival of a long-standing quarrel between two singularly worthless individuals. In January the old King died; and the Regent took his place upon the throne as King George the Fourth. Therewith his wife, who had lived abroad since 1815, returned to claim her rights as Queen of England. The King refused to grant them. All attempts at a compromise failed; and Ministers, standing by the King, brought in a bill of pains and penalties to uphold his will. Thereupon the Opposition at once espoused the cause of the Queen, and the whole mass of the discontented

[1] *Life of Lord Sidmouth*, iii. 330, 333.

joined them. The nation was divided into two factions for and against the Queen; but, while her husband's behaviour to her was justly made matter of reproach to him, too little account was taken of his hard fate in being married, through no will of his own, to her. The truth seems to be that neither King nor Queen was quite sane. In any case neither could boast of much moral sense, and both were low-minded and disreputable.[1] 1820.

However, this nauseous woman became for a while a popular idol, so popular that even a battalion of Guards was supposed to be infected with disloyalty to the King in her favour. For weeks and months the time of Parliament was occupied with the loathsome and degrading details of her life abroad, and, at the last, the third reading of the bill was carried by so narrow a majority that Ministers declined to proceed with it further. For three days there were frantic rejoicings in London and in the greatest of the provincial cities; but Ministers did not resign; and, since the object of the agitation had been to injure the government, the excitement quickly subsided. No man in his heart cared two straws about the Queen; no man with a spark of honesty in him could fail to realise what manner of woman she actually was. She had served her purpose as an instrument of faction and, having served it, was cast away. Her next notable appearance was when she claimed admission to Westminster Abbey on the occasion of the King's coronation. Riots were apprehended as the natural consequence of her action, and a strong force of troops was assembled in the neighbourhood of the Abbey; but there was no demonstration in her favour when she refused to take the place assigned to her; and, retiring to her own house, she fortunately died a fortnight later. There was some trouble when her body was removed from

[1] I have had exceptional opportunities for probing the character of George IV., and I am convinced that he inherited a taint of his father's madness, though it did not reveal itself in the same fashion.

1820. London to Harwich for embarkation to Germany. In fact the mob, after some ugly conflicts with the troops, fairly forced the procession to take the road through the city instead of through the suburbs, as had been ordered by Ministers. But with this final demonstration England was fortunately delivered from Queen Caroline; and the country was all the cleaner for her disappearance.

1821. By 1821 the firmness of Ministers had produced its effect. The ten battalions of veterans were reduced to two companies only, and the establishment reverted to its old number of, in round numbers, one hundred and ten thousand of all ranks, of which, roughly speaking, thirty thousand were in Great Britain, twenty-two thousand in Ireland, thirty-four thousand in the colonies and the remainder in India. The Yeomanry and Volunteers in Great Britain numbered thirty-seven thousand and in Ireland twenty thousand; and, since the militia was not embodied, the entire force of the Empire present and fit for duty probably rose little above one hundred and twenty thousand.

1822. The year 1822 brought with it important political changes. Since the peace Lord Liverpool's administration had from various causes grown steadily in disfavour, and the most prominent of its younger members, Canning, had resigned the Presidency of the Board of Control in 1820. Liverpool, therefore, tried to secure an accession of strength by calling the narrow clique of the family of Grenville to a share in office; while Lord Sidmouth in January resigned the Home Department to Mr., afterwards Sir Robert, Peel. Therewith Addington, to call Sidmouth by his more familiar name, dropped out of political life—a mediocre but at least a courageous man, who was the author of one fine saying which is worth recall: "No man is fit to be a Minister to whom it is not a matter of indifference whether he dies in his bed or on the scaffold." Parliamentary impeachment is now obsolete. Ministers can order the trial of generals and admirals

by court-martial for professional misconduct, and take authority to confirm the sentence. But there is no longer a court for the trial of Ministers, though they may be not only fools or knaves but, more dangerous still, doctrinaires of a stamp which would absolutely debar them from high command alike in Army or Navy. 1822.

The King, having a dislike for Canning, refused to readmit him to the cabinet, as Liverpool desired; and the ambitious man was compensated by appointment to be Governor-general of India. But before he could sail for Calcutta, the Foreign Office fell vacant, and Canning was called upon to fill it, for on the 12th of August Castlereagh died by his own hand. For some weeks previously to this day he had shown signs of mental aberration, caused beyond doubt by the strain of excessive work and anxiety. The vast burden of keeping the peace both at home and abroad rested chiefly upon him; and it is hardly surprising that he should have sunk under it. His colleagues, who had noticed an ominous change in his manner, deputed Wellington to represent their fears to him; and Wellington, after listening for a time to his voluble but incoherent ramblings, had the courage to say bluntly: "It is my duty to tell you that you are not in your right mind." The doomed man buried his face in his hands and, with equal courage, answered: "If you say so, I fear it must be so"; and not many hours afterwards came the end.

In him died a great and fearless ruler of men, and the best War Minister that England has ever known. It was he who first made personal military service compulsory for home-defence; it was he who, upon taking command, equipped his tiny striking force instantly with marine transport which would carry it to any part of the world, and so was able at the critical moment to throw it into Spain. It was he who, having no love for John Moore, defended his memory when Canning would have sacrificed it;

1822. and it was he who found Wellington and stood loyally at his back from the beginning of the Peninsular War to the end. He sometimes went astray both in his plans for training the manhood of England for war and in selecting the sphere of action for the Army; but in the main he chose the right path; and his good decisions far outweighed the evil. Such a master was sure of good service; and such a public servant deserved well of his country. It is, or has been, the fashion to dwell on his shortcomings as a speaker in Parliament, the defects of his language and the cumbrousness of his sentences; yet it is not by speech but by action that a statesman should be judged, and it is not by smooth periods or glowing oratory that even a speaker gains ascendancy, but by weight of character and magic of personality. Many have borne testimony to the effect produced on the Commons by the mere rising of Castlereagh to his feet, so noble was his presence, so instinct with the habit of command. His opponents could catch hold of his words and ridicule them—even so can a terrier snap a lock out of the coat of a Newfoundland dog and worry it—but they could not abash the man. He held his own by sheer strength of will and integrity of purpose; and he knew not the meaning of fear.

He was buried among the great in Westminster Abbey; the mob of London hooting and jeering at his corpse to the very door of the church. This was a small matter, for the disfavour of the populace was equally indifferent to him living or dead. This indifference has been construed into a haughty disregard of the sufferings of his fellowmen; and it is reproached against his memory that he could find no alleviation for the general distress at the close of the war save in such repressive measures as the famous Six Acts. Those, however, who have passed this criticism were either directly swayed by the passions of the time, or had no experience of the close of a

great war. Such a war, to use a homely phrase, jolts the entire population out of its groove. Men and women lose the simple bearings by which they have so far governed the course of their lives, and have to seek for others. They find them and adjust themselves to them, settling down as best they can into another groove. Peace in due time jolts them out of that in its turn. The rut in which they had run during the war is gone; the old rut which they had followed before the war is trodden out; and once more they are bewildered and, knowing not which way to go, think themselves privileged to go as they please. There is nothing strange in this. Mere change of residence is sufficient to upset most households for a time. It is proverbial that the Englishman abroad thinks himself delivered from the restraints which he observes at home. It is a matter of common knowledge that, when a regiment shifts quarters, there is generally some slight manifestation of indiscipline among the men, and that wise commanders repress such failings instantly and severely, in order to bring home to the rank and file that a change of scene does not mean a relaxation of order. Castlereagh acted upon precisely the same principle. Though fully alive to the prevailing distress, he knew that it could not be alleviated by heroic remedies, for that the damage wrought by a long war can only be made good by time and patience. He judged that the necessary time would only be prolonged and impatience stimulated by yielding to popular violence; and he therefore upheld discipline and order, with the wisdom of a good commanding officer, by the strongest possible measures. Moreover, he succeeded in his object. The people, finding that the government would not be trifled with, began to settle down, not of course with content, but with at least so much help towards the finding of a groove which they might follow until time should cure the ills which, except by time, were irremediable. It may be that, some

1822.

1822. centuries hence, history may reckon Castlereagh's high-handed government after the close of the war to be not the least of his claims to greatness.

It would be idle, at the same time, to contend that Castlereagh entertained anything but the strongest antipathy to what are called democratic institutions; or that he regarded revolutionary movements otherwise than with abhorrence. The example of France had shown him that popular revolutions tend to replace what may have been bad by what is certainly worse; and that even if dumb suffering be at their back, blind vanity and organised wickedness are invariably at their head. Were he to come back to life in this year 1923, he would remark that all the measures which were urged upon him—removal of religious disabilities, Parliamentary Reform, extension of the franchise, change of the commercial system, expropriation of Irish landlords and the like—have been carried into effect; that the spread of democracy all over the world has not banished the spirit of revolution from the countries that have accepted it; that a yet larger population than the French has tried the revolutionary experiment of France with the same disastrous results, and that the millennium is no nearer than it was. And with a quiet reflection that human nature at large is totally unchanged, he would return well satisfied to his rest.

CHAPTER III

With the first gasp of recovery from exhaustion, disturbances broke out simultaneously in many parts of Europe; the secret revolutionary societies, which had brought France to ruin thirty years before, being evidently at their old work. In Spain the Cortes, which had given such trouble to Wellington, had been dissolved by King Ferdinand upon his restoration at the close of hostilities, to the general content of the nation; but the only result had been to substitute for a very bad government one which was, if possible, worse. The country was to the last degree disorganised, impoverished and demoralised by seven years of war; and her South American colonies, upon which she had depended for her wealth, had for long been in a state of revolt. To bring them back by force to their allegiance seemed to be the first duty of any Spanish government; but with no ships and no money the effort seemed to be impossible. The sale of Florida to the United States for five million dollars, however, provided a little ready cash. Ships were purchased; troops were raised; and an effort was made in 1818 to send a great expedition over- 1818.
sea from Cadiz. There was, however, long delay in the preparations, and it was only after a formidable mutiny that three thousand ill-equipped, ill-disciplined and discontented men were shipped off across the Atlantic. Once fairly on the ocean, and free to do as they would, they sailed to the River Plate and there joined the insurgents. An outbreak of yellow fever

1819. among the troops at Cadiz paralysed all further endeavours ; and throughout 1819 nothing further was done towards quelling the insurrection in South America.

By that time the task of Spain, long hopeless, had become simply visionary, and all the more so since British veteran soldiers of all ranks had taken service in very large numbers with the South Americans. Disbanded at a time of intense commercial depression, without prospect of civil employment, they naturally embraced the chance of selling their skill in the most promising market, and sailed for South America by thousands. Out of a single battalion paid off at Chatham three hundred men enlisted immediately in the army of the South American insurgents.[1] The government did what it could to check the movement, first, by notifying that any officers accepting commissions in foreign forces, without leave, would forfeit their half-pay, and, next, by passing a Foreign Enlistment Act, which forbade British subjects to enter the service of any foreign government, recognised or unrecognised, and which equally made it illegal to fit out ships for the purposes of war. The enactment was furiously resisted by the Opposition in Parliament ; and the learned Sir James Mackintosh made a great parade of all the British regiments which had served in the armies of France, Holland and Sweden in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. His discourse was, however, entirely irrelevant. Spain had for some eight most critical years been our ally ; and that unhappy country, together with Portugal, had been the ground where the British had fought their defensive war against France. Spain had done us incalculably good service ; and it would have been a poor return for it to permit trained fighting men to join openly in swelling the ranks of her enemies. If she had allowed her disbanded soldiers to swarm into Ireland or, later on, into Canada, Mackintosh

[1] Walpole, ii. 300.

and those who thought with him might have changed their views. The Whig Opposition, in fact, was only initiating the policy which was to be faithfully followed by Whig and Liberal governments during the greater part of the nineteenth century ; a policy based on the dogma that the British constitution should be the model for the government of all peoples, nations and languages, and that rebellion against any other form of authority was deserving at least of England's moral support and encouragement. Since, however, it was equally the Whig and Liberal policy to reduce British armaments below the margin even of safety, such support could find small official expression except in arrogant lectures from the British Foreign Office ; and the era of such lecturing was very shortly to begin. 1819.

Despite, therefore, of all prohibitions and Acts of Parliament the disbanded veterans of the Peninsula made their way in vast numbers to South America, and for the best part of a hundred years were forgotten ; until in the twentieth century their great-grandsons, unable to speak a word of English but not forgetful of their origin, came over voluntarily in whole battalions from the land of their adoption to the land of their ancestors, to fight, as those ancestors had fought, against an overweening power that sought to dominate Europe.

Meanwhile in Spain things went from bad to worse. In February 1820 a military revolt in Andalusia, followed by another in Galicia, compelled Ferdinand to summon the Cortes and to accept a new constitution. The Cortes by violent measures soon made enemies among all classes ; and during 1821 and 1822 Spain was torn by civil war. In August 1820, moreover, the Portuguese army established a constitution on the Spanish model in Portugal, so that the entire Iberian Peninsula was in disorder. Yet another military rising in July 1820 compelled the miserable old King Ferdinand of Naples to accept the Spanish constitution for 1820.

1820. his dominions. All of these outbreaks, added to Thistlewood's conspiracy in February, the assassination of the Duc de Berri in France in March, and a formidable rising at Glasgow in April, afforded pretty clear evidence of a concerted revolutionary movement throughout Europe.

The great powers naturally took the alarm. Austria in particular, through her possessions in Italy, was nearly concerned with the trouble in Naples; and accordingly in December the Emperor met his brother of Russia and a representative of the King of Prussia in congress at Troppau. They soon decided that the revolutionary government of the Two Sicilies could not be recognised; and, after a decent interval, Austrian troops invaded Neapolitan territory early in
1821. February 1821. They met with no resistance worthy of the name; and before the end of March the Neapolitan revolution utterly collapsed. The leaders had hoped for a diversion through a rising of their friends in Piedmont; and such a rising did actually take place on the 10th of March. But upon an advance of the Austrian army this insurrection likewise came to an ignoble end; and Austrian troops remained in occupation of both territories to keep the peace. France raised no objection nor, on behalf of England, did Castlereagh, who contented himself with protesting that the British government could not regard such interference, as that of Austria, with the internal affairs of a foreign power, as a safe principle of international law. Castlereagh, in fact, disguised not his hatred of so-called popular revolutions. To him and to Wellington it seemed no great disadvantage that Austrian troops should occupy for three years, which was the term assigned by the Emperor Francis, both Naples and Piedmont, and keep a firm hand upon the secret societies and the forces of disorder.

Now, however, there threatened to be a wider application of the same principle. With Portugal it was geographically impossible for any continental

power to interfere, unless by sea, which gave England complete control of the situation. But Spain was another matter ; and in 1822 the confusion there was 1822. complicated by an epidemic of yellow fever which made frightful ravages in the eastern provinces. At Barcelona the deaths at the end of September rose to three hundred and fifty a day ; and the French government, for its own safety, placed a cordon of troops along the line of the Spanish frontier to keep the pestilence outside its borders. But, mindful of the plague of revolution which was also raging in Spain, they steadily reinforced this cordon till it became an army of observation, one hundred thousand strong. It was pretty clear that, should the insurrectionary movement take a turn unfavourable to the Spanish monarchy, this force would cross the frontier.

Meanwhile, trouble had arisen also in Eastern Europe. The Greeks during the course of 1821 rose 1821. in general insurrection against the Turks, and by their skill at sea threatened to deprive Constantinople of its supplies of wheat from the Mediterranean. In alarm the Turks prohibited the export of grain through the Dardanelles, thereby ruining the grain-trade of Odessa, and bringing the Tsar Alexander upon them in all his wrath. The Russian ambassador at Constantinople was instructed to make certain demands of the Porte ; and when these received no reply within the specified term of eight days, he demanded his passports and withdrew to Russian territory. Every sign pointed to immediate war ; but upon reflection the Tsar bethought him that, as the head of the Holy Alliance, he was responsible for the upholding of legitimate authority in Europe. Obviously, therefore, a Greek insurrection ought to receive no countenance from him ; and his reasoning was strengthened by the opinion of Castlereagh. That statesman, while admitting that Turkish rule was abominable and that the Greeks were deserving of sympathy and compassion, pointed out that they were after all the

1821. aggressors, and that their rising was revolutionary. He might have added that, in the matter of inhumanity, they were a shade worse than the Turks, and that the revolution had been started by a gang of "counting-house Catilines, bankrupt merchants and intriguing adventurers." If the Tsar should encourage them, he might find the revolutionary poison infecting his own subjects; if he should invade Turkey with the idea of suppressing the insurrection, he would infallibly find himself fighting both Greeks and Turks. Castlereagh recommended, therefore, that the Tsar should give his moral support to Turkey until the Greek rising should have been put down, then call her to account for any wrongs done to Russia, and take the Greeks under his protection.[1] Alexander accepted the advice in good part and decided for the present to abstain from armed interference. The weak point in Castlereagh's argument was that the Greeks, having command of the sea, could not easily be conquered by Turkey.

1822. The matter was to have been brought up for discussion at a second Congress to be held at Vienna in the summer of 1822; but the decision of the Tsar removed the need for immediate discussion of the Eastern question; and, as Italian affairs were those that demanded speedy settlement, Verona was substituted for Vienna as the place of meeting. Castlereagh was to have represented England, but on the 12th of August he died, as has been told, by his own hand. At the Congress of Verona his place was filled by Wellington, and by Canning at the Foreign Office. The Congress soon arranged for the evacuation of Piedmont and Naples by the Austrian troops; but the question of Spain was not so easy. In the course of 1822 the revolutionists had triumphed, and the King, though not deposed, had been rendered powerless. It was the independent opinion of both Castlereagh and Canning that England must decline to

[1] *Castlereagh Correspondence*, xii. 401-408, 443-446.

interfere with the internal affairs of Spain ; but the other powers agreed to countenance such interference on the part of France ; and England, standing alone, was unable to prevent them. Canning endeavoured to mediate between France and Spain, but without success. France declared war ; and on the 7th of April 1823, her army, led by the Duke of Angoulême, crossed the Bidassoa, and invaded Spain. The Spaniards, sick of fighting, offered little or no resistance. The Duke, moving at a leisurely pace, reached Madrid on the 23rd of May and, finding that King Ferdinand had been removed to Cadiz, pushed on rapidly to that city. By the middle of July he had laid siege to Cadiz ; on the 1st of October Ferdinand was delivered up to him to be reinstated in full authority ; and the reign of the revolutionary government was over. 1823.

It was, however, clear that not merely the rule of Ferdinand but the barest maintenance of order in Spain depended wholly upon French bayonets ; and it became an anxious question for England how far not only Spain, but the Spanish colonies in South America, might be subjected to French influence. There were, indeed, members of the Opposition in both Houses of Parliament, the very men who were always clamouring for the reduction of the Army, who held that England should have interposed by force to prevent the French occupation of Spain. This was of course out of the question ; and Canning determined to solve the problem of the Spanish colonies in a different fashion. Ferdinand had hoped, by inviting a conference of the Great Powers on the subject, to gain their assistance in recovering the revolted provinces by force. Canning would not allow England to be represented at this conference ; and President Monro, in a message to Congress, declared that the United States could not view armed intervention in South America with indifference. Thereupon Canning in 1824 recognised,

1824. as a beginning, the independence of Buenos Aires (now better known as Argentina), Colombia and Mexico. By so doing he really did little more than accept actually existing facts; but none the less did he thereby alienate the sympathies of every court in Europe. At home too, Wellington marked his dissent by resigning his office and leaving the government. Even if he had approved of the policy in principle, which he did not, it must have been uncongenial to him to deal so unkind a blow at Spain.

Thus the French gained little but trouble and anxiety through the military occupation of Spain; and, if France found it necessary to put down the constitution established by revolutionary means in that country, it was natural to suppose that Spain, with a revived autocracy, would see need to do the like in Portugal. The news of the military insurrection in Portugal had recalled King John the Sixth from Brazil, whither, as will be remembered, he had fled in 1808; and on his return to Lisbon he found that the new constitutional government was inclined to take charge of Brazil as well as of the mother country. He had taken the precaution to instruct his son, Pedro, in case of emergency, to assume the independent crown of Brazil, so as to secure that great possession, at any rate, to his house; and accordingly in September 1822 the prince declared himself Emperor. But meanwhile the mere presence of the French army in Spain gave new life and vigour to the opponents of the new
1823. constitution in Portugal; and early in 1823 the lately overthrown autocracy was by a counter-insurrection restored.

Feeling little confidence in the stability of the government thus established, its members sought the help of foreign troops to uphold it, one party begging for succour from England, and the other founding all its hopes upon France. The British Ministry was not a little troubled by the request. Portugal was a very old ally, and French preponderance at Lisbon

was highly undesirable ; but England had pronounced against the right of one country to meddle with the internal affairs of another, and, even if she desired so to interfere, she had not a battalion to spare for the purpose. The matter was for the moment compromised by the despatch of a squadron to the Tagus, to give moral support to the King and to furnish him with a refuge in case of mishap. Meanwhile the monarch used his restored powers with moderation, feeling his way to a renewal of constitutional government ; but a second military revolt, headed by his second son, Dom Miguel, in April 1824, set matters 1824.
again in a ferment, and, though unsuccessful, brought about a second appeal to England for troops. On this occasion the request was even more embarrassing to the government than the former had been, for the Portuguese Minister, who made it, desired nothing better than a refusal, which would give him an excuse for inviting a French garrison to Lisbon. The difficulty was surmounted by advising George the Fourth to send troops from Hanover ; and, when the French got wind of the project and demanded explanations, Canning smoothed matters over by obtaining a written engagement that French soldiers should not upon any pretext enter Portugal, and on his side countermanding the despatch of the Hanoverians.

By the end of 1824 British influence had been firmly re-established at Lisbon ; and, after much patient negotiation, Canning in 1825 succeeded in 1825.
persuading Portugal to recognise the independence of Brazil, upon the understanding that John the Sixth should retain for life the title of Emperor of Brazil, but resign the actual sovereignty to his son, the Emperor Pedro. Within six months, however, John the Sixth died, and Pedro became the undoubted heir to the crowns both of Portugal and Brazil. Being a sensible man he renounced the crown of Portugal for himself, but reserved it for his daughter, Maria, then

a child of seven. Meanwhile he appointed his sister, Isabella, to be Regent, and in order to conciliate his younger brother, Dom Miguel, arranged for the immediate betrothal of him, aged twenty-four, to his little niece, Maria. Having by these heroic measures smoothed the path of hereditary monarchy in his house, he sought to commend them to the Portuguese people by giving them a constitution.

Such a concession seems to us in these days to be trifling. Indeed the grant of a constitution to a people, which needed above all things firm and just government, rather suggests the presentation to a hungry man of a knife and fork in lieu of a hearty meal. But it was quite enough to stir up trouble. The Portuguese army and the adherents of the old order pinned their faith to Dom Miguel. Whole regiments deserted and crossed the Spanish frontier to avoid obedience to the Regency ; and the Spanish government, delighted to foster any movement which favoured arbitrary rule, encouraged rather than restrained them. Under threat of the withdrawal of the British ambassador from Madrid, Ferdinand promised to amend his ways ; but his promises were soon proved to be
1826. of little worth. The Portuguese deserters, steadily increasing in strength, at last openly proclaimed Dom Miguel as their King, and with the unconcealed connivance, if not with the active support, of the Spanish
Dec. 3. authorities, prepared to invade Portugal. The Portuguese Regency in alarm appealed through the Portuguese ambassador in London for help. Having
Dec. 8. received on the 8th, Friday, confirmation of the facts from the British Embassy at Madrid, Canning determined at once to send five thousand British soldiers
Dec. 11. to Portugal. On Monday, the 11th, a message from the King communicated the decision to Parliament, and on the 12th, according to Canning's proud boast to the Commons, the troops were on march to the ports of embarkation. Their doings in Portugal shall be briefly noticed in another place ; but the

immediate point is that Canning's action, proclaimed as usual by sounding blasts upon his own trumpet, was for the time successful. Ferdinand hastened to fulfil his duties as a genuine neutral. The French, who, it must be remembered, still kept an army of occupation in Spain, gave him to understand that he could expect no help from them. War in the Iberian Peninsula was averted, and the constitutional government of Portugal, such as it was, remained free to go upon its own way. Canning had every right to feel pride and satisfaction. 1826.

The danger that had menaced Western Europe thus passed happily away; but in the meanwhile the troubles in the east were steadily growing more acute. Canning's efforts to heal the breach between Russia and the Porte had failed; and the publication of the terms, upon which the Powers proposed to adjust the quarrel between Turkey and Greece, roused uncompromising fury in both of those parties. The difficulty was complicated by the fact that up to the end of 1823 the Greeks had on the whole been decidedly successful, fighting creditably on land and displaying real heroism at sea. Their cause enlisted much sympathy among their brethren in religion, the Russians, and not a little among sentimental scholars and rapacious rascals in England. Their proceedings, quite apart from their savage conduct of the war, were very far from edifying. They had leaders enough for a dozen revolutions, animated chiefly by vanity, jealousy and cupidity, who were so busy fighting among themselves that they could find no time to combine against a common enemy. They had indeed the wit to set up a National Assembly, but this was designed to deceive Europe rather than to organise Greece. It served its purpose, for in January 1824, the poet Byron arrived in Greece, seeking relief from the tedium of singing his sorrows to the world by essaying the work of a liberator. Through his influence a loan was raised in England for the support of the 1823. 1824.

Greek insurgents ; and the results were astonishing. The patriots relinquished the arduous task of cutting each other's throats for the delightful pastime of sharing the plunder. The leaders were far too busily occupied in filling their own pockets to establish order among their own countrymen, or to prepare for further resistance against the Turk ; and Sultan Mahmoud saw his chance and seized it.

Intestine strife had so much weakened his authority that he called to his aid his nominal vassal, Mohammed Ali, Pasha of Egypt, promising to add Greece to his dominions if he should put down the Greek insurrection. Mohammed Ali accepted this offer, and it was arranged that the main Turkish army should fall upon the Gulf of Patras from the north, while the Egyptian troops under Ibrahim Pasha descended under the protection of their fleet upon the Morea. The first campaign of 1824 was far from wholly successful, the Greeks, as always, showing irresistible superiority both in skill and courage ; but the second, thanks to the Egyptian fleet, brought the Turks such crushing
1825. victories in the following year as to leave little heart for further resistance in the Greek patriots. In August the Greek legislature passed a decree placing the sacred deposit of their liberty, independence and political existence under the protection of the British Government. Canning, being imbued with the natural enthusiasm of a classical scholar for Greece, was not sorry to be placed in a position of authority regarding her future. The next complication was the death of Tsar Alexander in November, and the accession, after threats of disturbance, of his second son, Nicholas, a strong and masterful man. In
1826. April 1826, Wellington was despatched on the usual mission of congratulation to him, with the further duty of securing, if possible, unity of action between England and Turkey on the Greek question ; and at about the same time Stratford Canning was sent ambassador to Constantinople, with the double task

of persuading the Sultan to end the war with Greece and of averting war between Russia and Turkey. 1826.

Wellington was successful in coming to an agreement with Russia as to a basis for the establishment of Greek independence ; and the Tsar took so high a tone towards the Sultan that he intimidated him into conceding the points, apart from Greece, that were at issue between Russia and Turkey, by the Convention of Akierman. Thereby Russian influence was re-established at the Porte ; but shortly afterwards the despatch of the British troops to Lisbon gave great offence to Nicholas ; and the relations between the courts of St. Petersburg and St. James's became the reverse of cordial. The two agreed, however, to offer at Constantinople their mediation between Turkey and Greece, which was not successful. The Sultan, in fact, had not failed to notice that the Greek insurrection had been supported by British money, by British arms, smuggled into Greece from the Ionian Islands, and by British officers both of the army and navy. The famous Lord Cochrane was about to take chief command of the Greek fleet, and Colonel Charles Napier, then governor of Cephalonia, was quite prepared, if certain military arrangements were made, to take command of the army. In such circumstances the Sultan declined to accept as sincere England's pretensions of impartial neutrality and her protestations of friendly feeling ; and it is difficult to contend that herein he departed from common sense.

Oct. 1827. Feb.

However, the concord between England and Russia upon the Greek question led them to invite the other powers to back their remonstrances with Turkey ; and France, being embroiled with the Bey of Algiers, at that time a dependency of the Turkish Empire, gave them her whole-hearted support. In July a treaty between the three parties was signed in London, under which it was proposed to enforce an armistice between Turkey and Greece by armed

July.

1827. intervention, and to secure to Greece virtual independence under the suzerainty of the Sultan. Greece accepted the armistice with avidity, her power ashore being completely broken, and most of her ships at sea more intent upon piracy than national service. But the Sultan refused to hear of any interference ; though the fleets of the allies compelled the Egyptian commander on the spot to abstain at any rate from hostilities by sea. The Greeks, meanwhile, continued to make attacks both by land and water ; and thus the immediate result of the allied interposition was that the Greeks, who had accepted the armistice, were allowed to carry on the war as they pleased, whereas the Turks, who had not accepted it, were prevented from prosecuting it at sea. Ultimately the British and French fleets under Admirals Codrington and de Rigny blockaded the Turco-Egyptian fleet in the Bay of Navarin ; whereupon Ibrahim Pasha wreaked a savage vengeance upon the wretched inhabitants of the Morea ashore. In October the Russian fleet joined those of England and France outside Navarin, and the three admirals, meeting in
Oct. 18. council on the 18th, decided that it was their duty to take their ships into Navarin Bay and remonstrate with Ibrahim, since the approach of winter would soon make it impossible for them to continue the blockade. They did so accordingly ; and the natural and foreseen consequence was a general action known
Oct. 20. to history as the Battle of Navarino, in which the Turkish fleet was annihilated.

Canning had died two months before the Treaty of London could bear its inevitable fruit. Goderich's government knew not what to make of the battle of Navarino, which was most emphatically an act of war delivered against an ally. The Porte with great calmness required the Allies to desist from all interference with the affairs of Greece and to pay compensation for the destruction of their fleet. The King, without consulting his Ministers, gave Codrington

the Grand Cross of the Bath, thereby preventing Goderich from passing any censure upon him ; and Wellington, when the matter, after Goderich's fall, came up to him for consideration, decided that the Admiral's conduct must be upheld. But the Duke had none of Canning's sentiment about the Greeks ; he had always disapproved of the Treaty of London ; and, mistrusting Russia, which had just taken the province of Georgia from Persia, was against excessive weakening of the Turks. The Sultan, however, suddenly alienated all sympathy by repudiating the Treaty of Akierman, and called down upon himself a 1828.
declaration of war from Russia. The Tsar wished France and England to attack Constantinople with their fleets while he invaded Turkey by land. But Wellington declined to be dragged into war ; and ultimately it was arranged that, in the Mediterranean, Russia should act only as a party to the Treaty of London, and that an expedition of eighteen thousand French soldiers should clear the Turkish troops out of the Morea. The Turks made a fine fight against the Russians ; but after two campaigns the brilliant successes of Paskiewitch in Asia Minor and the steady advance of Diebitsch through the Balkans compelled them to accept the peace of Adrianople, which was signed on the 14th of September 1829. Thereby the 1829.
independence of Greece was established, and an effort was made to find her a king. Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg, later King of the Belgians, accepted the kingship in 1830, but, being a wise man, quickly changed his mind and resigned it. Princes, strangely enough, are generally as greedy of a crown as radical politicians of a coronet ; but the crown of Greece was not a tempting diadem. After nearly three years' rule by a despotic President, and two more of anarchy, a king was in 1833 selected from the Royal house of Wittelsbach ; and the Greeks were left to work out their own destiny.

In Portugal the British troops were at the beginning

1828. of 1828 under orders of recall, everything apparently being quiet. The Regent, Princess Isabella, being incapacitated by sickness, the Emperor appointed Dom Miguel to be Regent in her stead. That Prince accordingly travelled to Lisbon in February 1828, took the oath to observe the constitution, and within two months issued a decree to abolish it. He then convoked the estates of the realm, which duly offered him the crown, and accepting it on the 1st of July he became the absolute ruler of Portugal. The British Minister at Lisbon, foreseeing this usurpation, took upon himself to detain the British troops; but Wellington, while approving his action, insisted presently upon recalling them, rightly thinking that it was for the Portuguese to decide for themselves how they should be governed, without the aid of British bayonets. Civil war of course followed in Portugal, to the advantage of Dom Miguel; and his political opponents took refuge in England, where they organised themselves at Plymouth as a military body. Wellington gave them plainly to understand that he would permit no individuals to make war upon Portugal or upon any of her possessions from England; and, when the refugees sailed to the Azores to descend upon the island of Terceira, where Donna Maria had been proclaimed Queen, they were hunted away, under Wellington's orders, by a British man-of-war.

Nothing, upon the face of the matter, could appear more correct than Wellington's conduct upon this occasion; yet it was furiously denounced in Parliament by the leading Liberals and the followers of Canning, as showing partiality to an autocratic and disfavour to a constitutional government. But this criticism was entirely beside the point, which was whether Portugal should be allowed to settle her internal affairs for herself, or whether England should step in and settle them for her. British troops had been sent to Portugal in the first instance to protect her from the unfair dealings of Spain, and, having accomplished that service, they were

rightly withdrawn. But Dom Miguel's usurpation was entirely a Portuguese affair. He might be, and very likely was, a very bad ruler, for his methods were precisely those of the leaders of revolutionary terror in France, and, more lately, in Russia. But, unless he injured England, the affair was in Wellington's judgment none of hers; for the Duke conceived it to be no part of his country's mission to countenance popular insurrections all the world over, nor to sing in every quarter the praises of the British constitution. The latter course he considered arrogant, which was in bad taste, and likely to promote ill feeling towards England abroad. The former he accounted not only unfriendly but dangerous, since every interference with a foreign country's affairs is impertinent and every unsettled government is a potential peril. In other words, he saw in such a policy a constant menace to peace; and for war he knew his country to be utterly unprepared. It is now time to examine the causes and the extent of England's military weakness in these critical years. 1828.

CHAPTER IV

1822. In 1822, after the subsidence of the troubles of the two previous years, the total establishment of infantry and cavalry for the British Isles and the Colonies was just short of sixty-nine thousand, and for India just short of twenty-three thousand men; the Royal Engineers and the Sappers and Miners adding nearly one thousand to this number, and the Artillery rather over six thousand more, making a total of just about one hundred thousand regular troops of all ranks. India claimed five regiments of cavalry, each with a total strength of seven hundred and forty-five, and twenty-one battalions, each of a thousand rank and file, or eleven hundred and twenty-eight of all ranks. On the home establishment, the cavalry regiments had three hundred and sixty of all ranks, with two hundred and fifty horses, excepting the King's Dragoon Guards, which, as usual, kept its increased strength of four hundred and eighty of all ranks with three hundred and forty horses. The Eighteenth and Nineteenth Light Dragoons had by this time disappeared from the Army List, and the Seventeenth, as in 1763, was once again the junior regiment of the mounted service. The battalions on the home establishment, eighty-six in all, numbered six hundred and fifty of all ranks, organised in eight companies; the military authorities evidently wishing to have the means of increasing the strength rapidly without calling upon untrained officers. But it is of course obvious that any of these battalions, if abroad and suddenly called to active service, could

not have counted upon putting more than five hundred bayonets into the field. In the West Indies, indeed, it is unlikely that at any time more than four hundred were fit for duty. 1822.

The Horse Artillery were organised into six troops, and the Field-Artillery into nine battalions of eight companies apiece. The Engineers were still a corps of officers only, rather over one hundred and forty in number; the men being furnished by the eleven companies of the Sappers and Miners, eked out by the Royal Staff Corps, which was almost wholly employed abroad. The Waggon-train was a mere skeleton of one hundred and twenty of all ranks, besides a corps of waggoners of about half that number, which was maintained permanently in Ireland. The Yeomanry in Great Britain, owing to the late troubles, now counted fifty-two different corps, twenty-seven of which, mostly of quite paltry force, had been raised between 1819 and 1821. Their strength was the same as in 1821, for it was they mainly who stood between the country and insurrection.

When introducing the estimates Palmerston took credit for a reduction of some twelve thousand men, and of a half a million sterling. Two complete regiments of cavalry had been disbanded; every other regiment had been diminished from eight troops to six, and every battalion (except in India) from ten companies to eight. Moreover, in the War Office alone £8000 had been saved by the removal of sixteen superfluous persons. In the Ordnance Office the diminution of expenditure had been still more remarkable, since Wellington, on his return from France in 1818, had taken up the office of Master-general. Reorganising the department upon the lines originally laid down by James, Duke of York, whose administrative ability he thoroughly appreciated, he abolished sixty-eight offices and saved £14,000 a year in salaries.[1]

[1] Stanhope, *Conversations of the Duke of Wellington*, p. 66. Hansard, vol. iv. p. 739. Speech of Mr. R. Ward on Ordnance

1822. He also in this same year, 1822, finally accomplished the great reform of embodying the corps of artillery-drivers with the artillery itself, and of laying down the rule that all recruits for the Royal Regiment should in future be enlisted as both gunners and drivers. Thereby he saved the cost of the driver-officers—unfortunate folk who could not rise above the rank of captain—and cut down the general expenses of the Ordnance by £83,000. The cost of the Commissariat was also reduced by £50,000 ; and altogether Ministers seem to have done their utmost to pare down military expenditure to the quick.

None the less were the critics in Parliament insatiable in demanding further reductions ; and it will be well to say a few words about the foremost of them. Joseph Hume, the son of a Scottish coasting skipper, lost his father in early childhood, but with the help of a frugal mother and the education that lay open to him at his native town of Montrose, worked his way up to a medical degree at Edinburgh, and in 1797 became an assistant-surgeon in the East India Company's service. On arriving in India he set himself to master the native languages, and, obtaining a situation as interpreter during the Mahratta war of 1803, was able to save money and to return home in 1808 with a substantial fortune. In 1811 he bought a seat at Weymouth, sitting as a Tory for a short time, and after a brief interval returning to Parliament as member for Aberdeen in 1818, with advanced radical views. In 1820 he came forward as the chief advocate for retrenchment in every direction, more particularly in the military departments, and as a bitter opponent of the lash.

His experience of field-service in India, added to abundant inborn shrewdness, enabled him to speak with

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Estimates, 16th February 1821. It may not be beside the purpose to remind the reader that, in spite of Macaulay's gibes at James II., that monarch was a good man of business and an admirable departmental administrator. I have gone through much of his departmental work in detail and can testify to his efficiency.

authority upon divers matters which were utterly hidden from the ordinary member of Parliament ; and he was by no means ill-disposed towards the British soldier, nor disdainful of the military profession as a whole. Thus, before the Royal Commission on military punishments, he boldly advocated the reservation of certain civil posts for old soldiers of good character, the extension of the practice of giving commissions to men from the ranks, and the granting of the franchise to every man liable to serve his country in the Army or Navy. But he had conceived a strong prejudice against the wealthier class of officer—not unjustifiably, for he had seen many of them shirk unpleasant duty in India—and, arguing from the particular to the general, he was inclined to condemn wholesale all officers who enjoyed any income besides their pay. No doubt he was swayed also by the natural bias of a self-made man against those born to greater station than himself ; and, being possessed of very considerable conceit and absolutely devoid of any sense of the ridiculous, he was prone to run atilt against everything which seemed to favour the British officer. He never grasped, nor wished to grasp, the military problems of the country as a whole. He could not, or would not, see that they were different in 1820 from that which they had been in 1792. If he could save a few hundreds of pounds to-day, he was quite prepared to risk thereby the loss of thousands to-morrow. If his medical at all resembled his political career, he must have been a very dangerous physician ; but we have no information as to the number of his victims. In brief, though he did some useful work in exposing jobs and gained some reputation during a parliamentary life of nearly forty years, his name has sunk into the oblivion which inevitably awaits mediocrity. 1822.

In 1820 Hume had begun his attacks on military expenditure by protesting against the building of new barracks in the manufacturing districts and in London, not because they were bad barracks, and unhealthy

1822. for the men, as they proved themselves to be, but because they presumed to be barracks at all. As a matter of fact, there were only three sets of barracks, at Chatham, Parkhurst and Winchester, which would hold two thousand men apiece, only three more that would contain a thousand men and upward, and only thirty that gave space for five hundred and over, leaving one hundred and six to be filled with small detachments. In London itself the Tower was supposed to have room for over eight hundred men, the barracks in Portman Street for between five and six hundred, and those at Knightsbridge for five hundred, one and all being, of course, desperately overcrowded.[1] But Hume never paused for a moment to reflect upon such details. He professed anxiety for the soldiers' backs, but was quite content to sacrifice their lives for the sake of some false economy in pounds, shillings, and pence. In 1822 he made an unsuccessful onslaught upon the Guards' Mess at St. James's; and in 1823 he raised the far larger question of the cost of the Empire at large—not less than £1,600,000 annually for civil expenses to the British exchequer. Here he started a very mischievous movement which was later, as shall be seen, to make most formidable progress.

1823. In 1823 the condition of Ireland compelled the formation of three veteran battalions each eight hundred
1824. strong; and in 1824, despite of Hume and his allies, it was necessary at great cost to undo the work of 1822, to raise six new regiments of infantry, numbered the Ninety-fourth to the Ninety-ninth, and to augment the strength of the three veteran battalions in Ireland six hundred men. The six new regiments were required to keep order in the West Indies, where the negroes, owing to continued talk of their emanci-

[1] I have had oral information respecting Portman Street Barracks from officers, now dead, who joined the Guards in 1855. They agreed that there was always much sickness among the men there quartered.

pation at home and the imprudent discourse of mis- 1824.
sionaries on the spot, were growing perilously restless. No folk make quite so much work for soldiers as the Friends of Humanity, who build fair structures upon the shallow foundation of their own ignorance of human nature. Palmerston made the best case that he could by taking all the officers for the new battalions from the half-pay list, and so saving at any rate some expense ; and it was well that he did so, for worse things were shortly to come.

The augmentation of 1824 had amounted to close 1825.
upon five thousand men ; but in 1825 Palmerston was obliged to ask for over eight thousand more for the service of the Empire. The expedition to Burma, as shall presently be narrated, was devouring British soldiers by hundreds ; an immediate reinforcement of five thousand men was required for India ; and this could only be supplied by retaining there regiments which were under orders for home and had already been for twenty years abroad. It was not fair, he maintained—and no man had the face to gainsay him—that foreign service should mean perpetual banishment for soldiers, especially for those who had passed through twenty years of war. But, though Palmerston did not say so in as many words, it was obviously impossible for the Empire to live from hand to mouth according to the system beloved of the House of Commons—cutting down establishments and disbanding regiments in one year, and raising them anew in the next. It was not merely dangerous, but it was evil economy, for the cost of pensions on discharge, and of bounties and clothing on re-enlistment, swallowed up more than all the savings effected through the brief reduction of a few companies or battalions ; and the crying need for more regular relief of troops abroad compelled a radical change of organisation.

Palmerston's method was this. The battalions of the Line were to be augmented from eight companies to ten, and from an establishment of five hundred and

1825. seventy-six to one of seven hundred and forty rank and file. Of the ten companies, six, each of them eighty-six strong, were to form the service-battalion, with a total strength of five hundred and sixteen rank and file ; and four, each of them fifty-six strong, a reserve or depot-battalion of two hundred and twenty-four rank and file. At home the entire ten companies were to be treated as a single battalion. On foreign service the six companies alone would go abroad, leaving the four reserve companies at home to obtain recruits and furnish drafts. The new scheme would also give considerable relief to officers. Under existing arrangements an officer returning home on sick leave felt himself bound to rejoin his battalion as speedily as possible, because his duty fell upon others. Under Palmerston's plan he could repair to the depot and be replaced abroad by another officer of the same regiment ; whereas, under the old system, he had no alternative, supposing that his recovery were slow, but to exchange with some officer on the half-pay list. Invalided men also, who as a rule were discharged upon arrival at home, might still be fit for duty in the British Isles and could thus be saved to the service. Lastly, as Palmerston pointed out, the organisation would be valuable also for war.

Here, therefore, was a return towards the past system of the Duke of York, which is generally called the new scheme of Mr. Cardwell, namely, that every regiment should consist of two battalions, one of which was to be abroad and the other at home. Virtually Palmerston's six service-companies and four reserve companies were two battalions, both of them absurdly weak and lacking the expensive equipment of two sets of field-officers, but capable of expansion, in case of emergency, into a true double-battalioned regiment. In compensation for this increase of the regular force the veteran battalions formed in 1821 were disbanded, the men receiving a moderate pension which might make them the readier to come forward

again, if required. Palmerston's proposals appear to have been accepted with no great difficulty or demur. They were, perhaps, favoured by the testimony of Sir Robert Wilson, who declared that he had recently visited Gibraltar and found the garrison there efficient, but too small. As Sir Robert had been removed from the Army on account of active sympathy, injudiciously manifested, with Queen Caroline, his evidence on such a point could hardly be rejected as partial.[1] 1825.

Thus the establishment of cavalry and infantry for the British Isles and the Colonies rose to over eighty-six thousand of all ranks, and that for India to over twenty-five thousand, which added to sixty-three hundred artillery and eleven hundred Engineers, Sappers and Miners made up a round total of nearly one hundred and twenty thousand. In 1826 the cavalry and infantry remained at the same figure, Palmerston resolutely refusing to reduce it, lest regiments, which had served for twenty years abroad, should be once again disappointed of relief. Moreover, the artillery was actually increased to a strength of seventy in each company and to a total number of seven thousand men, the demands of the colonies necessitating the despatch of five additional companies overseas. The proportion of soldiers on foreign service was really outrageous, considering that at the moment no war was actually going forward in any part of the Empire. There were, as Palmerston told the Commons, in all eighty-three regiments of the Line, of which no fewer than fifty-one were in stations abroad, twenty-three in Ireland, four—actually no more than four—in Great Britain, and five on passage home. Yet the egregious Joseph Hume could propose no better remedy for such a state of things than the abolition of flogging in the United Kingdom. It had never occurred to the poor man that the prospect of liability to the lash on every soil but that of the British 1826.

[1] Hansard, 1825, vol. xi. pp. 925 *sq.*

1826. Isles was not an inducement to the soldier to accept long exile with the greater content.[1]

Not all the mortality in the tropics, however, could relieve the stagnation of advancement among officers; and on the 2nd of May 1825 and the 25th of April 1826 the Horse Guards conceded to half-pay officers the right to sell their commissions subject to certain terms, namely, that they should be under sixty years of age, that they should have purchased their commissions in the first instance, and that they should have served, field-officers or captains for twenty years, lieutenants for fifteen, and ensigns for twelve years. Three hundred and seventy officers took advantage of the opportunity; and the heart of Joseph Hume waxed hot within him. To what purpose, he demanded, was this waste? Many of the three hundred and seventy would soon have died and have rid the country of the burden of their pittance. Now they had sold to younger men; and the charge upon the national purse would be by so much the longer continued. To this Palmerston rejoined that Hume was always complaining of the length of the half-pay list, but that there were only two means of curtailing it, namely, death and the full-pay list. Now, many gentlemen on half-pay had no desire to go on full pay; and if they were compelled to do so, the only result would be to flood the Army with decrepit officers. Of such were the three hundred and seventy composed; and it was an advantage to the country to be quit of them. On the other hand, full-pay captains bought half-pay majorities and then exchanged with a full-pay major, the vendors selling at the old rate, the buyers purchasing at a new rate; with the result that after eighteen months the public profited to the extent of £72,000.

General Gascoyne amplified Palmerston's argument with some interesting details. In one regiment there was an ensign on full pay who was sixty-one years of

[1] Hansard, 1826, vol. xiv. pp. 1192, 1292.

age, and several other officers who were not much younger. In another regiment there were, owing to the brevet-step granted after Waterloo to all officers of a certain grade, no fewer than eight captains who held higher brevet-rank. These were allowed to buy half-pay commissions of that brevet-rank, and so made way for younger men. Altogether it will be seen that the purchase-system, for all its pecuniary saving to the country, had drawbacks which greatly neutralised its economical advantages. But it seems never to have occurred to Hume and his brother zealots for parcimony that many, at least, of these unfortunate half-pay officers had done something to earn their paltry allowance, which, it must be repeated, was still the same as had been meted out to their predecessors a century earlier. 1826.

The year closed with the despatch of five thousand troops to Portugal under Sir William Clinton in circumstances which have been duly set forth in another place. It is noteworthy that even this tiny force could not be collected without the employment of portions of two regiments of cavalry, two battalions of Guards and seven battalions of the Line, two of which last were drawn from the garrison at Gibraltar.[1] It is hardly less interesting that the instructions as to transport and supply were drawn up by Wellington, Master-general of the Ordnance, exactly as they had been when he first landed in the Mondego in 1808 as Commander-in-chief of the first expedition to the

[1] *Commander-in-chief*: Lieut.-gen. Sir William Clinton.
Cavalry: 2 squadrons each of 10th Hussars and 12th Lancers.
Artillery: 4 companies.
Guards Brigade: (Maj.-gen. Sir H. Bouverie) 1/ Gren. Guards, 2/3rd Guards.
First Brigade: (Maj.-gen. Sir E. Blakeney) 4th, 10th, 23rd, 1/60th.
Second Brigade: (Maj.-gen. Sir T. Arbuthnot) 11th, 43rd, 63rd.
Royal Staff Corps: 1 company.
Royal Waggon Train: detachment.

1826. Peninsula. In the list of troops and staff furnished to Clinton there is no mention of a Commissary, the appointment of such an officer lying of course with the Treasury and not with the military authorities ; and it is evident that Wellington did not count upon that department to send out a competent man. It is really almost incredible that, within eleven years of Waterloo, that is to say, within eleven years of peace after twenty-three years of war, five thousand British troops could not proceed on active service without a memorandum from the greatest soldier in Europe to explain how they should be fed and made mobile in the field.[1]

1827. Less than a month after the despatch of the troops to Portugal, on the 5th of January 1827, died Frederick, Duke of York, a man of many faults in private life, but an admirable servant of the public. If he left behind him a huge mass of unpaid debts, the country's obligation to him was not to be estimated in money. He was, as Peel said in the Commons, Commander-in-chief for ten thousand days ; and of these not one had passed without his doing some work pertaining to his high office. Equally during the course of thirty-two long years he had created and maintained discipline without undue severity, using his great powers of patronage with fairness and without reference to political considerations, as a just master and not as a jobber. When his end was approaching and his sufferings were intense, he made no complaint and spoke even to his brothers not of himself but of military business. Nine days before his death, with not inexcusable pride, he compared the condition of the two brigades, which had been landed at Ostend in 1793, ill-found, ill-equipped, and ill-disciplined, with the force which he had just sent, in perfect order, to Lisbon. He was buried at Windsor with civil ceremony, for there were not troops enough in England to pay due honour to a Field-marshal ; but one who had lived for the good of the British Army could

[1] Wellington, *Supp. Desp.* (1858), iii. pp. 490-495.

afford to dispense with escorts and salutes to his corpse. 1827.

Upon his death George the Fourth had some idea of taking the control of the Army into his own august hands ; but Lord Liverpool promptly scouted the proposal as preposterous. Wellington and Peel seconded Liverpool ; straightforward Sir Herbert Taylor gave His Majesty to understand that such a thing could not be ; and on the 7th Wellington was appointed to be Commander-in-chief, holding that office, for the present, conjointly with that of Master-general of the Ordnance, though receiving no salary for the latter post. Some doubts were raised by constitutional carpers whether one man could combine in himself the functions of Commander-in-chief and Cabinet Minister ; but these were without difficulty silenced ; and Wellington, within six weeks of taking up his new post, showed himself a good follower of the Duke of York, by declining to entertain the claims of a general, who supported the government, against those of his old subordinate in the Peninsula, George Anson, who sat in opposition.[1]

Little more than a month after the Duke of York's decease Lord Liverpool, whose health had for long been failing, was stricken down by paralysis and apoplexy ; and though he lingered on, a breathing corpse, for yet nearly two years, was dead to the world from the day of his seizure. He had been in office continuously for twenty years, and Prime Minister continuously for eighteen years ; and history knows him best as the " arch-mediocrity " who was pilloried under that ill-sounding title in a remarkable book by a very remarkable man. Beyond question, politicians, who rise not even to the poor altitude of mediocrity, are found from time to time in the highest places ; but they do not remain in them for long, certainly not for so long as eighteen years. It is doubtless arguable that Liverpool was not well fitted to take charge of

[1] Wellington, *Supp. Desp.* (1858), iii. 507, 531-537, 597-600.

1827. the country in the first trying years of peace ; yet at least, with Castlereagh's help, he governed it, and suffered it not to become ungovernable. But it must not be forgotten that he controlled the department of war during the very critical years from 1809 to 1812, and only left it to become the Prime Minister who carried the war to a successful end. Surely this was hardly the performance of an "arch-mediocrity." It cannot be said in his case that his military subordinates did all the work, and that he took credit for it. He supported Wellington with courage and loyalty from beginning to end ; and Wellington, as we have seen from previous pages of this history, was not always the easiest of servants. To Liverpool, if to any one man, belongs the credit for keeping the British Army in the Peninsula, in the teeth of many discouragements, many and formidable difficulties and increasing denunciation from political opponents. In other words, he had the good sense to choose a sound military policy and the patriotic strength to pursue it with unflinching determination until it justified itself by a victorious end. If such service is to be described as mediocre, then may England never lack such an "arch-mediocrity" in her hour of need.

Liverpool's political death brought Canning to the helm as Prime Minister. His reversal of Castlereagh's foreign policy, with his eagerness to countenance insurgent populations all the world over, alienated from him many of Liverpool's political supporters. Among others Wellington declined to serve under him and resigned the Commandership-in-chief ; whereupon George the Fourth for the second time proposed to take the office into his own hands. Canning managed to persuade him to leave it vacant for the present, and made shift to conciliate his royal master by reviving the post of Lord High Admiral, in favour of the King's brother, William, Duke of Clarence, who, it may be said at once, made himself such an unmitigated nuisance to the Navy that within eighteen months it

was necessary to remove him. In May the King tried again to persuade Wellington to accept the Commandership-in-chief, but unsuccessfully; and finally Lord Hill was appointed to the post, though without the title, being gazetted, according to precedent, as General on the Staff at the Horse Guards. 1827.

With the help of the Whigs, however, Canning contrived to form a government; and, as Palmerston retained his place as Secretary at War with a seat in the cabinet, the Army was in good hands. But Canning's health also was failing, and on the 8th of August he died. He was buried in Westminster Abbey, not, as had been Castlereagh, amid jeers and execration, but with every sign of national mourning deeply felt. It was fitting that the last farewell to the two rival statesmen should present such a contrast. Castlereagh was a ruler of men and was feared; whereas Canning was a flatterer of men and was beloved. His imperious language towards foreign powers, and the telling phrases in which he summed up each diplomatic triumph, appealed to the national vanity; and the ordinary citizen proudly identified himself with the arrogant "I" which was for ever upon Canning's lips. No more brilliant nor witty man has ever governed this country; and it is impossible not to feel sympathy with one who would never allow the tedium of official routine to dull his sense of humour, and could cast even an official letter in the mould of rhyme. But if Liverpool was the arch-mediocrity, Canning was the arch-egoist; and an egoist can be neither a good servant nor a good master. It was Canning who advocated the sacrifice of Moore's reputation to save the Ministry in 1809. It was Canning who instructed Admiral Codrington to enforce the Treaty of London in 1827, and to prevent collision between the Greeks and Turks without himself "taking part in the hostilities between the two contending parties." There is recorded no worse instance than this of the deliberate and precontrived shifting of a

1827. responsibility, which should have fallen wholly upon ministers, to the shoulders of a helpless subordinate. In brief, Canning was tricky and untrustworthy ; and it is not, therefore, surprising that as time goes on his fame should be more and more overshadowed by that of Castlereagh. Finally it was Canning who, despite of his sense of the ridiculous, founded what may be called the lecturing school of British diplomacy, a mischievous novelty which inspired excessive national conceit at home, and general dislike and distrust of the British abroad.

Upon the death of Canning, his place as Prime Minister was taken by an individual who bore successively the names or titles of Mr. Robinson, Lord Goderich, Earl of Ripon and Earl de Grey and Ripon, all of which have failed to redeem him from merited oblivion. For the purposes of this history it is sufficient to chronicle that Wellington was induced to resume the Commandership-in-chief, that Palmerston continued to be Secretary at War, and that Mr. Charles Grant, later Lord Glenelg, who, with the best of intentions and the worst of judgments, was destined to do incredible mischief to the Empire, was for the first time included in the cabinet. This administration lasted for eighteen months, at the close of which Goderich, whose weakness had led him into hopeless difficulties with his colleagues, was bidden by the King to " go home and take care of himself." It was high time that a Minister who could endure, and even deserve, such humiliating language from George the Fourth should hide himself away.

1828. Jan. Goderich was succeeded by Wellington, who took over not a few of Goderich's cabinet, including Huskisson and Palmerston, and installed Peel at the Home Office. As a departmental administrator, no matter in what office, the Duke stood in the very first rank. His transcendent common sense guided him immediately to the heart of a question ; and long command in the field had trained him to rapid

decisions, which he expressed with the utmost clearness in terse language. But the government of the three kingdoms through Parliamentary institutions was strange to him. He had indeed in his earlier days been a member of the Commons and Chief Secretary for Ireland, but the greater part of his life between the age of thirty and fifty he had spent abroad ; and in effect, he knew nothing of England. As Prime Minister he assumed himself to be a commander-in-chief and his cabinet to be his staff ; and, if his staff did not agree with him, they were at liberty to go. It was not long before Huskisson voted in the Commons against his colleagues, and on the same night wrote to Wellington offering to resign his office. Wellington, treating the matter much as he would have treated an application from one of his generals in the Peninsula to go home on leave, accepted the resignation at once and finally. Within twenty-four hours Huskisson repented of his hasty decision ; and two of his colleagues waited upon Wellington to represent that a mistake had been made. The Duke's answer was characteristic. "There is no mistake ; there has been no mistake ; and there shall be no mistake." So Huskisson retired from office, and was immediately followed by Palmerston and three more of Canning's adherents. Wellington thereupon installed his old Quartermaster-general, Sir George Murray, member for Perthshire, in Huskisson's room in the department of War and the Colonies, and replaced Palmerston as Secretary at War by another distinguished soldier, Sir Henry Hardinge. Murray is said to have been an inefficient administrator, but Hardinge proved himself most capable in his new office, and spoke with exceeding good sense in the House of Commons. 1828.

Of the purely political story of the Duke's administration this is no place to speak ; but it is to be remarked that in the first year of his rule the strength of the Army was diminished by five thousand men through the reduction of the recruiting establishments. Palmer-

1828. ston's new organisation had, in fact, altered the entire system of raising men for the Army. The four companies at home furnished a much better recruiting centre for regiments abroad than the single skeleton company of former days ; and now regiments employed only a single recruiting officer apiece instead of several, diminishing the total number of such officers from nine hundred to one hundred. More remarkable still was Sir Henry Hardinge's testimony to Wellington's efficiency and economy at the Ordnance Office, where, in the five years from 1822 to 1827, he had effected savings to the amount of £200,000 a year. No administrator, not even of our own time, has ever been more careful to moderate military expenditure than the victorious general of the Peninsula and of Waterloo. No doubt he knew that extravagance was expected of him and therefore was careful to avoid it. No doubt also the experience of many campaigns in Portugal, with the exchange standing heavily against England, had taught him useful lessons. Moreover, thrift was a part of his nature. But above all he was a good citizen as well as a good soldier, who felt for the distress of his fellow citizens and sought by good husbandry to alleviate it.

More important and far-reaching was a motion brought forward by Peel for a select committee to enquire into the causes of the increase of crime in London, and into the state of the police. Hardly less significant was a question put forward by Mr. Spring-Rice, namely, What was the use of the Militia ? Now Wellington in May 1828 had given particular attention to the Militia, which force was in an exceedingly bad state. Pursuant to an Act of Parliament, passed in 1802, meetings of the lieutenancies of all the counties in Great Britain were convened annually in October for the purpose of holding the ballot. These meetings seem to have been very irregular. They were frequently adjourned through want of the attend-

ance of the deputy-lieutenants and magistrates ; and 1828.
the clerks in England no less than the schoolmasters and constables, who acted as clerks in Scotland, were interested in making such adjournments as frequent as possible, because they received their appointed fees at every meeting. The clerks also abused their powers by assembling the balloted men for three or four weeks, knowing that the unfortunate lot-men could be punished for desertion unless they joined their regiments. Since Waterloo there had been no training of the Militia except in 1821 and 1825 ; and, indeed, it had been practically the admitted policy of the government that such training should be enforced only once in five or six years. There was therefore no object in thus persecuting these poor men who, when released from service, often found their places filled up and their employment gone. In fact it is not difficult to gather that the clerks exerted their authority in order to levy blackmail.

Again, the lieutenancy-meetings, which probably reduced themselves in practice to the clerks, were entitled to hire parochial substitutes,[1] receiving, as a rule, five pounds for each man. They accordingly demanded the five pounds, hired a substitute for two guineas and pocketed the difference. These cheap substitutes were, of course, generally bad characters, who took the bounty for one regiment, proceeded then to accept it for two or three more, and finally enlisted into the Regular Army, receiving yet another bounty. On the other hand, an honest militiaman who wished to join the Army without bounty, was forbidden by law to do so. The door was thus opened for corrupt practices of every description ; and Spring-Rice probably did not exaggerate when he described the ballot for London and the adjacent counties as a mere system of fraud and perjury. Lastly, the practice of enrolling militiamen without training them defeated the whole object

[1] For the meaning of "a parochial substitute" see my *County Lieutenancies and the Army*, p. 17.

1828. of the Militia Acts, which was to exercise the manhood of the nation in arms. For, if a man were no more than enrolled and kept on the lists of the Militia for five years, he was thereby exempted from all further claim upon his services. This fact was quickly realised ; and in fact tens of thousands of men had discharged themselves from all legal liability to defend their country by the simple process of having their names written upon a sheet of paper.

The expense of the lieutenancy-meetings to the country did not exceed £24,000 annually ; but the pecuniary waste, both direct and indirect, of ballot without training was considerable. In the first place, the clothing of the Militia regiments after four or five years of repose in store became moth-eaten, rotten and practically useless. Next, the permanent staff kept in pay for Great Britain and Ireland consisted of four hundred and sixty adjutants, paymasters and surgeons, and not far short of five thousand non-commissioned officers and drummers, who had little to do and much leisure to forget how to perform their duties. In Ireland, where there was no ballot and therefore not so much as enrolment of militiamen, the staff was absolutely useless, except that the bandsmen and drummers were turned to account for the parading of disloyal processions. In the circumstances, the select committee proposed to do away with all of the eighteen hundred corporals and most of the eight hundred drummers on the Militia establishment, to reduce the number of the surgeons, and to make the adjutants do the duty of paymasters and quartermasters in addition to their own.

Wellington pondered the whole matter with some dismay. He knew that the regular army at home had been so much reduced that, in case of war, there were not troops enough even to guard the dockyards. Since the peace, the maintenance of order in the country had fallen mainly upon the Yeomanry. Now the Yeomanry had come into being mainly through the

desire of the farming class to escape being placed on the same level with their own labourers through the ballot ; they were classed as volunteers, which gave them little warrant for permanent existence ; and lately their strength had been seriously diminished. Nothing therefore remained for the defence of the country but the Militia, which also was too manifestly obsolete. The question was whether, even in its utterly rotten and inefficient state, it was worth preserving ; and Wellington decided that, since there was nothing better, preserved, if possible, it must be. He was willing to put down all abuses in the ballot, to do away with the paymasters, to reduce most of the drummers, and to adopt any measure, consistent with economy, that might increase the efficiency of the force. But he would not consent to do away with the ballot nor to diminish the staff, which was essential to the proper organisation of the Militia and to due care of its weapons. He, therefore, recommended that the men should be assembled once annually from Monday till Saturday, which would allow them one day for coming, another for going, and four days to gain knowledge of their officers, their non-commissioned officers and their places in the regiment—in fact much such a training as, for many years before 1899, was yearly given to the Yeomanry.[1] 1828.

There is something pathetic in the strong self-discipline with which the great captain faced unwelcome and dangerous facts. The machinery for training the manhood of England to arms had fallen out of gear because Parliament would not vote the money to keep it in repair. In fact the second line of British defence had perished ; and there was no third line. The Militia was doomed to death ; and Wellington, for all his clinging to the shadow that remained of it, cannot have failed to realise the truth. Moreover, the military situation of the Empire was not satisfactory even for a time of profound peace. In addition to all

[1] Wellington, *Supp. Desp.*, 1858, iv. 397-398, 415-419.

1828. other anxieties, there was trouble in Canada, where there had been a quarrel between the Governor and the House of Assembly, necessitating the increase of the garrison to six thousand men. Even so slight a matter as this subjected the first line of defence—the Regular Army—to intolerable strain. Of one hundred and three battalions of the Line seventy-four were abroad, and only twenty-nine at home. It had now been laid down that troops on foreign stations should be relieved every ten years, that is to say, at the rate of seven battalions a year ; but where were the reliefs to be found if there were only enough battalions at home to last for four years ? The politicians, as is their manner, put forward makeshift after makeshift. One member proposed the establishment of colonial corps —that is to say of permanent colonial garrisons, white and black—to the number of thirty or forty thousand men ; to which Hardinge replied that, in such a case, British gentlemen, who were the best officers in the world, would not join the Army. It had never occurred to this person that perpetual exile in the tropics, or in the very rough conditions which then prevailed at the Cape, in Australia and in Canada, might not attract the cream of British manhood, to say nothing of its wives and children. Another member then suggested that the time was come for parting with Canada upon amicable terms ; and we shall presently see that a school grew up whose guiding principle was to shake Great Britain free of her Empire beyond seas. Indeed, but for the discovery of gold at Ballarat, it is possible that this teaching might have prevailed. Fortunately, Wellington had devised other methods of meeting the difficulty.

1829. The year 1829 came big with trouble of every kind. At home the distress was worse than ever. There had been some revival of commercial and agricultural prosperity in 1822, and considerable lightening of taxation in 1823 and 1824. Moreover, the modification of the Navigation Acts and of other obsolete

trammels upon trade—for Lord Liverpool's government was by no means so blind or so narrow-minded as is commonly supposed—had eased friction in many quarters. But Ireland was in wild disorder, aggravated by actual famine in 1823 ; and in Great Britain the apparent return of better times had led to a fever of speculation. In December 1825 came a crash and a panic ; depression descended again upon the country, and for seven years thick darkness covered the land. Agitators eagerly turned the prevailing misery to their own base account ; and riots, destruction and pillage began anew. Abroad, the prospect was equally gloomy and menacing, what with the approach of war between Russia and Turkey and the troubles with Dom Miguel in Portugal. But, as regards international affairs, the matter was in safe hands, for Wellington, knowing the military weakness of the country, was firmly resolved to keep it clear of any foreign entanglements. For him the lofty speeches and condescending lectures to European powers lay happily buried, without hope (as he trusted) of resurrection, in the grave of Canning. 1829.

In the circumstances the government's measures were not those that might have been expected from a military premier. A bill was brought in, and passed into an Act, to suspend the Militia ballot for a year ; and this same enactment being renewed, annually, with little intermission for the best part of a century, finally destroyed the great work done by the elder Pitt in the year 1757. It seems strange that Wellington should have wrought such a thing. We have seen that he hesitated at first to do it ; and beyond question, had the temper of the nation allowed it, he would greatly have preferred to remodel the Militia system by a new Act. But such a course at such a time would have been out of the question. The ballot had become a farce, and an oppressive farce, and therefore a grievance. There was no object in holding it for the sake of adding a few names to a muster-roll ; and, by

1829. suspending it and reducing the permanent staff according to Wellington's ideas, a saving was effected, despite of a grant of retiring allowances, of £65,000. Hume, not content with this, moved, not for the first time, the utter abolition of the Militia. He was a worthy person but not a wise one.

The Army estimates also were not such as might have been looked for from a great general with a former staff-officer for his mouthpiece. Hardinge, conspicuous with his empty sleeve, rose as Secretary at War to announce a reduction of the Army by eight thousand men. Every battalion was diminished by fifty men ; four companies of one of the penal corps were disbanded ; and the Royal Staff Corps, twelve hundred strong, was swept out of existence, seven of its twelve companies being allowed to pass into the Royal Sappers and Miners, while five were transferred to the Board of Ordnance. The military strength of the country was thus weakened actually by fewer than seven thousand men ; for, though eight thousand were struck off the Army estimates, twelve hundred of them reappeared on those of the Ordnance. But this expedient served to satisfy many excellent though simple gentlemen who, though bitterly hostile to cavalry and infantry, were, quite unconsciously, tolerant of artillery and engineers.

Then came the really important bill of the session, that introduced by Peel for the improvement of the Metropolitan Police, which not only founded the admirable force which keeps the peace in London, but, within a few years, called into being also the rural and urban constabularies all over the kingdom. This is no place in which to speak of the actual state of the old police before Peel's reforms—of the eighteen different police-authorities within the parish of St. Pancras, for instance, nor of the three drunken beadles to whom, in such waking moments as their habits vouchsafed them, was committed the safety of the whole of Kensington. It is more interesting to chronicle that the original

force was composed to a great extent of disbanded soldiers, of whom the Commissioners reported in 1847 that they had never since had constables so trustworthy, nor non-commissioned officers so steady.[1] But even these details must give way to the vast constitutional importance of a measure which, so far as I know, has received little notice from writers upon constitutional subjects.[2] For the Police Force is neither more nor less than that abomination which British politicians had for over a century denounced as fatal to British liberty—a Standing Army. Of course it exists, nominally, only for the enforcement of the law in time of peace, and is supposed to be armed only with staves ; but none the less is it a permanent and most potent weapon for enforcing the will of the government for the time being, which is exactly the feature that our ancestors most objected to in a standing army. From a military point of view the creation of the metropolitan and provincial constabulary was even more important ; for it relieved the Regular Army of its very invidious duty of preserving order at home, and left it free to act as the police of the Empire. The Irish Constabulary Act, which was passed in the following session, supplemented in Ireland the good work begun in England ; and thus, unobtrusively and quietly, was accomplished the work which, though few were aware of it at the time and perhaps still fewer realise it now, must be set down as the greatest and most far-reaching military reform since Oliver Cromwell died, and his local constabulary perished with him. 1829.

The Army estimates of 1830 presented no striking feature, but were of course subjected to the usual carping by the usual people. Hume actually brought forward a motion to reduce the pay of all ranks from the private upwards ; but, as he had not been at the

[1] Hansard, vol. xci., 30th March 1847. Sidney Herbert's speech in Committee on the Army Service bill.

[2] It is not even mentioned in Acland and Ransome's *Handbook of Political History*, a strange omission from an admirable work.

1830. pains to inform himself accurately as to the date and circumstances of the increase of the Army's wages during the past great war, he was easily overthrown by Hardinge. There were also bitter attacks upon the post of Lieutenant-general of the Ordnance, which the malcontents wished to abolish ; but these also were successfully repelled. Then, in June, George the Fourth died, and Parliament, pursuant to the old rule, was dissolved. In September the first railway constructed in England — that from Liverpool to Manchester—was opened ; and Wellington, who was present, travelled for the first time in his life in a carriage at a sustained speed of fifteen miles an hour. Thus, within fifteen years of Waterloo came the earliest revelation of a power which was to change warfare from a strife of armies to combat between embattled nations.

In November the Duke, having suffered defeat in the Commons, resigned and was never again Prime Minister. It has long been and still is the fashion to sneer at his brief administration ; and it is quite certain that, as head of a party and as a parliamentary ruler, he was a failure. The chief reproach against him, however, is that he was opposed to the two great movements which were agitating the country at the moment, those for relief of the Roman Catholics and for parliamentary reform. Catholic Emancipation, as it was called, he himself introduced and carried against his own convictions ; but he did not believe that it would bring peace to Ireland, as many promoters of the measure had promised ; and he was perfectly right. As to parliamentary reform, he had no faith in the direction of the country's and Empire's destinies by an electorate of small tradesmen, still less by the whole body of adult males in the country. He boldly pronounced the existing parliamentary system to be, in substance, the best that could be devised for its particular purpose. This, in spite of all anomalies, it probably was ; presuming of course that

it be desirable for the House of Commons to include not only the ablest men in the three kingdoms but also representatives of the working classes at home, and of British communities beyond the sea. But he also declared that no change whatever was necessary ; and hereby he grievously damaged his own political reputation, and consummated the ruin of his own political party. 1830.

Practically this is the only incident in Wellington's political career which lingers in the memory of the ordinary British citizen ; and the fact is typical of the careless ignorance of our nation. Not a man reflects that he owes it to Wellington that he can perambulate the streets of London unarmed. The credit for the establishment of the Metropolitan Police is assigned wholly to Peel—not altogether without justice, for it was he who, as Home Secretary, had fullest knowledge of the anarchy that prevailed in London, thought out the means for suppressing it, and urged the necessity of the case upon Wellington's notice. But it was Wellington who sanctioned the measure, took charge of the Police Bill in the House of Lords, and was chiefly responsible for passing it into law ; thereby rendering both to the country and to the Empire an inestimable service.

Again, there are still many soldiers who think that, when once he had rendered up his command in France, the Duke ceased to take an interest in the Army ; and they point to his ruthless reductions of establishment, both at the Ordnance Office and at the Horse Guards, as their justification. But, at a time of almost unexampled distress, it was true statesmanship to silence, by anticipation, the clamour against military expenditure ; and the economies at the Ordnance Office were designed to meet a homely but crying need of the British private soldier. Nothing was said about it until 1827, when Hardinge announced to the House of Commons that men in barracks all over the Empire were no longer huddled by fours into wooden cribs,

1830. but had each of them an iron bedstead to himself, to the great improvement of his health, his comfort, his morals and his self-respect.[1] The matter sounds trifling ; but here was a practical action which redeemed more lives, averted more punishments and consequently saved more money than all the speeches and motions of Joseph Hume and his brother fanatics in Parliament. So great is the difference between the man who thinks that he knows, and talks, and the man who truly knows and acts upon his knowledge. Were it not for the homely prose of it, one could wish that there could be added upon the base of all the statues of Wellington the words " He gave the British soldier a bed to himself."

With the fall of Wellington, the old government of England passed away, for better or for worse ; but before considering the structure of the new one it is necessary to take account of the state of the affairs of the Empire.

[1] Hansard, xvi. 559. Hardinge's speech on the Ordnance Estimates, 16th February 1827.

CHAPTER V

THE events of 1814–1815 gave to Europe the fitful and disordered repose which comes of exhaustion. To India they brought rather a renewal and embitterment of unrest. The anarchy that had followed upon the decay of the Mogul Empire was, after a full century, still seething without prospect of abatement in Central India. It is true that the masterful policy of Lord Wellesley had for the time abased all the most dangerous rivals of the British domination. The dynasty of Hyder Ali had been swept out of existence in Mysore ; the Mahrattas had been humbled and brought low; and the native armies trained on the British model in India had by these successes been for the most part dispersed. Henceforward the foremost states of India, whether Mohammedan or Mahratta, were bound over not to fight among themselves, not to overstep the boundaries fixed by the British government at Calcutta, nor to enter into relations with any foreign power, but to refer all differences and negotiations to the Governor-general and to appeal to him for protection, in return for the subsidy which they had agreed to pay, if protection they needed. Finally, Wellesley took the titular Emperor at Delhi under his guardianship, granting him rank and income though no power ; and this he did with no object of asserting the imperial sovereignty in the name of the British, but in order to prevent powerful and ambitious princes, such as Scindia, from forcing themselves upon the imperial puppet as vice-gerents. He aimed, in fact, at the

1800–1814.

1800–1814. political supremacy of the British within the great peninsula, and the reconstruction, upon the ruins of the Mogul dominion, of a new empire which should live in peace.

It was a lofty ambition; and, for one man, he did much to fulfil it; not indeed enough to satisfy himself, but too much for the East India Company and even for the British Ministers, who looked with dismay, the one upon failing trade, and the other upon a vast increase of responsibility and upon a treasury emptied by war. Lord Cornwallis, who succeeded him in 1805, died within three months of his arrival, but lived long enough to initiate a new policy, confining British interference strictly within the limits of British possessions. Sir George Barlow, who followed after him, not only obeyed the halt that had been called by Cornwallis, but even took a step backward, withdrawing from every kind of relation with native states to which the British government was not definitely bound by treaty. Thus he abandoned the subsidiary alliance which Lord Wellesley had projected for the curbing of Scindia, and left to their fate the minor states which lay within or contiguous to the Mahratta possessions. In fact he gave it to be understood that henceforward the British would attend only to their own affairs within their own borders, concerning themselves no more with the quarrels and the interests of their neighbours. We have seen that Barlow had as little love for soldiers as for wars; and herein he was at least logical, for the British India of his ideal was to be an isolated state, within which peace and, with peace, commerce should reign undisturbed, no matter what the tumult and the confusion on the British marches.

This is, as has been well said,[1] a policy which from time immemorial a strong European state, placed in the midst of uncivilised rulers and races, has vainly endeavoured to uphold. Order cannot long live side

[1] Lyall, *Rise of the British Dominion in India*, ed. 1893, p. 249.

by side with anarchy. One of the two is bound to destroy the other sooner or later ; and it was no false instinct which led Revolutionary France to attack her neighbours, and hurried her neighbours into a destructive league against her. In the East revolutions are not the work of the people, claiming equal rights for all, but of individual adventurers, claiming the right to dominate all ; and the oriental interpretation of the French phrase *la carrière ouverte aux talens* is that there should always be an opening for such adventurers. British rule has put an end to this time-honoured tradition ; and India chafes under the change. A vote, a tiny indistinguishable voice in the government, is a poor substitute for the possibility of sole autocratic power. It is true that such power is reserved for very few ; but if a man, by virtue of a strong arm and a superior brain, can rise to be of these few, how should he be content with less ? Thus the British rule, though just, is dull ; and when, as in 1814, it was still strictly circumscribed, anarchy flourished the more exceedingly beyond her frontiers. 1800–1814.

Thanks to Wellesley, British suzerainty and protection now embraced six of the most powerful native states—in the south Mysore and Travancore, in Western and Central India the Mahratta principalities of Baroda and Poona, besides the territories of the Nizam of Hyderabad, and, in the north-west, Oudh. But in Central India there remained still three members of the Mahratta Confederacy, Scindia at Gwalior, Holkar at Indore and the Bhonsla at Nagpore, all of them sulky over their late chastisement and over the limitation of their field of plunder, which, to satisfy traditional Mahratta rapacity, should have known no bounds. Beyond the Mahratta border westward lay the Rajput States, weak, disunited, full of internal quarrels, helpless against the raids of Mahrattas on the one side and of Afghans on the other, and clamouring vainly to the British for protection. This central region was going rapidly from bad to worse. Owing

1800–1814. to the extension of British rule upon all sides, it had become the one happy hunting-ground left to the Indian adventurer and free-booter. The mercenaries disbanded all over Northern India, in consequence of the subsidiary alliances, swarmed into it ; and the greater chiefs drew them to their banners with the double object of preying upon the weaker princes and of recovering the military ascendancy which had been shattered by Arthur Wellesley and Lake. Marauding bands increased and multiplied, the principal of them being known by the generic name of Pindaris. One leader, Amir Khan, was living upon Rajputana with a compact army of thirty thousand men and a powerful artillery. He preserved some kind of discipline, for his design was to found for himself a kingdom. Another leader, Chitu, was at the head of ten thousand horse, or, in plain words, ten thousand mounted robbers, who could only live by raids upon rich districts. Other smaller bands swept down upon any luckless territory that might tempt them. All alike used hideous tortures to compel the inhabitants to disclose where their treasure might be hidden, and marked their visitations by wanton mischief and unspeakable outrage. The great Mahratta chiefs, who might have put them down, recognised their possible value in the event of a renewed contest with the British and left them untouched ; while the Pindaris, on their side, by a tacit understanding, spared the Mahratta districts, and confined their incursions to the territory of the Peishwa and of the Nizam, who acknowledged British superiority, and of the British themselves. Feeble attempts to check them by a long chain of military posts along a vast frontier were of course futile ; and it was rapidly becoming clear that the only way to make an end of these forays was to extirpate the predatory hordes upon their own ground. The task might well prove to be formidable if the Mahratta princes should countenance them ; and this was likely, because some of the Pindari bands were actually feuda-

tories of Scindia, and Chitu himself was a favourite of that chieftain. 1800–1814.

Here was one problem, the pacification of Central India, which pressed for speedy solution ; and it was not the only one. Beyond our frontier to the north a new power, that of the Sikhs, was growing in the Punjab. Early in the seventeenth century the saintly Nanak had founded a new sect, by the union of all that was best in Mohammedanism and Hinduism ; and his disciples, or Sikhs, by the genius of two of his successors were organised first into a regular social community, and some years later into a military force. Govind, who accomplished this last reform, decreed that the faithful should all name themselves Singh or soldier, and should devote their energies to steel alone among material things, ever carrying arms and ever waging war. He also it was who established the Khalsa or theocracy of Singhs, the first Khalsa being a company of five faithful disciples. After many vicissitudes in peace and war the Sikhs at the end of the eighteenth century first came into contact with the British, asking, though in vain, their aid against the Mahrattas in 1788. The British knew little about them and saw nothing very formidable in them ; though one keen-witted traveller had predicted five years earlier that, if an able chief should arise among them, he would become the terror of his neighbours. At the moment the able chief, Ranjit Singh by name, had actually been three years in the world ; and by the time that he reached the age of nineteen he had already made his mark. In 1798 an Afghan host swept down upon the Punjab and mastered Lahore, but was presently recalled westward by troubles nearer home, though not before Ranjit Singh had, by service astutely rendered, obtained a royal investiture of that city. Here he established his capital, and by judicious intimidation of some neighbours and alliance with others gained for himself also the Holy City of Amritsar in 1802. Ludhiana was his next important acquisition,

1800–1814. in 1806 ; and thus he carried his conquests eastward to the Sutlej, and established his hold on the country between that river and the Ravi.

But by this time the course of events in Europe had drawn the attention of the Indian government not only to the conqueror of the Punjab but to the countries beyond the Indus, Scinde, Afghanistan and Persia. Bonaparte's expedition to Egypt in 1798 had excited the fears of Lord Wellesley lest French intrigues at Teheran should bring about an invasion of India from Afghanistan ; and in 1799 Wellesley sent Captain John Malcolm to open negotiations with the court of the Shah. By lavish bounties Malcolm easily secured a treaty which bound Persia to attack the Afghans if they should attempt to enter Hindostan, to oppose any French army and even to refuse habitation to any Frenchman. Almost immediately, however, it appeared that Russian aggression was far more to be dreaded than French. Nelson had put an end to Bonaparte's oriental projects ; but in 1800 the armies of the Tsar had wrested Georgia from Persia ; and in 1804 they followed this up by two great defeats of the Persian hosts under the command of the Shah's heir-apparent. The victorious career of the Russians was arrested temporarily by the treacherous assassination of their general ; and then the Shah, dreading the certain vengeance that would overtake him for this base action, appealed to Napoleon for help. He would probably have preferred alliance with England ; but Wellesley, embarrassed by his campaigns against the Mahrattas, could offer him no assistance ; and England herself was still quaking under the menace of Napoleon's camp at Boulogne.

Thus it was that in the course of 1805 a French mission was established at Teheran, French officers drilled Persian troops, French intrigues became busy along the western border of British India, and there was much talk of a joint invasion of Hindostan by French and Persian armies. The situation was in

fact one that suited Napoleon exactly, and which he could be trusted to turn to the utmost account. Then in 1807, in consequence of the Treaty of Tilsit, affairs assumed a new and even more formidable aspect. There were now rumours of a joint invasion of India by the French and Russians ; and such a combination, at a time when little was known of the country west of the Indus, was calculated to fill even the coolest heads in London and in Calcutta with anxiety. The Indian government, therefore, resolved to regain the amity of Persia, if possible, and in any case to endeavour to unite Afghanistan, Scinde and the Sikhs into a solid barrier against aggression from the west. 1800–1814.

Missions were accordingly despatched to all four of these states ; and their results must be briefly narrated. It so happened that both the Foreign Office in London and the Indian government at Calcutta sent, each without the other's knowledge, its own envoy to Teheran, and that the emissary from London, Sir Harford Jones, was the first to arrive upon the spot. To the huge indignation of the authorities at Calcutta and the fury of Malcolm, who had for the second time been selected as their representative, the successful negotiation of the treaty was, in March 1809, accomplished by Jones. Thereby Persia bound itself to allow no European force to pass through its territory, and, in the event of an invasion of India by Afghans or by any other power, to supply a force to aid the British in its protection.

The embassy to Cabul was entrusted to Mountstuart Elphinstone, who, bringing costly presents, carried his mission outwardly to a successful issue. But Afghanistan was in a state bordering upon anarchy, its usual condition when a single strong man is not at hand to dominate it ; and the treaty, though signed by the nominal monarch, Shah Shuja, was of small value, since his throne had little prospect of stability.

The negotiations with Scinde were a more complicated matter, for the Indian government was anxious

1800–1814. not only to gain the friendship of the rulers, but to open up the navigation of the Indus for purposes of commerce ; and it was not certain that the two objects were compatible. This arid province, scourged by a sun which overpowers even the natives, had passed through many vicissitudes. Having been subject in succession to Mahmoud of Ghazni, Akbar of Delhi and Nadir Shah of Persia, it had finally reverted to a nominal dependence upon Afghanistan. In 1786 the sovereignty had been seized by the Baluchis, and the country had been divided into three independent districts, Khairpur in the north, Mirpur in the south-east and Haidarabad, each under a group of chiefs of the Talpur tribe, who bore the title of Amirs. All efforts of the Indian government to gain access to the Indus were steadily thwarted by the jealousies and suspicions of these Amirs, wherefore it was natural that an opportunity of closer intercourse with them should be eagerly welcomed. The Amirs lived in deadly hatred of the Afghans, and being threatened by them with invasion, invoked the aid of Persia. The appeal was readily answered. An army of Persian auxiliaries appeared ; the inroad of the Afghans came of itself to naught ; and the Amirs, anxious now to be rid of the Persians, sought the friendship of the English. Accordingly, in 1808, a Captain Seton was sent to Haidarabad ; who, being an impulsive, ambitious and foolish young man, concluded a treaty binding each party to give military aid upon the request of the other. Since this committed the Indian government to aid the Amirs against the Afghans, whose goodwill it was even then seeking to gain, this agreement was repudiated ; and in 1809 a new treaty was concluded whereby the Amirs and the Governor-general bound themselves to eternal friendship, and the Amirs undertook not to permit the establishment of "the tribe called the French" in Scinde. Not a word was said about the navigation of the Indus, presumably because it would have wrecked the negotiation.

Lastly, in 1808, for the first time a British emissary, in the person of Mr. Charles Metcalfe, appeared at the court of Ranjit Singh at Lahore. At the outset this incident seemed likely to turn rather to war than to alliance, for Ranjit Singh was bent upon extending his conquests south of the Sutlej, whereas the Governor-general firmly contended that the states on the left bank of that river were, since Lord Lake's campaign, under British protection. The Sikh chief at first played with the envoy, set his troops on the march and seized Umballa ; but in January 1809 a British force under Sir David Ochterlony marched into Ludhiana, whereupon Ranjit Singh after some hesitation recalled his army. Finally, in April, he signed a treaty, whereby he relinquished his latest conquests, and, while keeping such territory as he had previously acquired to south of the Sutlej, bound himself to encroach no farther in that direction. After two or three years of mutual suspicion the Sikh chief and the British general at Ludhiana learned to respect and trust each other. Ranjit Singh was satisfied that the British would not interfere with him so long as he confined his activity to the north and west ; and the British, in their turn, felt assured that, with this outlet for his ambition, he would give them no more trouble in the south. 1800–1814.

But meanwhile new complications had arisen from other quarters. The ink of the Afghan treaty was hardly dry before Shah Shuja, the prince who had signed it, was early in 1810 driven from his throne by his brother. The exiled potentate quickly drifted to the court of Ranjit Singh, who promised him great things in return for the Koh-i-noor diamond, but, having obtained the famous stone, soon made it evident that he designed to use Shah Shuja for his own purposes only. Here then for the present we must leave Ranjit Singh, still full of ambitious designs, and, in order to their fulfilment, drilling and arming his Sikhs after the British model, paying them well to

1800-1814. secure their obedience, and going through the exercise with them himself to heighten their zeal. In another thirty years we shall meet again, in tragical circumstances, with the exiled Shah Shuja, and shall take the measure of the Sikh warriors in the field.

Pindaris, backed by the Mahratta chiefs, and Sikhs, with a man of genius at their head, were sufficiently dangerous neighbours for the British to the north and west ; but there was also a third power which threatened their peace from the north. The mountainous tract, which stretches from the plains of Hindostan to the high lands of Tartary and Tibet, had never been touched nor even threatened by Akbar nor by any of his descendants on the throne of Moguls. The country had not escaped penetration by Hindu migrants and missionaries, who had established their religious customs, with some modification, among the people, and by intermarriage had in some cases slightly altered the strongly Mongolian type of feature. About the middle of the eighteenth century a strong man rose up among the Gurkhas, a people which had hitherto been confined to the territory immediately around Katmandu. This chief formed a disciplined army and, taking advantage of the dissensions of his neighbours, exterminated family after family of petty hill-chieftains and appropriated their dominions. His policy was avowedly copied from that of the British themselves; and it was not less successful. By 1768 he had subjugated the entire valley of Nepal, and, more than this, had infected his people strongly with the spirit of conquest. His capital at Katmandu lay not above one hundred and fifty miles due north of Patna.

Thus along the northern frontier of the British dominions for some hundreds of miles a powerful and aggressive neighbour had been suddenly established. The process had not gone forward without alarm to the British and to the native states under their protection on the plains. The Nuwab of Murshidabad had

attempted to intervene in 1762–3, but had been signally defeated under the walls of Makwanpur, a fortress about twenty miles south and west of Katmandu. The British government also, dreading the loss of trade with the hill-chieftains, had attempted in 1767 to succour one of them against the Gurkhas, sending for the purpose a small party under the command of a Captain Kinloch. This officer advanced by the line of the Bhagmati river, which flows southward from Katmandu, but, though a capable man, could penetrate no farther than to Hariharpur, about thirty miles south and east of the Gurkha capital, when he found himself forced to return, owing to the swelling of the rivers in his front and the impossibility of keeping open communications in his rear. He had started in October, two months too early, and with insufficient strength, and consequently he accomplished nothing. 1800–1814.

A few years later, during the first administration of Lord Cornwallis, the Gurkhas invaded Tibet and called down upon themselves a punitive expedition from China. Both parties invoked the aid of the British ; and in the opinion of many good judges the conditions were such that, with proper handling, Nepal might have been thrown open wholly to British influence and British enterprise. Lord Cornwallis, however, declined to listen to either side ; and the opportunity, if opportunity there were, was lost. The Chinese succeeded in defeating the Gurkhas in the field, and from thenceforward treated Nepal as a tributary country. An envoy, Captain Kirkpatrick, was later despatched by Cornwallis to Katmandu to negotiate a commercial treaty, but he failed ; the Gurkhas being jealous to the last degree of any entry of the British into their country. In 1800, during a contest for the succession to the kingdom of Nepal, an exiled ruler took refuge at Benares ; and during his absence the government of Bengal concluded a treaty with the dominant faction at Katmandu. A resident was also sent to that capital in 1802, but

1800–1814. the same jealousy of commercial intercourse was strong, and in 1804 he was withdrawn. Nepal was, as it still is, a closed land to the British.

The spirit of conquest, however, was yet strong in the Gurkhas. The paramount authority in Nepal had passed into the hands of a faction called the Thapas; and a very able soldier, Umur Singh Thapa, carried the dominion of the Gurkhas westward across the Gogra to the Sutlej. Thus by the year 1814 the Gurkha marches were conterminous with those of the British, and of the states under their protection, along a front of some seven hundred miles from the river Tista, which flows north and south through Sikkim, to the Sutlej. Along all that vast front to southward the plains lay open to the men of the hills. It was inevitable that they should descend towards them, and they did so descend with violence and rapine, as was their wont. Thus arose dispute after dispute with the British government at Calcutta; Sir George Barlow yielding, according to his custom, rather than run the slightest risk of a military expedition; and Lord Minto remonstrating and endeavouring to patch matters up by negotiation, without success. The Gurkhas refused to give up any territory that they had occupied, and treated the British government with contempt.

1813. In October 1813 the Marquess of Hastings, whom we have known ever since the American War of Independence, first as Lord Rawdon, the victor of Hobkirk's Hill, and later as Lord Moira, came as Governor-general to India. After mastering the papers concerning the aggression of Nepal, he in April 1814 demanded the instant evacuation of some of the contested lands, ordering that, unless his demand were satisfied within twenty-five days, a body of troops should move up to occupy them. The Gurkhas answered with feigned assurances of respect, but did nothing; and at the expiration of the appointed period the troops of the Indian government quietly marched

into the disputed districts. Still the Gurkhas made no sign until the end of May, when they suddenly surrounded some small outlying British posts and killed or captured the garrisons. Powerless to take further action until the close of the rainy season, Lord Moira bided his time until November, when he issued from Lucknow a formal declaration of war. 1814.

Meanwhile, as became a commander of skill and experience, he strained every nerve to ascertain the true nature of the military problem that confronted him. Little or nothing was known of Nepal except from the narratives, eked out with rather speculative maps, of Captain Kinloch, Captain Kirkpatrick and a very small handful of travellers who had actually traversed a part of the country, and had gathered information about it from native merchants. Roads, apart from the roughest of tracks, appeared not to exist ; and it was realised at the outset that the only possible form of transport, wherever Nepal might be entered, would be human porters. The native ponies were not commonly employed to carry burdens, though they might be used for officers to ride ; but, with this exception, men who could not travel on their own feet would have to depend on litters, borne by peasants. The troops, moreover, would require special clothing —loose trousers tied round at the ankle, and soft deer-skin shoes or ankle-boots, having stout soles tipped with metal at toe and heel. It would not be difficult to collect depots of supplies at the very edge of the hills ; but, when once the troops had plunged into the tangle of steep forest-clad ridges that form the lowest spurs of the Himalaya, transport and supply would become most difficult.

The Gurkhas, according to the Governor-general's intelligence, carried every man three days' supply of flour upon his back, keeping that quantity always by him whether he could obtain victuals from any other source or not. Moreover the privates were not

1814. provided with tents, contenting themselves with the improvised protection of a blanket stretched over high sticks or bamboos. The officers had little more shelter ; and only the seniors possessed actual tents of minute size, those of the commander-in-chief himself not exceeding a burden that could be carried by six men. The men were described as hardy, patient of privation and obedient, but armed with bad muskets and worse ammunition. Some had not even bayonets, though all carried their peculiar curved knife, the *kukri*. The commanders were set down as ignorant, subtle, faithless and avaricious to an extreme degree ; bloodthirsty and merciless after victory, abject and mean after defeat. Such an enemy, whatever his weak points, promised at least to be wary, elusive, skilled in harassing tactics, and in the primitive but immortal resources of the ambush and the surprise.[1]

Again, what, along a frontier of seven hundred miles, was to be the objective ? Katmandu was the capital and seat of government, rather more than four thousand feet above the sea, but how Katmandu was to be reached, and whether, if captured, its fall would mean the subjugation of the Gurkhas, was another question. One route, following the course of the San Kosi, seemed suitable for a force based upon Dinajpur with an advanced base at Bijapur ; but this signified a march of at least two hundred and fifty miles through hilly country of which little was known. Farther to westward a force based upon Patna could move either due north upon Katmandu by the same line as that chosen by Kinloch, or could ascend the river Gandak north-westward and then turn eastward to its source. As to the former of these routes British travellers had furnished fairly full information. Still farther to the west, Gorakhpur furnished a base for a movement northward upon Palpa, the way to which led through Butwal—one of the districts in dispute—

[1] *Nepal Papers* (presented to Parliament, 1824), pp. 47, 49.

and the occupation of which would sever the main communication between Katmandu and all Gurkha territory to westward. The vanquished chieftains in this quarter were known to be ill-affected towards the Gurkhas and might give valuable aid. But the most promising field of operations seemed to be in quite another quarter, on the Sutlej far to the west, where Umur Singh Thapa, having been checked at the fort of Kangra, was occupying, with the flower of the Gurkha army, the latest of its conquests. Here he was far from Katmandu ; his principal line of communication actually passed for a short distance through British territory ; and it might well be possible to strike in upon it here and between the upper waters of the Ganges and the Jumna, and either cut him off from Nepal altogether, or force him to take such inhospitable paths through the high mountains to northward as would ensure at least the destruction of the greater part of his force. 1814.

Lord Moira, as a practical soldier who had learned in Carolina the difficulties of warfare in a wild country, seems to have spared no pains to obtain intelligence and to guide himself by the experience of the very few British who had ever set foot in Nepal. He had none too many troops for a campaign along so vast a frontier, but after much thought he decided upon the following plan of campaign.

The northern marches from the Kosi river eastward were entrusted to the care of Major Latter, with two thousand native levies, including a newly raised Rangpur battalion,[1] of which he was commanding officer. His attitude was to be strictly defensive, but he was empowered to encourage offensive operations by the Rajah of Sikkim, who was one of the many sufferers from Gurkha depredation, though not to engage in them himself.

Farther to west, a force of some eight thousand

[1] Rangpur lies about 225 miles north and a little east of Calcutta.

1814. men under Major-general Marley,[1] based upon Patna, was to advance by the line of the Bhagmati direct upon Katmandu. Marley was ordered to be ready to break up from Patna at any time after the 15th of November.

Next, another column,[2] under the command of Major-general John Sullivan Wood, was to assemble at Gorakhpur on or before the 15th of November, move northward first upon Butwal, so as to recover territory which had been occupied by the Gurkhas, and advance thence upon Palpa, thus severing the main line of communication between Katmandu and the west.

Next, a column[3] under command of Major-general

[1] Major-general Marley's force.
1st Brigade : H.M. 24th; 2/15th N.I.; detacht. irregular L.I.; 1/8th, 2/15th, 2/25th N.L.
2nd Brigade : Rangpur battalion, Champara Light battalion, 3 companies of pioneers.
Artillery : 1 co. European, 4 cos. Native.
4 three-pounders.
8 howitzers, 4·4 inch.
2 mortars, 4·4 inch.
20 wall-pieces.

[2] Major-general Wood's force.
1 troop 6th Native Cavalry.
H.M. 17th Foot; flank companies of 2/8th and 2/12th N.I.; 2/17th N.I.; half a battalion each of 1/14th and 2/14th N.I.
Artillery : 3 three-pounders.
2 howitzers, 4·4 inch.
2 mortars, 4·4 inch.

[3] Major-general Gillespie's force.
Detachment H.M. 8th Light Dragoons.
7th Native Cavalry.
One battery of Horse Artillery.
5 flank companies of N.I. from Meerut and vicinity. 1/6th, 1/7th, 1/17th, N.I.
2 cos. of pioneers.
Colonel Ochterlony's force.
2nd Native Cavalry; 2/1st, 2/3rd, 2/6th, N.I. 1 and 2/19th N.I.
Artillery : 1 co. Europeans, 2 cos. Native.
2 eighteen-pounders.
2 howitzers.

Gillespie was to concentrate on or before the 1st of November at Saharanpur, strike north-eastward over the Siwalik Hills into Dehra Dun, occupy Dehra, and push out detachments, northward, to seize the unfinished Gurkha fort of Kalanga, and to secure the passages of the Jumna to north-west of Dehra at Lakhwar and Kalsi, and westward into the valley known as the Kyarda Dun. These operations would sever Umur Singh Thapa's line of communication with Katmandu; and, these necessary points once occupied, the principal force would move westward upon Nahan, and eastward upon Srinagar. The object of the former would be to second the operations, immediately to be described, of Colonel Ochterlony against Umur Singh Thapa, and of the latter to seal up the one remaining passage by which that chief could retreat upon Katmandu. 1814.

Lastly, a fourth column under Colonel Ochterlony, based upon Ludhiana, was to concentrate forty miles due east of that place at Rupar on the Sutlej, by the 1st of November, and attack Umur Singh Thapa's main body, which was reported to be at Arki, rather less than thirty miles, as the crow flies, north-east of Rupar.

The general idea therefore was that Gillespie and Ochterlony should close in upon Umur Singh from east and west, thus making an end of the most formidable of the Gurkha forces; that Wood should cut off all Gurkha troops west of Palpa and east of Srinagar from the capital; and that, relieved by these operations on his left and by demonstrations on his right, Marley should march rapidly upon Katmandu. No great difficulty seems to have been apprehended by the military leaders. Due warning was given that the Gurkhas had trained themselves upon the British model, that they had a predilection for ambuscades, and that they were particularly skilful in night operations; but the general impression seems to have been that the British had only to advance, as on

1814. the plains, and that the enemy would flee before them.

False information came early in October that Umur Singh Thapa had taken the alarm and was retreating ;
Oct. 6. and orders were issued on the 6th to Ochterlony to hasten his attack, and to Gillespie to expedite his march to Dehra Dun. Gillespie was disinclined to plunge into the hills until Ochterlony should come abreast of him. Though the bravest and most daring man in the Army, he was disposed to be cautious about the coming campaign, and asked for howitzers and mortars before advancing upon Kalanga. Having obtained
Oct. 20. these, he moved forward, and on the 20th and 21st pushed detachments under Colonels Mawbey and Carpenter over the Siwalik Hills into Dehra Dun, the latter by the Timli pass, the former by the Mohan pass. No opposition was encountered, and on the
Oct. 22. 22nd Mawbey occupied Dehra with thirteen hundred foot, three hundred horse and five guns. On the 24th he reconnoitred the fort of Kalanga, but, finding the garrison on the alert and the place too strong to be stormed without artillery, fell back again to Dehra. Gillespie, who had held his main body together at Saharanpur, ready to move westward to second the operations of Ochterlony, thereupon pushed forward
Oct. 25. into Dehra Dun on the 25th ; and by the 28th had been joined also by Carpenter. "Here I am," he wrote, "with as stiff and strong a position as ever I saw ; garrisoned by men who are fighting *pro aris et focis* in my front, and who have decidedly the resolution to dispute the fort so long as a man is alive. The fort stands on the summit of an almost inaccessible mountain, covered with an impenetrable jungle ; the only approaches stockaded, and stiffly stockaded. It will be a tough job to take it, but by the 1st prox. I think I shall have it, *sub auspice Deo*." [1]

Oct. 29. On the 29th a detachment occupied Kalsi, a fort about twenty miles north-west of Dehra, which com-

[1] *Nepal Papers*, pp. 163-165, 179.

manded the main road north-east and south-west from Gahrwal to Sirmur ; and Gillespie, shifting his camp forward on the 30th, matured his plans for his attack upon Kalanga. The Gurkha force in Dehra Dun consisted, so far as was known, of six hundred men under an officer named Bulbhadar Singh ; and, since he had chosen Kalanga as the centre of his resistance, Gillespie resolved that, if possible, not a man of the garrison should escape. On the afternoon of the 30th he brought up two companies of the Fifty-third and five of native infantry, the whole just over six hundred of all ranks, with a reserve of over nine hundred more native troops, to a tableland about eight hundred yards from Kalanga and four hundred feet below it, on the other side of the deep ravine of the Nala Pani. The movement was unopposed except by a desultory fire of light artillery from the fort, and of matchlocks from a neighbouring eminence. During the night batteries for two twelve-pounders, four six-pounders, two mortars and as many howitzers, were thrown up ; and the pieces, having been brought up by elephants, were mounted before day-break of the 31st. At two o'clock of the same morning, the rest of the force moved out in three columns, each from two hundred and fifty to four hundred and fifty strong, to attack the fort from north, east and south, while the troops at headquarters should assail it from the west. The four assaults were to be delivered simultaneously at 9 A.M., the total number of troops employed being almost exactly twenty-five hundred men. At 7 A.M. signal-guns were to be fired at head-quarters to enable the leaders of the columns to check their positions.

1814. Oct. 30. Oct. 31.

Shortly after daylight Gillespie's guns opened fire on the fort, and were briskly answered by the Gurkha artillery. At 7 A.M. the signal-guns were duly discharged, and at some uncertain hour before 9 A.M. a detachment of Gurkhas moved forward on Gillespie's right, with the obvious intention of harassing his flank. These were checked by the fire of a howitzer and

1814. Oct. 31. driven back, apparently in disorder, for Gillespie, hoping to enter the fort upon their backs, gave the word to advance. The assault was led, it seems, by a dismounted party of about one hundred of the Eighth Light Dragoons, who went forward with great dash, carried a weak stockade that lay between them and the fort, and, followed by a party of pioneers with ladders, rushed up to the very walls. Their very impetuosity, however, carried them too far in advance of their supports. The Gurkhas sallied out. The sabre was no match for the kukri at close quarters, and the dragoons were beaten back with heavy loss. Then the infantry came up ; but the fire of small arms and other missiles from the walls was heavy ; and Bulbhadhar, with excellent judgment, had built out from the gate of the fort an emplacement for a gun which enfiladed the walls. The raking fire of grape from this piece seems not only to have swept away the foremost of the storming party, who had advanced gallantly enough, but to have struck panic into the troops which should have supported them. For a time they fired away their ammunition uselessly at the walls, and then they turned, and were only with the greatest difficulty rallied and brought back to their position in the captured stockade.

The worst feature in the situation was that not a sign had been seen or heard of any one of the three columns that were supposed to be closing in from all sides upon the fort. Gillespie sent messenger after messenger by different routes to hurry them forward, but not one of them reached his destination ; and finally at 10.30 A.M. Gillespie in person entered the captured stockade at the head of three companies of the Fifty-third and two more six-pounder guns of the horse-artillery. These last were pushed up to within twenty-five yards of the walls and served with the greatest coolness by the gunners ; and under cover of this fire the storming party again advanced, though half-heartedly, and was again repulsed. Once more

they essayed to storm and were beaten back; and then, seeing that the men were shaken, Gillespie came himself to their head to lead them. He carried them forward almost to the foot of the walls and was still waving them on, when he fell dead with a bullet through his heart. Therewith the troops gave way; and it seems that it was only the opportune arrival of one of the wandering columns from the east that enabled the assailing column to retreat with some show of order. 1814. Oct. 31.

This was an unpleasant reverse. The casualties did not exceed two hundred and twenty-five; but they fell almost entirely upon the European troops. The detachment of the Eighth Light Dragoons lost five officers and fifty-eight men killed and wounded, or more than half their number. The Fifty-third, of which five companies at most were engaged, lost ninety-eight of all ranks killed and wounded, or about a third of their number. The native troops suffered little; and it is very evident that, though their European officers did not spare themselves, the men would not come on. As to Gillespie's dispositions it is impossible, for want of full details and proper maps, to make any comment. It is certain that he did not underrate the difficulties of his task, that he brought up every piece of artillery that he could in order to batter the fort, and that he tried to employ the tactics which are most telling against an oriental enemy, of barring their retreat from every side. His columns went astray—it is likely enough that they were misled by treacherous guides—and the whole of his combinations went to pieces. It is possible that, if he had not fallen, he might have carried the fort; but such speculations are unprofitable. The main result of the action was that the British Army lost a general, who was not only the bravest man that ever wore a red coat but also extremely capable and resourceful, and that the Gurkhas inspired their opponents with a respect which was not very far removed from terror. Gillespie's force now passed under the command of

1814. Colonel Mawbey, who decided to attempt nothing further until he could obtain from Delhi a few heavy siege-pieces.[1]

Meanwhile Ochterlony, advancing from Rupar, Oct. 31. reached Palasi on the 31st of October. The distance from thence to Arki, Umur Singh's headquarters, is little more than twenty miles as the crow flies ; but the intervening country is covered by wall after wall of rough mountain and jungle, the general trend of the ridges being from north-west to south-east. On the outermost range the fort of Nalagarh, with an outpost, commanded the principal route into the hills. On the next range stood the fort of Ramgarh, with its subsidiary forts ; on the next again, yet higher and more formidable, the forts of Malaon and Surajgarh ; and behind all these gigantic barriers Umur Singh lay at his ease, drawing supplies from his faithful ally the Raja of Bilaspur, whose capital lay twenty miles to north-west of him. He had thrown garrisons into all these forts, but kept his main body at Arki, shrewdly judging that he would have plenty of time to carry it to any point where it was needed.

Ochterlony, firmly persuaded that to assault these fortified posts without heavy artillery would be simply useless waste of men and a playing into the enemy's hands, advanced with the greatest deliberation upon Nov. 2. Nalagarh, and on the 2nd of November halted within three miles of it. A dense belt of jungle lay between him and the fort, which though weak, was accessible only by a very rugged, steep and difficult ascent. Pushing forward seven light companies as an escort to his engineers, he found a site for a breaching-battery, and began the work of making roads and getting guns forward at once, covering his camp at every point with strong posts, for he was not disposed to offer to the

[1] The account of the attack on Kalanga is drawn from the *Memoir of Sir R. R. Gillespie* (1816), Stubbs's *History of the Bengal Artillery*, i. 5-8, supplemented by the account in Prinsep and the reports of Mawbey in *Nepal Papers*, pp. 437-441.

Gurkhas the chance of cutting off weak detachments piecemeal. The advanced party suffered a few casualties from the enemy's sharp-shooters,[1] but by the morning of the 4th at least two eighteen-pounders were in position, which presently opened fire. After twenty-four hours of battering the breach was not yet practicable, though the walls were crumbling rapidly ; but at 9 A.M. the survivors of Nalagarh and of the outpost, only ninety-five men in all, surrendered. Ochterlony's casualties did not amount to half a dozen men. 1814. Nov. 4. Nov. 5.

Umur Singh now broke up from Arki and threw the bulk of his force into the forts about Ramgarh. This was a disappointment to the Governor-general, who had expected that the Gurkha leader, seeing his front menaced by Ochterlony and his communications by Gillespie, would retreat without delay to the eastward. Umur Singh's omission to do so was ultimately his undoing ; but, looking to Gillespie's failure before Kalanga and to the extreme difficulty of the country, he may well have reckoned upon tiring the British out before they could force him to terms ; and he stood his ground accordingly. Ochterlony, for his part, upon hearing of the increase of force in the immediate front, established garrisons in the captured posts and redoubled his vigilance against possible raids and counter-attacks. He sent forward a brigade and four pieces of artillery to cover the only pass by which a large body of troops could move against him, true to his principle of never exposing small unsupported parties to attack. Moreover, he took the unusual step of sending most of his light field-guns away, keeping only his heavy eighteen-pounders, howitzers and mortars. "We shall gain in men what we lose in artillery," he wrote ; "and manual labour, strength and perseverance are our principal dependencies in these Alpine regions. . . . I hope His Excellency will approve a determination I have formed not to be

[1] The words "sniping" and "snipers" seem to have come into regular use for the first time in this campaign.

1814. hurried into any attempt that may occasion more eventual delay than the very tedious advance I now anticipate."[1]

Ochterlony's right-hand man alike for purposes of reconnaissance and for choice of positions was Lieutenant Lawtie of the Engineers; and this indefatigable officer, as soon as Nalagarh had been occupied, was busily exploring Ramgarh and the ground about it from every side. Ascending the heights of Goela, two miles south of it, Ochterlony judged that Umur Singh's position might be assailed from its left flank, and actually ordered an assault; but he countermanded it upon learning that the ground was impracticable. Lawtie having pronounced a frontal attack to be absolutely hopeless, Ochterlony was fain to move his troops round by a north-easterly movement to the rear of Ramgarh, with the object of intercepting Umur Singh's communications with Bilaspur to north and with Arki to east. The operation was extraordinarily difficult. The road was so indescribably bad that even light artillery and ammunition could be conveyed only by elephants, eked out by some seven hundred coolies; and even then the distance, which cannot have been great, was not covered in less than two days. The protection of this convoy, and of the parties of villagers hired to improve the road, necessitated the employment of a great number of troops; and the consequence was that Ochterlony's outlying posts were not as strong as he could have wished. Thus it
Nov. 26. was on the 26th a party sent forward to occupy ground selected for a battery, after driving back some small numbers of the enemy, was suddenly attacked upon all sides and virtually annihilated. Over seventy native troops were killed or wounded; and though the affair was in itself of no importance, it heightened the confidence of the Gurkhas and correspondingly depressed that of the British.[2]

[1] Ochterlony to A.G., 7th November 1814, *Nepal Papers*, pp. 456-457.

[2] *Nepal Papers*, pp. 476, 478-479.

But the close of November was an unlucky time. 1814.
Ochterlony was counting on Mawbey's early capture Dec. 26.
of Kalanga to enable that officer to move his troops
westward upon Nahan, and to distract part of Umur
Singh's force to that quarter. It so happened that on
this same 26th of November Mawbey opened fire upon
Kalanga with eighteen-pounders, and by 1 P.M. on the
27th had, after expending seven hundred rounds, Nov. 27.
battered a practicable breach. He therefore ordered
an immediate assault, forming the storming party out
of the grenadier companies of his force, led by that of
the Fifty-third, with the light company of the Fifty-
third deployed in two parties upon either flank. The
column rushed forward with muskets unloaded, having
orders to trust only to the bayonet ; and the grenadiers
of the Fifty-third mounted the breach, to find before
them a sheer descent, at the foot of which was a forest
of sharpened bamboo stakes, surrounded by Gurkhas
with spears and *kukris*. Not a man dared leap down ;
and the native troops, refusing even to draw near to
the breach, began to fire steadily at the fort under
showers of grape, bullets, arrows and even stones. In
vain a gallant officer of Artillery, Lieutenant Luxford,
brought forward a twelve-pounder and a light howitzer
to the foot of the breach, so as to drive the Gurkhas
away with shrapnel. In vain Lieutenant Harrington
of the Fifty-third ran up the breach to show how easy
the ascent could be. His men must have made some
effort to follow him, for the casualty-list shows that
they suffered severely ; but he was shot down and
his gallant effort came to naught. The resistance of
the Gurkhas was most valiant and resolute. Nothing
could drive them from the breach, and Mawbey was
fain to call his men off and abandon the attempt. He
was bitterly disappointed, for he had made all dis-
positions to prevent the garrison from escaping ; and
on the contrary he had been humiliatingly repulsed.
His casualties exceeded four hundred and eighty, those
of the Fifty-third alone amounting to two hundred and

1814. twenty ; so that the British losses in the two unsuc-
Nov. 27. cessful assaults exceeded the total number of the garrison.[1]

His supply of ammunition having run short, Mawbey decided to blockade the fort and, so far as possible, to cut off its supplies of provisions and water. The service was bound to be exhausting to the troops, and Mawbey apprehended much sickness as the result ; but the blockade had not been in force three days before the Gurkhas evacuated the fort, which was entered by
Nov. 30. the British at 4 A.M. on the 30th. The place was full of dead and wounded, the latter in the last stage of exhaustion from fatigue, hunger and thirst ; and Balbhadar Singh had been driven from the stronghold, which he had so gallantly defended, by the stench of the corpses and by want of water. From forty to seventy men escaped with him, and were joined by a party of some three hundred more who for some days had been hovering outside the British posts. They were actively pursued over terribly difficult ground, and some fifty of them were killed ; but in spite of all exertions the bulk of them escaped safely. Balbhadar had shown himself not only brave but humane, and Mawbey had given orders that, if he were captured, he was to be treated with every respect and consideration. But Balbhadar was not captured, and was destined to bring yet another British officer to disgrace.[2]

The fall of Kalanga, belated though it was, had its effect upon the Gurkhas, who evacuated the fort of
Dec. 4. Bairat without resistance on the 4th of December, and thereby gave the British command of the last of the easier passes from east to west. Had they not deserted this stronghold the British could hardly have taken it. The path to it was in many places not a foot broad, so that it would have been almost impossible to bring even a mortar within range of it ; while the fort itself, being in good repair and containing a good supply of

[1] *Nepal Papers*, pp. 464-467. [2] *Nepal Papers*, pp. 492-497.

water, could not have been reduced by musketry and hardly by blockade.[1] However, since Bairat and Khalsi were both of them secure, Mawbey was ordered to move the bulk of his force, as Ochterlony had designed, through Kyarda Dun upon Nahan, where Umur's son, Ranjur Singh Thapa, was in position with some twenty-three hundred men. Kalanga having been razed to the ground, Mawbey marched from Dehra Dun on the 5th of December and reached Mojamund, three miles south of Nahan, on the 19th. Ranjur Singh by his father's order thereupon retired north-eastward to the fort of Jytuk, nearly five thousand feet above the sea-level ; and on the 24th the British occupied Nahan. 1814. Dec. 5. Dec. 24.

On the 20th Major-general Martindell had arrived to take the place of Gillespie, and on the 25th the new commander planned an attack upon the outer defences of Jytuk. From want of maps it is impossible to follow the operations with any closeness ; but it seems that he sent one column, a thousand men strong, under Major Richards, on a march of sixteen miles to seize a height just to the north of Jytuk, while another, seven hundred and fifty strong, under Major Ludlow, was to approach the fort from the south. Both columns were composed principally of native troops ; the only British soldiers being the grenadier company of the Fifty-third with Ludlow, and the light company with Richards. Both started at night, Richards at 11 P.M. and Ludlow an hour later, by mountain paths difficult even for unarmed men, and nowhere broad enough to admit troops except in single file. Ludlow reached his appointed ground with his company of the Fifty-third only, but, instead of awaiting the arrival of his native soldiers to secure it, yielded to the entreaties of the grenadiers—who wished to wipe off the disgrace of Kalanga—to attack a small stockaded post a little in advance. The Gurkha officer, who knew his business, allowed them to approach close to the Dec. 25. Dec. 26.

[1] *Nepal Papers*, pp. 498-499.

1814. Dec. 26. stockade, when he pushed out parties round both their flanks and opened fire from three sides upon them. The grenadiers recoiled ; and the Gurkhas, charging with the *kukri*, hunted them back to the main body of native troops, which, terrified at the spectacle of British soldiers in flight, took to their heels, in spite of Ludlow's efforts, and ran back to Nahan. The Gurkhas pursued ; and the column returned at unseemly speed to camp, where it arrived at 10 A.M. with a loss of thirty Europeans and about four times as many natives killed and wounded.

Richards fared little better. After nine hours of weary climbing he found himself at 8 A.M. at the foot of the ridge which he was intending to occupy. After halting his men for a couple of hours he resumed his march, took up his appointed position within eight hundred yards of Jytuk, and soon had completed his arrangements for defence. Nothing, of course, was to be seen of Ludlow, but presently Ranjur Singh led his whole force from Jytuk to the attack. Advancing at first in regular order the Gurkhas were easily stopped by a few steady volleys, whereupon they broke up into small parties of sharp-shooters, taking advantage of any cover that they could find, and maintaining an irregular but destructive fire. Till 4 P.M., however, Richards confidently maintained his position, when, finding that his reserve of ammunition had not come up, he sent a message to Martindell to ask for reinforcements. At 7.30 P.M., two hours after sunset, Richards was still holding his own with little loss, when a positive order arrived from Martindell to retire. Retreat by narrow paths along the sides of precipices at night was a dangerous matter, with a skilful and savage enemy in pursuit and no ammunition to keep him at a distance ; but Richards had no alternative. Lieutenant Thackeray with the light company of the Twenty-sixth Native Infantry covered the retirement with equal skill and devotion. At length, after half of his men had fallen, he and his subaltern were both

of them killed ; and then the rearguard gave way. 1814.
All order was lost in the tail of the column ; and Dec. 26.
Richards finally came back to camp with but six hundred out of the thousand men whom he had led out. No blame was imputed to him ; but there was no evading the unpleasant fact that Martindell's first offensive operation had been foiled with the loss of some five hundred and fifty men, and of ten priceless British officers.

Moira was not the man to allow such a matter to pass ; and Martindell received a very unpleasant letter from the Adjutant-general, asking why he had sent no support to either column and taken no measures to protect their retreat.[1] However, there the matter was. Martindell's force was so much weakened that it could do no more than hold its own ; and the Governor-general was at his wits' end to find troops to reinforce it. Ochterlony, therefore, could expect little if any help from Martindell ; and Ochterlony, though he never for a moment betrayed the slightest anxiety or depression, began to harbour serious doubts as to his ultimate success against Umur Singh.[2] He had, as has already been told, made a movement round the southern flank to the rear of the Gurkha position, establishing his headquarters at Nher, a village a mile and a half north-north-east of Ramgarh. Thence he had projected an attack, and had indeed issued full orders for it, but had countermanded them Dec. 2.
upon hearing of Mawbey's second repulse before Kalanga, for he dared not risk the possibility of another failure. This was on the 2nd of December ; and he spent the greater part of the month in persuading the Rajah of Palasi to strike in heartily upon the British side, and to grant the use of his subjects for making a road to his new headquarters. At length on the 27th of December Ochterlony was able to Dec. 27.

[1] A.G. to Martindell, 3rd January 1815. India Office, Home Series Miscell. 649.

[2] *Nepal Papers*, p. 488.

1814. detach a force of fourteen companies, with light guns and howitzers, to attack the stockades on a spur which ran north-eastward from Ramgurh towards Nher. These stockades were too heavily built of logs of stout timber to suffer much damage from any but heavy artillery; and finding that he could not make a breach with his light pieces, Colonel Thompson, who was in command of the party, wisely decided not to assault. The shells from the howitzers, however, compelled the Gurkhas to evacuate one stockade upon a spur leading directly to Ramgarh; and Thompson promptly occupied it and placed it in a state of defence. Umur Singh thereupon concentrated a considerable
Dec. 30. force during the night, and at dawn of the 30th counter-attacked, but was driven back with the loss of about one hundred and fifty men. Ochterlony had shown that two could play at the game of stockades, and that by seizing certain vital points he could compel the Gurkhas to waste their strength in assaults upon impregnable positions, instead of wasting his own.

Umur Singh, however, was not yet at the end of his resources. So far his defences had faced south-west, Ramgarh forming his left. He now changed his front, pivoting on Ramgarh, from south-west to east; and himself quitting Ramgarh, which still formed his right, he shifted his headquarters to the left or northern end of his new line, which he strenuously fortified. It was a clever manœuvre, for the ground captured by Thompson offered no advantage for approaching the main stockades of the new position, the intervening ground being impossibly rugged. Ochterlony answered by a still subtler movement. Leaving a brigade under Colonel Arnold in the position captured by Thompson
1815. to watch Umur Singh, Ochterlony on the 16th of
Jan. 16. January crossed the Gumbur river, struck eastward along the river to Arki until he had turned the ridge of Malaon, and then turned north upon Bilaspur.
Jan. 18. By the 18th an advanced party of irregular levies

under Captain Ross was on the heights commanding Bilaspur ; Colonel Thompson was within supporting distance of him upon the same road ; and Ochterlony himself was in rear. Thus Umur Singh's supplies were cut off both from the east and from the north. If he likewise should take the road to Bilaspur, Arnold had orders to follow him up, occupying the stockades that might be abandoned on the way, and so to place the Gurkha chief between two fires. If, on the other hand, Umur Singh, dreading lest Ochterlony should be before him at Malaon, should retire thither, leaving garrisons in his old position at Ramgarh, then Arnold was to use the heavy artillery, which had been left at Nher, to reduce them. As Ochterlony had anticipated, Umur Singh no sooner realised the object of the British manœuvre than he moved off with his entire force to occupy the ridge of Malaon ; and Arnold, leaving Colonel Cooper to subdue the posts of the position of Ramgarh, marched, pursuant to his orders, upon Ratangarh, heading for Bilaspur. Here then Ochterlony must be left for the present. He had manœuvred his enemy out of two positions, compelled him in some measure to dissipate his force, and now held him straitly confined in his third position, cut off from his sources of supply, and with his retreat effectively barred by Mawbey's occupation of Kalsi and Bairat. 1815.

CHAPTER VI

1814. Turning now to the main columns of invasion upon Katmandu and Butwal, it will be convenient first to follow the force under the command of Major-general Marley. Operations on the Baghmati had actually been opened by Major Bradshaw, the political agent,
Nov. 25. on the 25th of November, when with quite a small force he had surprised a Gurkha post and inflicted on it a loss of about a hundred men, at a cost of no more than twenty casualties to himself. This showed that, to an enterprising officer, the Gurkhas were not formidable ; but upon Marley's advance Bradshaw's independence of command came at once to an end. Having chosen Bettiah as the advanced depot for his supplies and stores, Marley fixed his headquarters on
Dec. 10. the 10th of December at Pachrukha, about seventy-five miles north and a little west of Patna. Here he proposed to concentrate his force and advance in three columns: the right column, of about eleven hundred bayonets, under Brigadier Dick,[1] upon Hariharpur ; the centre column, of about thirteen hundred bayonets, under Major Roughsedge upon Jurjuri ; the left

[1] Brigadier Dick's column :

2 cos. H.M. 24th	162
2/25th N.I.	637
Left wing, 2/22nd N.I. . . .	314
	1113 rank and file.

Artillery : Two 3-pounders ; two 4·4 howitzers.
One 4·4 mortar.
Six wall-pieces.
1 company of Pioneers.

column, of about twenty-two hundred bayonets, under Marley himself, upon Hataura. The remainder of the force was to act as support to any column that might require it, and to keep communication open through the forest at the foot of the hills. The entire month of December was spent in preparing for this plan ; and meanwhile the main body moved up to the vicinity of Bharagarhi, about thirty miles north and a little east of Pachrukha, with two posts thrown out wide to right and left. The first of these, three hundred men of the Twenty-second Native Infantry, under Captain Blackney, lay at Samanpur, about twelve miles east and south of Bharagarhi ; the second, about three hundred and fifty men, half of them of the Fifteenth Native Infantry, under Captain Sibley, was at Pursa, where it appears to have been quite fifteen miles to west of the main body.[1] There were no intermediate posts to give them support ; and neither officer had attempted seriously to fortify his position. 1814.

Major-General Marley's column :

8 cos. H.M. 24th	648
1/8th N.I.	754
2/15th N.I.	798
	2200 rank and file.

Artillery : Four 6-prs., two 3-prs., four 4·4 in. hows.
One 4·4 mortar ; seven wall-pieces.
Half a company of Pioneers.

Major Roughsedge's column :

6 cos. Rangut bn.	558
6 cos. Champaran L.I.	722
	1280

Artillery : Two 4·4 in. howitzers ; six wall-pieces.
Half a company of Pioneers.

(*Nepal Papers*, pp. 483-484.)

[1] It is almost impossible to make out any details of this campaign from want of maps. I have at this moment before me five of different scales and dates, and among them the best modern maps that I could procure ; but Makwanpur appears only on Stanford's map of 1857. The Indian cartographers seem to lack the historic sense.

1814. The consequences soon showed themselves. The principal Gurkha force in this quarter lay at Makwanpur, some fifteen miles north-west of Hariharpur, under a commander who knew his business at any rate better than Marley. He detached two separate parties to fall upon these two isolated posts before
1815. dawn of the 1st of January 1815. What number
Jan. 1. of men and of guns was brought before Samanpur it is impossible to say; but at any rate the Gurkhas opened fire with artillery at 5 A.M., completely surprising Blackney. Within ten minutes he and his second-in-command had fallen, and his men were in full flight. The camp and a considerable quantity of commissariat-stores were burned, and the one surviving British officer, finding his retreat to Bharagari cut off, retired with such men as he could collect fifteen miles south-westward to Ghorashan. The casualties in this affair numbered one hundred and twenty-five, and would doubtless have been heavier if most of the men had not taken to their heels at once. Captain Sibley at Pursa made a better fight, his men being at least under arms; but the Gurkhas, who were in considerable force, attacked simultaneously in front, on both flanks, and in rear; and, though the men formed a circle and stood firm as long as their ammunition lasted, they exhausted their cartridges after two hours' firing and then broke and fled. Happily a reinforcement, which was on its way to them, met them within a mile and covered their retreat; but even so the casualties at Pursa numbered over two hundred and fifty, including Sibley and a dozen European gunners. The artillery, both British and natives, fought magnificently, but the drivers disappeared early; and the only guns, a six-pounder and a wall-piece, were captured by the enemy. Altogether the loss of the British in the two actions amounted to over three hundred and eighty.

Marley, meanwhile, upon hearing of the disaster to Sibley, strengthened his post at Bharagarhi and

marched at 2 P.M. for Pursa. At 4 P.M. he received news of the mishap to Blackney's post and pushed on with all speed through the night, till checked by a deep watercourse which he dared not cross in the dark. On the 2nd he moved to the high road from Bettiah to Pursa, to await the arrival of his train of artillery from the former place, and, having secured it, pursued his advance on the 6th to the neighbourhood of Pursa. But he was thoroughly frightened. The survivors of Sibley's detachment said that they had been attacked by ten thousand men, and those of Blackney's detachment spoke of twenty guns being brought against them. Both reckoned numbers by fears rather than by facts ; but the Sepoys were dismayed to the soul by their defeat, and for a few days there was considerable desertion from their ranks. The Gurkhas spread boastful reports, and talked boldly of moving westward and burning Marley's advanced depot at Bettiah. There was general alarm along the British frontier ; and altogether Marley found abundant reasons for what he called "a line of conduct of a retrograde character."[1] He consulted his two brigadiers, who, naturally taking their cue from him, declared, doubtless without falsehood, that to cover the ground between the Gandak and the Baghmati, to protect the advanced depot at Bettiah, to form further depots at Hariharpur, Makwanpur and Hataura, and to guard the line of communications between Bettiah and these places, would require more than the entire strength of Marley's column and leave nothing for offensive operations. Fortified by this opinion Marley on the 11th fell back to a position covering Bettiah, and sat down.[2]

1815. Jan. 1. Jan. 2. Jan. 6. Jan. 11.

On his left Major-general John Wood, having with extreme difficulty collected hill-porters sufficient to carry his baggage and supplies, marched from Gorakhpur on the 13th and 14th of December. During the latter day he received a message from an advanced post

1814. Dec. 14.

[1] *Nepal Papers*, p. 528. [2] *Nepal Papers*, pp. 523, 526-529.

1814. Dec. 14. which he had pushed out to Lotan, about forty miles north of Gorakhpur, that it was threatened by eight thousand Gurkhas who had come down into the plain. Wood at once sent forward a reinforcement of a native battalion, a company of the Seventeenth, a troop of cavalry, two galloping guns and two howitzers ; but, while giving latitude to the officer in command at Lotan to retreat in case of real necessity, he adjured him, if possible, to fortify his position and hold it. This would seem to indicate that the general realised the war to be a war of posts, and that the Gurkhas must be fought with their own weapons. The Gurkhas, whatever their strength, made no attack ; and Wood, after much delay owing to difficulties of transport, pushed north toward Palpa.

A native agent, particularly recommended to him by the gentleman who was supposed to be the greatest living authority concerning Nepal, suggested that he should first carry a stockade at the mouth of the pass leading to Palpa ; and accordingly on 1815. Jan. 3. the 3rd of January Wood marched with twenty-one companies to attack it on the front and right, detaching seven more companies to fall upon it simultaneously from the left. The distance was about ten miles from Wood's camp,[1] and the last seven miles of the way lay through dense forest ; but the agent asserted confidently that there was open plain round the stockade. Wood himself, together with his staff, accompanied the advanced guard, and was expecting shortly to enter unwooded ground, when he suddenly realised that the stockade was only fifty yards from him. A heavy and galling fire was opened by the Gurkhas, which was returned by the advanced guard until the main body came up. Then eight companies of the Seventeenth, supported by two companies of native infantry, attacked the work in front, while two more companies of the Seventeenth made for a hill

[1] The camp was at Simlar, a name which I cannot find upon any map.

which commanded the stockade. This was duly gained ; but the Gurkhas still fought tenaciously from tree to tree ; and Wood, judging that the stockade, even if captured, would be untenable, drew off his troops and fell back to his camp. His casualties numbered over one hundred and thirty, including two British officers of his staff and four more. The loss of the Gurkhas was reckoned to be greater ; but, as the British had retired, the Gurkhas claimed a victory.[1] 1815. Jan. 3.

The whole affair was trifling, and Wood's troops had behaved exceedingly well ; but the Gurkhas also had fought with great determination, and Wood decided that his force was insufficient to enable him to penetrate the hills. The alarm along the frontier increased ; and the magistrate at Gorakhpur actually reported that he considered an attack upon the town was by no means impossible.[2] In fact, the Gurkhas were credited with extravagant numbers, and, as they boasted loud of their strength and of their meditated aggression, supporting their vaunts by constant little raids, they succeeded in paralysing the columns of Wood and Marley. Wood fortified Lotan and marched his troops occasionally in the direction of the last Gurkha inroad ; but, though reinforced by another native battalion and a regiment of Native Cavalry, he renounced all idea of an offensive.

So things continued to the end of January and the beginning of February ; when the situation proved to be too much for Marley. The Gurkhas, realising that they had to deal with a feeble and unnerved man, insulted his advanced posts, and were permitted to do so with impunity ; and on the 10th of February Marley, without publishing a word of warning to the troops or delegating his authority to any subordinate, rode out of his camp before daylight and vanished from the scene. Desertion is not a common offence of generals in the field ; and it is charitable to assume Feb. 10.

[1] *Nepal Papers*, pp. 524-525.

[2] *Nepal Papers*, p. 535.

1815. that Marley was insane when he was guilty of it ; but
Feb. 10. Lord Moira very naturally dismissed him from his command, though not, as Marley deserved, from the service.[1] The incident, however, had no effect in stimulating General John Wood to action ; and indeed it must be confessed that three out of the four British columns, Marley's, Wood's and Martindell's, were brought to a stand, and that only Ochterlony's, which included not a single British battalion, was making progress. The Gurkhas were undoubtedly a formidable enemy, and the operations were both novel and difficult ; but the greatest difficulty of all was that the generals of the Indian Army were scared and helpless. The junior officers alone kept their heads and maintained their fighting spirit.

On the 19th of February Colonel Dick, who had
Feb. 19. succeeded temporarily to the command of Marley's forces, received information from his intelligence-officer, a subaltern, of an isolated party of five hundred Gurkhas. He at once sent out a party of irregular horse under a cornet, and followed himself with a stronger body of infantry. Numbers of other officers rode out with the cornet ; and the intelligence-officer having adroitly lured the Gurkhas into the open with the prospect of annihilating his escort, the mounted party—apparently more officers than sowars—charged them and cut them down to a man. The Gurkha parties thereupon retired hurriedly from the plains and forest into the hills. On the very next day, the 20th of February, Marley's successor, Major-
Feb. 20. general George Wood, arrived ; and once again there was paralysis. His column had by this time been augmented to over thirteen thousand men ; but, dreading the approach of the sickly season—no trifle, it must be admitted, in the Terai—he contented himself with marching south-eastward along the southern

[1] Strangely enough, Marley was not even hindered in future advancement. He held lucrative commands for many years, and died, a full general, in 1842 (Stubbs's *Bengal Artillery*, i. 29 *n.*).

border of the forest to Janakpur, about fifty miles east and south of Bharagarhi, and thence back again to his starting-point. Not a single Gurkha was seen, for not one was within many miles of the army ; and, for all the good done, the column might as profitably have marched back to Patna. 1815.

Naturally this enterprise had no very inspiring effect upon George Wood's namesake John, who had contented himself in March with burning a few Gurkha villages, and was only with the greatest difficulty pushed up to Butwal again in April. Arriving before the place on the 17th, he drew up his army in battle-order, opened fire of artillery and musketry and, after suffering a few casualties, marched back to Gorakhpur, doing a little devastation of Gurkha territory on the way. The manœuvre before Butwal was of course described as a reconnaissance in force ; but, as is not uncommon in such cases, it was really a demonstration in feebleness. Altogether the two Woods showed themselves to be tremulous and not easy to kindle, aspen rather than oak. April 17.

Martindell was little less sluggish than they. Bulbhadar Singh's detachment after its escape from Kalanga had contrived to make its way into Jytuk, to the immense annoyance of Moira, who rebuked Martindell sharply for not intercepting him, and added exhortation to greater activity. Martindell's excuses were pathetic. He had sent a detachment to intercept Bulbhadar Singh ; but the Gurkha chief had eluded it by taking an unfrequented path. As to inactivity, he had endeavoured early in February to establish a permanent post on a hill on the same ridge with Fort Jytuk. No sooner had he done so than the rain poured down without ceasing for four days and nights. The garrison of the post was nearly starved, and was with difficulty relieved ; and, no sooner had the relief been effected, than the rain came down again. The mountain-paths became so slippery that two elephants and several men, laden with camp-equipment,

1815. fell over precipices and were killed. Then the weather improved, and he sent up mortars, howitzers and light field-guns to shell the Gurkha stockades. The effect of these small pieces was trifling, so he prepared to bring up eighteen-pounders ; but this involved making roads, and this again necessitated the employment of a large force to cover the working-parties. However, the eighteen-pounders were dragged into position, to the great astonishment of the Gurkhas, who watched the operation with the greatest interest and made no attempt to interrupt it. Indeed, it suited them much better that Martindell should use his troops to protect fatigue-parties rather than to intercept the Gurkha detachments which were continually making their way into Jytuk.[1]

Martindell's intelligence-department was bad ; but on the 17th of February he heard news of the approach of such a detachment from the Jumna, and sent out two thousand irregular levies to intercept them. The Gurkhas did not number more than two hundred, but the British officer in command dared not attack them with his rabble, and contented himself with surround-
Feb. 21. ing them by a chain of posts. Thereupon on the 21st the Gurkhas fell *kukri* in hand upon the nearest post, which gave way at once ; and in a few minutes the entire cordon was in panic flight, leaving the Gurkhas free to enter Jytuk. Meanwhile Martindell had at last brought up his heavy guns, and, opening fire on
Feb. 20. the 20th, had battered a Gurkha stockade to the ground. Having accomplished this, it occurred to him that it was useless to storm and occupy the ruins, since they could not be maintained against the force that might be launched against it from Jytuk. Since the essence of a war of posts is to gain a hostile position as cheaply as possible, and provoke the enemy to sacrifice strength in the vain endeavour to regain it, Martindell's sudden abandonment of his operations is difficult to explain,

[1] I.O. Home Series, Misc., 652, Martindell to A.G., 10th February, 6th March 1815.

and all the more so since his force counted five thousand men, and the Gurkha troops not more than half of that number. It is possible that he chose the wrong stockade for attack. It is more probable that the man was hopelessly cowed by his first reverse ; and he now set himself to reduce Jytuk by blockade and starvation. 1815.

On the 1st of April he detached two[1] battalions and some irregulars under Major Richards to attack a post on the eastern ridge near Jytuk ; and Richards carried this and another beyond it with little difficulty, inflicting a loss of over three hundred killed and wounded upon the enemy at a cost of under forty casualties to himself. He then proceeded to stockade the captured positions, and the Gurkhas did not venture to counter-attack. The Gurkhas in fact were not really formidable when encountered by young and skilful officers ; but the old Indian generals, sapped by the climate and with no traditions but of comfortable and victorious advances in the plains against an enemy which invariably ran away, were helpless in face of a few brave and cunning hill-men. By the end of April a chain of stockaded posts had been established round Jytuk with little difficulty or loss, and the garrison of the fortress was seriously straitened. April 1.

Let us now return to Ochterlony, the one senior officer who from the first had shown himself superior to the Gurkhas. He had, it will be remembered, manœuvred Umur Singh out of the ridge of Ramgarh, and compelled him to shift eastward with his main force to the ridge of Malaon. He had further cut off Umur Singh's communications northward with Bilaspur and westward with Arki. The next object was to gain the ridge of Ramgarh itself, by the capture of the fortress and of the minor post dependent upon it. This operation, entrusted to Colonel Cooper, was a matter of time, for these strongholds could not be breached without heavy guns, which could only be brought up slowly and by the greatest exertion

[1] 1/13th and 15th N.I.

1815. in so rugged a country. By the 16th of February,
Feb. 16. however, Ramgarh was breached, and its garrison, together with that of a minor fort, making about two hundred men in all, capitulated without awaiting an assault. Cooper then moved northward against the
Mar 10. fort of Taragarh, but could not open fire until the 10th of March. After a day's battering the Gurkhas evacuated the place ; and Cooper moved on to Chambagarh, which surrendered, also after a single day's
Mar. 16. cannonade, on the 16th of March. Thus Cooper's work was done ; and meanwhile Arnold also had mastered Ratangarh. The ridge of Ramgarh was occupied from end to end ; communication with Bilaspur had been severed ; and Cooper's force was free to join in the final operations against the ridge of Malaon.

These had been gradually matured by Ochterlony during the past six weeks. Umur Singh's position extended from the fort of Malaon in the north to that of Surajgarh in the south ; but since Ochterlony's main force was in the valley to east of the Malaon ridge, Umur Singh had faced about to eastward so that his right rested on Surajgarh and his left on Malaon. The comb that connected these two strongholds was just over four miles long, being broken by a chain of peaks, nearly every one of which was crowned by a Gurkha stockade. The lower peaks to east of Surajgarh were also strongly stockaded ; but there were two points on the main ridge, Deothul, about two thousand yards south of Malaon, and Ryla, about the same distance north of Surajgarh, which were undefended. Ochterlony judged that if he could seize but one of these two undefended points he would cut Umur Singh's force in twain, while, if he could not only take but hold Deothul, he could make certain of the reduction of Malaon.

His plans were laid with minute precision. His force lay in the valley of the Gumrola, headquarters being at the village of Buttoo at about an equal distance

from Deothul and from Ryla. First, a column of irregulars was directed to move up to Ryla during the night of the 14th of April. It did so, and upon arriving at the position sent a signal to headquarters by flashing a light. Thereupon two more columns set out, the one from Buttoo, the other from a point farther to south, and converged south-westward and north-westward upon Ryla, where they joined the irregulars without any opposition. Simultaneously two more columns, the one from Buttoo under Lieutenant-colonel Thompson and the other from farther north under Major Lawrie, marched westward to the bed of the Gumrola. Here they halted, waiting for daylight in order to push on north-westward and south-westward upon Deothul, while two smaller columns, each of three companies of Sepoys together with irregular levies, under Captains Bowyer and Showers, prepared to advance, as a feint movement, the former from the east, the latter from the north, direct upon Malaon. 1815. April 14. April 15.

All went well. Thompson and Lawrie met at the foot of the last ascent to Deothul, and proceeded as one column. As its head reached the summit, the advanced guard was charged by a picquet of twenty or thirty Gurkhas, and at once turned tail. The panic infected the main body ; and it was only by extreme exertions of the officers that order was restored. Happily the Gurkhas devoted most of their attention during the day to the columns of Showers and Bowyer, though here once more the Sepoys were unsteady. The Gurkhas charged Showers's column ; and, though that officer gallantly led a counter charge and even slew the Gurkha leader in single combat, his men would not stand by him. Presently he was shot down ; and his detachment incontinently took to its heels and ran for half a mile or more with the Gurkhas in eager chase, until the pursuers were stopped by the British guns in the post of Ratangarh, a mile to the north. Bowyer, seeing what had happened, took his men in

1815. hand and retreated steadily by alternate bodies, inflicting considerable loss upon the Gurkhas, who had followed him in confidence of an easy victory, and suffering little himself. Thus the Gurkhas were distracted from the really vital point at Deothul, and gave Thompson and Lawrie time to prepare their position thoroughly for defence.

At nightfall Umur Singh realised his blunder. Two battalions of native infantry with two light field-guns, besides irregulars, were in occupation of Deothul; and, unless he could drive them out, he was lost. He therefore called out two thousand of his best men under Bhagti Thapa, his best officer,
April 16. and just before daybreak delivered his counter-attack at all accessible points. The Gurkhas came on with splendid courage, Umur Singh, with his banner planted by his side, watching them the while just within musket-shot; and several of them were bayonetted or cut down within the British works. Their sharp-shooters meanwhile devoted all their attention to the detachments with the British guns, and with such effect that at length but three officers and one gunner were left to serve them. The struggle for long hung in the balance, and might have inclined to the Gurkha side, had not the officer in command at Ryla sent a timely reinforcement with ammunition. At length after two hours the Gurkha assault slackened. The British counter-attacked; Bhagti Thapa was slain; and the Gurkhas took to flight. They left over five hundred killed and wounded on the ground. Ochterlony's casualties in the defence of Deothul amounted to two hundred and thirteen, and in the operations of the 15th and 16th to three hundred and fifty-four.

Here at last was a real success. Umur Singh withdrew all his outlying troops to Malaon, evacuating even Surajgarh, the garrison of which was intercepted and dispersed. Ochterlony, without losing a moment, began the construction of a road for heavy guns to

Deothul, with a view to close blockade of Malaon. 1815.
The preparations were, of course, lengthy and tedious ; but meanwhile things had gone ill with the Gurkhas in other quarters. Unable to spare more of the King's and East India Company's troops for this troublesome campaign, Moira had entrusted two British officers, Colonel Gardner and Captain Hearsey, both of whom had been in Scindia's service until the outbreak of the Mahratta war, with the duty of raising levies in Rohilkhand for an attack upon Kumaon. Receiving their commissions in December, these two officers had organised their raw troops by February 1815, when Gardner advanced from Kashipur, about March.
a hundred miles south-west of Saharanpur, and Hearsey from Pilibhit, some sixty-five miles farther to south, the former north-eastward and the latter northward upon Almora.

Hearsey, attempting to hold too wide a line, was defeated on the 31st of March, himself captured Mar. 31.
and his levies dispersed. Gardner, manœuvring with extreme skill, and avoiding all actions in which he had not decided superiority, penetrated by the end of March deep into the heart of Kumaon, and, moreover, gained all the people heartily to his side. Moira, therefore, at the beginning of April rein- April.
forced him with over two thousand regular native infantry and ten guns under Colonel Jasper Nicolls, his Quartermaster-general, who now took the command out of Gardner's hand. Energetic as Gardner himself, Nicolls promptly continued the advance and, encouraged by a successful skirmish, pushed on to the walls of Almora. He was here counter-attacked by the Gurkhas on the night of the 25th, but held his own ; and, bringing up his guns, he on the next day received April 26.
an urgent message from the governor of the town for a suspension of arms. A capitulation was then signed which provided for the surrender of the entire province of Kumaon to the British, the liberation of Major Hearsey, and the withdrawal of all Gurkha troops to

1815. east of the Kali River—the present western frontier of Nepal.

The news of this disaster to the Gurkha arms
May. reached Umur Singh in the first week of May, by which time Ochterlony had already raised one battery against Malaon. The Gurkha garrison, much disquieted, urged Umur Singh to come to terms ; but Umur Singh obstinately refused, saying very truly that they had only to hold out until the rainy season, when the British would be forced to withdraw. Thereupon his men began to desert so rapidly, not to their homes but to take service with the British, that by the
May 15. 15th of May but two hundred were left in Malaon. On that day, therefore, the gallant chief capitulated, surrendering not only Malaon but Jytuk, and agreeing once again that all Gurkha troops should be withdrawn to east of the Kali. Umur Singh and his son Ranjur, in consideration of their valiant defence, were allowed to march out of Malaon and Jytuk with the honours of war, and to carry all their private property with them ; but of the Gurkhas, who had deserted, Ochterlony retained sufficient to form three full battalions.

Thus the whole face of the campaign was changed ; and the Gurkhas, shaken in their confidence that they could defend themselves successfully against the British, sent down an emissary from Katmandu to sue for peace. Lord Moira stated his terms, which were, briefly, the permanent cession of the conquered ground and of the Terai along the whole length of the southern frontier of Nepal, the restoration by the Gurkhas of such territory as they had wrested from the Raja of Sikkim, and the reception of a resident at Katmandu. These conditions being rejected, Moira prepared a new plan of campaign. Ochterlony was transferred to the command of the column which had originally been entrusted to Marley ; Colonel Nicolls took over that of General Wood, which was considerably reinforced ; and a brigade was entrusted to Lieutenant-colonel Adams for the invasion

of Nepal from Kumaon. Meanwhile the negotiations for peace were not wholly broken off; and Moira consented to restrict his claim to the Terai to that part of it only which extended from the Gandak westward to the Gogra. This concession was accepted; and a treaty to that effect was signed on the 28th of November, ratification being promised by the Gurkha agent within fifteen days. Thereupon Moira assumed that peace was actually accomplished. Salutes were fired; the preparations for the new campaign were suspended; and the commissariat began hastily to break up its transport-train and to sell off the supplies accumulated in the depots. 1815. Nov. 28.

These measures were very soon proved to be premature. No ratification of the treaty came from Katmandu; and in fact the agreement was finally rejected by the Gurkha chiefs. The passes along the principal route into Nepal, due north from Katmandu, were fortified to the utmost; and at the beginning of February 1816, Ochterlony, who was moving his force up to the Terai, was met by the news that the Gurkhas had decided to recommence the war. His army amounted now to nearly twenty thousand men organised into four brigades.[1] One of these, under Colonel 1816. Feb.

[1] *Right Column*—
1st Brigade. Lieut.-col. Kelly, H.M. 24th.
H.M. 24th; 1/18th N.I.; Right wing, 1/21st N.I.; Left wing, 2/21st N.I.; Champaran L.I. All ranks 4201
Centre Column—Major-general Sir D. Ochterlony.
3rd Brigade. Lieut.-col. Miller, H.M. 87th.
4th Brigade. Colonel Burnet.
H.M. 87th; 2/4th N.I.; 2/8th N.I.; 2/9th N.I.; 2/12th N.I.; 2/15th N.I.; 2/22nd N.I.; 2/25th N.I.; Right wing, 1/30th N.I. All ranks 7843
Left Column—
2nd Brigade. Lieut.-col. Nicolls, H.M. 66th.
H.M. 66th; 5th Grenadier Bn.; 8th Grenadier Bn.; 1/8th N.I.; 2/18th N.I. All ranks . . 4280
Cavalry. 5 troops 1st Rohilla Cavalry . . 500
Artillery, Pioneers, Staff, etc. 2540
19,364

1816. Kelly, of the Twenty-fourth, he detached to his right with directions to advance, if possible, by the Baghmati River and Hariharpur ; two more he kept under his own orders to penetrate the Bichakoh or Churiaghati pass upon Hataura ; and the fourth, under Lieutenant-colonel Oliver Nicolls, was to advance upon Ramnagar, about twenty-six miles north and a little west of Bettiah.

The centre column had been assembled at Amwa, about seven miles south-east of Bettiah, from which point it marched northward by infamous boggy roads to the edge of the great forest at Semrabasa. Here a fortified depot was established in a building ; and the advance was continued to the foot of the Churiaghati pass, the Gurkhas making no attempt to dispute the passage of the forest. Here again there was a halt, while a depot was fortified and filled up ; and careful reconnaisance was made of the pass itself. Reports both of officers and spies agreed in describing it as inaccessible, but after four days an unguarded route was discovered by which the defile could be turned.

Feb. 10. The enemy's picquets being in full view, Ochterlony left the tents of Miller's brigade ostentatiously standing; but at 9 P.M. withdrew the brigade under screen of darkness and brought up the Fourth brigade to cover the ground thus vacated. He then in person led Miller's brigade through a deep and narrow ravine into a nearly dry water-course, along which the men moved through bright moonlight at the rate of about two hundred yards an hour, at every twenty yards plunging deep into waterholes or scrambling over

Feb. 11. boulders. Then began a steep and dangerous ascent ; the advanced guard reaching the summit of the pass at 8 A.M. and thence pushing some two miles farther on to a position where water was to be found, which the last of the troops did not reach until 9 P.M. Meanwhile five companies were left at the summit to protect working-parties, which were felling trees and constructing roads ; and with enormous difficulty two

elephants, carrying ammunition, were coaxed up the ascent. Then came a halt of four days, during which the troops suffered much from privation and cold. Through some blunder on the part of the staff, the men had not been warned to carry three days' rations with them, as had been intended ; their clothing had suffered greatly through the roughness of the march ; and their shoes had been literally worn off their feet. During seven days the pioneers worked strenuously on the construction of roads ; and by the 18th these were fit for the forwarding of supplies and even of guns. " I had the happiness," wrote Ochterlony with modest elation, " to see that object effected which had been pronounced impracticable." 1816. Feb. 18.

The sudden appearance of a British force with elephants and guns in the heart of the mountains profoundly affected the Gurkhas, who had never dreamed that such an inroad was possible. On the 15th Colonel Burnet, advancing with his brigade to the mouth of the Churiaghati Pass, found the elaborate defences evacuated and was able to penetrate it with little difficulty or loss. On the 19th, therefore, Ochterlony moved on to Hataura, where he was joined on the 20th by Dick ; and the first stage of a very difficult advance was accomplished. After a week's halt for the formation of a depot, Ochterlony pursued his way to the next barrier on his road, the fort of Makwanpur, situated at the eastern end of a low ridge, running from east to west. The principal features in this ridge were occupied by the enemy when Ochterlony on the evening of the 27th encamped on the plain along its southern slopes ; but on the morning of the 28th the Gurkhas evacuated a village at its western end, and Ochterlony promptly detached the light companies of the Eighty-seventh and of the Twenty-fifth Native Infantry to seize it. These could only ascend the hill by a very rough path in single file, and presently encountered the Gurkhas, who had evacuated the village, returning to retake it. A very sharp skirmish Feb. 19. Feb. 20. Feb. 27. Feb. 28.

1816 ensued. Both sides fought in extended order, avail-
Feb. 28. ing themselves of every scrap of cover, and the British officers in many cases used double-barrelled fowling pieces with great effect. After a stubborn contest the Gurkhas were driven back, and the village was secured. But now the enemy streamed out of Makwanpur, some two thousand strong, determined to recover the lost post ; and Ochterlony, turning two six-pounders upon them as they advanced, sent up in succession the rest of the Twenty-fifth Native Infantry, two more companies of the Eighty-seventh, and the Eighth Native Infantry, to reinforce the troops in the village. Thus after a well-contested combat the Gurkhas were finally repulsed at sunset by a charge of the Eighth Native Infantry, and retired discomfited within their forts and stockades. The casualties of the British numbered two hundred and twenty, the light company of the Eighty-seventh losing thirty men out of eighty. Those of the Gurkhas were reckoned at five hundred.

Feb. 29. On the following day Nicolls's brigade, having also made its way through an unwatched pass to the valley of the Rapti, joined Ochterlony before Makwanpur. Colonel Kelly likewise succeeded in finding an unguarded route which brought him within a few miles of Hariharpur without opposition. Here, however, he found his further progress barred, and on the 29th sought an easier passage a little to the west. On the
Mar. 1. following morning he seized a hill which threatened the enemy's principal stockade on the Baghmati ; and this brought the entire Gurkha force down upon him. The detachment which held the hill, not exceeding eleven companies, was hard pressed for some six hours from daylight till noon, but maintained its ground until reinforced, when the Gurkhas were driven off with appreciable loss. Kelly's casualties did not exceed sixty-one, and the action resulted in the evacuation of Hariharpur, which he promptly occupied and converted into a depot.

The defeat of the Gurkhas before Makwanpur spread consternation at Katmandu ; and an envoy was hastily sent to Ochterlony with the once rejected treaty duly ratified. Ochterlony answered that the Gurkha chiefs must now expect harder terms, and began to throw up batteries within five hundred yards of Makwanpur. On the 3rd of March the enemy reappeared, and entreated Ochterlony abjectly to accept the ratified treaty ; which the general, thinking that the Gurkhas had been sufficiently humiliated, now consented, in effect, to do. The campaign, in fact, had closed none too soon, for the sickly season was approaching and seventy men of the Eighty-seventh had been sent to hospital that morning with dysentery. Thus, then, ended the first and last Gurkha war. 1816. Mar. 3.

It is a pity that there is not fuller material for the study of this, our first mountain campaign in India. The story of such campaigns is always the same. The enemy is brave and elusive, and knows well how to turn to the best account the advantages offered to him by the ruggedness of his country. The ways by which it may be entered are few, difficult and easily defended ; there are scant supplies for an army to be obtained, and even water is not infrequently hard to find. The invader also is only at the beginning of his troubles when he forces an entrance. He may do so at comparatively small cost of life, but, even then, his casualties are likely to be larger than his enemy's, and he must leave a chain of posts along the whole length of his communication. By this means alone can a regular transmission of supplies and stores be assured to the army ; by this means alone is retreat made secure ; yet these posts themselves must be victualled, and they are really a succession of vulnerable spots, always liable to petty injury and, if there be the slightest neglect or lack of vigilance, to very serious damage. The wear and tear of transport is terrible ; and wet and cold, which are inseparable from mountains, cause much sickness among the men. Hospitals, hospital-

1816. stores and the evacuation of the sick add to the strain upon the lines of communication. All these difficulties may be overcome ; and yet the commander is little nearer to the accomplishment of his main task, the imposition of his will upon his enemy. He may reach the hostile capital and occupy it, yet the hostile resistance remains unsubdued. He cannot bring his enemy to action except upon the enemy's own terms ; and, if he falls back upon the crude methods of rough-and-ready attack, he is sure to lose heavily and to accomplish practically nothing. If on the contrary he proceeds slowly and cautiously, he is still not immune from petty but humiliating reverses which irritate him, frighten his political superiors and dishearten his troops. The operations are interminably slow and tedious, and their monetary cost is so great that the financial authorities clamour for despatch at almost any price. In fact, these mountain-campaigns are as arduous as they are thankless, and as troublesome as they are inglorious.

It was fortunate, therefore, that in 1814 there was a Governor-general who had had experience of guerilla warfare, and at least one commander who saw his way clearly and was strong enough to insist upon it. The isolation of some of the best of the Gurkha troops in the Sutlej was an advantage promptly seized by Moira and never let go. The initial reverses at Kalanga were vexatious, but the object of cutting off Umur Singh's force from Nepal was a sound one, and was attained in time to be ultimately decisive. Yet, but for the pressure of Ochterlony, Umur Singh, having obtained a new base of supply at Bilaspur, need have troubled himself little about his communications with Nepal ; and Ochterlony's great difficulty was to make his pressure felt. From the first he made it his rule that Gurkha stockades and *sangars* must be dealt with always at long range, otherwise his force of men would be rapidly consumed by costly assaults. Hence he would attempt no serious operation without

siege-artillery. To drag these cumbrous pieces over so appalling a country was heavy work and slow, but it was sure and it did not cost lives. It was, however, not the less anxious, for there remained always the double problem of covering the working-parties which made the roads for the cannon, and of seizing and holding good positions for batteries. As regards the working-parties, he was in the fortunate situation of having on the Sutlej a very large supply of civil labour at his disposal, which enabled him to use his military force exclusively for military duties. Had he been obliged to employ half of a brigade upon fatigue-duty and the other half to protect it, he would probably have failed to make his operations successful. As to artillery-positions and other tactical points, he fought his enemy with his own weapons, pouncing upon the ground that he desired, and then fortifying it with all possible haste, so that the Gurkhas found themselves obliged to attack stockades, whereas the essence of their system of warfare was to defend them. Even so, however, Ochterlony did not escape serious loss to some of his detached parties. 1816.

The final advance of the central column to Makwanpur through the turning of the Churiaghati Pass seems to have been in its kind a masterpiece. The Gurkhas were evidently undone by excessive confidence. They had made the main passes practically impregnable with endless stockades; in fact, on the ascent to Makwanpur Fort there was a stockade at every turn in the road. Relying upon this resource they had neglected the less frequented routes, though, had they watched them, they might have overwhelmed Ochterlony's column by the simple process of rolling down stones upon it. Ochterlony must have been apprehensive from the outset over this movement, otherwise he would not have accompanied the column himself; and the pass was so much more difficult than he expected that he evidently suffered agonies of anxiety until he heard that the Gurkhas had evacuated

1816. the Churiaghati Pass. Had they not been seized with panic, they could have made an end of Ochterlony and his men, who had no supplies, and were entangled in a defile which invited annihilation. Small wonder if the general ascribed his success to "great good fortune as well as to the most persevering labour, the greatest exertion and the most persevering fortitude." Indeed the behaviour of the troops, weary, ragged and hungry, was beyond all praise; but the secret of their endurance is betrayed by one of them who records that "our gallant general walked every yard of this critical march encouraging his men."[1] Success, after all, justifies any enterprise; and Ochterlony deserves honour for this desperate venture not less than for his calm and deliberate methods in his operations upon the Sutlej. His name is known to few, his honest boyish face to still fewer; yet but for him the Gurkha war might have ended in failure and disaster, which would have shaken the British Empire in India to its foundations.

Authorities: Papers respecting the Nepaul War—printed by the E.I. Co.—a large folio of 998 pages containing some good matter. It is as cumbrous and ill-arranged as a collection of documents could possibly be. Prinsep's *History of the Military and Political Transactions in India during the Administration of the Marquess of Hastings* is founded chiefly upon the foregoing, but has some small value apart from it. A few points are to be gleaned from the MS. records in the India Office, quoted in the course of the narrative. The arrangement of these also is detestable, being highly typical of the methods of the East India Company. Stubb's *History of the Bengal Artillery* contains very useful matter.

[1] *Memoirs of John Shipp* (the hero of Bhurtpore), pp. 147-148. Shipp's account of the ascent of the elephants is worth reading.

CHAPTER VII

THROUGHOUT the earlier stages of the Gurkha campaign Moira's diplomacy was active and his anxiety very great. To understand his position aright it is necessary to keep steadily in mind the actual boundaries of the British territory in India at the time. A glance at the map will show that those of the British, and of the Indian chiefs under their protection, extended, in the north, from Ludhiana in the west to Cuttack in the east, thence south-westward, in a relatively narrow strip, to the Kistna, from which point it embraced the entire point of the peninsula to southward. The neighbours in the extreme north-west were the Sikhs; next to them to southward was the disordered region of Rajputana; then Scindia; then the relatively small states of Saugor and Bhopal, and then the large tract held by the Bhonsla of Nagpur. North and south of Bombay, Gaikwar and the Peishwa were more or less controlled by subsidiary alliances; but the five Mahratta powers occupied together a central position which, if they were to unite against the British, would enable them to swoop upon them either to north, to east or to south. Moreover, the problem of guarding its vast western frontier was quite beyond solution by the supreme government at Calcutta. As a matter of fact the only semblance of a frontier-guard along the immense line from Bundelcund to Cuttack consisted in a single battalion of Indian infantry quartered at Midnapur, some seventy-four miles west of Calcutta. 1814.

1814. The ideal arrangement for the protection of the line was a treaty of alliance with the Bhonsla of Nagpur, and, failing that, with his neighbours to eastward, the Rajas of Saugor and Bhopal. Negotiations with the Bhonsla had been in progress since 1812, but our overtures were finally rejected by him in the autumn of 1814, when it was discovered that he was secretly treating with Scindia for the subjugation of Bhopal by their joint arms. Moira decided at once to anticipate the two Mahratta chiefs by sending envoys to Bhopal and to Saugor to offer them protection upon certain conditions. Meanwhile the troops in Bundelcund were reinforced; the Nizam's subsidiary
Nov. force was moved up from Jalna (about two hundred and fifty miles east of Bombay) some eighty-five miles north-eastward to Ellichpur, so as to intervene between Nagpur and Bhopal; the Poona subsidiary force was brought up to the vicinity of Jalna in its place; and the Bombay government was instructed to draw all the troops in Gujarat to the eastward of that province. This menace was enough to make Scindia and the Bhonsla hold their hands off Bhopal for the moment; but the two chiefs continued to keep up a secret correspondence; and the British reverses in Nepal stimulated them to conspire with Pindaris and Pathans for the overthrow of the British ascendancy. Scindia, ignoring Moira's military preparations, openly declared that he would not desist from hostilities against Bhopal; and Moira could only respond by ordering every man that could be spared of the Madras army to take the field under Sir Thomas Hislop, for the support of the two subsidiary forces. He also increased the Bengal army by seven battalions, and brought it up to a total of eighty-five thousand men, none too large a force for the protection and preservation of half a million square miles inhabited by forty million people.

1815. The Madras army was not concentrated until
March. March 1815, by which time the aspect of affairs had changed. The Bhonsla and Scindia arrested the

advance of their troops upon Bhopal; but on the other hand the Raja of Bhopal was inclined to use the prospect of British protection for his own private ends, without regard to any obligations that he might owe to his helpers in return. The negotiations for the treaty with that prince therefore fell to the ground, as did also, for much the same reason, those with the Raja of Saugor. However, the aggression of the Bhonsla and Scindia had for the present been checked; the most perilous moment of the Gurkha war had been safely passed; and Moira felt justified in breaking up the Madras army and ordering the Gujarat force back to its cantonments. The assembly of those two bodies had been of course expensive, and the financial position of the supreme government at Calcutta was anything but strong; yet at least the two most formidable of the Mahratta powers had been overawed into refraining from open mischief. 1815.

But far more serious was the trouble that was brewing at Poona in the court of the Peishwa, Baji Rao, who, though owing his throne and authority to the British and bound to them by subsidiary alliance, dreamed of their destruction through a revival of the old Mahratta confederacy with himself at its head. He had craftily used the authority and the military strength which he derived from British protection to consolidate his own power among his feudatories, and was now making exacting demands upon another Mahratta power, the Gaikwar of Baroda, and upon the Nizam of Hyderabad, both of them subsidiary allies of the British. Profligate and unscrupulous, he entrusted much power to a low-born favourite, a mere pander to his debauches, named Trimbakji, who laid himself out to supplant British influence by the Peishwa's at Baroda. The climax came when Trimbakji caused the Gaikwar's principal minister to be assassinated, though the British resident, Mr. Elphinstone, had personally guaranteed his safety at Poona. Elphinstone, speedily ascertaining with whom lay the Aug.

1815. guilt of the crime, insisted upon the surrender of Trimbakji to the British government ; and by calling in the subsidiary force to his support he succeeded, after six weeks of struggle against the Peishwa's
Sept. 19. evasions and excuses, in obtaining it. Trimbakji was imprisoned in the fort of Tanna, near Bombay ; and the Peishwa's resentment against the British was thereby mightily increased.

So the year 1815 began to draw to its close, when the old trouble of the Pindaris renewed itself in a very formidable shape. In October eight thousand of these pests assembled at Chitu's cantonment at Nemawur, about fifty-five miles south and west of
Oct. 14. Bhopal, crossed the Narbada on the 14th, and broke up into two parties. One of these, unmolested except by a small detachment of the Nizam's forces on the Tapti, traversed that potentate's territory from north to south till it reached the Kistna, and was only prevented from raiding the Madras Presidency by the unusual height of the water. They then turned eastward to the frontier of Masulipatam, when they wheeled northward and returned along the line of the Godavari and Wurda with enormous booty. Encouraged by
1816. this success a second party, ten thousand strong, crossed
Feb. 5. the Narbada on the 5th of February 1816, and was next heard of in the vicinity of Masulipatam on the 10th of March. Turning southward, they on the 12th reached the civil station of Guntur, where they plundered every house except the collector's office, which was protected by a handful of sepoys, and after a stay of twelve days on British territory recrossed the Kistna and made homeward. Detachments of troops were sent in all directions to pursue or to intercept them, without success, for the marauders had broken up into small parties ; and finally the ruffians by the middle of May had all recrossed the Narbada with little or no loss. They had plundered over three hundred villages, murdered nearly two hundred people, maimed over five hundred others,

tortured over three thousand more, and carried off or destroyed private property to the value of £100,000. 1816.

Moira's wrath at this audacious inroad may be imagined; and it burned not the slower since the Pindaris had spared the territory of the Mahratta chiefs and confined their depredations to that of the British and their allies. It was pretty evident that they were countenanced, if not actually encouraged, by these chiefs; but that they must be put down, whether so countenanced or not, was imperative. Meanwhile the Bhonsla, Ragoji, had died on the 22nd of March; there was, as usual, a dispute as to the succession to his rule; and a new opportunity offered itself of courting a subsidiary alliance. Ragoji's legitimate heir was an imbecile and a paralytic. The next heir, his first cousin, Madaji Bhonsla, better known as Apa Sahib, took over the government, not without violence, as his vicegerent; and with him the British government on the 27th of May concluded the treaty that it had for so long desired. Moira looked for it to detach the Bhonsla permanently from the other members of the Mahratta confederacy, and to give himself a good vantage-ground for operations against the Pindaris. The Bhonsla welcomed it as an obligation which secured him against the faction that disputed his authority, and which could be repudiated as soon as circumstances might render such a course convenient. Immediately upon the signature of the treaty a part of the Nizam's subsidiary force under Colonel Walker marched up to the vicinity of Nagpur, the main body taking up cantonments three miles to west of the town, while two battalions entered it to assure the personal safety of Apa Sahib. By the end of August his authority was to all appearance firmly established; and in October a new force under Lieutenant-colonel Adams was directed to relieve that of Walker at Nagpur. May 27. Oct.

Scindia allowed the negotiation to go forward without interference, being rather dismayed and

1816. bewildered by it ; but, on the other hand, he showed no disposition to conciliate the British by making common cause against the Pindaris. The Peishwa continued his intrigues with all the Mahratta powers, including Holkar and Gaikwar, for forming a coalition with himself at its head ; and no remonstrance by the British resident could prevail with him to desist. He contrived also that his favourite Trimbakji should escape from his prison at Tanna and make his way
Sept. 2. to the hills south of Poona, where he at once became busy in making mischief.

This trouble, moreover, coincided in time with the autumn—the usual raiding season of the Pindaris. Moira was still obliged to meet their incursions as
Oct. 25. best he could by a defensive line ; and by the 25th of October Colonel Walker had taken up such a line on the southern bank of the Narbada from Singorgarh, which lies about ninety miles south-east of Saugor, westward to the level of Hoshangabad. In other words, Walker was supposed, with five battalions of infantry and one regiment of cavalry, to guard a front of one hundred and twenty miles, which, estimating the total of his force liberally at five thousand men, allowed him about forty men to the mile. Such cowards were the Pindaris that the mere approach of Walker's detachment sufficed to throw them into a panic, and to make them beg Scindia for a refuge for their families among his numerous fortresses. Scindia openly rejected their applications, notwithstanding that they were accompanied by threats ; but some of his military commanders gave Chitu to understand that these public professions were made only to deceive the British. Then, seeing that Walker remained stationary, the Pindaris took
Nov. 4. courage. On the 4th of November a party crossed the Narbada at Hindia, fifty miles west of Hoshangabad, whence half of them struck south-west upon Burhanpur and the other half southward. Distracted between the two, Walker failed to do more than trifling damage to either ; and, under cover of this feint, five thousand

more Pindaris passed the Narbada at the eastern extremity of the line on the 12th. Then dividing into two bodies, one took a southerly direction, passed within twenty miles of Nagpur unmolested, reached Nirmal on the Godavari, one hundred and thirty miles north of Hyderabad, on the 15th of December, and Bidar, seventy miles farther to south-west, on the 21st. Here they halted, uncertain whether or not to pass the Kistna into the British territory, and on the 15th of January 1817 were surprised and dispersed by a detachment of infantry from Hyderabad. One leader, however, who had carried off some three hundred men a few days before, turned westward, descended from the mountains into the Konkan, plundered the west coast of India along a length of over two hundred and fifty miles, struck up the valley of the Tapti to Burhanpur, and though intercepted at the Narbada in March, contrived to bring home nearly half of his men and enormous booty.

1816. Nov. 12. Dec. 15. 1817. Jan. 15.

The second of the bodies, which crossed the Narbada on the 12th of November, struck due south-east upon the district of Ganjam on the east coast. They crossed the British frontier in the middle of December, marching upon Parlakimedi, fifty miles south-west of Ganjam. A British subaltern with a company of Madras infantry was weak enough to retreat before them ; and the Pindaris burned and plundered part of Parlakimedi on the 19th, and part of Ganjam on the 25th. A more enterprising subaltern, however, followed them up by forced marches with a handful of infantry as they retired north-eastward, surprised them both on the 27th and 29th, killed the leader and several men and drove the rest into precipitate retreat. The survivors were twice attacked in the vicinity of the Narbada on their return, by troops which happened by chance to be in their neighbourhood, and some five hundred of them were slain.

Dec. 19. Dec. 27.

There remained still the party that had taken the

1816. road to Burhanpur on the 4th of November. This was presently reinforced by more Pindaris, and penetrated without difficulty over the valley of the Tapti, passing between Jalna and Aurangabad on the
Nov. 28. 28th of November on the road to Ahmadnagar. It so happened that a detachment of Madras Native Cavalry was returning from police-duty in the south towards Poona on Christmas Day, when the commander, Major Lushington, heard of this body, two thousand five hundred strong, at a village twenty-two miles from his halting-place. Starting at 1 A.M. on
Dec. 26. the 26th with three hundred and fifty men, he found, on reaching this village at 7 A.M., that they had decamped; but, satisfying himself that they were ignorant of his presence, he followed them up, and after a march of fifty miles in all overtook them and surprised them at 6 P.M. The Pindaris, being caught dismounted in the act of cooking, fell easy victims. Between seven and eight hundred were cut down, at the cost of but a single casualty to Lushington; and the remnant of the band, being intercepted at the Narbada, was utterly dispersed and destroyed.

Thus the Pindaris suffered heavily in the winter of 1816–1817, though rather through good luck than good management; for it was only by accident that the troops, which had been most successful against them, chanced to find themselves within striking distance. Moreover, Moira had gradually strengthened the forces between the Narbada and the Kistna until they numbered some thirty-two thousand; and if such a number were necessary for defensive purposes, and even so, as events had shown, could not prevent large bands of raiders from passing straight through their line, it would obviously be much cheaper and sounder policy to advance and root out the Pindaris completely. This view, long cherished by Moira, was finally embraced by his Council on the 21st of December; and he resolved, without waiting for permission from home, to make an end of the Pindaris in 1817. He antici-

pated serious trouble with the Peishwa and possibly with Scindia, but counted at any rate upon the support of the Bhonsla. In any case, however, the operations must be upon a very large scale, for, whether the Mahrattas were for him or against him, he intended to restore order in Central India ; and this could only be done, practically, by the advance of troops from all quarters upon one centre. This signified the employment of every man that could be spared from all three Presidencies ; and the assembly of such a host in those days took time. The campaign was appointed to begin at the close of the rainy season, in October 1817 ; and eight months were none too many to perfect all military preparations. 1817.

Meanwhile it was Moira's task to render, through diplomacy, the task of the military as easy as possible ; but very early in the year some of his calculations concerning the Mahratta powers began to falsify themselves. At Nagpur, Apa Sahib, having gained practically all that he wished from the British alliance, began to concentrate power more and more into his own hands and to displace all ministers who had favoured connection with the British. The first step was to remove the imbecile Bhonsla, in whose name he reigned, which was effected by assassination on the 1st of February ; the next to take over the sovereignty, as was now his right, in deed as well as in name ; the next to fill every official station with his new personal dependents ; and the next to enter into close relations with the Peishwa, Scindia and Holkar, and to engage himself wholly with the Peishwa's designs for a revival of the Mahratta confederacy against the British.

The Peishwa, on his side, with a dissimulation which should not have deceived, professed warm friendship with the British, and even desire to co-operate with them in the suppression of the Pindaris. In February, however, the resident became aware of the collection of troops in the Mahadeo Hills, fifty Feb.

1817. miles south of Poona, and represented to the Peishwa that this was a rebellion which must be suppressed. The Peishwa waived the matter airily away; but in March. March Mr. Elphinstone ascertained that Trimbakji was responsible for the raising of these levies, and that the Peishwa had not only helped him by providing money, but had actually contrived to hold an interview with him at a village only fifteen miles distant from Poona. The resident's remonstrances produced only the usual denials from Baji Rao; but it was now certain that he was not only enlisting troops in all quarters but repairing his fortresses and making every April 1. preparation for war. On the 1st of April the resident told him plainly that he was secretly abetting insurrection against the British government, and that the Poona subsidiary force should be used to suppress that insurrection. Thereupon the brigade actually at Poona was ordered to hold itself in readiness and to take measures for the protection of the residency and cantonment; while the remainder of the force, together with other detachments, was sent to act against the insurgents. The new levies of the Peishwa, being advised of their coming, slipped away northwards into Khandesh; but at least one body, two thousand strong, was followed up and overtaken by a April 20. regiment of irregular horse on the 20th of April. This party took up a position for defence, but was promptly charged and dispersed with a loss of four hundred left dead and disabled on the field. The casualties of the victors numbered seventy-four, so that the enemy must have made some resistance; and indeed, had not the irregular horse been led by two British officers, there would have been no victory, for on both sides the men were equally untrained and undisciplined. But the example of Captains Davies and Pedlar, riding far ahead of their troops, engaging the foe single-handed and cutting down opponent after opponent, turned the wild horsemen into heroes. Both of these officers were wounded, though happily

their hurts were not so severe as to keep them long out of the field. 1817.

Meanwhile, as Baji Rao continued his practice of evasion and dissimulation, Mr. Elphinstone on the same day summoned a further reinforcement to Poona, which arrived on the 26th and posted itself at Kirkee a few miles to north of the city. A few days later the resident delivered his ultimatum. The Peishwa must within twenty hours agree to surrender Trimbakji within one month and meanwhile to give up three of his principal hill-forts as earnest of his good faith; or he must accept the penalty of immediate war. To the last moment Baji Rao remained defiant, when, seeing the British troops actually in motion to invest Poona, he yielded, and on the morrow surrendered the three forts. So too he delayed all attempts to arrest Trimbakji till the month was all but expired, and then once more gave way. Finally on the 13th of June he signed, always under the menace of force, a treaty under which, among other things, he abjured the practice of negotiating with native powers otherwise than through the British resident, renounced his title as supreme head of the Mahratta empire and his rights as such in Hindostan, and ceded territory enough to enable the British to meet the expense of maintaining the Poona subsidiary force. All these were strong measures, neither more nor less than acts of war. But the times were critical; the Peishwa himself had been guilty of acts of war; and Moira was determined, so far as possible, to draw the teeth and pare the claws of so dangerous an ally. Reckoning that he had done so, he, upon the execution of the treaty, withdrew the subsidiary force to its usual cantonment at Sirur, forty miles north-east of Poona; and a few days later the force in Khandesh, having extinguished the adherents of Trimbakji, moved back to Jalna, in readiness for the coming campaign.

April 20. April 26. May 6. May 7. June 13. July 7.

Moira's plan, as has been already hinted, was to close in upon Central India from three sides; and the

1817. theatre of war may be defined roughly as the space enclosed by the Jumna, from Allahabad to Delhi on the north, the Narbada to the south and the Aravalli Mountains on the west. In the north the Bengal army was to furnish four divisions, each of them strong enough to act independently in the field, and two corps of observation to guard the most exposed portions of the frontier. The right division, under Major-general Donkin, was to assemble at Agra ; the centre under Major-general Brown, between Etawah (forty miles down the river from Agra) and Kalpi ; the left division under Major-general Marshall, at Kalinjar, fifty-five miles west and south of Allahabad ; and the reserve under Ochterlony, at Rewari, fifty miles south-west of Delhi. Of the two corps of observation, one, under Brigadier-general Hardyman, was stationed about Rewah, sixty miles due south of Allahabad, with posts extending seventy miles eastward to Bardi, where it joined hands with the other under Brigadier-general Toone, whose head-quarters lay at Untari, some seventy miles farther to the east and south. The Governor-general himself was at the head of this northern army ; and his head-quarters were appointed to be at Sikandra. The entire host numbered some five thousand Europeans, twenty-six thousand native regular troops and twelve thousand irregulars, or, roughly speaking, forty-three thousand rank and file with one hundred and forty-one guns.

The army of the south, under Lieutenant-general Sir Thomas Hislop, was organised into five active divisions and one reserve division. Of these the Nagpur division under Colonel Adams, the Advanced division under Hislop himself, and the Third division under Brigadier-general Sir John Malcolm were to furnish a line of posts along the Narbada, east and west from Hoshangabad, Hislop's head-quarters being fixed at Harda, between fifty and sixty miles south-west of that place. In rear of these on the right, the Second division under Brigadier-general Doveton was to be

extended along the Purna and Penganga rivers, north and south of the Berar Ghauts, for the protection of the Nizam's dominions ; and the Fourth under Brigadier-general Smith, on the left of Doveton, was to prolong the line westward along the Girna and the upper waters of the Godavari, north and south of the Ghats of Khandesh. The reserve division under Brigadier-general Munro was to be posted about Gulbarga, some two hundred miles east-south-east of Poona, and about a hundred miles west of Hyderabad, so as to stand more or less midway between those two capitals and be ready, if need should be, to fall back to the protection of Madras about the line of the Toombuddra. Lastly the Gujarat division under Major-general Sir William Keir, which did the work that should have been done by the Gaikwar's subsidiary force, was to guard the frontier of Gujarat against any inroads of the Pindaris, intercept them if they should cross the lower Narbada, and act in concert with the Madras army ; Hislop being vested with authority to take it under his orders for the purpose. The entire force counted about five thousand Europeans, forty-four thousand regular native troops, and twenty-two thousand irregulars, making a total of over seventy thousand fighting men with one hundred and sixty-two guns. 1817.

The general design, so far as can be deduced from these facts, seems to have been a great offensive drive from the south upon a stopping line in the north. This would indicate that the Pindaris were the only enemy that Moira expected to meet ; and indeed he seems to have reckoned even upon the co-operation of Scindia and Holkar in suppressing them. Little was to be dreaded from Gaikwar ; but the Bhonsla was doubtful, and still more doubtful was the Peishwa. There was, moreover, always the chance of trouble with turbulent Pathans at Hyderabad. However, Moira was content to post three native battalions and half of the Hundred and Third alike at Poona and in Hyderabad, in isolation and without prospect of nearer support than the

1817. reserve division, which, as a matter of fact, had not even reached its station at Gulbarga by the opening of the campaign. Nagpur, where the Bhonsla seems to have been trusted as certainly favourable to the British interest, was left with a still weaker garrison of two Madras native battalions only. On the other hand, since the whole of the Mahratta powers, united with the Pindaris, could not put into the field more than one hundred and thirty thousand horse and eighty-seven thousand foot, many of them of little fighting value, Moira's eighty thousand regular troops may be considered as sufficient to deal with any possible combination of forces that was likely to be opposed to him. But the annihilation of any isolated detachment of the British at the outset might, after the reverses in Nepal, have exerted a very dangerous moral effect in heartening their enemies and inclining waverers to the enemy's side. And it should seem that Moira had not yet gauged the full measure of Mahratta duplicity. He was, it is true, new to India, yet, in spite of that disadvantage and the possibility of offending his masters at home, he had with great moral courage taken upon himself the responsibility of restoring order in Central India. The task was a heavy one; the field of operations was enormous; the means of transit were difficult and slow; there were a thousand matters to think of, a thousand obstacles to overcome; but a commander who keeps small bodies in isolation in territory of doubtful friendship has given hostages to fortune.

CHAPTER VIII

THE Governor-general embarked from Calcutta on the Ganges on the 8th of July and reached Cawnpore in September. A great and unforeseen difficulty had already arisen to mar his plans. There was unusual drought in Hindostan, whereas in the Dekhan the monsoon, instead of subsiding during September, continued with unusual violence. Small streams were swollen to great rivers, and great rivers became huge impassable lakes. The concentration of the Madras army was therefore much delayed. In some cases troops were detained in the same place for days, unable to move; in others they accomplished the passage of the larger rivers only with extreme difficulty, danger and tardiness; on the Godavari the floods threatened their very existence, and actually swept away numbers of cattle and followers. The transport-animals perished rapidly under the strain; and camp-equipage and appointments, not easily to be replaced, were greatly damaged. The staff was worried by the necessity for constant change of routes; and above all there was the evil of delay, delay, delay. Then Sir Thomas Hislop was attacked by illness, from which, after weeks of incapacity, he only with difficulty recovered; and this made another complication. Moira had been urgent that the first divisions of the Madras army should be in their place on the Narbada at the beginning of October; yet the advanced division did not reach Hindia until the 10th of November; and the forward movement of the Northern army was perforce postponed in consequence.

1817. Sept.

Nov. 10.

1817. Meanwhile, diplomatic activity continued without ceasing. Moira on reaching Cawnpore laid it down that towards such an enemy as the Pindaris, who spared no man, no state should be neutral, but that all, Mahrattas, Bundelas and Rajputs alike, must unite against them. The presence of fifty thousand men was a cogent argument ; but Scindia, whose military chiefs were talking big of the Peishwa's intention to break with the British, was not swift in coming to a decision. The Peishwa, as a matter of fact, had ever since his unwilling acceptance of the treaty of Poona absented himself from his capital, not returning until the end of September. He then became urgent for the reduction to obedience of one of his rebellious feudatories to south of the Toombuddra, suggesting that part of the reserve division under General Munro should be employed for that purpose. As there was an old promise of the British government to perform this service, the resident in a conciliatory spirit recommended compliance to Hislop, who gave his consent. Munro's division, being then at Dharwar on its way north, accordingly turned south on the 11th of October, reached the Toombuddra on the 20th, passed the river in basket boats—an operation which lasted three days—and on the 27th entered the valley of Sandur, where the refractory chief submitted at once. This done the division proceeded on
Nov. 16. its way and on the 16th of November reached Sindhuur, where it was still a hundred miles south of its proper station at Gulbarga.

It is difficult to say who was the more to blame in this matter, Elphinstone, the resident, or Hislop, the general. The latter was new to India, having done the greater part of his service in the West Indies, but principles are the same whether in the West Indies or in the East ; and on the eve of operations so important it seems monstrous that a division should have been diverted from its post of concentration during several weeks for so trifling a reason. Elphinstone's

behaviour in the matter is the more curious, inasmuch as he did not trust the Peishwa in the least, and might have seen through this flimsy though clever device for weakening the British army within the area of decision. However, having thus succeeded in keeping the reserve division at a distance, Baji Rao began to collect troops from all quarters and to encourage his feudatories to do likewise. He professed, of course, that these were to be employed for the furtherance of the common cause ; but his real intentions were evident, not least from his sedulous endeavours to seduce some of the irregular infantry in the British service from their allegiance. As the Mahratta levies multiplied they became more and more insolent, encroaching with blustering menaces upon the ground occupied by the British Poona brigade. The position occupied by these troops was none too strong, but Elphinstone, while protesting strongly against Baji Rao's accumulation of force at Poona, hesitated, for the sake of peace, to order the brigade to a stronger position. At length on the 31st of October the situation was so threatening that Elphinstone directed the brigade to proceed to Kirkee, some six miles north-east of the city. Thither accordingly it moved on the 1st of November, and was there joined, after a forced march, by its European contingent, half a battalion of the Hundred and Third, which was on its way to Poona from Bombay. 1817. Oct. Nov. 1.

Talk of war among the Peishwa's people now became loud and open ; and the situation was most serious. The nearest British troops were General Smith's division, which, stationed at ordinary times at Sirur, some thirty miles to north-eastward, for the support of the Poona brigade, had marched away to the borders of Khandesh to take its share in the coming operations. Upon hearing of the hostile demonstrations at the Peishwa's capital, Smith had ordered one battalion back to Sirur ; and he had arranged with Elphinstone that, if he did not hear

1817. Nov. from him daily from Poona, he should consider his communication with him to be cut, and should immediately march southward. But meanwhile he was on the Godavari, at least seventy miles away, and was naturally unwilling, except upon the most urgent necessity, to spoil the Governor-general's plans by quitting his appointed station. Things grew steadily worse in Poona. A British officer on his way to Bombay was attacked and plundered, barely escaping with his life, within two miles of the town; and the Mahratta soldiers never ceased to insult the British sepoys. Elphinstone accordingly summoned the battalion from Sirur; but, before it could join the Poona brigade, Baji Rao called out his troops, posted some of them so as to sever communication between the residency and Kirkee, and advanced upon the residency itself. Elphinstone, who until this time had with great courage stuck to his post, on the 5th quitted the residency and retired to the brigade at Kirkee, his escort skirmishing continually with hostile parties all the way.

Nov. 5.

He had already arranged with Colonel Burr, who was in command of the brigade, that he should not wait to be attacked but should take the offensive at once; and accordingly Burr, leaving the post at Kirkee in charge of two or three companies of the Sixth Bombay Native Infantry, boldly descended into the plain with the remainder. On his right was the First Bombay Native Infantry, in his centre the Hundred and Third, and on his left the Seventh Bombay Native Infantry. The resident's escort of native horse and the rest of the Sixth Native Infantry were placed in second line to foil any attempt of the Mahratta cavalry to get round the flanks of the little force; two field-guns were posted on either flank of the Hundred and Third; and in this order the handful of men strode across the plain to meet the Mahratta host.

It was now, apparently, from two to three hours

past noon. The position of the enemy was strong. Kirkee lies within a bend of the river Mula, which, flowing from west to east, joins the Muta Mula just to north-west of Poona and flows with it past the city; and the Mahrattas had rested their right upon the Mula and their left upon a deep water-course, their numerous artillery being for the most part about their left centre, on each flank of the ridge called Gunniskund Hill. As Burr moved forward, the Mahratta guns opened a heavy fire, for the most part at extreme range; and their horse swarmed forward in immense bodies, leaving nearly all their infantry far in rear. One battalion, however, trained and led by a Portuguese commander, followed them up by a short cut which concealed his advance, and formed in front of the British left. No sooner was this body of foot seen by the British sepoys than the Seventh Native Infantry pushed on, eager to close, repulsed the battalion with ease, pursued it and became detached from the rest of the line. One of the Mahratta commanders promptly drew out a body of six thousand picked horse from his reserve on the other extremity of the British array, and gave the order to charge. The whole mass then swept down diagonally across the British front, receiving its fire, and flew upon the exposed right of the Seventh. Burr was but a wreck of a man, his right side helpless through a paralytic stroke and his mind impaired as well as his body; but he had for years commanded the Seventh, and, riding up to them, ordered them to halt and reserve their fire. As luck would have it, a piece of boggy ground, unknown to either side, lay in front of the Seventh, and into this the foremost of the Mahratta horsemen rode at speed. In a moment every horse was down, and the rear ranks, unable to pull up in time, floundered on to the top of them and fell likewise. The Seventh opened fire with deadly precision; the impetus of the charge was checked; and Burr, turning two battalion-guns on to the mass with grape, and leading forward

1817. Nov. 5.

1817. some of the Hundred and Third, finally repulsed the
Nov. 5. attack with loss.

The line was then re-formed with the left flank thrown back ; and now there arrived two irregular battalions, which were in course of formation in a cantonment near Kirkee at Dapori, and had been promptly led by their commander, Major Ford, to the scene of danger. Ford had to fight his way down to the battlefield in squares under constant menace from large bodies of cavalry, but he brought his men safely to the right of Burr's line, and made the right flank secure. The advance was then continued, practically in double echelon from the centre. The Mahrattas limbered up their guns and drew them back ; their infantry retired from their position ; the cavalry retreated without further attempt at attack ; and at nightfall Burr fell back unmolested to his original position at Kirkee. With some three thousand of all ranks and four guns he had defeated or overcome eighteen thousand horse, eight thousand foot and fourteen guns. His casualties did not exceed seventy-five ; whereas the enemy left five hundred dead and wounded on the field. Considering that the British commander was, more or less, both palsied and imbecile, matters might have gone worse.

Nov. 6. On the morning of the 6th the expected battalion came into Kirkee from Sirur, also a strong regiment of irregular horse which was forming in the vicinity under a British officer. Baji Rao made no attempt to intercept them, and was careful not to approach Kirkee, preferring to burn the residency and to murder two or three British officers who, quite ignorant that hostilities had begun, were travelling peaceably towards Bombay. He also continued his efforts to tempt the irregular troops to desert, and actually succeeded in drawing away over two hundred of them. But this was a small matter. General Smith was already approaching, having been little troubled on his march until he reached Sirur. From that point his troops

were surrounded by Mahratta cavalry on every side, and, having none but raw irregular horse with which to combat them, suffered the loss of some baggage. But on the 13th Smith brought his troops safely in ; and it was resolved to fall upon the Peishwa without delay. Owing to unforeseen difficulties at the fords of the rivers, which had to be crossed before the troops could advance direct upon Poona, the attack was deferred until the 16th, when a brigade forced the passage of the rivers in the teeth of the Peishwa's infantry and established itself four thousand yards east of the city. During the night the Peishwa fled away to the south, and on the 17th Poona was quietly occupied by the British ; some sixty guns being taken in the city and in a neighbouring fort. Thus one of the five Mahratta powers had at length openly declared himself hostile. His first and most dangerous blow had been parried and had been answered by a telling counter-stroke ; and from henceforth the Peishwa was a mere fugitive from the wrath to come. So let us leave him for the present, and return to the main operations of the campaign.

1817. Nov. 13. Nov. 16. Nov. 17.

Of the Northern force, under Moira's personal command, the right division, under Donkin, being assembled at Agra at the end of October, marched on the 5th of November to the left bank of the Chambal at Dholpur, where it arrived on the 8th. The centre division, with which was Moira's head-quarters, having moved to Sikandra on the 20th of October, crossed the Jumna by a temporary bridge a little farther up stream and, moving westward, reached Mahewa on the eastern bank of the Sind river on the 5th. These preliminary movements had for sole object the exertion of pressure upon Scindia, for Moira possessed already proofs of his intrigues with Baji Rao and the Pindaris, and had recently discovered that he had also been in secret correspondence with the Nepalese. Scindia had made Gwalior the centre for such proceedings as he meditated, and had collected there his train of

Nov. 8. Nov. 5.

1817. Nov. artillery, amounting to nearly one hundred and fifty pieces, also five thousand horse and three thousand foot. The rest of his regular forces, amounting in all to over twenty thousand fighting men, were scattered in five different garrisons. Two of these lay to the west of the Chambal at Ajmer (nearly two hundred miles west of Dholpur) and at Jawad (one hundred and twenty miles south of Ajmer), where nine thousand men altogether were assembled; and three of them were in the south, namely, from six to seven thousand men at Bijroni, about one hundred miles south and a little west of Gwalior, and the remainder at Shahjapur and Badnawar, thirty miles north-east and south-west, respectively, of Ujjain. By approaching within two marches of Gwalior, east and west, the divisions of Brown and Donkin effectively severed from it all these outlying detachments; and this was not all. About twenty miles south of Gwalior runs a ridge of broken woody hills from the Sind westward to the Chambal, with only two passes, one on the extreme east and the other on the extreme west, practicable for carriages or for bodies of horse. Scindia, therefore, had two alternatives. He could shut himself up in Gwalior; in which case the fortress, having but one outlet, could be blockaded into starvation by a single brigade in entrenched positions, while the rest of the army would reduce the adjacent provinces. Or he could move away to his more distant possessions and to the Pindaris; but in that case he must either leave his guns behind in Gwalior, where they would certainly fall with the fortress into the hands of the British; or he must carry them with him, which signified that they would with equal certainty be overtaken and captured before they could reach the passes. Moreover, quite apart from the question of the guns, no sooner would he have traversed the passes than they, and every other inlet into Gwalior and Gohud, would be sealed up behind him, and his two richest provinces would be lost to him for ever.

In the circumstances Scindia decided to accept the 1817.
treaty offered to him by Moira, which stipulated among Nov.
other things that he should supply a contingent of five thousand horse under a British officer, remain at Gwalior until permission was granted him to quit it, receive a British force to keep his bellicose and refractory officers in order, and yield up the fortresses of Hindia on the Narbada and Asirgarh on the Tapti to the occupation of British garrisons for the duration of the war. On the 5th of November the treaty was Nov. 5.
signed, after much discussion and with natural reluctance, by Scindia; and Moira was careful for some days to keep his head-quarters within striking distance. Thus another and the most formidable of the Mahratta powers was, to all intent, disarmed and forced to declare himself upon the side of the British.

The way was now clear for advance upon the true enemy, the Pindaris. The left division under General Marshall, punctual to time, had assembled at Kalinjar on the 10th of October, and moving slowly reached Hatta, some seventy-five miles to south-south-westward, on the 4th of November, and Rehli, fifty miles farther in the same direction, on the 12th. Donkin, being no Nov. 12.
longer required to put pressure upon Scindia, was instructed to leave a detachment to hold the fort at Dholpur, and with the rest of his division to move to the upper waters of the Chambal. He marched accordingly on the 13th of November, striking first Nov. 13.
westward for forty miles to Bayana and turning thence south-westward for another forty miles to Kushalgarh. Until the 13th, however, the line of the Northern army still extended, roughly speaking, from Dholpur south-eastward through Mahewa to Rehli.

The Southern army meanwhile had been likewise coming, almost a month later than had been projected, into its position. Hislop's head-quarters marched into Harda, in the Narbada just to south of Hindia, on the 10th of November. Adams's division on its right, Nov. 10.
having been in the Narbada valley till the breaking of

1817. the monsoon, was reassembled at Hoshangabad with little difficulty by the same date, and Malcolm's division on the left was also in its place. Of the two divisions in second line Doveton's on the right had extended itself somewhat to the west, the head-quarters being about Jalna, about a hundred miles south of Burhanpur, while Smith's, as is known to us but was as yet unknown at Hislop's head-quarters, had moved south from the Upper Godavari upon Poona. The Gujarat division, being compelled to detach troops to suppress an insurrection in the south of that province, was not re-concentrated to fulfil its true mission until the end of the month.

As to the enemy, the Pindaris were understood to be extended, roughly, from Bhilsa, about fifty-five miles north of Hoshangabad, westward through a line of sixty to seventy miles to Shahjapur ; Chitu being on the right or west, Karim Khan in the centre, and Wazil Mohammed on the left, together about twenty-three thousand men, with about twenty guns. They made, however, some changes of disposition which decided Hislop upon the following orders.

Adams's division on the right was to pass the Narbada at Hoshangabad and move due north upon Raisen.

Malcolm's division on the left, reinforced by part of the head-quarters division, was to cross a little below Hindia and advance due north upon Ashta.

A detachment of the head-quarters division, crossing at Hindia, was to ascend the hills a little farther to the west so as to act as reserve to Malcolm's division, or to intercept any movement of the Pindaris to westward.

On the extreme east General Marshall of the Northern army was to advance from Rehli westward upon Bhilsa, so as to supplement the frontal attack from the south with a flanking attack from the east, and intercept any Pindaris that might try to break away to eastward or north-eastward.

The day fixed for the general advance from Raisen,

Ashta and Rehli was the 22nd of November ; and it 1817.
was designed, of course, that the right and central divisions of the Northern force should be at hand to head the Pindaris off, should they attempt to enter the space between the Sind and the Chambal or to cross the Chambal itself at Kotah.

The Southern army accordingly began the passage of the Narbada on the 14th, and by the evening of the 15th Adams's and Malcolm's divisions and the Reserve were all on the right bank of the river. But on the night of the 15th Hislop received news of the attack Nov. 15.
made on the British at Kirkee on the 5th, and at once sent orders for Malcolm's divisions to halt. Further news came in from Nagpur that the Bhonsla, who till the end of October had maintained a most friendly attitude towards the resident, had suddenly changed it upon hearing of the Peishwa's hostile designs, and was resolved to make common cause with his brother Mahrattas. Moreover, although Scindia had by the recent treaty pledged himself to make over to the British the fort of Asirgarh, it was doubtful whether its commander would surrender it except to force ; and indeed it was made a condition that, should he refuse submission, the place should be besieged by the British at Scindia's expense. Upon the whole, Hislop judged the position in his rear too insecure to permit him to continue his advance. He therefore placed Malcolm in command of the troops of the Southern army that were to operate against the Pindaris, namely, Malcolm's own division, reinforced by one brigade, and Adams's division. He also directed Doveton to send down his siege-train and the Royal Scots northward to Jaipur-Kotli, about sixty miles south of Asirgarh, so as to be in readiness for the siege if it should be necessary. Lastly, on the 17th he ordered a mixed detach- Nov. 17.
ment from Adams's division, under Lieutenant-colonel Gahan, which had been held ready, at Sindkhed, twenty miles north-east of Jalna, to meet any trouble with the Bhonsla, to march to Nagpur immediately.

1817. This done, he on the 19th began to fall back towards
Nov. 19. Berhanpur.

His division had proceeded as far south as Charwa, thirty miles south of Hindia, when he received urgent orders from Lord Moira to countermarch northward at once. The Governor-general had guessed that Hislop might be induced to fall back by the intelligence of trouble at Poona and at Nagpur, but he considered such complications of small account as compared with the wreck of his general plans, and with the danger that Malcolm, unless supported by Hislop's division, might be overwhelmed by superior forces. With respect to Poona, he placed Smith's division and Munro's reserve at the disposal of Mr. Elphinstone, and left Nagpur, so far as can be gathered, to take
Nov. 26. care of itself. Accordingly on the 26th Hislop faced about and once again marched from the Narbada, sending word to Malcolm that he would move by the pass of Unchaud, thirty-five miles north-west of Hindia, upon Ujjain.

Moira was evidently greatly vexed by the delay thus imposed on his operations by Hislop. The whole question was of course that of a choice of risks. It was natural that Hislop should feel nervous with his right flank and rear threatened from Nagpur, and for aught he knew from Hyderabad also, and his left flank and rear menaced from Poona. Hislop may also have reckoned, not altogether incorrectly, that the Pindaris were merely a rabble, fond of plundering but with no taste for fighting, and therefore easily to be dispersed by a very small force, whereas the troops of the Peishwa and the Bhonsla might be more formidable. Possession of Asirgarh, moreover, was of great importance to him to secure him an advanced base. Moira, on the other hand, was none too certain that Scindia's outlying forces would observe the conditions of the treaty, and, it is probable, was suspicious, and justly suspicious, as to the intentions of yet another of the Mahratta powers, Holkar of Indore, who might give

serious trouble to Malcolm if the latter were left without support. Considering the vast field of the operations, according to the scale of the day, the impossibility of forecasting the proceedings of such subtle schemers as the Mahratta leaders, and the enormous difficulties of communication, such misunderstandings between the Commander-in-chief and the leaders of his armies were inevitable. What is most noteworthy is the fact that Moira had exactly taken the measure of Hislop, foresaw precisely what course he would take in certain circumstances and, by anticipating his orders, prevented him from committing himself irrevocably to that course, though his headquarters and Hislop's were two hundred and fifty miles apart as the crow flies. 1817. Nov.

Hislop's apprehensions proved to be not altogether ill-founded. Undismayed by the defeat of the Peishwa at Kirkee, the Bhonsla, at the first tidings of that potentate's rising against the British, lost his head completely, and on the 25th of November began to mass troops in a position threatening the residency. The resident, Mr. Jenkins, responded by calling in the Nagpur brigade from its cantonments about three miles west of that city. This force consisted of two battalions of the Madras Native Infantry, both much weakened by sickness, two companies of the resident's escort, three troops of the Sixth Bengal Cavalry and four field-guns, the whole numbering under sixteen hundred of all ranks, under command of Lieutenant-colonel Scott, the senior officer on the spot. The residency lay to the west of Nagpur, being separated from it by a small ridge, measuring about twelve hundred yards north to south, and marked by two very slight eminences called the Sitabaldi Hills, about three hundred and fifty yards apart. The more northerly of these was the higher though considerably the smaller of the two, its summit being less than an acre in extent, while the more southerly was crowned by an oval level space of about seven acres. On the Nov. 25.

1817. west these hills adjoined the grounds of the residency
Nov. 26. and the sepoys' lines to north of them ; on the south and east their skirts were covered with native huts, and to north lay the open plain. The more northerly hill was about fifty feet above this plain, and the ascent, but for artificial scarping on the eastern side, was easy. Scott occupied this smaller hill with nine companies of the Twenty-fourth Native Infantry and one gun, possibly rather overcrowding it ; but the ground was so rocky as to forbid entrenchment, and, as this eminence commanded the other, it was of great tactical importance. On the larger hill he stationed the remaining company of the Twenty-fourth, the Twentieth Native Infantry, part of the escort, and three guns. The cavalry and the rest of the infantry he posted in the grounds of the residency.

These dispositions were made on the 26th, throughout which day the Bhonsla assembled his infantry in the suburbs, reinforcing them by large bodies of Arab foot with five guns. At 6 P.M. Scott went down to post his picquets and sentries for the night, when the Arabs fired upon his party, which, after returning a volley, retreated up the hill. Immediately afterwards the enemy opened fire with their artillery, and the Arabs swarmed forward to the attack with great resolution. They were everywhere repulsed, though not without difficulty, for the troops on the smaller
Nov. 27. hill suffered heavily. Before daylight Scott found it necessary to reinforce this post with another company, and at 5 A.M. he was obliged to withdraw the whole of the Twenty-fourth Native Infantry, which had been much cut up and was utterly exhausted, replacing it by one hundred and fifty men of the escort. These were directed to hold the summit only, where a rough breastwork of bags of grain had been thrown up by the pioneers during the night. Daylight showed the plain north-west and south to be covered by bodies of the enemy, horse, foot and artillery, the Bhonsla having by this time got together thirty-six guns. The

attacks were renewed, and at about 8 A.M., in spite of the utmost endeavours of the two British officers in command, the smaller hill was carried by the Arabs, who promptly brought up two light guns to the summit. Surrounded upon all sides by some twenty thousand men, Scott's little band seemed to be doomed to destruction. The sepoys, already somewhat shaken, were still further demoralised by the shrieks of their women in the lines, who had been terrified by a few shot that had fallen in their midst ; and the followers had given way to panic. The strength of the sepoys was failing, and not their strength only but their ammunition. The enemy now closed in upon the south-west angle of the residency grounds with troops of all three arms, and the fate of the day hung in the balance when Captain Fitzgerald, putting himself at the head of his three troops of horse—about three hundred sabres—sallied out from the residency and swept down like a whirlwind upon the enemy's principal mass of cavalry. Crashing into the midst of them, Fitzgerald's troopers sent them flying in all directions, and then fell with fury upon the guns and their escort of infantry. The latter was cut to pieces, and two twelve-pounders, being taken and turned upon the flying Mahrattas, completed their discomfiture. Then the captured pieces were limbered up and brought away to the residency in triumph. 1817. Nov. 27.

The moral effect of this charge was enormous. Shortly afterwards a tumbril on the smaller hill exploded in the midst of the Arabs ; and the whole of the troops on the larger hill broke away to recover the lost position. Scott only with the greatest difficulty was able to prevent this larger hill from being absolutely deserted. The Arabs did not wait for the assault, but ran back into the plain, abandoning two guns. They rallied, however, at the foot of the hill and were massing for a fresh attack, when a single troop of Fitzgerald's horse galloped out of the residency round the base of the hill upon their flank and dispersed

1817. them with heavy loss. Therewith the enemy seemed
Nov. 27. to lose heart. The fire slackened, and at noon, after eighteen hours' duration, ceased entirely. The Bhonsla's most deadly stroke had, even as the Peishwa's, been parried, though with far greater difficulty ; and the worst of the danger was past. The loss of the British was heavy. Of thirty-four British officers present fifteen were killed or wounded, and the assistant-resident, who, with his chief, Mr. Jenkins, was in the thick of the fight throughout, was slain. The full sum of the casualties amounted to three hundred and sixty-four, one-third of whom were killed. The Twenty-fourth Native Infantry, which had forfeited its number of the First and its facings in consequence of its share in the mutiny of Vellore, worthily regained its old colours and precedence by bearing the brunt of the action. The enemy's loss was probably not greatly in excess of the British, but they left five guns as trophies in their opponents' hands. Altogether the affair of Sitabaldi was highly creditable to the native troops engaged, but honourable above all to the British officers.

At the close of the engagement Scott's people were utterly exhausted, so much so that one of them deserted in dismay and gave information to the enemy of their condition. But the wretched Bhonsla had passed instantly from defiance to utter despair, and, instead of renewing the attack, which would have brought him success, he sent abject messages of sorrow and disavowal to the resident. Jenkins on his part refused to treat at all so long as the Bhonsla's army continued undispersed ; and Scott was fain to stick to his position at Sitabaldi, keeping a bold countenance in spite of all misgivings. On the 28th the resident so far relented
Nov. 29. as to agree to a suspension of arms ; and on the 29th all anxieties were set at rest by the arrival of Gahan's detachment from Sindkhed—comprising the Twenty-second Bengal Infantry, the three remaining troops of the Sixth Bengal Cavalry and two horse-artillery

guns. Starting on the 20th he had covered in nine marches one hundred and seventy-six miles. On the 5th of December two more battalions arrived under Major Pitman, who had been summoned from Amraoti, ninety miles west of Nagpur, during the critical night of the 26th of November. Marching himself in all haste with such troops as were with him, Pitman had forwarded Jenkins's letter to Brigadier-general Doveton, who at once moved upon Nagpur with his entire division and reached it on the 12th of December. Lastly, Moira also, upon hearing that the Bhonsla had showed himself openly hostile, had ordered Brigadier-general Hardyman's column of observation to Nagpur from Rewah. Thus three weeks after the moment of real danger was past, there were British troops enough at Apa Sahib's capital to overwhelm forces of thrice his strength. 1817. Dec. 5. Dec. 12.

But even this was not the end of the general dislocation of plans brought about by the exposure of Scott's weak detachment in isolation at Nagpur. Keir with the Gujarat division had marched from Baroda for Ujjain on the 4th of December. The district which he had to traverse is part of that wild wooded tract which practically cuts India in two from west to east, and of which even now much remains unknown. For two marches his road lay through dense jungle, infested by the primitive and predatory race, known as Bhils, who succeeded in capturing part of his baggage and cut off not a few not only of his followers but of his men. Emerging from this into more open country on the 10th, he on the 13th reached Dohad, eighty miles north-east of Baroda, where he received an order from the Bombay government to return forthwith to within a day's march of Baroda. The authorities at Bombay, taking fright at the trouble with the Bhonsla, had concluded that Gaikwar would likewise join forces with the Peishwa, and, ignoring altogether the designs of Moira, recalled their contingent to watch over their own safety. Keir obeyed, but, before he had made Dec. 13.

1817. two marches towards Baroda, he received fresh orders giving him liberty to continue his advance if, after the detachment of a part of the Gujarat division to Baroda, the resident then should consider the situation secure. Accordingly Keir sent a thousand men to Baroda, and, with his division thus reduced to four thousand regular
Dec. 19. troops, reached Dohad for the second time on the 19th of December, having, through no fault of his own, wasted time and men to no purpose whatever.

However, to return to Nagpur, no sooner had Doveton's division recovered from the exhaustion of its long and harassing marches than Jenkins again
Dec. 15. took the Bhonsla in hand. On the 15th of December he required him within twenty-four hours to acknowledge that he had placed himself and his territories at the mercy of the British government, to surrender all his artillery, to disband his Arabs and other mercenaries, and to move his own person to the British residency as a hostage for the performance of these conditions. Emissaries poured in during the day from the Bhonsla to entreat for longer respite, but Jenkins would grant no later delay than 7 A.M.
Dec. 16. on the 16th ; and in the evening Doveton moved his entire force to the position of Sitabaldi. The camp of the Mahratta army lay to south of the city, its right practically resting on the south-eastern angle, while its front, facing to the west, was covered by a belt of huts and plantation about a mile long from north to south, and half a mile broad, with an enclosed pagoda and garden, called the Sakadara Gardens, at its southern extremity. Behind this screen, with its two defensible flanks, there was ample room for trickery and false dealing ; but Jenkins was in no mood for trifling.

Six o'clock came on the morning of the 16th and with it an envoy from Apa Sahib promising acceptance of the terms, but praying still for two or three days' grace. Jenkins gave him three hours, and Doveton filed his troops southward and formed them in line

of battle. Nine o'clock came without further message from the Bhonsla ; Doveton began his advance ; and Apa Sahib, in abject fear, mounted his horse and rode straight to the residency, where he delivered himself up to Jenkins. Doveton thereupon halted, and Jenkins pressed for the immediate surrender of the guns and the disbandment of the army. After some parley, it was agreed that by noon the Mahratta troops should be withdrawn to a distance, leaving their cannon behind them. Messengers from Apa Sahib accordingly reported a little before noon that all was ready, and begged for a detachment or a party to take over the surrender of the guns. Doveton, after a few questions, satisfied himself that some trick was toward, and advanced his whole line in open column of companies from the right of battalions. The Bhonsla's guides led him first to the arsenal at the northern end of the screen above described, where fourteen pieces of ordnance were seized before the enemy could discharge them. Leaving Scott's brigade to secure them, Doveton pressed on into the plantation, and was at once met by a sharp fire of musketry in his front and from the Sakadara Gardens on his right flank. He therefore sent his cavalry and horse-artillery to turn the enemy's left by Sakadara, and pushing forward his infantry, found himself in the open plain beyond the plantations with the enemy's whole army, seven thousand foot, twice as many horse and several batteries, in position before him. Here perforce he halted to deploy ; and meanwhile the cavalry, on rounding the Sakadara Gardens, came upon the left of the enemy's line, where was a battery backed by a strong force both of cavalry and infantry. The British horse, wheeling into line to the left, at once charged, capturing the guns and driving the rest of the enemy's troops in upon their centre. A second charge gave them a second battery ; but the enemy, being as yet unassailable upon their front, collected troops for a counter-attack, which was dispersed by the fire of the British horse-artillery. For yet a short time the

1817. Dec. 16.

1817. cavalry was obliged to stand on the defensive ; and
Dec. 16. then, with the advance of the British infantry, the Mahratta resistance speedily collapsed, and the whole line gave way. The British cavalry pursued them for five miles, inflicting some loss, and the infantry took possession of the Mahratta camp with forty elephants and sixty-four guns. Doveton's casualties in the whole affair did not exceed one hundred and forty-one.

The feebleness of the Mahrattas showed that their hearts were not in the fight ; but the Arab mercenaries, being brave men, were not disposed to yield so ignominiously. Some three thousand strong they took refuge in the city and occupied the fort ; nor could the discharge of their arrears of pay, coupled with promises of safe conduct to the Bhonsla's frontier, prevail with them to give it up. It was therefore necessary to besiege them in force, using the captured guns as a substitute for siege-artillery. After four days' firing, one of the gates was considered to be sufficiently damaged to warrant an assault. On the
Dec. 24. 24th accordingly the assault was delivered, three attacks being made at three different points by five companies of the Royal Scots and the flank companies of six native battalions, supported by three more native battalions. The general result was a failure, the principal onset being beaten off with appreciable loss ; but it made the Arabs more reasonable, and induced them, five days later, in return for a gratuity of fifty thousand rupees and other concessions, to evacuate the fort. The siege had cost the British rather over three hundred casualties, one hundred and twenty of which fell upon the five companies of the Royal Scots alone in the assault. In fact this attempt to storm a really formidable fortress, defended by resolute men, after no real preparation by artillery, seems to have been as wantonly foolish a thing as is to be found in the annals of the British Army in India.

However, the main purpose was accomplished. Another of the Mahratta powers had been not only

beaten, but reduced to abject dependency. Had Apa Sahib been a man of any spirit or activity he might have given endless trouble. In the first place he should easily have annihilated Scott's detachment, and, having done so, could probably have made an end of Gahan's also. He could then have led Doveton deep into mountains, ravines and jungles of Berar, prolonging his resistance indefinitely and working havoc with Moira's general operations. As things were, two only of his subordinates offered any resistance, the one at Jubbulpore, the other at Sirinajjur, and both were easily overcome, the former by General Hardyman in December, the other by a brigade of the Nagpur subsidiary force in January 1818. Thus Moira's difficulties were beginning to clear themselves up. Scindia had been bound to unwilling and hardly recognisable amity ; Bhonsla had been utterly subdued ; and the Peishwa was in flight. It is now time to turn to the main field of operations north of the Narbada. 1817.

CHAPTER IX

1817. Nov. 5. The Northern army, at our last review of its movements, on the 5th of November had its right division on the Chambal at Dholpur, its centre division on the Sind at Mahewa, and its left at Rehli. This last was under orders to advance westward upon Bhilsa.

Of the Southern army, the right division under Adams had crossed the Narbada and was to move upon Raisen, and the left division under Malcolm upon Ashta. The centre division under Hislop was to act as reserve. The general advance from Rehli, Raisen and Ashta was timed to take place about the 22nd of November.

We have seen how these arrangements were upset by the hostile attacks at Nagpur and Poona ; how Hislop had fallen back with the centre division, leaving Adams and Malcolm to advance without him ; how Doveton's division, which had been originally intended for the protection of the Nizam's dominions and later to besiege Asirgarh, had been drawn away to Nagpur, and Smith's division, which should have guarded the mountains of Khandesh, had been called to Poona. A detachment from Doveton's division had already been prepared to take Smith's place in Khandesh, but, in view of Smith's urgent demand for cavalry to pursue the Peishwa, this force was likewise sent to Poona. Yet another detachment, under Lieutenant-colonel Deacon, was taken from the centre division, which, marching on the 20th of November south-westward from Harda, entered Khandesh by the pass

of Sendhwa, eighty miles west of Asirgarh. Altogether, 1817.
what with one change and another, the drive from the south was likely to be disappointing alike in speed, weight and impetus.

An unforeseen misfortune seemed likely to impair Nov.
the efficiency of the Northern army also. Cholera had shown itself in the delta of the Ganges with the breaking of the monsoon. By September it had reached Calcutta, destroying over two hundred victims a day. Progressing up the valley of the Ganges it fell upon the British camp at Rewa at the beginning of October, and overtook the centre division of the Northern army at Mahewa in the first week of November. Grain, as it chanced, was scarce and of inferior quality in that district owing to failure of the harvest. The water-supply was also defective ; and, with two such allies as bad food and bad water, the fell disease leaped savagely upon Europeans and Indians, followers and fighting men. For ten days the whole camp was a hospital ; and when, on the 10th of November, Moira decided to move east- Nov. 10.
ward in search of a healthier position on the Betwa, it was impossible to find transport for the conveyance of the sick. Every day many dead and dying were abandoned, alike those that had sickened in camp and those that had fallen by the way. Of the survivors many thousands of followers deserted in panic ; and when the army halted at Erachh, on the Betwa, on the 20th of November, it was, to all appearance, broken Nov. 20.
in spirit and crippled in efficiency. Scindia heard it and rejoiced. The close pressure upon Gwalior had been relaxed, and the cause of the Mahrattas might yet be saved.

Meanwhile General Marshall on the extreme east was still in the vicinity of Rehli on the 18th of November ; Adams on his left marched into Raisen on the 22nd, and Malcolm on the extreme Nov. 22.
left came into Ashta on the 21st. The general intelligence was that the Pindaris were everywhere

1817. Nov. moving north-west, having shifted uneasily in that direction immediately upon the British passage of the Narbada ; and the combined movement of the three British divisions promised, after all, to be not much behind the appointed times. The next stages in the advance arranged between the three commanders were that Marshall should proceed to Raghugarh, about sixty-five miles west-north-west of Saugor, Adams to Rajgarh, some forty miles to south-west of Raghugarh, and Malcolm to Susner, thirty-five miles west of Rajgarh.

Marshall accordingly advanced as far as Sironj, Nov. 30. which he reached on the 30th of November. He had proposed to leave all heavy guns and baggage here under the guard of part of his army, and to move forward with the remainder, lightly equipped for the sake of speed. Instead of this, however, he remained halted at Sironj for a whole week upon various pretexts, which do not suggest that he was a man of enterprise. Adams, moving by Barasia, where he dropped half of his guns and five companies of infantry to protect them, reached Rajgarh on the 4th of December ; but, being there refused permission to purchase supplies, pushed on northward to Manohar Thana, Dec. 5. within the friendly territory of Kotah, on the 5th. Malcolm, having likewise discarded all encumbrances, at Talen, some fifty-two miles north of Ashta, turned sharp to westward, and formed a flying column, when on the 3rd of December he learned that Chitu, having been headed back from the frontier of Kotah, had turned southward towards Mehidpur, five and twenty miles north and west of Ujjain, and was encamped near the army of Holkar. This was in itself a highly Dec. 4. suspicious circumstance ; and Malcolm on the 4th made another march westward to Agar, for the double purpose of easier communication with the British political agent at Kotah, and of observing more nearly the movements and intentions of Holkar.

It was fairly evident that Holkar also had been

dazzled by the Peishwa's design of a revival of the old Mahratta confederation. His generals no sooner learned of the outbreak of hostilities at Poona than they declared their intention of marching south to join their titular head, Baji Rao. Defying all authority they were as good as their word. Calling every battalion to them they moved south from Rampura, ninety miles north of Ujjain, upon Mehidpur, where, before the 28th of November, fourteen outlying battalions had joined them. A day or two later Chitu formed a junction with this force, leaving no doubt that yet another of the Mahratta powers was abetting the Pindaris ; and the leaders spoke openly of their design to march by Indore to the Narbada and so to Poona, where the Peishwa promised to make good their arrears of pay. Malcolm, in his political capacity, protested and warned, but to no purpose ; and then, being in no strength to encounter Holkar's whole force with his flying column, he fell back southward, gathering in his heavy baggage and the remainder of his division as he went, and halting on the 9th and 10th at Tarana, twenty miles north-east of Ujjain. 1817. Dec. Dec. 9.

Ujjain, it will be remembered, was the point at which Hislop had instructed Malcolm to look for his support when his division should have crossed the Narbada ; and it is now time to return to Hislop's movements. Receiving on the 25th of November his instructions from Moira to return northward, Sir Thomas had reached Hindia on the 29th, and by the 2nd of December had passed the whole of his force across the river. On the 4th the division struck north-westward to ascend the ghauts of Malwa at Unchaud, which was reached on the 7th. Hislop had meanwhile sent instructions to Keir's Gujarat division to march eastward from Baroda to Ujjain, and he now called Malcolm's division to join him from Tarana at that same place. On the 12th accordingly Hislop's and Malcolm's forces united on the left bank of the Sipra over against Ujjain. The city was closed and guarded Dec. 4. Dec. 7. Dec. 12.

1817. against any armed body, though individuals were admitted to make purchases in the bazaar. With doubtful friends in Ujjain on the east and almost certain enemies at Mehidpur, little more than twenty miles to the north, Hislop made every preparation against a possible attack, though, despite of every precaution, he could not save many of his transport-animals from being carried off by Holkar's parties of horse. On the 14th he advanced one march along
Dec. 15. the road to Mehidpur; and on the 15th Holkar's envoys came into the camp to adjust with Malcolm the relations between their master and the British.

While Chitu had thus taken refuge with the army of Holkar, the other two principal bodies of Pindaris, under the chiefs Karim Khan and Wazil Mohammed, had turned north-westward upon Gwalior. This, as was timely discovered, they had done upon the express invitation of Scindia, who, since cholera had thrust back Moira's division to a safe distance at Erachh, had prescribed to them their route, namely by Kolaras, twenty-seven miles south of Narwar, upon Narwar itself. He had even engaged himself to join them when they should have arrived within a certain distance. Scindia, in fact, now thought that he could with impunity violate the treaty that he had lately signed, and was doing so freely. He had pledged himself that no part of his army should quit its station; but two large detachments had hovered, to no great purpose it is true, about the front both of Marshall and of Malcolm during their advance. He had promised to send five thousand horse to operate against the Pindaris; and there was not a sign of them. He had bound himself to enter into no negotiation with native powers except through British mediation; and he had been detected in secret correspondence both with the Nepalese and the Sikhs. But a treaty, signed under duress, has little binding power upon any man, and least of all upon a Mahratta. The salient fact for Scindia was not that he had written

his name upon a sheet of paper, but that the central division of the Northern army was, in his belief, incapable of action. 1817.

He was rudely undeceived. Cholera or no cholera, Moira was not to be trifled with. Since the first outbreak of the pestilence he had held ready at Barwa Sagar, fifty miles east and south of Narwar, a flying column of a brigade of cavalry and a battalion of native infantry under Colonel Philpot ; and on the 4th of December this force marched from the Sind with orders, if the Pindaris should fall back towards Gwalior, to cross the river and attack them. Simultaneously another flying column was sent with all haste to Tehri, sixty-five miles north of Saugor, to prevent the Pindaris from breaking away to eastward. Meanwhile the central division marched from Erachh westward upon the ford of Sonagir ; and on the Chambal, Donkin, who had halted at Kushalgarh on the 23rd of November, continued his progress south-westward upon Bhagwantgarh. Here he left his infantry behind him, and crossing the Banas, with a flying column only, on the 5th, hastened south-westward upon Dablana. Lastly, Moira called out detachments from the frontier-stations to guard the fords of the Jumna. Dec. 4. Dec. 5.

The bands of Karim Khan and Wazil Mohammed, counting upon Scindia's support, had during this time hurried northward to Narwar ; but, arriving there on the 6th of December, they heard[1] of the advance of Philpot's column upon Chinor, twenty-five miles to northward, and realised that the road to Gwalior Dec. 6.

[1] According to Blacker, Philpot did not reach Sonagir until the 7th of December nor cross the Sind to Chinor until the 8th (p. 98), but none the less he adds (p. 100) that Philpot was in time to intercept the Pindaris who had reached Narwar, apparently before the 6th. There is evidently some mistake in the dates ; or possibly Philpot pushed an advanced party forward to Chinor several hours before his arrival with his main body. The important point, that the Pindaris found themselves cut off from Gwalior and turned back, is, however, certain.

1817. was closed to them. On the same day, therefore, they turned west and southward towards Jhiri, looking for some safe place where they might deposit their wives and families with a view to swifter flight. Failing to find one, they attempted to cross the hills at Digtoli, north of Shahabad,[1] but, being headed by the troops of Kotah, struck south along the foot
Dec. 12. of the hills to the vicinity of Sirsi. Here on the 12th they forced their way through a detachment of Kotah
Dec. 13. troops, and on the 13th encamped at Bichi Tal to allow their baggage to rejoin them. But now they struck against another column. Marshall, after his long halt at Sironj, had at last moved north-westward some fifty miles to Nai Serai, where on the 12th he left his heavy artillery, stores and baggage, and with a lightly equipped column pursued his way towards Kolaras. Being advised, however, of the wheel of the Pindaris westward he hastened after them, and on the 13th reached Bijroni, some twenty-two miles east of Bichi Tal. At midnight he marched straight upon the Pindari camp, but being delayed by bad roads
Dec. 14. did not draw near it until 2 P.M. on the 14th. Meanwhile the Pindaris, having warning of his approach, crept off, leaving a thousand horse to cover their retreat. These were dispersed and pursued with some loss by Marshall's cavalry, whose casualties were trifling; but the bulk of them escaped, still making away westward. On the following day the pursuit was continued, the cavalry finding the road
Dec. 18. strewed with abandoned baggage; and on the 18th Marshall halted at Baran, on the west bank of the Parbati, forty miles to west of Bichi Tal.

In the interval, Donkin crossing the Banason on the 5th of December had hurried by forced marches from Bhagwantgarh fifty miles south-westward to
Dec. 9. Dablana, whence after a day's halt on the 9th, owing to uncertainty as to the enemy's movements, he moved southward upon Burdi and thence south-

[1] Shahabad lies fifty miles south-west of Narwar.

eastward upon Tikri. Here on the 11th he was again obliged to halt, having outmarched his supplies, but on the 13th his whole division crossed to the east bank of the Chambal ; and a light column made a forced march eastward to Sultanpur. There he heard of the repulse of the Pindaris at the pass of Digtoli, a few days before ; and on the 15th the flying column struck north-eastward for ten miles to Kalana on the east bank of the Kali Sindh river. Here he learned of General Marshall's attack on the previous day upon the Pindaris at Bichi Tal, seventy-five miles to east and south of him ; and on the night of the 16th he ascertained that Marshall's pursuit had driven Karim Khan's band into his neighbourhood. The light column, therefore, marched south-eastward soon after midnight and before dawn of the 17th surprised Karim Khan's foremost party about four miles north-east of Baran. The fighting men in the party were few, being no more than an escort for Karim's wife, his state elephants and other insignia of command. These were captured without bloodshed, but the main body, which was not more than six miles distant, heard betimes of the disaster ; and the chiefs meeting in council, decided to burn their tents, abandon their baggage, disband all but the best of their fighting men, and fly in all haste with the remainder.

1817. Dec. 15. Dec. 17.

Karim Khan and Wazil Mohammed accordingly made off with some four thousand men, all well mounted ; and, since all passages to the north and west were barred against them by Donkin's dispositions, they turned perforce to the south, between the Parbati and Kali Sindh rivers. It now seemed certain that they must be intercepted. Not only was Marshall lying right across their path at Barra, but farther to the south Adams, whom we left last at Manohar Thana, had marched thence northward to Chhabra ; and on the 17th his cavalry reached Jatawarra, something over thirty miles to west and south of Bichi

Dec. 17.

1817. Tal, and some fifteen miles south and east of the encampment which Karim Khan had just quitted. Marshall, however, seems to have had no knowledge of the Pindaris' movement, and Adams must have received false information, for on the morning of the 17th he detached his cavalry under Major Clarke in a southerly direction up the course of the Parbati. Clarke made an exhausting march of thirty miles to no purpose, and after much aimless wandering, with great hardship and privation to his troops, halted
Dec. 19. on the 19th at Put Barod, ten miles north of Chhabra.

Adams, meanwhile, with the main body had marched north to Jatawara and crossed the Parbati westward to Kotra, where, learning something of the truth, he turned south and westward for some fifty miles
Dec. 21. to Aklera ; Clarke rejoining him on the 21st, a day's march to north of that place. But it seems that the true course of the Pindaris had been to westward both of Marshall and of Adams. In any case they appear to have arrived at Rajghur, thirty-five miles to south-east of Aklera, on the 21st, dispirited indeed and disunited, but little damaged. Clarke had dispersed one small party ; and another, four hundred strong, was caught, after a forced march of fifty miles, by the First Rohilla Cavalry and, according to report, was nearly annihilated. But, broadly speaking, as Moira himself confessed,[1] his effort to " make an impressive example " of the Pindaris had failed. Numbers of them had been cut off in detail. The villagers, while concealing the movements of the main bodies, had turned with fury upon helpless individuals. Still the leaders had escaped, though with but a small following, and had got a good start on their way to join Holkar. But here, at any rate, Moira had been before them, and we must now return to Hislop, whom we left parleying with Holkar's envoys a day's march north of Ujjain.

The negotiations, opened on the 15th, were pro-

[1] *Papers concerning the Mahratta War*, p. 131.

tracted upon various pretexts by the Mahratta emissaries until the 19th of December, when Hislop, realising that any further delay would be construed as weakness, dismissed them and prepared to advance. On the same day bitter dissensions broke out in the Mahratta camp, but were ended by a violent triumph of the party that favoured war. On the 20th Hislop moved forward to a short distance to Hurneah, within ten miles of Holkar's position at Mehidpur, and half an hour before daybreak on the 21st set his whole army in motion. For eight miles he advanced without seeing anything of the enemy except a messenger with a last futile letter from Holkar. This individual was at once dismissed with an answer which Malcolm had already prepared against such a contingency; and he made off at speed upon observing that his arrival had not caused the army to halt for a moment. 1817. Dec. 19. Dec. 20. Dec. 21.

About 9 A.M. the columns passed over an eminence which afforded a commanding view of the valley of the Sipra, in which Mehidpur lies; and Hislop halted to examine the ground for himself. Before and immediately to north of him, ran the Sipra, a deep river running between sheer banks some twenty-five feet high. Along most of the front of his line of march its course was from west to east, and was screened from sight by an avenue of trees; but over against his extreme right, it made a bend and ran from south to north. In the elbow of this bend, about a mile to northward of him, the Mahrattas were disposed in two lines upon rising ground, with their left resting upon the river; infantry and guns in the first line, and a mass of cavalry in the second. Parties of the enemy's horse were hovering about Hislop's side of the water; and the first step was to send out the cavalry and horse-artillery under Malcolm to drive them off. Previous enquiry had ascertained that there were two fords by which the Mahratta position could be approached; but it was observed

1817. Dec. 21. that the hostile horse used only the higher of these two in their retreat; those parties, which were opposite the British right, descending the right bank of the river for more than a mile, and circling round the town of Mehidpur before they ventured to cross. Hislop decided at once that the entire army must pass the water by this higher ford, which was all the better adapted to his purpose since it led to a broad sand-bank, a thousand yards long and with a ravine at each extremity, which afforded good passages through the steep banks on to the plain beyond. He accordingly ordered a battery down to the right bank, and directed his Light infantry brigade to cross the ford at once, under cover of its fire, and to seize the opposite bank with its outlets on to the open ground.

The Light brigade accordingly plunged into the stream and accomplished this service unopposed except by a heavy cannonade, of which several shots, although the range was fully eight hundred yards, fell on the right bank of the river. This done, the cavalry and horse-artillery crossed the water, the former towards the plain by the left, where rising ground gave them some shelter, while the guns unlimbered immediately in front of the ford. A second battery was then sent farther down stream on the right bank to answer, or at any rate to distract, the enemy's artillery-fire; and by noon the main body of the infantry had begun the passage of the ford. As soon as the First brigade had formed on the left bank, Hislop gave the order for the attack to begin forthwith, leaving his remaining brigade of infantry to follow as a reserve. It was now seen that the Mahrattas had not lost their cunning in the art of choosing a position. Their left rested, as has been told, on the Sipra; their right was covered by a deep ravine which ran down into the river; and in the space—about a mile—between river and ravine, along a ridge of rising ground there were massed sixty-three guns, many of large calibre. In their left centre, on the highest point of the ground, was a

ruined village, strongly occupied by infantry, and skilfully flanked by artillery. The approach lay over about eight hundred yards of smooth natural glacis. No turning movement was possible; and the only practicable way to a decisive action was a simple frontal attack. The numerical odds against Hislop were great, for his force counted no more than six thousand regular troops and three thousand irregulars, with eighteen six-pounder guns.[1] Holkar had ten or twelve trained battalions, some twenty thousand horse and over sixty guns, ten of them fourteen and eighteen-pounders and none lighter than seven-pounders. And these guns were good weapons, served by brave and skilful men.

1817. Dec. 21.

[1] Order of battle of Hislop's army—

Horse Artillery Brigade (Captain Rudyard, Madras H.A.):
- 10 guns Madras H.A.
- 2 guns 3rd Madras Light Cavalry.
- 2 guns 8th Madras Light Cavalry.
- Rocket troops.

1st Cavalry Brigade (Lt.-Col. Russell, 3rd M.L.C.):
- 1 squadron H.M. 22nd L.D.
- 3rd Madras Light Cavalry.

2nd Cavalry Brigade (Major Lushington, 4th M.L.C.):
- 4th Madras Light Cavalry.
- 8th Madras Light Cavalry.

	European Officers.	Other Ranks.
Light Infantry Brigade (Major Bowen, 16th M.L.I.):		
Madras Rifle Corps	9	315
1/3 Madras L.I.	13	568
1/16th Madras L.I.	10	563
First Brigade (Lt.-Col. Scott, 102nd):		
Flank companies, H.M. 1st Foot	7	161
102nd Foot (Madras European Regt.)	9	314
1/14th Madras N.I.	6	610
2/14th Madras N.I.	9	487
Second Brigade (Lt.-Col. M'Dowell, 6th Madras N.I.)		
2/6th Madras N.I.	9	487
2 bns. Hyderabad Regular Infantry	7	1001
Madras Pioneers	4	315

Artillery:
- 1 company Madras Artillery.
- Hyderabad Brigade of Artillery.

Mysore Irregular Horse.

1817. Dec. 21. The ruined village being the key of the position, Hislop ordered Malcolm to lead his two brigades of infantry against the enemy's left and left centre. These had to be arrayed under fire, the First brigade deploying first on the right, a manœuvre which, owing to a stupid piece of pedantry, took much longer time than it ought to have taken, while the Light brigade came in from guarding the ravines to form battalion-columns of companies on its left. Meanwhile the British horse-batteries, overborne by weight of metal, had been almost silenced, several guns having been dismounted ; and the cavalry on the left was not only exposed to the enemy's artillery in its front but was galled by sharp-shooters who had crept down the ravine on their left. These last were presently driven off by a company of infantry ; but the trial, while it lasted, was severe. Indeed the cannonade was so heavy that the First brigade was ordered to advance before more than three companies of the native battalions had got into line. Then the whole array, infantry on the right and cavalry on the left, moved rapidly and steadily upon the enemy's batteries. As Malcolm's men drew near, the enemy threw forward the guns on their left to enfilade them both with grape and round shot ; and many of the British fell. But when the glacis had been passed, the battle was practically over.

The infantry on the right carried the village and the batteries at the point of the bayonet, while the cavalry on the left charged with an impetus which carried them, with little loss, well to the rear of the Mahratta guns. The Mahratta foot for the most part fled, but the gunners stuck most gallantly to their pieces and served them until they were struck down. One small party of infantry and artillery in the centre did for a time stand firm, being as yet unassailed ; but the infantry melted away when they saw Hislop's Reserve brigade advancing to the attack, and the brave gunners were left to meet their fate alone. The flying Mahrattas separated into two parties, those nearest to the

river following the left bank, and the remainder making away to the north-west with the cavalry in pursuit. The British horse, however, turned away to the attack of the Mahratta camp, which was found to be abandoned, and, when they followed the fugitives by the river, they were checked by a battery and parties of the enemy which had taken up a position below Mehidpur to cover the retreat of the army across the Sipra. These parties being strongly posted took some time to dislodge, and, when the British at last began to cross the river to renew the pursuit, the ford was found to be so difficult as to cause long delay. The Mahrattas thus gained a start and were not to be overtaken, though Malcolm followed them until dark ; and the British halted for the night in the captured position. 1817. Dec. 21.

The loss of the enemy was reckoned at about three thousand ; and sixty-three guns were captured. The casualties of the British amounted to seven hundred and seventy-eight killed and wounded, the brunt of the loss falling upon the Light brigade, which counted three hundred and forty-two killed and wounded out of fewer than fifteen hundred of all ranks in action. In the horse-artillery there were twenty-one casualties among the men and fifty-seven among the horses. Moreover, as the majority of the wounds were inflicted by grape or round shot, they were very severe if not mortal ; and, in fact, over two hundred out of six hundred wounded men died, not a little through want of proper surgical treatment. In the field-hospitals there was scarcely a scrap of dressing-plaster for the officers, and none for the men. Further, there were no surgical instruments except those belonging, as private property, to individual surgeons, some of whom could produce none. Hence, of the patients who underwent amputation, all suffered unnecessary torture owing to the bluntness of the knives, and two out of three died from lack of proper dressings. It appears to have been the practice in the Madras army to allow the medical officers to make their own con-

1817. Dec. 21. tracts for medical stores ; and to this vicious system hundreds of brave men were sacrificed.

But it should seem that much of this loss could have been avoided with greater skill on the part of the general. It is not easy, in the first place, to see what could have been gained by thrusting forward ten light guns into the fire of batteries of five times their number of pieces and thrice their weight of metal. Again the Light brigade was kept under a heavy cannonade for the best part of an hour while the First brigade was forming, according to the pedantic principles of the parade-ground, upon its right. And the nature of the action was such that any careless handling of the troops might have brought about disaster. The British had to cross the river by a single ford, and could only reach the plain beyond it by the two ravines that flanked the egress from that ford. To put the matter more crudely, they had to advance from the apex of a triangle upon its base with no security for their flanks ; and, viewed in this light, Hislop's attack might be considered sheer madness. If the Mahrattas had occupied the two ravines with infantry in strength, the passage of the river could only have been forced with difficulty, and debouchment upon the plain might have been impossible. If again they had advanced their guns upon each flank, as they actually did upon their left, they might have brought a cross-fire to bear upon the ford and, even if that had been carried, could have enfiladed the subsequent attack from both flanks. They had, in fact, every opportunity of making Mehidpur a second Fontenoy, but fortunately they failed to seize it. Hislop took all these risks, and, as he was successful, he must receive credit for his audacity. But such audacity is not very remote from stupidity.

In the matter of pursuit he failed lamentably ; but not altogether through his fault. He was hampered by the fact that his cavalry was under no single leader, and that consequently each brigadier did what was

right in his own eyes. The same defect was seen at Vittoria with precisely the same result. Indeed the general rush of the regular cavalry at Mehidpur towards the Mahratta camp, which could easily have been dealt with by the infantry, suggests rather anxiety to gain a share in the spoil than zeal to make an end of a routed enemy. As a matter of fact, the Mysore irregular horse were the troops that captured the most precious of the booty, amounting in value to nearly a million sterling. By the terms of their engagement, they were allowed to keep whatever they took in the field, but were excluded from participation in the general prize-fund. The regular cavalry, being no doubt aware of this, was all the readier to relinquish the pursuit for the possession of the camp. At the close of the war Hislop entered into a bitter controversy with the Governor-general, contending that the Mysore Horse should be compelled to disgorge their plunder. But the Governor-general, with an impartiality that does him honour, refused to allow the irregulars to be defrauded of what he considered to be their right, and gave his decision against the claim of Hislop and the regular troops.[1] 1817. Dec. 21.

Whether some misgivings as to the distribution of the prize-money had already, upon the evening of the battle, overtaken the regular troops and disheartened them for further work, is a matter of conjecture ; but it is certain that for one reason or another, the army was unfit to resume operations for some time. Hislop's Quartermaster-general says vaguely that the army was so much disorganised by the action that it was impossible to prepare a detachment to continue the pursuit ; and it seems likely that this disorganisation was due to dispersal in search of spoil. It is true that the Light brigade and Horse Artillery had suffered more than others ; but there was other infantry, besides the Light brigade, which could have taken its place in a flying column. Be that as it may,

[1] Wilson's *Madras Army*, iv. 193-198.

1817. it was not until the 27th that a detachment[1] was placed
Dec. 27. under Sir John Malcolm's command and sent north-westward upon Mandasor, to complete the discomfiture of Holkar's army. Once again the Mysore Horse were to the fore, for on arriving before the place on the 31st, together with a squadron of regular cavalry under an European officer, they captured the whole of Holkar's cattle and bazaars under the walls. Here Malcolm halted by order; and meanwhile Hislop with the main body marched north-westward on
Dec. 30. the 28th and on the 30th reached Tal. Here he was met by the Gujarat division which had left Dohad on the 20th, and striking north-westward had reached Ratlam on the 24th, and moved thence on the 28th. The two columns then pursued their way
1818. to Mandasor, where they arrived on the 1st and 2nd
Jan. 1. of January, 1818, and overtook Malcolm. Hislop, in spite of his bold attack at Mehidpur, still thought Malcolm too weak to deal with the disorganised and disheartened rabble which had once been Holkar's army.

Holkar himself, however, was by this time so thoroughly cowed that he had made overtures for submission, and on the 1st of January, 1818, signed a preliminary treaty which had been laid before him
Jan. 6. by Malcolm. On the 6th he agreed to amended conditions approved by the Governor-general, which included, over and above the usual terms of a subsidiary treaty, the cession to the British of Khandesh and all his other possessions to south of the Satpura Hills. Thus out of the five great Mahratta chiefs, one, Scindia, had been forced to accept the dictation of the British by the menace of overwhelming strength,

[1] 2 squadrons 4th Madras N.C.
2 squadrons 8th Madras N.C.
4 Horse Artillery guns.
1/3rd Madras N.I.
1/16th Madras N.I.
2000 Mysore Horse.

and two, the Bhonsla and Holkar, by humiliating defeat in the field ; one, the Peishwa, had likewise suffered defeat and was now a fugitive ; and from the fifth, Gaikwar, little was now to be feared. The Pindaris, though not actually exterminated, had been harried, broken, dispirited and deprived of the support of their Mahratta sympathisers. On the whole, Moira, in spite of some disappointments, had not done ill in his three months' campaign towards re-establishing order in Central India. He had quenched the flames of anarchy and strife ; and there now remained the weary task of trampling out the embers. Let us deal first with the south, and with the chase of the arch-offender, Peishwa Baji Rao. 1818.

CHAPTER X

1817. It will be remembered that when General Smith prepared to attack the Peishwa's troops at Poona on the 17th of November, 1817, he found that the Peishwa and his army had fled, taking their guns with them, and that the city had been abandoned to his mercy. Having no cavalry with him Smith was unable to do more immediately than to occupy Poona ; but being joined on the 18th by the Second Madras Cavalry he prepared at once for the pursuit.

Nov. 19. On the 19th a detachment was sent twelve miles southward to the Fort of Singarh, where the Peishwa was reported to have left his artillery and much of his baggage ; and fourteen guns, together with their ammunition, and considerable booty were captured without difficulty. This detachment returned on the 21st, and on the 22nd Smith started with his whole force in chase of the Peishwa, who was understood to be near Satara, some fifty miles to the south, where one of his feudatories had joined him with a thousand Arabs and two thousand horse.

Almost from the outset Smith's march was dogged by five thousand of the Peishwa's best horse, an awkward complication for a commander who had at his own disposal only a single regiment of regular cavalry and a handful of irregulars. However, by occasionally opening fire with shrapnel from a concealed light gun, these troublesome neighbours were kept at a distance ; and after some days, not knowing whether the Peishwa might not throw himself into

a fortress, Smith took with him his heavy guns, ready for a siege, which greatly impeded his movements. Nevertheless by the 27th, in spite of all the difficulties of a rugged country, he was within ten miles of Satara. The Peishwa by that time had fled to Pusesavli, twenty-five miles farther to the south-east; but here he was headed back, much to his discomfiture, by another column. 1817. Nov. 27.

The Reserve division, which we saw employed south of the Toombuddra under Colonel Munro, having received its new commander, Brigadier-general Pritzler, had marched from Sindhuur on the 20th of November, and was moving to its appointed place about Gulbarga, when the intelligence of the Peishwa's hostilities caused its course to be altered towards Poona. The passage of the Kistna, owing to the scarcity of boats, occupied from the 25th of November to the 5th December, so that there was plenty of time for the Peishwa to learn of his coming; and hence it was that when Smith marched into Pusesavli on the 2nd of December he found that Baji Rao had turned eastward to Pandharpur, evidently with the intention of doubling back to the north. He, therefore, followed in his track to Pandharpur, harassed all the way by large bodies of Mahratta horse, which swarmed round the army and greatly hampered its measures for obtaining supplies. Arrived at Pandharpur he halted on the 8th and 9th, and on the night of the 9th attempted, unsuccessfully, to surprise a Mahratta bivouac. Then, hearing that the Peishwa had struck north-westward upon Pedgaon, he continued the pursuit without a halt until he was satisfied that Baji Rao had passed clear of Poona, when he turned aside to his old cantonment at Sirur to recruit his exhausted transport-cattle. He had marched, carrying his heavy guns with him, three hundred miles in twenty-six days and, beyond exhausting his troops, had accomplished nothing. So far the Peishwa had had decidedly the best of the game. Dec. 2. Dec. 9.

1817. Smith now dropped his heavy train and made his preparations for marching lightly equipped. Pritzler had meanwhile reached Bijapur on the 11th and
Dec. 17. Pandharpur on the 17th ; and Smith, having found an additional battalion awaiting him at Sirur, sent it to Pedgaon to join Pritzler. This done, he marched
Dec. 22. on the 22nd north-westward by Ahmadnagar, and thence north-westward for some forty miles to Kolhar, having intelligence that the Peishwa was making for Nasik, near the head-waters of the Godavari. Leaving Kolhar on the 26th he turned westward upon Sang-
Dec. 27. gamner and there on the 27th learned that he had been, if anything, too successful. He had already got to north of the Peishwa at Kolhar ; and the fugitive, having been joined by the levies of his old favourite Trimbakji, had doubled back southward upon Poona. This seemed to be a serious matter ; for Colonel Burr, who was in charge of Poona, had then only one irregular and two regular battalions, with some light artillery. Smith, therefore, followed up the chase with all speed, though with great difficulty, the country being rough and confined, and rapid movement almost impossible. His way lay at first westward and then southward through the Wazir Ghat, over which even the light guns still with him had to be dragged by hand. Hence the passage of the Ghat occupied more
Dec. 30. than twenty-four hours ; and on the 30th he was still from sixty to seventy miles distant from Poona. He therefore now divided his division into two parts, of which he sent one, under Colonel Boles, in an easterly direction to head off the Peishwa if he should double back once more towards Khandesh by the eastern route ; while with the other under his personal command he continued the direct pursuit. Moving
1818. still due south he arrived on the 2nd January 1818
Jan. 2. at Chakan, within eighteen miles of Poona, and learned that Baji Rao had been there three days before him. The Peishwa, it appeared, was accompanied by his whole army and was likely to rally the

inhabitants on his side. His design, so far as could be divined, was to recapture Poona ; and there seemed good reason to dread that he might succeed. In spite of all his exertions Smith feared that the Baji Rao might, after all, have outmanœuvred and overreached him. 1818.

The garrison of Poona was weak, as has been told, but by chance on the 28th of December seventeen hundred irregular horse had been brought thither by their British commander, Major Cunningham, to be mustered and paid. Knowing nothing of Smith's division except that it was far away, Burr on the 30th judged it prudent to summon to Poona another battalion of Native foot from the cantonment at Sirur ; and accordingly at 8 P.M. on the 31st, Captain Staunton with the second battalion of the First Bombay Native Infantry, two guns of the Madras Artillery under Lieutenant Chisholm, and two hundred and fifty irregular horse under Lieutenant Swanston, set out upon a night march to Poona. At 10 A.M. on the 1st of January the detachment reached the high ground overlooking the valley of the Bhima ; and there Staunton saw before him the entire army of the Peishwa, nearly eight thousand foot and twenty thousand horse, encamped on the south bank of the river. Below him, on the very edge of the north bank, was the village of Koregaon, under the walls of which ran the road to Poona, crossing the river by a ford. The enemy did not at first perceive his approach, and had not occupied the road to the village on the left bank ; so Staunton made haste to seize the village before it was too late. His irregular horse trotted down the hill and formed in readiness to charge any of the Mahratta cavalry that might attempt to pass the ford ; and, thus protected, the battalion marched down to the bank at the western extremity of the village, and opened fire from its two battalion-guns. Jan. 1.

Under cover of this demonstration, it seems,

1818. Jan. 1. Staunton gradually filed his troops into the village and occupied it as best he could. It was a straggling irregular place of oval form, with an extreme length, east and west, of about three hundred yards, and an extreme width, north and south, of about two hundred yards, and was traversed along its whole length by an open space some fifty yards wide. About the centre of this open space was a small knoll, and one hundred yards to west of it a second knoll, which afforded excellent positions for the two guns, the former enfilading the road to Sirur, the latter commanding the opposite bank of the river. Of the buildings some few were substantial and surrounded by walls ; and there was a walled enclosure towards the south-eastern extremity which, given time, might readily have been made defensible. But there was no time. It is difficult to say exactly what happened, but it is certain that some of the enemy's Arab infantry managed to cross the water and enter the village almost, if not quite, as soon as Staunton's men. The Peishwa had two heavy guns, and he may have opened fire with them and driven Swanston's irregular horse from their position on the left bank. Or again, there may have been another ford lower down the river by which the enemy could cross the water unharmed. Be that as it may, the hostile infantry—some three thousand Arabs—were early in and about the southern and eastern parts of the village, occupying in particular the walled enclosure already mentioned ; and soon afterwards great bodies of the enemy's horse with two guns encircled Koregaon upon every side. When they appeared, Staunton's cavalry, transport, and followers hurried for shelter within the walls ; and the crowding and confusion became very serious. The cavalry, having no weapons except for work in the saddle, were huddled away, dismounted, at the eastern end, the transport and followers at the western end. The infantry ensconced itself in small parties in the best positions that it could find. The entire

strength of the detachment, exclusive of the horse, did not exceed five hundred regular sepoys, twenty-six European gunners, six British executive officers and two British surgeons. 1818. Jan. 1.

Staunton, putting a bold face on the matter, at once attacked the Arabs who had installed themselves in the village, but was stoutly resisted, and soon found that it would need all his efforts to defend his own position. The Arabs, telling off special marksmen to pick off the gunners, fell upon his posts with impetuous courage ; and there was confused fighting at all points. Sometimes the enemy gained a little ground, but were instantly driven from it by a counter-attack. Once they captured a small enclosure and slaughtered one of three European wounded officers who lay within it ; but they were expelled from it before they could murder the rest. Once by a desperate effort they captured one of the guns, killing Lieutenant Chisholm who was in command of the artillery ; but they had no sooner gained the trophy than they lost it ; and the two pieces, raking the chief avenues, mowed them down in masses. On one occasion a gunner half filled his gun with grape, waited till the assailants were within a dozen yards, and then fired it into the thick of them. Thus afternoon wore on to evening, when the defenders were so much weakened in numbers and so much exhausted by hunger and thirst that some of them, both native and European, began to speak of surrender. But Staunton would not hear of it ; and, representing that they were as likely to be massacred if they surrendered as if they continued to resist, he was able to hearten them anew. So they struggled on desperately through evening to night. Darkness came down ; and at 9 P.M. the Arabs, having had enough of fighting, evacuated the village. Then at last the garrison was able to obtain water ; and, the agony of thirst abated, they took new courage. Staunton, now in possession of the whole village, made his dispositions for renewing the

1818. fight on the morrow. He can have taken little rest on that anxious and trying night.

Jan. 2. Daylight brought him unexpected relief. The Peishwa had heard of Smith's approach to Chakan, and the enemy was seen preparing to move away on the road to Poona. They halted, however, short of the city, and endeavoured to lure Staunton nearer to it, sending in false spies, who purported to have come from Major Cunningham, with an invitation to meet him on the site of the Peishwa's camp and march with him into Poona. Staunton was quite in the dark as to Smith's movements ; but he knew that he could not break through the Peishwa's army and that he had neither the food nor the ammunition to enable him to stay where he was. He therefore feigned to acquiesce in the proposal of the Mahratta spies, made all arrangements for the conveyance of his wounded, and, when night fell, slipped back quietly to Sirur,

Jan. 3. which he entered safely at 9 A.M. on the 3rd. There too he found the battalion which had been detached by Smith to join Pritzler, but had been instantly recalled upon the tidings of the Peishwa's approach. All therefore was well ; but Staunton's losses had been heavy. Of the seven European officers with him two only besides himself were untouched, for the surgeons had of course for those days exchanged the lancet for the sword. Three, including one of the surgeons, had been killed or mortally hurt, and two more severely wounded. Of the twenty-six gunners, eight were killed and twelve wounded ; of the native infantry, fifty were killed and one hundred and five wounded ; and of the irregular horse, ninety-six were killed, wounded or missing. The enemy's loss was computed at six or seven hundred.

Altogether this was a very fine little fight, and greatly to the honour of Staunton. He had spent the day of the 1st in making his preparations for the march, and he had actually brought his little column forward twenty-six miles in the course of the

night. He had then to take up a defensive position in the face of a hostile army at a moment's notice, huddle his undisciplined cavalry and transport under cover somehow, maintain a fight not only against overwhelming odds but against thirst and exhaustion for twelve hours, many of them under a burning sun, and, with more than half of his European officers and five-sixths of his few European gunners out of action, to keep up the courage of his fighting men as best he could. The physical exertion of moving from threatened point to threatened point during the combat must in itself have been very great ; and all the time he was equally putting forth the moral force which held his troops together. When the fight ended he had to spend the hours of darkness in looking to his wounded and making fresh dispositions. When the dawn came, he had to outwit the Mahratta spies and perfect his arrangements for the retreat ; and, when night again fell, he had to conduct his retreat once more through the darkness. He can have had no sleep—hardly indeed relaxation of mental, moral, and physical strain—for seventy-two hours ; and never once, so far as can be gathered, did he fail during that period to do not merely his duty, but the best that any man in the circumstances could have done. 1818. Jan.

Smith, on his arrival at Chakan on the 2nd, heard that Staunton had been surrounded at Koregaon on the 1st, and on the 3rd hastened to his relief. Finding that Staunton was safe, he halted at Koregaon on the 4th, having marched sixty-one miles in three days, and then pushed on to Sirur, where he again halted for the day of the 7th. Pritzler, meanwhile, having been delayed by the necessity of bringing in a convoy, had not been able to resume active operations from Pandharpur until the 3rd of January, when, having news of the Peishwa's double to the southward, he struck north-westward upon Akluj on the river Nira, and thence westward up the stream to Phaltan, where he arrived on the 6th. Finding there that the Peishwa Jan. 7.

1818. was passing southward, athwart the head of his column, he turned south-westward upon Satara ; and on the
Jan. 8. 8th his cavalry overtook the Mahratta rear-guard, cut up some fifty of them and captured some baggage-cattle. In alarm the Peishwa fled from the vicinity of Satara on the 7th and, following the western bank of the Kistna, reached Miraj on the 11th and Erroor, twenty miles farther to south, on the 13th, where he crossed the river. At this same point Pritzler, following by forced marches, passed the Kistna on
Jan. 15. the 15th ; and the Peishwa, finding that his infantry could not endure further pursuit, sent it off to the south-west, and himself turned south-east to the river Ghatpurba, covering his rear with large bodies of cavalry. These were overtaken, charged and routed
Jan. 17. by the Twenty-second Light Dragoons on the 17th, who cut down a few score of them with little loss to themselves ; and the chase then continued across the Ghatpurba, when on the 19th it was found that the Peishwa, discovering that the inhabitants south of the river had been armed against him by Brigadier-general Munro, had again doubled back to the Kistna. Re-crossing the Ghatpurba, Pritzler reached the Kistna at Galgala, nearly sixty miles east and south of Erroor,
Jan. 23. on the 23rd, and pressed the pursuit up the right bank of the Kistna for nearly forty miles to Sidapur, where on the 27th he heard that Smith had once again taken up the hunt from Sirur. Pritzler therefore
Jan. 29. halted till the 29th at Sidapur. He had traversed three hundred and forty-six miles in twenty-five days and had hustled his enemy considerably, but had failed to inflict on him any serious damage.

Smith meanwhile had marched from Sirur on the
Jan. 8. 8th of January with a lightly equipped column, leaving behind him Colonel Boles with his heavy train and a sufficient force to cover Poona. Moving southward, Smith reached Phaltan on the 12th and Hingungaon,
Jan. 21. some seventy-five miles farther to south, on the 21st, where he heard that the Peishwa had crossed to the

left bank of the Kistna and was heading for Miraj. 1818.
As a matter of fact, the fugitive chief had pushed westward up the Kistna to Erroor, where he had made a great show of pitching his camp and announced that he was moving upon Nipani, twenty miles to south-west. In a few hours, however, he struck his tents and fled away northward up the right bank of the Kistna by Urun Islampur upon Satara. On the 22nd Jan. 22.
Smith made a forced march of twenty-eight miles southward, and, receiving at its close true intelligence of the intentions of the Peishwa, who was only twenty-four hours ahead of him, hurried on the 23rd towards Miraj.

So far Smith had encountered no enemy, but on this day his rear-guard was much pressed by the enemy's horse; and on the 24th these, now ten Jan. 24.
thousand strong, closed in so menacingly upon his flanks and rear that he was obliged to halt and engage them. This gained some time for the Peishwa; and Smith now resumed the chase northward upon Satara along the right bank of the Kistna, while Boles was directed to bring the battering-train to the same point. Smith gained rapidly upon the fugitives, who, however, none the less contrived to slip past the head of his column to eastward, without further loss than some of their rear-guard and part of their baggage. Heading north the Peishwa ran into Boles's column, and finally made off eastward by Phaltan to Pandharpur, where for the present he was left alone. Smith and Boles united their forces at Lonand, some thirty miles north-east of Satara, on the 31st, and, halting there until the 3rd of February, countermarched southward to Feb. 3.
Rahimatpur. On the following day Pritzler joined him there from the Kistna; and on the 10th the two divisions marched upon the fort of Satara and, after throwing a few shells into it, received its surrender. A manifesto was then published that the British Government intended, as a punishment to Baji Rao, to exclude him and his family for ever from sovereignty,

1818. to annihilate the Peishwa's name and authority altogether, and to take to itself the whole of his territorial possessions.

This was the beginning of a new military as well as political departure. It was plainly unprofitable to hunt Baji Rao round and round the country between the Godavari and the Kistna ; and Moira, upon Elphinstone's suggestion, now resolved to unite the cavalry and light troops of Smith's and Pritzler's divisions, using the siege-train and the rest of the force to reduce the strong places south of Poona, and to take actual possession of the country. Accordingly a compact flying column was organised for Smith,[1] and the remaining troops were made over to Pritzler.[2]

The two divisions moved off from Satara on suc-

[1] Smith's Column :
Horse Artillery.
2 squadrons H.M. 22nd L.D.
2nd Madras N.C.
7th Madras N.C.
1200 Poona auxiliary horse.
2500 Poona auxiliary foot.

[2] Pritzler's Column :

Artillery :		
Madras Bombay	. . . .	194 rank and file.
Madras Infantry Brigade :		
Detachment Madras Rifle Corps European Flank Battalion 2/12 Madras N.I.	1775	,,
Bombay Brigade :		
Bombay Europeans (H.M. 103rd) 2/9th Bombay N.I. 2/15th Madras N.I.	1766	,,
	3735	,,

Train :
1 ten-inch mortar.
4 eight-inch mortars.
2 five-and-a-half-inch howitzers, heavy.
4 five-and-a-half-inch howitzers, light.
4 eighteen-pounders.
4 twelve-pounders.
10 six-pounder field-guns.

cessive days, Smith on the 13th of February to resume 1818.
the chase of the Peishwa, Pritzler on the 14th to Feb. 14.
besiege the fortress of Singarh, fifty miles to the north and west. The Peishwa was reported to be between Pandharpur and Sholapur, which lies fifty miles to east of the former place ; and Smith moved in that direction by easy marches, reaching Yelapur, some sixty miles east of Satara, on the 19th. Here he heard Feb. 19.
the welcome news that the Peishwa had shifted westward, that is to say in Smith's direction, from Sholapur ; and on the same night he marched eastward to meet him. On the way, however, he learned that the Mahratta chief had turned north-westward from Sholapur upon Karkamba, being wholly ignorant of the presence of the British. Smith, therefore, inclined south-eastward, crossed the Bhima at Kerauli, fifteen miles south-east of Yelapur, and pushed on with his mounted troops only in all possible haste. At 8.30 A.M. on the 20th Smith heard the Mahratta Feb. 20.
drums beating on the far side of a hill, near Ashti, which concealed his force from view, and knew that he was within reach of his prey at last.

The Mahrattas, however, were not completely surprised ; and Baji Rao had plenty of time to mount a horse and gallop away with a small escort, while his most trusted leader, Gokla, arrayed some ten thousand horse to cover his retreat. These he had massed behind a broad and deep ravine at the foot of a hill ; and the ground over which the British had to advance was rough and broken by many lesser ravines. Most of these ran at right angles to this main ravine, but one, larger and more difficult than the rest, joined it at an acute angle opposite the extreme left of the Mahratta line. Smith, who was not a cavalry-officer, had probably heard that cavalry was most vulnerable upon its flanks ; and he now proceeded to move his brigade across the front of the Mahrattas, as if manœuvring to turn their left. To execute this evolution he formed the brigade in parallel regimental columns of threes at

1818. Feb. 20. deploying intervals, with his two batteries, which were none too happy in the difficult ground, echelonned in rear of either flank. In this formation, even on a plain as smooth as a billiard table, the columns could form line to the front only by headlong galloping of the rearmost threes, while to form line to the left flank, which was exposed to the enemy, would be an awkward and difficult evolution. However, probably under the impression that he was handling three companies in column of route with their battalion-guns on their flanks, Smith led his squadrons over the plain to the deep lateral ravine already mentioned. The Seventh Native Cavalry, being on the right, reached this ravine first, crossed it and began to form up on the other side. Gokla, seeing his opportunity, had meanwhile led some three hundred horse across the great main ravine, ordering another chief to support him with four thousand more. No more than three troops of the Seventh had been formed when Gokla came galloping up at speed, swept across the front of the Seventh, his men firing their matchlocks as they passed, and then, fetching a wide compass, came down full upon their right flank and rear.

For a moment there was wild confusion. Smith, who for some reason had taken his place on the extreme right of the line, was disabled by a sabre-cut on the head ; and the affray might have taken an ill turn had not Major Dawes of the Twenty-second Light Dragoons thrown back the right squadron of his regiment to meet the flanking attack, and charged in turn along the rear of the Seventh. The Second Native Cavalry, on the left, threw out a squadron to check any further menace upon the flank and rear of their comrades. Gokla, fighting most gallantly far ahead of his men, was cut down. The chief who should have supported him never came forward. Gokla's handful of brave troopers lost heart and fled after the fall of their leader ; and the main body of the Mahrattas moved off without venturing to come into

action. The British battery on the left unlimbered 1818.
and opened fire on the retreating masses with some Feb. 20.
effect, and the Second Native Cavalry pursued them for five miles, inflicting no great loss, but dispersing them effectually and capturing much baggage. The casualties of the Mahrattas were reckoned at one hundred, whereas those of the British did not exceed twenty. Nevertheless the honours of the fight lay with the fallen chief, Gokla ; and if, among his host, one chief in ten had shared his skill and one man in ten his courage and resolution, the issue would have been very different. The bare fact that the Seventh Native Cavalry and Twenty-second Light Dragoons were not for some time in a condition to join the Second in pursuit, is sufficient evidence of this. Of Smith's handling of the cavalry brigade the less said the better.[1] It was no fault of his that his party was not annihilated.

However, the Peishwa's rearguard had at least been brought to combat and defeated; and the affair, trifling though it was, entirely disconcerted that chieftain's plans, for he had ordered his infantry north-westward from Nipani, and hoped, with the help of some of Holkar's troops, to stand a general engagement. He now abandoned any such project and fled due north to the Godavari at Mungi (about fifty miles south-west of Jalna) and thence over one hundred miles up the river to Nasik. His people, weary of being hunted, began to fall away to their homes, and his following was greatly reduced. Smith, for his part, pursued his way steadily towards Poona, taking with him the titular Raja of Satara, who, during the recent action, had seized the opportunity to escape from the Peishwa's custody and throw himself into the arms of the British. On the 8th of March Smith marched into Sirur, by Mar. 8.

[1] Blacker, who was a cavalry-officer, evidently slurs over the more unpleasant features of this action; but with the help of his plan and of Grant Duff's brief account of the affair (*History of the Mahrattas*, iii. 316), it is possible to arrive at something near the truth.

1818. which time Baji Rao had crossed the Godavari, abandoning his possessions to south of that river. The end of the Peishwa was not far off.

Meanwhile Pritzler had begun the work of occupying the Peishwa's territory. He had marched from Feb. 14. Satara, it will be remembered, on the 14th of February, and he made first for the fortress of Sinhgarh, some fifty miles to the north and west. His progress was slow, for the country around it was hilly and difficult, and his line of march, with the battering-train, stores and provisions, was four miles long; but, being absolutely unmolested on his way, he arrived before Feb. 20. the place safely on the 20th. The fort stood on a rocky height of considerable altitude and difficult access; but neighbouring eminences of almost equal elevation on the same ridge afforded good sites for batteries; and between the 21st and the 28th Pritzler opened fire from five mortars of large calibre, four Mar. 1. howitzers, and six heavy guns. On the 1st of March, after over fourteen hundred shells and two thousand heavy round shot had been expended on the fort, the garrison, twelve hundred strong, surrendered; and Mar. 6. Pritzler on the 6th marched for Purandhar, another hill-fort, some twenty miles to the east. Outlying works which commanded this stronghold being easily reduced by a short bombardment, Purandhar was Mar. 28. quickly surrendered, and by the 28th all the hill-forts between Poona and Satara, ten in number, had been captured and occupied.

Another detachment under Colonel Deacon, which had been called up to head Baji Rao away from the north in December, but had found itself without employment owing to that chief's double back to the Feb. south, was likewise used during February for the reduction of the forts between Ahmadnagar and Poona; and the strongholds of Kurra, twenty-five miles to south-east of Ahmadnagar, and of Chakan, fifteen miles to north of Poona, were mastered before the end of the month at the cost of a few shells

and of trifling casualties. Yet another detachment 1818.
under Lieutenant-colonel Prother, specially equipped by the Bombay government for maintaining communication between Bombay and Poona, was now used for this same service. Such was the strain upon the resources of the Army at this time that it was necessary to draw upon the body-guards of the Governor and of the Commander-in-chief to furnish this force with a few cavalry ; but even so, Prother was able with ease during January to capture the strong places of the Peishwa below the Ghats to west of Poona. In February, being slightly reinforced, he ascended the Ghats and made as facile a conquest of the forts to west and north-west of Poona, though many of them were of exceeding natural strength. Thus the Peishwa's territory to southward was passing steadily into British possession and under British control. He himself had fled north of the Godavari and had entered the sphere of action assigned to the main armies of the North and of the Dekhan. It is time, therefore, to return to the Pindaris and to the operations of Moira.

CHAPTER XI

1817. The military situation north of the Narbada at the close of the year 1817 was as follows:

Of the Northern army—Donkin's division on the right had moved westward from Sultanpur to Bundi; the centre division was at Uchar, a little to east of the ford of Sonagir, and nearly forty miles to south-east of Gwalior; the left division, under Marshall, had by Moira's orders fallen back to Berasia, thirty miles north of Bhopal.

Of the Southern army—the right division under Adams was at Susner, one hundred miles due south of Sultanpur; the centre division, under Hislop, was close to Mandasor.

The Gujarat division, under Sir William Keir, had just effected its junction with Hislop.

The Reserve, under Sir David Ochterlony, having advanced a few marches at the end of November, lay at Jaipur, one hundred and thirty miles west of Agra.

As to the enemy, Scindia was bound hand and foot by the presence of Moira and the centre division of the Northern army at Uchar.

The bands of Karim Khan and Wazil Mohammed had crossed the Chambal at Gangdhar, thirty-two miles north of Mehidpur.

The remnant of Holkar's defeated army had also crossed the Chambal and was supposed to be at Rampura, about sixty-five miles north of Mehidpur.

It was tolerably certain that they would be joined by the Pindaris of Karim Khan and Wazil Mohammed. 1817.

Chitu's band of Pindaris, which had suffered little or no loss, had likewise passed to the left bank of the Chambal, and was believed to be making for Jawad, ninety-five miles north-west of Mehidpur.

Thus Hislop's and Keir's troops were in position to continue the pursuit of the fugitives from the south, and Donkin's were well posted to intercept them in the north. Columns more lightly equipped than these were, however, essential if the chase were to be effectively pressed ; and Moira had by anticipation provided for this, stripping the centre division and Marshall's division of most of their cavalry, including a dromedary-corps, which had been formed, as an experiment, for this campaign, and placing them under the command of Major-general Brown. This officer marched from the Sind on the 18th of December, picked up the troops from Marshall's division near Shahabad on the 26th, and thence struck south-westward from the Chambal. On the 1st of January 1818 he reached Chipa Barod, forty miles south-west of Bichi Tal, where he heard of the defeat of Holkar's army at Mehidpur and the flight of the Pindaris to join what was left of it. He therefore pursued his way west and south for another fifty miles to Sunel, whence, after two days' halt, he continued his march some twenty-three miles farther westward to Peptia. Arriving there on the 9th, he heard that the remnant of Holkar's force was still lying at Rampura about eighteen miles to the north-west ; and at 1 A.M. he moved off to surprise them with one regiment of native cavalry, the dromedary-corps and two companies of infantry mounted behind the dromedary-riders. Coming upon Rampura soon after daybreak, he promptly surrounded the place, but found there only a few hundred men ; the bulk of the force having moved with the guns north-westward to Ahmadgarh a few days before. Some

Dec. 18.

Dec. 26.

1818. Jan. 1.

Jan. 9.

1818. scores of men were cut down ; some horses and baggage were captured ; and the ten guns were presently surrendered by the head man of Ahmadgarh. But the leaders of Holkar's troops got clear away northward into Mewar, though with followers greatly diminished. Brown, halting until the 14th at Rampura for the remainder of his detachment to rejoin him, marched on that day south-westward to Sanjat, and
Jan. 16. then turning to the east halted on the 16th at Jaora.

Jan. 1. Meanwhile Donkin had marched on the 1st of January from Bundi, rightly judging that, the Pindaris having been driven across the Chambal, he could not do better than seal up the outlets of Mewar to northward. He therefore struck west for some fifty-
Jan. 8. five miles to Sanganer, where on the 8th he halted, having heard no news of the operations of the British to southward. As a matter of fact, Keir on the 3rd of January had set his division in motion to seek out Chitu's gang, detaching on the same day a flying column, composed chiefly of irregular horse under Captain Grant, to find Karim Khan's band, which was reported to be north of Jawad about Jat. After marching northward for two days, Keir, unable to obtain any satisfactory information as to the enemy, turned westward upon Bari Sadri, but halted far short of it
Jan. 6. on the 6th, unable, among a flood of contradictory accounts, to divine where Chitu was to be found. On the 7th better intelligence led him to make a night march with a flying column upon Dheira, twenty miles to north-west of Nimach ; but he arrived in time only to secure five guns and some baggage, the Pindaris having already fled with precipitation. Keir followed them up south-westward to Deoda and then came to a halt, his men being utterly exhausted. Grant meanwhile, acting upon such information as he could get, led his column to Jawad, but, on arriving there on the 5th, learned that Karim had moved away twenty-four hours earlier to join Chitu. But where the two chiefs might be it was

impossible to ascertain, for the inhabitants were strongly in their favour, and the British intelligencers worked at the peril of their lives. 1818.

Of all these movements Donkin, despite of Hislop's endeavours to keep him fully apprised, heard nothing until the 11th. On the 12th accordingly he moved south-westward in the direction of Udaipur, sending a column of horse due south upon Chitor, near which place a large body of Pindaris was said to be assembled. But within two days it was definitely ascertained that the Pindaris had doubled south in two main bodies, the one towards Malwa, the other towards Gujarat. Donkin, who had advanced almost to Gangipur, thirty miles south-west of Sanganer, and had halted there from the 13th to the 15th, thereupon retraced his steps to Shapura, eighteen miles north-east of Sanganer, where he arrived on the 22nd. Keir, unwilling to leave the chase of Chitu, followed him westward from Deoda to Bhindar, where he learned that he had fled by way of Banswara (forty miles west of Ratlam) to the jungle on the borders of Gujarat. More than once he sent out light columns upon false information to no purpose, and finally on the 16th he came back to Deoda, and on the 17th turned southward by way of Partabgarh for his original station at Mandasor. On his way he was at last cheered by a gleam of success, for on the 19th, after a forced march of twenty miles with a light detachment, he succeeded in surprising a small party of Pindaris, of whom almost a hundred were cut down by the Seventeenth Light Dragoons. This, however, was all that Keir could show for three weeks of exhausting marches, when on the 23rd he brought his column into Nimach. Grant's detachment had already on the 18th returned to Mandasor; and meanwhile Karim's band, evading all the columns by twists and doubles as intricate as a hare's, made their way to the Chambal, and crossed it about thirty-five miles to west of Susner. On the 12th of January Adams heard of their approach, and at 11 P.M. sent

Jan. 11.

Jan. 13.

Jan. 22.

Jan. 16.

Jan. 19.

1818. off the Fifth Bengal Cavalry under Major Clarke in
Jan. 13. pursuit. At 5 A.M. on the 13th Clarke fell upon them ; and the surprise was complete. The whole party, numbering about fifteen hundred, was hunted relentlessly for some twenty miles, at the close of which at least half of them had been cut down. This at last was a solid success, due in no small measure to the energy of Clarke, who in the course of the day carried his regiment over more than fifty miles of ground within thirteen hours.

Still Karim's evasion of all other columns was unsatisfactory ; and it was tolerably evident that he must have received countenance and assistance from some quarter. General Brown, having ascertained pretty clearly that Jeswant Rao, Bhao of Jawad, was the guilty party, marched northward from Jaora on the
Jan. 25. 19th, and arriving before Jawad on the 25th demanded the surrender of two officers who were known to be the immediate protectors of the Pindaris. Jeswant Rao protracted the negotiations for four days, hoping to enable the two inculpated officers to escape, and at last
Jan. 29. on the 29th actually fired upon a squadron sent by Brown to intercept them. This was not to be borne. Brown at once made his preparations to attack. The Bhao hastened to draw up his troops in position. A few shrapnel shells sufficed to disperse them, and in a very short time Jeswant Rao's rabble was in flight, while he himself took refuge in the town. Without hesitation Brown ran a twelve-pounder by hand up to the gate, blew it open, stormed the town, and drove the Bhao to fly for his life. Karim Khan, it was afterwards discovered, was also in Jawad at this time, and escaped with difficulty to the jungle. It was reckoned that several hundreds of the enemy perished in the fight and the pursuit, whereas Brown's casualties did not exceed thirty-six. Thus another false friend was unmasked and another support of the Pindaris overthrown.

Difficult though the operations had been against so

elusive an enemy, the Pindaris were now in desperate straits. Adams, not content with Clarke's success, promptly followed up the remnant of the Pindari bands on the 18th, and in nine days reached the Betwa near Bhilsa, about thirty miles to north-east of Bhopal. Halting here on the 27th and 28th, he offered to the Pindari leaders, through the Nawab of Bhopal, security for themselves and their followers on condition of their surrendering their arms and their horses. A minor chief and some ninety of his men were the first to accept these terms on the 3rd of February, after which other of the Pindaris continued to come in by twos and threes. Karim Khan surrendered to Sir John Malcolm on the 16th of February. Wazil Mohammed after some wanderings fled for refuge to Gwalior, where Scindia for a time concealed him and, for a point of honour, refused to give him up, but was ultimately obliged to do so. There remained Chitu, who likewise after many wanderings drifted back to the Narbada in the vicinity of Hindia, where, on the 25th of January, he was surprised by a party sent out from Hindia, and his band was dispersed. With some two hundred followers he now wandered about Malwa, homeless and helpless, with every man's hand against him. Ochterlony, by judicious handling of his force and tactful negotiation, had from the first kept Amir Khan from mischief, and finally bound him by treaty to disband his troops, taking some ten thousand of the best of them into the British service. Thus by the end of February the power of the Pindaris had been completely broken, and the re-establishment of order was beginning on Central India. It remained only to deal with the Peishwa and with such of Holkar's and the Bhonsla's troops as were still inclined to resistance.

1818. Jan. 18. Jan. 28. Feb. 3. Feb. 16. Jan. 25.

Moira therefore broke up the Northern army in February and withdrew the greater part of it to cantonments on the Jumna, adding only a reinforcement of three native battalions, a regiment of native cavalry,

Feb.

1818. and a siege-train to Marshall's force for the reduction
Feb. of Sinhgarh, which had been ceded by the Peishwa through the treaty of Poona in July 1817. The army of the Dekhan was still earlier dislocated. Hislop was recalled in the middle of January to the south, for the siege of Asirgarh or the pacification of Khandesh as he might think best, with the general object of subjugating the entire country that still professed allegiance to Baji Rao. Brown received orders to join Hislop. Malcolm, with his column reinforced, took Brown's place at Jawad ; Keir was directed to cover the access to Gujarat from the north ; and Adams was instructed to return to his original station of Hoshangabad and prepare for the reduction of one of the Bhonsla's forts, which still defied the British. All three of these last forces were now taken under the direct orders of Moira.

Hislop, having reached Indore on the 2nd of February, after four days' halt pursued his march due south to the Narbada, crossed it after much delay by a very
Feb. 27. difficult ford, and on the 27th came before the fort of Thalner on the Tapti, about one hundred and twenty-five miles south-west of Indore. Here to his great surprise he was fired upon by Holkar's commandant, who, being summoned, refused to surrender. This resistance was somewhat serious, for the fort covered the access to the Tapti, which was the only water-supply for Hislop's troops. A cannonade, with such small pieces as Hislop had at the moment with him, proving ineffectual, he brought up two guns to blow in the gates ; whereupon the garrison sent out to ask terms of capitulation. They were answered that only unconditional surrender would be accepted ; and, as evening was approaching, the flank companies of the Royal Scots, which formed the British storming party, entered the town by a gap between the gate and the wall, which was in a ruinous state, without opposition. There was every prospect that the fort would be peaceably taken over, when suddenly the garrison

attacked the British within the walls. These speedily admitted their comrades by the gates; and the defenders were annihilated at a cost of no more than twenty-five casualties. The whole affair seems to have arisen out of a misunderstanding; but the troops, thinking themselves to have been treacherously dealt with, spared no lives, and Hislop hanged the commandant next morning. The example was not without influence upon other garrisons in Holkar's dominions. 1818.

Crossing the Tapti on the 3rd of March, Hislop moved southward to Parola, where he came into communication with Doveton's division at Outran, about fifteen miles to south-east of him. Doveton, it will be remembered, had marched to Nagpur in December, at the time of the Bhonsla's rising, and, as matters at Nagpur were thought to be satisfactorily settled, had been summoned by Hislop to join him with his battering-train, in case other forts might follow the example of Thalner. As a matter of fact, the Bhonsla had promptly begun to intrigue again with the Peishwa, and some of his horse had been present with Baji Rao's troops at Ashti. Now, however, Hislop heard for the first time of the flight of the Peishwa to the Narbada, and resolved to prevent him, if possible, from crossing it. His information was that Baji Rao had been at Kopargaon, sixty-five miles west of Aurangabad, on the 27th of February, making northward; and he accordingly directed his own march on the 7th of March south upon Malegaon, and Doveton's on a parallel track eastward of him upon Bahal, some thirty-five miles to east of Malegaon. On the 9th Hislop was met by the news that Baji Rao had moved eastward, having gathered in the garrisons of some of the forts, which he purposed not to defend, and was heading eastward for the Godavari. The British general therefore altered his course to south-east; and finally, after further changes of direction according to intelligence gathered while on the march, he brought his own division on the 15th

Mar. 3.

Mar. 7.

Mar. 9.

1818. to Puntamba on the Upper Godavari, forty-five miles west and south of Aurangabad, while Doveton's division on the same day reached Kopargaon. Smith,
Mar. 10. meanwhile, had marched from Sirur on the 10th, moving north-eastward by Ahmadnagar to the Godavari at Rakisboan, fifty-five miles east and north of Ahmad-
Mar. 18. nagar ; but upon reaching the river on the 18th he found that the Peishwa had on the 15th slipped past him to Kher, some eighty miles lower down the stream. It was tolerably clear that the fugitive had abandoned the district of Poona and was in full flight for the Nizam's dominions, hoping no doubt for help from Apa Sahib at Nagpur.

Hislop now, pursuant to the tenor of the Governor-general's instructions, broke up the centre division, which he had accompanied in person so far, divided it between Doveton and Smith, and prepared to return to Madras. Doveton led his division to
Mar. 19. Puntamba, while Smith, after halting for the 19th at Rakisboan, continued the pursuit eastward down the left bank of the Godavari for some sixty miles to Pepalgaon. Here he learned that the Peishwa's army in several bodies had proceeded towards Basim, far ahead of him ; wherefore, after two days' halt on the 23rd and 24th, he countermarched to rejoin Doveton, who after many delays had reached Jalna, on his march
Mar. 25. eastward, on the 25th. Meanwhile matters had come to a crisis at Nagpur. The resident, being suspicious and at last certain of Apa Sahib's double dealing, arrested him and sent him away under escort on the 15th of March, and at the same time summoned Adams's division from Hoshangabad to Nagpur. Adams promptly marched on the 23rd with a lightly equipped column of one regiment of native cavalry and three battalions of native infantry ; and, as he
Mar. 29. approached Nagpur, the resident on the 29th sent a part of his garrison, chiefly cavalry, under Lieutenant-colonel Scot, to the fort of Chanda, some eighty miles south of Nagpur, which Baji Rao was

understood to have designed as the base of his future operations. On arriving before the place on the 2nd of April, Scot was fired upon, and, being too weak to storm the place, made his dispositions to prevent Baji Rao's troops from entering it. However, on the 5th of April Adams arrived at Nagpur, whence, after two days' halt, he pursued his way southward for another fifty miles to Hunghanghat, where he arrived on the 9th and at once summoned Scot to join him. 1818. April 2. April 9.

Meanwhile the Peishwa had in the latter days of March made his way to Wun on the Wardha river, some twenty-five miles west and north of Chanda, where he remained halted during the first days of April. He was believed to have still twenty thousand horse with him, though few infantry and guns ; but with a force thus composed he was only the more likely to elude pursuit. However, his hopes of receiving help from Nagpur were frustrated. Adams, coming into position to east of him, shut him off from any movement into Berar ; Smith and Doveton forbade him to move to the west ; and the only question was whether he would recross the Godavari, southward, or fly northward across the Narbada into Malwa. In order to counter either of these movements Smith and Doveton agreed that they should march from Jalna in two parallel columns, Doveton a little north of east in the general direction of Hunghanghat, Smith a little south of east in the general direction of Chanda. Both columns were strengthened by two regiments of native cavalry, to ensure the utmost celerity of movement.

Doveton was the first to leave Jalna, on the 31st of March, and by the 11th April had reached Karanja, over a hundred and ten miles to east and north. He seems to have expected that this menace would have shifted Baji Rao from the mass of rugged hills and jungle in which he had hidden himself. But the Peishwa had by this time sunk to the level of a Pindari chief, and would make no decided movement. From Karanja, therefore, Doveton struck south-east directly April 11.

1818. upon Wun and on the 17th reached Pandharkawada,
April 17. where he halted. Smith, taking a slightly more circuitous route in order to pick up a cavalry brigade from Ahmadnagar, followed a course, roughly speaking, parallel to that of the Godavari on the north bank of
April 18. the river, and on the 18th of April reached Mudhol, some eighty miles south-west of Pandharkawada, where he likewise halted to await further information. Meanwhile Adams had perfected his system of intelligence and was fully apprised of the Peishwa's position. Hitherto Baji Rao had marched and countermarched between the Wardha and its next tributary to southward, according to the reports that reached him of the course of his pursuers; but on the 13th he seems to have learned of Adams's arrival at Hunghanghat, upon which he began to move slowly southward upon Seoni, about twelve miles north of Pandharkawada. The delay was fatal to him. Adams, having gathered in Scott's detachment from Chanda on the 14th,
April 15. marched on the 15th[1] some fifteen miles westward from Hunghanghat and awaited the arrival of his spies. On the 16th these came in with the report that the Peishwa was at Pepulcote, some fifteen miles to south, and on the same day a messenger from Doveton brought the news of the approach of that officer to Pandharkawada. Adams accordingly marched at 9 P.M. in the hope of surprising the enemy before
April 17. dawn, but on his arrival found that Baji Rao had moved a short distance southward to Seoni. After a brief halt, therefore, Adams pushed on with his cavalry, horse-artillery, and a single battalion of light infantry.

The country being exceedingly rough and difficult, it seems that Adams himself was the foremost man in the column, riding well ahead of the infantry, with his

[1] Blacker and Prinsep differ in their dates by one day; and Adams himself (*Papers on the Mahratta War*, p. 271) affixes no date whatever to his report, so that it is impossible to say which of them is correct. The matter is of little importance.

cavalry and guns in rear.[1] After five miles' march Adams suddenly met Baji Rao's advanced parties of horse. The Peishwa had learned of Doveton's progress upon Pandharkawada, and was counter-marching in hot haste to the north. Galloping back to his battalion Adams formed it in square, and sending for the cavalry and horse-artillery led one regiment and one battery forward at a gallop, hunting the Mahratta horse for some distance back upon their main body. After a chase of some miles the pursuers came to a brow of rising ground and saw part of Baji Rao's army in great confusion in the valley beneath them. Unlimbering his guns Adams plied them with shrapnel, and then, charging at the head of his single regiment of cavalry, swept the enemy up the low ground. By this time he had left the rest of his force far in rear, but he pressed on without hesitation, leading two of his squadrons to direct pursuit, and detaching the third to scour the high ground on the further side of the valley. Continuing the chase he came upon another vale, where the rest of the Mahrattas were assembled in greater numbers than before. Once again the guns opened with shrapnel, and the two squadrons advancing swept everything before them. Two large bodies of horse at the head of this second valley attempted to stand and make some show of resistance, but broke immediately upon receiving a few rounds of shrapnel and realising that their flank was threatened by the third squadron. The rout was now complete. Baji

1818. April 17.

[1] This fact, which is given by Prinsep only, and is not confirmed by Blacker (whose account differs entirely from Prinsep's) sounds almost incredible; but I can hardly believe that Prinsep would have invented the story that follows. Blacker, who was a cavalry-officer, of course assumes that the cavalry must have formed the advanced party, and not the commander-in-chief and his staff; but one can believe anything of the Indian officers of those days, and Adams, who seems to have been not only keen but competent, may be assumed to have known what he was about. Living officers could no doubt adduce parallels to such an incident during the South African War of 1899–1902. There must be many in the history of Indian warfare.

1818. Rao had galloped off at the very beginning of the
April 17. action, and his followers breaking up into small parties fled away through the jungle, leaving in Adams's hands five guns, three elephants, two hundred camels and such of the Peishwa's treasure as had not been stolen in the confusion by his own people. The casualties of the Mahrattas were probably trifling, for they never waited for the British cavalry to close with them and consequently suffered only from artillery-fire. But their discouragement was great ; and many of them dispersed to their homes. Of Adams's troops only two were even wounded, sufficient testimony to the poor resistance of their opponents ; but this should not detract from the praise due to Adams for attacking the whole of the Peishwa's host with a single regiment and his artillery only. The only unsatisfactory feature of the affair was that the remainder of Adams's cavalry, whether through the incompetence or the disloyalty of its leader, did not join him until the enemy had entirely disappeared.

Having marched from thirty to forty miles, Adams's troops were too much exhausted to continue the chase. Baji Rao with a small following fled south-westward ; and Doveton at once formed two flying columns to pursue him. Striking southward so far as Bori, he led the main column westward up the north bank of the Penganga, while the second column followed a parallel route farther to the south. Reaching Daigaon, fifty
April 21. miles west of Bori, on the 21st of April, Doveton turned south, and being joined next day by the other column at Danki, twenty-five miles south of Daigaon, turned westward again upon Umarkhed, which he
April 23. reached on the 23rd, to find that Baji Rao had left it before dawn of the same morning. The track of the fugitive was marked by the familiar signs of foundered horses and dead or over-driven cattle ; but, after following it on the same day for another eight miles westward to Sapti, Doveton came perforce to a halt. He had outmarched his supplies ; and both horses

and men were utterly exhausted. Smith, meanwhile, being without information, had on the 19th made one march eastward and had then halted until the 22nd ; but learning at length of the Peishwa's true direction, he counter-marched with all haste up the north bank of the Godavari to Rati, fifty miles to west of Mudhol, where on the 26th he crossed the river, pursuing his way along the south bank to Kher, where he arrived on the 28th. Here he learned that a large detachment of the enemy had that same forenoon passed within eighteen miles of the place, heading westward for Dharur. A small flying column was at once formed and sent off under Lieutenant-colonel Cunningham to come in rear of Dharur ; and at 10 P.M. Smith marched after him with the main body. Cunningham after a march of seventy miles entered Dharur an hour after the enemy had decamped, but captured a few prisoners, from whom he learned that the party which he had followed was making its way homeward, having had enough of war, and that the Peishwa had again turned north.

1818. April 22. April 28. April 29.

Doveton and Smith now made by easy marches for their bases at Jalna and Sirur to refresh and re-equip their troops ; but Smith detached two light columns of cavalry to right and left of his line of march to sweep up any bodies of fugitives that they might encounter ; and thus it was that a party of two thousand Mahrattas was overtaken by the right-hand column and captured without attempt at resistance. Among the leaders was one of Baji Rao's best commanders and his own youngest brother. The end was, in fact, drawing very near. The Peishwa's fortresses were falling right and left before the British besieging columns, and his only hope now lay in refuge within the territory of Scindia, who might either assist him with troops, or mediate with the British to obtain easy terms of conciliation. On the 5th of May he crossed the Tapti just below its confluence with the Purna and made for the pass of Sendhwa. He found the British in possession of the

May 5.

1818. fort and the pass thus closed to him ; while all the
May 5. lower passages of the Narbada were sealed against him by the dispositions of Malcolm. He turned eastward to the vicinity of Burhanpur with a remnant of some eight thousand men, and there remained while the British prepared to close in after him from every side, Malcolm with such troops as he could collect from the north, a mobile column from Hindia from the north-east, Doveton from Jalna in the south.
May 25. By the 25th of May, Doveton, who had started from Jalna on the 14th, was encamped on the Tapti, a little above Burhanpur, and was making his arrangements to fall upon Baji Rao, who lay about Dhulkot some ten miles to north of him, upon the same night. All was ready for the march, when the movement was countermanded upon the news that the Peishwa was parleying with Sir John Malcolm for surrender.

Negotiations had in fact been opened at Mhow,
May 16. Malcolm's headquarters, on the 16th. The great object of the Peishwa was to gain time. At Dhulkot he had the fortress of Asirgarh only nine miles in his rear, that is to say, to east of him ; and Doveton's column could not approach him from that side without either passing within range of cannon-shot—indeed, even of musketry—from the lower defences, or ascending a very long and difficult pass a little further to the westward. He therefore reckoned that he could always, in the last extremity, take refuge in Asirgarh, which, though not likely to stand for long during the dry weather, could not be besieged during the rains, which were due in the second week of June. Furthermore, the maintenance of a chain of posts to guard the line of the Narbada effectively would be impracticable during the monsoon, so that, if he could but hold out for another few weeks, he might still hope to make his way northward and give fresh trouble in Malwa. The news that Apa Sahib had escaped from his escort on the 13th near Jabalpur, and had not been recaptured, was likely to encourage him, disheartened though he

was, to further efforts ; and Malcolm decided that closer pressure must be laid upon him without delay. 1818.

Accordingly, on the 27th, Malcolm carried his own headquarters forward to Bhikangaon, some thirty-five miles north-west of Dhulkot, and sent a strong detachment to Boregaon, ten miles north-east of the same point. The movement had its result in the immediate arrival of compliant emissaries from the Peishwa's camp, but still the Peishwa himself came not ; and Malcolm was obliged to advance to Mitawal, only fifteen miles to the north of Dhulkot, before Baji Rao could be persuaded to meet him on the 1st of June. For a time the Peishwa still affected princely state and still made difficulties over delivering to the British his favourite Trimbakji ; wherefore Malcolm on the 2nd closed the web of his detachments yet a little closer upon Dhulkot ; and on the 3rd Baji Rao accepted Malcolm's terms. These practically compounded his claims to sovereignty for an annual allowance of £100,000, with liberal provision for his principal adherents. On the same day he entered the British camp with some five thousand horse and three thousand foot; and presently proceeded under escort of Malcolm's division to the Narbada. There was some trouble with his mutinous soldiery on the march, but by Malcolm's firmness these were subdued with little difficulty ; and Baji Rao, being forbidden under the terms of his surrender to live in the Dekhan, finally entered Bithur, the place of honourable captivity assigned to him, with six hundred horse and two hundred foot. With him the great Mahratta confederacy, which, but for the British, would have mastered all India, passed finally away.

May 27. June 1. June 3.

The rest of the story need not be told at length. The capture of the strong places in the Peishwa's dominions had gone forward steadily during the first six months of 1818, Munro subduing those between the Ghatpurba and the Toombuddra, and joining with Pritzler for the reduction of those to east and south-east of Poona. One only, Sholapur, where the Mahratta

1818. infantry was under command of the Portuguese Major de Pinto, gave any real trouble ; and even this cost only one hundred and two casualties, little more than a tenth of them killed. The forts in Khandesh were as easily taken by a detachment under Lieutenant-colonel Macdowell, that of Mallegaon alone offering serious resistance. The siege of this place, chiefly owing to the want of heavy guns and ammunition, lasted from the 16th of May to the 18th of June ; and, in consequence of the failure of a premature assault, it was necessary to bring up a regular siege-train from Bombay. Even so, however, the casualties of the besiegers, which included a detachment of the Royal Scots, and the Hundred and Second, little exceeded two hundred. The strong places of the Bhonsla were taken in hand by Marshall's division, with the exception of Chanda, which was stormed by Adams's division. The final subjection of the Nagpur territory, however, was prolonged, owing to Apa Sahib's persistent efforts, into the rainy season, and gave full employment to a number of small columns of Adams's and Doveton's divisions until the
1819. spring of 1819. Nevertheless Apa Sahib, who at the end of October joined his fortunes to those of the hunted Pindari, Chitu, contrived to escape capture; and his flight towards Asirgarh in February 1819 brought down Sir John Malcolm's force from Mhow to join Doveton's, a Bengal division, and a Bombay brigade in the siege of the fortress. The place being of exceeding natural strength and mounting over one hundred heavy guns, demanded the largest concentration of troops and of heavy artillery that had hitherto been required.[1] The town was first taken on

[1] Hyderabad Subsidiary Force :
H.M. 1st, 30th, and 102nd; 122nd N.L.I.; 2/17th N.L.I.; 1 Bn. Pioneers.
Bengal Division : 2/13th N.I.; 1 and 2/15th N.I.; 2/29th N.I.; Pioneers.
Malcolm's Division : 3rd N.L.C.; 2/6th N.I.; 1/7th N.I.; 1/14th N.I. (Madras).
Bombay Brigade : H.M. 67th; 2 battalions of N.I.; Pioneers.

the 17th of February, and the erection of batteries against the fort was begun on the same day. It would be tedious to go into the details of the siege ; and it must suffice to say that after more than a month of incessant cannonade and bombardment Asirgarh surrendered on the 6th of April 1819. The casualties of the besiegers slightly exceeded three hundred, one-third of which were due to an accidental explosion. 1819. Feb. 17. April 6.

The fall of Asirgarh, the siege of which had been watched by the whole of India, produced a profound political effect and brought the war to a dramatic conclusion. It was realised that no native stronghold and no native host could stand before the arms of the British. The only disappointment was that Apa Sahib was not found within the walls. Though assured that upon his surrender he should be treated as generously as Baji Rao, he distrusted the offer and preferred to be a wanderer in deserts and jungles, an outlaw with a price upon his head. The end of Chitu was more tragical. He had very narrowly missed capture by the Seventeenth Light Dragoons in March 1818, escaping only through the speed of his black horse, an animal with hoofs so abnormally large that his tracks could always be recognised. Since that time Chitu had roamed far and wide, living the life of a hunted beast, until soon after the fall of Asirgarh he disappeared into the jungle and was seen no more. The black horse was, however, tracked, and was found grazing, still saddled and bridled ; and search in the jungle revealed first mangled remains which could not be identified, and at last the head of the once famous chieftain. He

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Artillery :

Cannon—11 eighteen-pounders, 2 twelve-pounders.

Mortars—1 ten-inch, 4 eight-inch, 1 five-and-a-half-inch.

Howitzers—4 eight-inch, 3 five-and-a-half-inch.

Additional troops and ordnance from 31st of March—2/1st, 2/13th Bengal N.I.

Cannon—2 twenty-four and 2 eighteen-pounders.

Mortars—3 ten-inch, 3 eight-inch, 8 five-and-a-half-inch.

Howitzers—2 eight-inch.

1819. had been slain and eaten by tigers ; and, though a ruffian and at one time the leader of twenty thousand ruffians, he remained at least a Pindara to the last.

Thus was order at last restored in Central India. The general result of the war was to enlarge the sphere of British rule, direct or indirect, to an extent which embraced about two-thirds of the Indian Peninsula, and to furnish a practically unbroken line of communication through British territory alike from Bombay to Calcutta and from Bombay to Madras. In 1820 the Bombay government fitted out expeditions by sea and land to suppress piracy in the Gulf of Cutch, the Arabian coast and the islands of the Persian Gulf, which extended the *Pax Brittannica* still further. Altogether this so-called Pindari War was an epoch in the history of the British in India.

From the military point of view the campaign has, owing to the absence of any sensational incident or famous action, attracted less attention than it deserves. The area assigned to the operations in Moira's plans was, roughly speaking, a quadrilateral contained by Delhi, Allahabad, Baroda and Udaipur, an area of some hundred and fifty thousand square miles. To assemble over one hundred thousand troops with their transport north, south and east of this territory from Bengal, Madras and Bombay was in itself an operation which demanded the best part of nine months ; and the task of maintaining the steady flow of victuals and stores was most exhausting. In fact, if the armies had not found abundant supplies on the spot in Central India, they must have starved. But the actual sphere of operations stretched from the Jumna to the Kistna ; the eastern boundary, which we may take as a line drawn from Sikandra through Saugor, Nagpur and Hyderabad, being seven hundred miles long, and the western—a line drawn from Delhi through Ajmer, Baroda and Poona to Dharwar—fully a thousand miles. It is small wonder that the military resources of India were strained to the utmost in the

attempt to cover so vast an extent of territory. The enemy was, of course, generally speaking, contemptible, and there was nothing worthy the name of a general action except Mehidpur ; but this really made the problem the harder rather than the easier of solution. We have only to follow the flight of Baji Rao, and to observe the comparative ease with which he eluded his pursuers, to realise so much. An additional complication was that much of the country was very rough and hilly, part of it peopled by savage tribes, such as Bhils, who were always on the watch to cut off stragglers and plunder broken-down waggons, and not a little of it utterly unexplored by Europeans. The roads were infamous, many of the passes were difficult, hill-forts were thickly scattered in all directions ; and this last detail signified that the operating columns needed to be equipped with siege-artillery. This artillery, once again, owing to the roughness of the roads, required to be mounted on very heavy carriages ; and these heavy carriages in difficult places needed, literally, scores of the weak native bullocks to move them. Thus the mere work of getting over the ground was most arduous, and indeed, as we have seen, paralysed the movements of Moira's columns at the outset. 1819.

It was in these circumstances that he recast his military policy, setting apart one section of his force to besiege and capture strongholds, and organising the remainder as mobile columns to hunt down the enemy's bands in the field. But here again there were difficulties. There were not nearly engineers, artillery nor staff enough to deal with so many sieges ; and in fact Munro in the south took the field without staff or engineers, and was obliged to turn some of his European light dragoons into gunners. The ordnance, again, was sometimes found unsuitable for its purposes ; and it was necessary to take the elevating screws off howitzers and use the howitzers as mortars. Happily, the forts were taken with almost incredible ease, whether assailed by generals, captains or subalterns ;

1819. but then arose a new complication. It was useless to capture them unless a garrison were left to keep them. The besieging detachments were too weak to spare many men ; native levies were not to be trusted ; and this problem practically defied solution until the mobile columns had completed their work.

These mobile columns likewise worked under great disadvantages. Swift movement and surprise were the elements that they counted upon for success ; but swift movement is not easy in a rugged country, and surprises depend upon good information. Until the army had been in the field for fully eighteen months, its intelligence seems to have been defective ; the sympathies of the natives being at first against the British, though gradually changing as the might of the British arms was more and more successfully asserted. Yet, even when good information was forthcoming, it was impossible to impart it in good time to three or four columns acting upon convergent or parallel lines ; and hence there were inevitably many severe and arduous marches in the wrong direction. Again, although rapid movement dictated the use of cavalry in large numbers in the mobile columns, the enemy was careful as a rule never to close with the British horse, so it was almost imperatively necessary for a battery of horse-artillery or the two "galloper-guns," which at that time were attached to every regiment of cavalry in India, to be well forward on the march. Altogether this campaign, the first of its kind since Tarleton's operations in Carolina in 1780, tried the cavalry, both British and native, severely ; but the leaders showed both energy and resource, and they made some very fine marches which were crowned with the success that they deserved—a total surprise of the enemy. It is somewhat singular that the one British regiment which served under Tarleton should have been fated not only to share in the chase of Chitu and the Pindaris in 1817–18, but to hunt Tantia Topi over the same ground in Central India in 1857,

and to take part in yet another campaign of the same nature in South Africa in 1900–1901. No cavalry regiment in the Army has such a record of long marches and little nameless encounters as the Seventeenth Light Dragoons, or, as they have now for a century been called, the Seventeenth Lancers. 1819.

It may be inferred, therefore, that the pacification of Central India, though it claimed few casualties through lead or steel, was one which tried the energy of the troops and still more the nerve of the Commander-in-chief to the utmost. It must have been a very bad moment for Moira when the Peishwa and the Bhonsla rose in his rear at the very outset of his operations, while simultaneously, for the first time in British military history, cholera attacked his army in the north. Yet, as we have seen, he never hesitated for a moment to pursue his original plan; and, in spite of all difficulties and discouragements, he persisted, with an empty treasury and great shortage of troops, in his project of restoring order, until he had attained his end. Beyond all question his firmness and energy infected all ranks of the army, with the possible exceptions of the generals, Hislop and Marshall; and he should receive full credit for it. Yet let it be noted that with but a very little more skill, enterprise and courage on the part of his enemies, the operations might have ended in disaster. Few campaigns of the kind are so free from the petty but often serious reverses which generally attend the subdivision of an army into small isolated columns. The Mahrattas frequently carried off a few waggons and speared a few followers, but they never overwhelmed a single small detachment. They missed their chances at Kirkee, Sitabaldi and Koregaon from sheer pusillanimity; and they paid for it with the final loss of their empire. Had the followers of Baji Rao and Apa Sahib been South African Boers or even Mysoreans under the leadership of Hyder Ali, the story would have been very different. But a commander who rightly gauges the measure of

1819. his opponents has already half won his campaign. Moira knew that he could take great liberties and must accept great risks ; and his audacity and courage were rewarded by success. As a commander it seems to me that he deserves high praise ; and it is fortunate that at so critical a time a man of wide military experience and sound military views should have held the reins at Calcutta. But his fame as a general is rightly swallowed up by his political reputation. No Englishman has ever rendered greater service to India than he, by the extirpation of the huge organised bands of robbers which desolated almost the entire peninsula, and by putting a stop to the strife of native princes. Yet it may be doubted whether he would have dared to undertake such a task had he not been not merely a clear-sighted statesman but a highly trained and accomplished soldier.

The authorities for the Pindari War are Blacker's *Memoirs of the Mahratta War*, a more or less official narrative by the chief staff officer of the Madras Army ; and Prinsep's *History of the Political and Military Transactions in India during the Administration of the Marquis of Hastings* ; the latter to a great extent founded upon *Papers respecting the Pindari and Mahratta Wars*, published by the East India Company in 1824. There are a few details, worth little, in the *Memoirs of John Shipp*, and a few, of greater value, in Colonel Fitzclarence's *Journal of a Route across India*.

CHAPTER XII

It will be recalled that in the course of the operations in Nepal Moira called upon the Governor of Ceylon for troops, but had been answered that owing to local disturbances none could be spared ; further, that at the height of the campaign against the Pindaris the Governor of Ceylon had made an urgent appeal to the Governor-general for reinforcements, and that Moira, with admirable public spirit, had unhesitatingly complied. It is now time to look into these disturbances at Ceylon, which, though from a strictly military point of view of trifling importance, twice intervened at most critical moments to aggravate difficulties in India. In a sense they might be regarded as merely affairs of police, analogous to the expeditions to capture the strongholds of petty but predatory Indian chiefs, which were so numerous during the earlier years of the nineteenth century that no space can be found for them in this history. But the reduction of Kandy marks, on its own scale, as truly a stage in the consolidation of our Eastern Empire as the suppression of the Pindaris or the curbing of the Gurkhas. Furthermore, although the Kandyans were a contemptible enemy, the operations, owing to the climate and the ruggedness of the country, were to the last degree trying to the troops, and taxed the patience and resource of their leaders to the utmost. 1819.

In a previous chapter [1] an account was given of the first capture of Kandy by the British in 1803, of the

[1] Vol. V. p. 138.

1819. final disastrous issue of the enterprise, and of the peace which, in spite of the refusal of the Kandyans to enter into any direct treaty, Sir Thomas Maitland was able to establish with them by the simple expedient of leaving them alone. Such a policy the Kandyans naturally interpreted as a submission of the British to their will. The white men might rule in the plains of Ceylon, but in the mountains, ringed about by those plains, the Kandyans would reign supreme. They might, if it pleased them, descend upon the flat land, to ravage or to conquer ; but no subject of the white man should pass into their hills. It was an arrogant attitude, but not in the circumstances unnatural, for the Eastern mind invariably construes conciliation into confession of weakness ; and moreover, the Kandyans had once for some time held British prisoners as hostages for British forbearance. For nine years, therefore, there was no further trouble with the Kandyans, though a garrison was always maintained in Ceylon for the safety of the naval stations and the defence of the island against a possible attack by the French. This consisted of two British battalions—in 1814 the Nineteenth and Seventy-third—and four native Ceylon regiments, composed chiefly of Malays, which in 1805 had been declared by Maitland to be both useless and dangerous, but seem later to have been restored to discipline and efficiency.

Suddenly in October 1814, before the news of the peace with France had reached Ceylon, it became known that ten natives, British subjects, who had entered Kandyan territory for purposes of trade, had been seized by the Kandyan authorities. Their noses, right ears and right arms were cut off, and with these severed members tied to them they were thrust back across the frontier as a warning to all who presumed to violate the passes into Kandyan territory. Eight of them died of this savage treatment, and two only crawled back to tell their story. The Governor at this time was Sir Robert Brownrigg, for some years

Quartermaster-general at the Horse Guards, and Lord Chatham's chief staff-officer in the Walcheren expedition of 1809. He realised the significance of the incident at once. Maitland's policy of conciliation had failed; indeed Maitland himself had realised before he left Ceylon that there could be no real peace with a power which held good faith in contempt. The security of the plains and the establishment of peaceful commercial relations must now be asserted by the sword. In consequence of the disasters of 1803 the Secretary of State had absolutely forbidden any resort to arms without his express permission; and Brownrigg dutifully respected these orders. But he made every preparation for a fight, for, quite apart from the outrage perpetrated upon British subjects, the cruel and odious misrule of the King of Kandy had driven most of his people into revolt; and British intervention must sooner or later become imperative. By the end of November the inhabitants of the district called the Three Korales had risen in rebellion against the King; and the native ruler of the district assured Brownrigg that his brother, now the King's chief adviser, would join the insurgents. Early in January 1815 a party of Kandyan troops actually crossed the British frontier in pursuit of the rebels; and on the 10th of that month Brownrigg declared war. 1819. 1815. Jan. 10.

The interior of Ceylon, to quote Brownrigg's own description, is bounded by steep and lofty mountains, varying from three to eight thousand feet in height, forming a quadrangular barrier about sixty miles square. The points at which this barrier could be passed were few; indeed, upon the greater part of three sides ingress was practically closed. Immediately to west of Kandy lay the pass of Balani, and ten miles to south of it another unnamed pass; but from thence southward, round the south-western angle and all the way to the south-eastern angle there was not a single passage through which even a loaded bullock could enter the hills from the plains. At the south-eastern

1815. Jan. angle there were three passes, none of them very easy; but the eastern chain of mountains bordered everywhere on wild, uncultivated and unhealthy country—in fact upon a wilderness of almost impenetrable jungle, known by the names of the districts of Panowa and Wellasse—so that, though there were one or two entrances on this side, it was a quarter to be avoided, if possible. To all intent, therefore, the points of invasion were limited to the south-eastern angle, the north side, and the western side as far south as the Balani pass. This did not assort ill with the stations of the troops, which were normally distributed for the defence of the naval stations at Trincomalee in the north-east, Galle in the south, and Colombo in the west. Moreover, the case was one which imperatively demanded abandonment of the usual rules for the concentration of the force into one principal body. In the first place the enemy was cowardly and elusive, never standing to meet an attack from the front, but preferring to hang upon his opponent's flanks and harass his line of communication. In the second, the difficulties of transport and supply in so rugged a country absolutely forbade the march of even so many as one thousand men by a single road.

Brownrigg, therefore, decided to divide his force—some four thousand fighting men, British and native—into eight columns, varying in strength from eight hundred to two hundred apiece, but each of them complete in every respect. Every column had its due proportion of white soldiers, drawn from the Nineteenth and Seventy-third Foot; the greatest number of these in any one column being two hundred and fifty, and the least seventy. The strength of the native detachments likewise varied from nearly six hundred to a little over two hundred. But every column had its little train of artillery, generally a single light field-piece and a couple of small howitzers or mortars. For the Kandyans had a certain number of forts; and Brownrigg had no intention to allow his

advance to be checked by these, nor to waste valuable lives by attacking them without artillery. 1815. Jan.

The principal advance was to be made from Colombo; and it will, therefore, be convenient to enumerate the routes of the various columns beginning from the north-west and working thence southward and eastward back to the north.

The most northerly or eighth column, composed entirely of native troops under Captain de Bussche, was to advance from Negombo north-eastward upon Kornegalle. A little beyond this place it was to divide itself in twain, and turn south-eastward, one detachment securing the passes of Ikirriwatta and Yatiwala, and the other attacking the hill-forts of Galagedara and Girihagama. This column practically was to follow the route taken by Macdonald in 1803.

The two next columns, numbered the first and second, were based upon Colombo, and were to march in succession eastward to Ruwanwella, and thence round two sides of a triangle, first northward and then eastward upon the Balani pass. This defile once mastered, they were to move by different routes upon Kandy, having first gained touch with the eighth column by way of Kornegalle.

The third column was to march from Galle, and the fourth from Hambantota, both converging upon the Idalgasheina pass at the south-eastern angle of the mountain-barrier, and uniting at a point to south of it. Their line of supply was from Hambantota through Weylanga, which place, about sixteen miles to south-west of the pass, was to be their advanced depot. Entering the fertile province of Uva through the Idalgasheina defile they would there be free to act on every side, with a centre at Badulla.

The fifth column was based upon Trincomalee and was to endeavour by forced marches to reach the summit of the Narangasheina pass, about nine miles due north of Kandy, in time to co-operate with the

1815. Jan. columns from Negombo and Colombo ; and the sixth column was to follow it in support.

The seventh column, based upon Batticaloa, was to march thence westward upon Bintenne, so as to complete the investment of the mass of mountains on the eastern side.

This plan, modified from another of greater elaboration in consequence of the extreme dearth of transport, was finally decided upon on the 24th of January ; but, owing to the violation of British territory by the Kandyans, Brownrigg had already pushed forward his first column, under Major Hook, to the vicinity of Avisawella, about twenty-six miles due east

Jan. 11. of Colombo. On the 11th the Kandyan forces were entrenched at Ruwanwella, about eight miles north of Avisawella ; and Hook, dividing his tiny column into three bodies, attempted to envelop them by a simultaneous advance upon their centre and both flanks. The centre and left reached their objectives together, but the right was delayed by the difficulty of the road ; and the enemy, who fled immediately, made their escape to the eastward with trifling loss. The operations were, therefore, suspended until the remaining columns should be ready to move ; but meanwhile the districts known as Four Korales, Three Korales and Saffragam, on the western frontier of the King of Kandy, were surrendered by the inhabitants who were in insurrection against him, and by proclamation of the 11th of February were annexed to the British Crown.

Meanwhile the columns had begun their advance.

Feb. 1. By the 1st of February Hook was already at the foot of the Balani pass; the second column, under Lieutenant-colonel O'Connell, was close in his rear, and de Bussche well on his way to Kornegalle. On the 2nd O'Connell carried the post that covered the Balani pass against a

Feb. 3. feeble resistance, and on the 3rd Hook, taking the place of de Bussche, mastered the forts of Galagedara and Girihagama without the loss of a man. Brown-

rigg, joining O'Connell on the 6th, then ordered a halt to allow time for the column from Trincomalee to come up. On the 9th Lieutenant-colonel Kelly of the third column reported himself to be near enough to the Idalgasheina pass to support an advance of the first and second columns; and on the 10th these two resumed their advance. On the 11th Hook reached the ferry over the Mahawelia Ganga, three miles north of Kandy, and found the defences of the river deserted. The King in fact had fled from his capital, none of his people raising a hand in his defence. On the 14th Brownrigg entered Kandy; on the 19th the King was delivered up to him by his insurgent subjects; and a few weeks later the captive monarch's crown, sceptre and throne were sent to the Prince Regent, to find their last home in Windsor Castle.[1] 1815. Feb. 9. Feb. 14.

A convention was then agreed to under which Kandy was taken over by the Sovereign of England; the government to be exercised by the governor and his agents, but with reservation to the native headmen of all ranks, lawfully appointed by the governor, of their rights according to native law and custom.[2]

The general purport of this arrangement seems to have been that the territory of Kandy was parcelled out into districts, in each of which a British agent exerted much the same authority as the residents at the courts of Indian native sovereigns. For two years these agents worked diligently at the preparation of reports upon their new charge, of which they had, of course, everything to learn; and in September 1817 Brownrigg himself repaired to Kandy to look into matters for himself. Within six weeks he reported the arrival of a suspicious stranger who had made his way through Wellasse to Bintenne and there proclaimed himself King of Kandy. A native constable, who was sent out to arrest him, was captured and murdered 1817.

[1] *Public Record Office*, C.O. Ceylon, 54. Brownrigg to Sec. of State, Oct. 30; Dec. 31; Jan. 16, 17; Feb. 25, 1815.

[2] Brownrigg to Sec. of State, March 15, 1815.

1817. by a Kandyan headman ; and the resident at Badulla
Oct. then went out with a small body of native troops to deal more summarily with the offender. This party was opposed by bodies of natives armed with bows and arrows ; and, though these were easily dispersed by a few shots, they only bided their time until the troops should turn back to Badulla. When once these had begun their return journey, they were harassed by arrows all the way. The resident, lagging behind the troops in the hope of conciliating the insurgents, was cut off and murdered ; and altogether things wore an unpleasant aspect. The pretender was presently found to be a native Kandyan of respectable family, set up by the headman of Uva, who was a man of bad character, and supported by the priests ; and it was pretty evident that he had a considerable following among the Cingalese. In fact most of the mountainous country between Bintenne and Badulla was in rebellion. Moreover, there was no certainty that any of the headmen were loyal to the British, whatever their professions, for the idea of keeping faith was absolutely foreign to their character. Some few, compromised by crime, were certainly adherents of the pretender, and among them, unfortunately, was a chief who had rallied to his side the Vedas, a primitive tribe not above two thousand strong, which haunted the jungles of Wellasse and Bintenne. So wild were these Vedas that few of them cultivated the ground for food or possessed so much as a dwelling. They had, therefore, nothing to lose ; while, being expert bowmen and at home in the forest, they were difficult and dangerous to hunt down.

Troops were called up to the disturbed districts
Nov. from the plains, and by the first week in November over seven hundred men from the east coast were assembled under Lieutenant-colonel Kelly to march into Uva, and over eleven hundred had been brought up to the vicinity of Kandy from Colombo. Communication behind Kandy and Badulla was closed

except to armed parties ; and the troops had not been brought together without casualties, for the roads were narrow, steep and rugged, and the enemy, mostly armed with bows and arrows but not without a few muskets, hung continually about their skirts in the dense forest. But even when assembled the soldiers could do little. Tiny columns overran the disturbed districts, striving incessantly to seize the person of the pretender, or of one or other of his leading adherents ; but in vain. The columns converged punctually upon the appointed place at the appointed time, always to find that the bird was flown. The inhabitants generally were hostile to the British, and not only declined to give information, but attacked every small party and every weak post. The casualties were rarely very numerous, though upon one occasion a convoy of porters under an escort of ten soldiers was annihilated ; but the troops were much harassed by endless petty actions ; and, since most of the roads were impassable even by bullocks, the maintenance of communications and the transport of supplies were matters of extreme difficulty. 1817.

By February 1818 the rebellion had spread westward to the districts of Dumbera, Hewahetta and Saffragam, east and south-east of Kandy ; and Brownrigg was at his wits' end to know how to deal with it. He had now not far from four thousand men dispersed among the Kandyan provinces, including detachments of the Nineteenth, Seventy-third and Eighty-third Foot, and of the native Ceylon regiments. They were so far fairly healthy, and their casualties in the five months since the outbreak of the insurrection did not exceed forty (including three European officers) killed and six wounded ; but the work of defending little posts and of escorting convoys was most arduous and exhausting. To give an instance, one detachment of eighty men was surrounded by a body of some eight thousand Kandyans, chiefly armed with muskets, and was subjected to continuous attacks for ten days. 1818. Feb.

1818. Every day the officer in command detached minute
Feb. parties of his force to make counter-attacks; and eventually he drove his enemy away disheartened. But, though he suffered no loss of any kind, his men were worn out by want of rest. Between the 21st of February and the 31st of March the casualties were swelled by another fifty; and now also the sick-list rose to a proportion of one-seventh of the entire force, the British succumbing chiefly to dysentery and the natives to ulcers, attributable probably to the bites of leeches. In the circumstances Brownrigg, though fully aware of the strain laid on Moira by the Pindari war, appealed to Madras for reinforcements, and meanwhile abandoned the line of communication between Kandy and the north, which left the province of Matale wholly to the rebels, withdrawing also a part of his chain of posts between Badulla and Saffragam.

He had hardly done so when the first battalion of the Fifteenth Madras Native Infantry reached him on
Mar. 22. the 22nd of March from India, followed on the 10th of April by five companies of the Seventh Madras Native Infantry and a body of armed followers. Yet another Madras battalion was embarking to join him; wherefore, using these reinforcements to guard Colombo, Kandy and the line of communication between them, and to prevent the rebellion from spreading to Seven Korales, Brownrigg prepared to throw the whole of his own strength into the work of restoring order. But meanwhile the troops about
April. Bintenne began in April to sicken, and very soon the hospitals were full. In the first three weeks of the month over two thousand fell down, and, though the bulk of them speedily recovered and the number of deaths did not exceed sixty, there were still eleven hundred men, or more than a fifth of the whole force, on the sick-list on the 20th of April. With this drain upon his strength, Brownrigg found himself obliged to abandon his posts of direct communication between Kandy and Badulla, and to use a circuitous route

through peaceable country farther to the south. He 1818.
also gave up the post of Bintenne. Another mishap was that the last of the Madras battalions, the Eighteenth Native Infantry, which had sailed for the port of Galle, was compelled, after six weeks' battling with foul winds, to land at Trincomalee, where it was not expected. This necessarily caused delay, and meanwhile, owing to fatigue and privation, half of the battalion fell sick, and only a sorry remnant made its way to Kandy in the middle of June. Thus the whole of Brownrigg's plans were overset ; and though in July his force in the Kandyan provinces amounted July.
(including a thousand sick) to nearly fifty-five hundred men, he was fain to apply to Madras for yet further reinforcements. His casualties in action in April, May and June little exceeded one hundred killed and wounded ; but the number of sick and convalescent men kept the fighting strength of his force to all intent stationary.

Nevertheless he had his consolations. Two of the rebel leaders, trying to induce some Malay soldiers to desert, were caught in their own trap. Thirty soldiers were sent out as if intending to desert, who carried off one of the chiefs and routed a party of Kandyans, that attempted to rescue him, with heavy loss. They rarely had the chance of meeting any of the enemy in the open, but on this occasion they did meet about five hundred of them and taught them a lesson. The hostile bands which waylaid weak British parties, also, rarely came off victors. In June four men of the Seventy-third and twelve Kaffirs of the native Ceylon regiment, the whole under command of Lance-corporal M'Laughlin of the Seventy-third, were attacked in dense jungle by a large body of Kandyans. Two men of the Seventy-third were shot dead at once. M'Laughlin left ten men to stand over their bodies, and himself with five more fought his way two miles on to Badulla, whence he returned with reinforcements to find the ten still, after two hours in action, standing firm where

1818. he had left them. Again, a strong party which had
July. passed south-westward from Hewahetta into Four Korales was caught between two columns and utterly dispersed. In Uva also three bodies of the enemy were surprised and routed, showing that the inhabitants were weary of the rebellion and inclined to put an end to it. By the end of July the outlook was more cheerful; but Brownrigg's European force was shrinking daily from sickness, and he despaired of restoring order completely without the display of an imposing and irresistible force.

Meanwhile the Madras government had refused his application for further reinforcements; whereupon Moira, with the generosity which marks a great commander, undertook to send him from India, not only a strong native battalion, but the Fifty-ninth British also. The Madras government, possibly upon hearing that Brownrigg had addressed himself to Moira, in the meantime repented, and offered to send the Eighty-sixth to Ceylon, but withdrew the offer again until
Sept. pressed once more to despatch it. By September, however, the rebellion was dying out. A rapid movement, in the course of which one small column traversed thirty-four miles, fifteen of them by night, in twenty-four hours, dispersed the principal rebel bands in Matale; and, when the Fifty-ninth and Eighty-sixth arrived in the second week of September, Brownrigg sent the greater part of them back to India. In every quarter the rebels were surrendering, and by
Oct. October, saving that the three principal leaders were still at large, the insurrection was over. Two of these were hunted down before the end of the month and the third was captured a few days later. Of the three, two were tried and executed, and the third, together with a score of the subordinate chiefs, was banished. The sacred tooth of Buddha, which had been abstracted from Kandy by one of the foremost rebels in May, was recovered by an ensign of the Seventy-third; and its restoration to its place by the British produced a

great reaction in their favour among the Cingalese. 1818.
Thus, after some sixteen wearing months, the third and last campaign in the Kandyan provinces came at length to its close.[1]

It may seem that too much importance has been attached to these petty operations, which did not cost the three British regiments engaged in it above four or five score casualties in killed and wounded. But it is not by the mere tale of the hurt and the slain that the work of the troops and of their commanders must be measured, but by the difficulties which they encountered and the exertions by which they overcame them. More trying work has seldom been assigned to British soldiers. They could only move on steep, narrow mountain paths encompassed by dense jungle ; and though their enemy was, as a fighting man, contemptible, he made up in cunning what he lacked in valour. No isolated soldier, indeed no small party of soldiers, was safe against attack at any time in any place. Every man's hand was against them, and, though that hand might be weak, it was invisible and could therefore be deadly. To the commanders this state of things was more trying even than to the men, for they could obtain no information, and were, therefore, obliged to impose upon their troops endless, long and exhausting marches to no purpose. Again, the fact that transport was impossible except by human porters, and that these were exceedingly hard to obtain, necessarily imposed very severe labour upon the Europeans ; and in fact the work of the campaign at last fairly broke them down. The deaths from sickness in the three British battalions, in August, September and October 1818, amounted to three hundred ; and Brownrigg was fain to delay the return of five companies of the Fifty-ninth to India until his own white regiments, which were quite worn out by fatigue, should have recovered themselves. There was no glory to be

[1] Brownrigg to Sec. of State, July 24, 26 ; Aug. 17 ; Oct. 9, 27, 31, 1818 ; Jan. 8, 1819.

1818. reaped by the soldiers from their exertions, no medal to be gained, no prize-money to be pocketed—no reward, in fact, to be expected for the severest of hardship and privation among tropical plagues of all kinds, but fever and dysentery which might very likely hang about them for their life-time. Yet they did their duty, as Brownrigg testified again and again, with exemplary patience and cheerfulness, laughing at all dangers and discomforts, and by sheer tenacity bending their elusive adversaries to their will. The history of the Army and of the consolidation of the Empire is made up of such unrecorded campaigns. Millions of Englishmen have drunk tea and coffee at their breakfasts, and cured their catarrhs with cinchona, all grown in Ceylon ; but not one in a million thinks of the hundreds of British soldiers who died in 1803 and 1818 in order that Ceylon might become a peaceful tropical garden for the British nation. They think that it is a soldier's business to die ; and so no doubt it is. But there are sundry forms of death ; and only high discipline and example can make men march readily into the jaws of pestilence and famine, and abide therein with spirit unbroken and courage unabated until their work is done. Let the story, therefore, be set down at least in these pages, that the good work of the Nineteenth, the Seventy-third and the Eighty-third be not utterly forgotten.

[This is one of the obscurest campaigns that I have ever handled. Were there not allusions to it in Moira's despatches, and were not the trophies of 1816 to be seen at Windsor Castle, it might altogether have escaped me. My narrative is compiled from Brownrigg's despatches in the Record Office, C.O., 54, vols. 53, 55, 66, 70 and 71.]

CHAPTER XIII

Moira resigned the Governorship-general in 1823, and was succeeded after an interregnum of some months by Lord Amherst, son of the conqueror of Canada, who assumed office on the 1st of August. Like Moira he found himself confronted immediately with the prospect of war against a new and untried enemy. On the eastern as on the northern frontier of the British dominions a new power had risen up in the person of the Kings of Ava, who, after precisely the same fashion as the Gurkha chiefs, had for a full generation been dispossessing the petty chieftains of the country, that is now called Burma, of their territory, and welding it into an empire for themselves. Assam in the north-east, Cachar, immediately to south of it, and Arakan on the eastern shore of Bengal fell successively into the hands of these conquerors, until their boundaries became conterminous with those of the British ; and it was tolerably certain that they would not stop there. The tyrannous rule of the Kings of Ava finally brought about the expected violation of the British frontier. In 1793 three Arakanese chiefs, with a rabble of followers, fled across the borders of Chittagong, immediately to west of Arakan, and were pursued by a party of Burmese which had orders not to relinquish the chase whithersoever it might lead them. The Governor-general, Sir John Shore, remonstrated, but being answered by the Burmese commander with defiance, was too weak and timid to insist upon his withdrawal, and was even abject enough

1823.

1793. to deliver over the unfortunate fugitives to the tender mercies of the Burmese. The King of Ava naturally concluded that the British were afraid of him, and from thenceforth the tone of the Burmese steadily increased in arrogance.

Meanwhile the oppressed Arakanese continued to swarm over into Chittagong by tens of thousands, in so wretched a condition that it was impossible to refuse them asylum ; and the harbouring of these miserable people was made a pretext by the Burmese for a
1809. constant menace of war. It was ascertained in 1809 that the Burmese meditated the conquest of Chittagong and even of Dacca, not more than two hundred and fifty miles north-east of Calcutta, so that it was easy to understand why they cherished a ground of quarrel. Moreover, this ground at times became unpleasantly
1811. solid. One of the emigrants in 1811 boldly crossed the border into Arakan with a party of banditti, and overran much of the country before he was routed and driven back by the Burmese into Chittagong ; and, though the Calcutta government sent a mission to Ava to disavow these insurgents and issued orders for the apprehension of the chiefs, this same leader continued to harry Arakan from time to time until his
1815. death in 1815. The cessation of his inroads, however, did not conciliate the Burmese, who, after first sending emissaries into India, ostensibly to purchase manu-
1818. scripts, but in reality to stir up disaffection, in 1818 openly laid claim not only to Chittagong and Dacca, but even to Murshidabad and Cossimbazar, almost on the main stream of the Ganges. Frequent missions and negotiations served only to bring out the insolent contempt in which the court of Ava held the British. Retaliatory inroads into Chittagong became frequent, and at last the Burmese took the decisive steps which provoked war.

1823. On the 24th of September 1823 they landed a force on the island of Shahpuri, at the mouth of the river Naaf, which had for long been a British possession,

overpowered the British guard, several of whom were killed or wounded, and retired. As Amherst answered this aggression only by remonstrance, the Burmese were confirmed in their belief that the British stood in fear of them. Shortly afterwards two columns invaded British territory, the one advancing from Assam south-westward upon Sylhet, about two hundred and seventy miles north-east of Calcutta, and the other westward from Manipur upon the same point. The former column was attacked and routed north of Sylhet on the 17th of January 1824, by the British frontier-guard, which, however, was too weak to follow up its success ; and the Burmese, returning, united with the column from Manipur and threw up stockades east of Sylhet on the river Surma. Here again they were promptly attacked, and the column from Assam was once more driven back in confusion ; but that from Manipur held its own and, beating off the British force, compelled it to retire. Finally, the island of Shahpuri was again seized, and on the 24th of February 1824 Amherst published a declaration of war. 1823. 1824. Feb. 24.

Then the question arose how hostilities could be most successfully prosecuted against such an enemy. Little was known of the country. Two or three British officers had gone on missions to Ava, and one of them, Captain Symes, had set down his experience in a book. A few merchants had also made their way for a short distance up the coast, or up one branch or another of the Irrawaddy, and had seen a few narrow belts of land from the water ; but beyond that nothing was known of the geography of Burma. It was generally understood that the country, or at any rate the southern and more easily accessible part of it, presented the usual features of the delta of a great river within the tropics—continuous tracts of marsh and forest, steaming under a vertical sun, swarming with mosquitoes, unhealthy to the last degree at all times, and subject to heavy inundations during

1824. the rains—but beyond this there was nothing save the vaguest of information.

The enemy, moreover, had his own system of warfare, curiously anticipating in some respects that of European nations in the twentieth century, and recalling in others that of the same nations in the seventeenth century. The force consisted chiefly of infantry, of which thirty to forty thousand were equipped with firearms, and the remainder with long spears and short swords; but every man, whether musketeer or spearman, carried a spade or entrenching tool of some kind. Upon arriving in presence of a hostile army, the Burmese troops would take up their ground in good order and, to use a modern phrase, dig themselves in. Their system was to delve a succession of holes, each large enough to hold two men and so excavated as to afford them shelter both from the weather and from the fire of the enemy. The line of these holes was designed according to a settled plan, so that it took the form of a more or less continuous entrenchment, in which traverses, as a protection against enfilading fire, were unnecessary, for even a shell falling straight into one of these holes could not kill more than two men. The actual labour of digging was entrusted in the first instance to the spearmen, the musketeers meanwhile covering them with their fire; and, as the Burmese had no system of reliefs, the whole of the work was done by pairs of men, each hole containing a sufficient supply of food and water for both, and a bed of straw or brushwood under the excavated bank, so that one man could sleep while the other worked, according to the principle known in naval parlance as "watch and watch." In this way an army of tens of thousands would take up its position, and in a couple of hours would disappear underground; and, where they had to deal with a formidable enemy, they would creep up to him, sinking themselves into the earth, for mile after mile.

The spade, however, was only one of their weapons

of defence, for a country of dense jungle and forest made the axe equally valuable. The front of a Burmese entrenchment-line was always covered by abatis, skilfully constructed so as to make a most formidable obstacle, and the rear was fortified by stockades, which could either be put together hastily, though strongly, of bamboo, as platforms with loopholes for sharpshooters and with embrasures for light guns, or more solidly built of stout teak beams which defied light artillery. It was a common Burmese practice also to build platforms in trees, which served as posts of observation and as positions for light guns. The favourite pieces for this purpose were the small weapons known as *jingals*, which fired a ball weighing from one half to three-quarters of a pound, and were mounted on a light carriage easily manageable by two men. These, having a greater range than a musket and being, in Burmese hands, little less mobile, were weapons to which the British could not easily supply a counter. For the rest the general tactics of the Burmese infantry resembled those of European armies in the seventeenth century, when the musketeers were employed for missile action and the pikemen for shock-action. It was the business of the musketeer to keep the enemy from approaching the stockade, and of the spearmen and swordsmen to close with the enemy if he succeeded in entering it. The musket and bayonet were, of course, supposed to combine missile and shock-action in a single weapon ; but even in the twentieth century, when a rifle can be loaded in far less time than a soldier of the eighteenth needed for the mere priming of his flint-lock musket, short clubbing or thrusting weapons have been often preferred for close and crowded fighting in entrenchments. In these circumstances the primitive division of the Burmese infantry into missile fighters and shock-fighters was at that time by no means wholly to its disadvantage. 1824.

The artillery of the Burmese included a vast number

1824. of pieces of various calibres, which, however, were generally used as guns of position, being not readily manœuvrable, and were frequently brought to the scene of action on the backs of elephants. The cavalry numbered little above seven hundred, and, being drawn exclusively from Manipur, were known as the Kasi horse. They probably bore a strong resemblance to the English northern horsemen, mounted on tough little ponies, of Henry the Eighth's time.

Such was the country and such the enemy, both very vaguely known and very imperfectly understood, against which the British arms were now to be employed. It was, therefore, unusually difficult to frame a plan of campaign ; and the military authorities judged it best to penetrate into the interior of Burma by water only. The Irrawaddy was the great highway. The capital and all of the principal cities were situated upon its banks ; and it was thought that, if the proper season were chosen, a flotilla conveying troops could ascend the four to five hundred miles of river from Rangoon to Ava in about six weeks. In fact it was to be a maritime expedition ; and the Commander-in-chief, Sir Edward Paget, whom we have known well in the Peninsula both with Moore and with Wellington, could think of no other means for bringing the Burmese to reason. Any military attempt upon the internal dominions of the King of Ava he deprecated. " In place of armies, fortresses and cities," he wrote with picturesque prescience, " I am led to believe that we shall find nothing but jungle, pestilence and famine." It was, therefore, decided that the expedition should arrive at the very beginning of the rainy season, when there would be the greatest possible volume of water in the river ; and a naval force was prepared of the *Larne* and *Sophie*, sloops of war, several of the East India Company's cruisers, a flotilla of twenty gun-brigs and twenty war-boats, each carrying one heavy gun, and—wonder of wonders—a small steam-

vessel, the *Diana*, the first ever employed in British warfare. Among the naval commanders was Captain Frederick Marryat, the novelist, and, through his novels, the greatest historian of the Royal Navy during the struggle with the French Revolution and Empire. 1824.

The military force was furnished chiefly by Madras, the sepoys of the Bengal presidency having an unconquerable antipathy against crossing the sea. Hence Bengal furnished only one detachment of native infantry besides the Thirteenth and Thirty-eighth of the King's service, while Madras supplied the Forty-first and Eighty-ninth of the British Line, and the Hundred-and-Second and seven native regiments of the Company's service.[1] The whole formed a body of some eleven thousand men with forty-two pieces of ordnance under the command of Major-general Sir Archibald Campbell, one of the British officers who had gained distinction in the Portuguese service during the Peninsular War. As to transport and supply, everything was left to

[1] Burmese Expeditionary Force :

	Total all Ranks.
Bengal Division. Colonel McCreagh.	
H.M. 13th, 727; H.M. 38th, 1035; 40th B.N.I., 86; European Artillery, 360 . . .	2208
Madras Troops. Colonel Maclean.	
1st Division: H.M. 41st, 762; Madras Europ. Regt. (102nd), 863; 1st Bn. Pioneers, 552; 3rd Madras N.I., 676; 7th M.N.I., 695; 8th M.N.I., 652; 9th M.N.I., 658; 10th M.N.I., 609; 17th M.N.I., 617; 22nd M.N.I., 711 .	5170
Madras Foot Artillery	560
H.M. 89th (arrived some in June and some in December, 1824)	1012
	10,575
Detachment of Bombay Foot Artillery . . .	69
	10,644

Artillery :

Light guns—10 six-pounders, 2 three-pounders.
Heavy guns—6 twelve-pounders, 8 eighteen-pounders.
Howitzers—2 eight-inch, 4 light five-and-a-half-inch, 2 four-and-a-half-inch.
Mortars—6 eight-inch, 2 five-and-a-half-inch.

1824. chance. Since the Burmese were known to be oppressive conquerors, it was assumed that the British had only to appear before Rangoon, at the mouth of the Irrawaddy, to be welcomed as protectors of an enslaved people, who would at once place at their disposal all their resources of food, cattle, drivers, boats and boatmen. Those who despatched the expedition were, in fact, governed by much the same hopes as was Henry Dundas when he sent Sir Ralph Abercromby to North Holland in 1799. There, in like manner, it was expected that the Orange party would rise and that everything needed would be readily forthcoming ; and yet, when Abercromby had forced his landing, he found no support from the inhabitants, no victuals, no boats and no waggons.[1] So soon are the lessons of a great war forgotten.

The rendezvous for the expedition was Port Cornwallis in the Andaman Islands, and there the Bengal division arrived at the end of April, to be joined by the Madras division on the 2nd of May. Three days were occupied in taking in fresh water ; and on the
May 5. 5th the armament sailed for Rangoon, sending two detachments, the one under Colonel McCreagh and the other under Major Wahab, to seize the island of Cheduba, nearly four hundred miles due north, and Cape Negrais, about a hundred miles north and east,
May 10. from Port Cornwallis.[2] On the 10th of May the armament dropped anchor within the bar of the Rangoon river, some fifteen miles below Rangoon city. Lack of wind and the ebb-tide prevented the fleet from going any further on that day ; and Campbell had full leisure to arrange his plan of attack. It seemed pretty evident that the arrival of the British was a surprise to the Burmese ; and all through the night signal-

[1] See Vol. IV. of this History, pp. 646-647, 661-662.

[2] McCreagh's detachment :
Det. H.M. 13th Foot, 7 cos. 40th Bengal N.I.
Wahab's detachment :
1/17th N.I., det. Madras Artillery.

beacons were observed flaring along the stream to Rangoon to give the alarm. On the morning of the 11th the fleet weighed and continued its way up the river. After it had covered three or four miles, fire was opened upon it from a battery of two guns, which were promptly silenced by one of the men-of-war; and then there was no further sign of resistance until the ships arrived off Rangoon, when shortly after 2 P.M. a small Burmese battery of twelve guns had the temerity to fire a few shots, and was instantly extinguished by a couple of broadsides from the *Liffey*. Campbell had particularly wished to avoid firing upon the town, as it was of the utmost importance to the British that the inhabitants should remain peaceably within it; but, as it happened, these broadsides delivered from confinement and possibly from death eleven Europeans, inhabitants of Rangoon, who had been secured by the Burmese as hostages. Meanwhile Campbell had made his dispositions for landing; and detachments of the Thirty-eighth, Forty-first and Thirteenth were set ashore to cover the disembarkation of the rest. These advanced parties met with no resistance; and within twenty minutes the British were in undisputed possession of Rangoon. 1824. May 11.

Here seemed to be a solid success; but the capture of an oriental city too often means only the beginning of troubles; and so it was in the present instance. Rangoon, upon which the projectors of the expedition had counted for a friendly population with abundance of supplies, transport-animals and boats, was found to be entirely deserted. Upon the first news of the arrival of the fleet at the mouth of the river, the inhabitants had begun to steal away and to hide themselves in the adjacent jungles; less from fear of the invaders than from the persuasion that occupation of Rangoon by the British would be short, and that submission to them would mean no more than to share in their destruction at the hands of their Burmese conquerors. Abandonment of their homes signified for

1824. May 11. them hardship and privation during the rainy season in the jungle; but anything was better than the vengeance of the Burmese authorities, who, for their part, with excellent judgment not only permitted but enjoined this flight from the city. There, then, Campbell found himself at the beginning of the rainy season in a wilderness of empty dwellings, surrounded by swamps, which would soon be meres, and by jungles almost as impassable as the swamps, with no means of moving and therefore pinned by sheer force of circumstances to his ground.

The first night spent upon Burmese soil was not creditable to the force. The troops, remembering the booty shared at Seringapatam, looked to enrich themselves by this Burmese expedition; and the sight of the great golden pagoda of Shwe-da-gon, towering up, like St. Paul's in London, to a height of four hundred feet, seemed to promise untold wealth in some quarter. No attempt seems to have been made to keep the troops in hand. They wandered away through the deserted streets; and, though they found little plunder, a large party of European troops happened upon a cellar, belonging to an European merchant, full of brandy. In a very short time the party was riotously drunk. The happy news quickly spread to their comrades; and by nightfall the British soldiers, almost to a man, were either prostrate and insensible or rambling, blissfully intoxicated, with lighted torches from house to house, in search of plunder.

The natural result was that half of the town was burned down, and the remainder saved only by the exertions of sailors landed from the fleet; and had the enemy been as enterprising and watchful as they were cunning and provident, they might have annihilated the troops in Rangoon without further trouble.[1]

[1] See *A Sketch of the Services of the Madras European Regiment during the Burmese War* (by Major Butler), p. 15, which is confirmed by Doveton, *Burmese War*.

The officers, as soon as they found out what was toward, sallied out and spilled what was left of the brandy on the ground ; but this measure, which ought to have been taken at first, could not undo the mischief, though probably it at least limited its duration. The entire incident points to negligence and laxity of discipline among the regimental officers, and extreme improvidence, to say the least of it, on the part of the Commander-in-chief. Campbell, who had been at Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz, must have known the British soldier's passion for alcohol at that period. He must have guessed that liquor was to be found somewhere in Rangoon, and that the men, after long confinement on board ship, would be inclined to break loose in search of it. Not a musket-shot had been fired, and not a drop of British blood had been shed, so that there was no excuse for not keeping the men in hand. In these days of telegraphic communication he might have found himself superseded within forty-eight hours. 1824. May

On the morning of the 12th the remaining troops were landed, and Campbell made his dispositions for the holding of Rangoon. The town proper stands on the north side of the river and at that time covered an area of about nine hundred yards by seven hundred, being bordered by shallow water on three sides and by the river on the south side, and being further defended by an inner enclosure of palisades, from ten to twelve feet high. Northward two roads, gradually converging, led to the Shwe-da-gon Pagoda, about two miles and a half distant, passing through groups of substantial buildings, which afforded excellent cover for the troops. The whole of this line was placed in a state of defence, with batteries thrown up at intervals both to front and rear, and a chain of posts connecting the entire length of it. Head-quarters and all departments were stationed in the town, together with the regiments ; and the Shwe-da-gon Pagoda was occupied by the Thirteenth and Thirty-eighth. This building May 12.

1824. May 12. stands upon a mound, which was eight hundred yards square and formed the key to the position. Close up to this line the grass grew high, so high indeed in places that it was necessary to throw up mounds to enable the sentries to see over it, and at all points the jungle was disagreeably near, and so thick as to afford good cover for a skulking enemy. It was not a highly dignified situation for a British force, landing to punish an aggressive neighbour, but it was inevitable. The desertion of Rangoon by the inhabitants signified that neither land-transport and drivers, nor water-transport and rowers, could be obtained; and an army that has no transport must sit still.[1]

Very soon it was apparent that the Burmese had thought out their plan of operations with admirable thoroughness, and, having admitted the British into Rangoon, were determined not to allow them to quit it. Under cover of the jungle they threw up earthworks and stockades on every road and pathway, even within musket-shot of the British posts; and from these fastnesses they stole out under cover of night, sometimes firing at the sentries, sometimes creeping up still nearer, hurling their spears at them, and creeping off invisible; at all times lurking on the skirts of the jungle to cut off any unfortunate straggler. Hence, at first the hours of darkness were constantly disturbed. The men, until they became inured to these wiles, were nervous and unsteady, firing at anything or at nothing and keeping the whole line in a state of alarm. By water also the Burmese had their war-boats, not wholly to be despised by vessels at anchor, and, still worse, their fire-rafts, with which they threatened to drive the shipping out of the river altogether. Meanwhile the enemy, upon which they chiefly counted to make an end of the British, got early to work. Reckoning, upon the reports of a couple of political officers, to find abundant supplies of fresh meat and

[1] The solitary exception to this rule is Sir Alured Clarke's march from Simonstown to Capetown, in 1795; see Vol. IV. pp. 399, 400.

vegetables, the authorities had sent out the expedition with little more food than was sufficient for the voyage. Of this food the staples were salt pork, at best not the most digestible of meats, and biscuit ; and under the influence of the climate the pork turned putrid and the biscuit mouldy. Dysentery, therefore, declared itself almost immediately ; and the weakening of all the men by insufficient nourishment bade fair to offer them as easy victims to malarial fever. It should seem that the Hundred-and-Second, of its own motion, collected some four thousand bullocks, but was ordered by Campbell to release them as being the private property of the natives, whom he wished to conciliate. The officers of course obeyed ; but they did not fail to note that Campbell instituted a prolonged, though fruitless, search for hidden treasure in the Great Pagoda, obviously with no intention of restoring it, if found, to its owners ; and the men took the hint and proceeded to rifle all the smaller pagodas of such small images of gold and silver, worth comparatively little, as they could lay their hands on. Altogether the first weeks of the occupation of Rangoon cannot be considered edifying to the military mind. 1824. May.

It so chanced that operations in another quarter at this same time did much to heighten the confidence of the Burmese. They had assembled ten or twelve thousand men in Arakan under the command of Maha Mengyee Bundoola, an officer of great reputation ; and on the 13th of May this force advanced upon Ramu, about ninety miles to north-west of Arakan city, where lay a British detachment of about five hundred Bengal Sepoys and six hundred irregular levies under Captain Noton. This officer's perfectly correct instinct was to go out and fight ; but, owing to the cowardice of his elephant-drivers, his two guns failed him on the day of action, and he fell back to Ramu, where he took up a defensive position and resolved to stand his ground until reinforcements, which were on their way, should join him. On the May 13.

1824. 15th of May the Burmese approached him and, by
May 15. taking advantage of natural cover, succeeded in entrenching themselves close to him. During the night and during the day of the 16th they sapped their
May 17. way still closer, and by morning of the 17th were within twelve yards of his picquets, upon which they maintained a heavy and destructive fire. Noton's irregulars now abandoned the defence, and, the position being thus rendered untenable, he began his retreat in good order. The Burmese, however, pressed him hard; and a small body of their horse, cutting down every straggler, filled the sepoys with dismay. In spite of all that their officers could do, they gave way to panic, threw down their arms and dispersed. About two hundred and fifty only were killed or taken, but of nine British officers six were killed, and only three, two of whom were wounded, made their escape. Happily Bundoola made no attempt to follow up his success, otherwise he might have mastered Chittagong and Dacca. Reinforcements soon made these secure; but meanwhile there was wild panic in Calcutta, where some of the native merchants actually moved themselves and their families under the guns of Fort William. Altogether the campaign did not open happily for the British.

At Rangoon, however, Campbell and Commodore Grant soon realised that they could not allow the Burmese to have things all their own way; and they
May 19. began operations on the 19th by a raid of a company of the Thirty-eighth, and of the boats of the fleet upon three outlying stockades a little way up the river at Kemmendyne. The Burmese fought well, meeting bayonet with spear, but were driven from all their defences, leaving sixty dead behind them. On the
May 28. 28th guessing, from the persistent annoyance given by the enemy at one point in his line, that formidable works must be in the vicinity, Campbell led out a stronger party of about two hundred and fifty Europeans and as many sepoys, with a gun and a howitzer,

to what may be called a reconnaissance in force. The rain was falling in torrents, which meant that the men, being unable to keep their priming dry, were unable to fire their muskets ; and the first two miles of the march lay by narrow paths through dense jungle ; so that the enterprise was not without peril. The Burmese, however, fell back steadily, offering now and again an opportunity to the artillery. After advancing seven miles the artillery-men were worn out with the labour of getting their pieces forward ; whereupon Campbell, leaving his sepoys to protect them, pushed on with his Europeans alone and at length debouched from the jungle into a plain of paddy-fields, some inches deep in water. Two miles ahead stood a village, wreathed in smoke, which seemed to indicate the presence of a large force cooking ; and behind it the Burmese officers could be seen drawing up their troops in line. 1824. May 28.

In high hope of at last meeting his enemy in the open, Campbell pressed on towards the village, just short of which he was met by a heavy fire from two stockades, so cleverly masked as to be invisible at sixty yards' distance. He had in fact been lured on into something very like an ambuscade. With great promptitude he ordered one of his four companies to hold the plain and keep the enemy's main line in check, while he launched the three others to the attack. Fortunately, both stockades were low, not exceeding eight feet in height. In ten minutes the first stockade was cleared with the bayonet ; and the troops, re-forming as if on parade, after a sharper struggle carried the second stockade also. Pursuit was impossible, and Campbell, after waiting for an hour in the hope of engaging the enemy's main force, marched back to camp. His casualties had been trifling, and he had counted three hundred dead of the enemy. It seems that the Burmese system of fortification had one great defect—the outlets in rear of the stockade were always too narrow, so that, when once the defenders had

1824. May. ceased to resist, they became huddled together in their flight and were slaughtered without difficulty.

This little affair showed at least that the spirit of the British troops was excellent, and may not have been without its effect on the enemy ; but it was not the kind of operation that could be repeated. A march of twenty miles under a tropical downpour is sufficient in itself to send many men to hospital ; and the risk of meeting an enemy ten times superior in number with the bayonet alone on difficult ground was very great. In fact, had the two stockades captured in this day been a few feet higher and had the assault in consequence failed, Campbell's handful of men would probably have been annihilated. On the other hand, nothing succeeds so well as audacity against an oriental foe ; and Campbell was assuredly right to put heart into his men, worried as they were through the harassing tactics of the enemy, by taking the offensive. But it is hard upon a commander to place him in such a position that he must accept such risks, or see his army go to pieces.

Before the 1st of June the detachment from Negrais rejoined the main army at Rangoon, having mastered the island with little difficulty or loss but found it not
June 4. worth the keeping. On the 4th the Eighty-ninth and two battalions of Native Infantry began to arrive from Madras ; and on the 11th the detachment from Cheduba, having also accomplished its mission with little loss, came likewise into Rangoon. Their arrival was timely, for sickness was greatly on the increase. Fever was supplanting dysentery ; and scurvy[1] and hospital gangrene had made their appearance ; nor

[1] In the Burmese campaign of 1884–85 the troops were fed chiefly on "bully beef" and biscuit ; but I myself saw a case of an officer who, as a consequence of that campaign, developed scurvy some months after his return to England. The symptoms were unmistakable ; but the officer in question was not one "of depraved habits," and the disorder was ascribed by the doctor simply to general bad health after two years of fatigue, privation and exposure in a very trying climate.

did it help matters much to ascribe these two last to the "depraved habits" of the men.[1] The Burmese during these first days of June sent emissaries to Campbell's head-quarters to make a show of negotiation. The object of this could only be to gain time, probably for the assembly of troops to attack the British lines in force; and Campbell was consequently the more intent upon an aggressive policy which should bring their machinations to naught. Petty raids in various quarters had by this time gained for him from fifty to sixty large cargo-boats, which he was adapting for the transport of troops; and meanwhile his attention was specially directed to Kemmendyne, some two miles up the river from Rangoon, where the Burmese had erected one main stockade of unusual strength and extent, with similar though minor stockades in the vicinity. As this seemed likely to be the pivot of the expected Burmese attack, Campbell was anxious to master this stronghold at Kemmendyne; and the Commodore was equally solicitous to possess it, since it gave the enemy a convenient station for floating fire-rafts down the stream upon his shipping.

1824. June.

Accordingly on the 3rd of June three columns were set in motion from the Shwe-da-gon Pagoda, two of them under Colonels Hodgson and Smith to converge by different routes upon the great stockade, and a third under Major Frith to a more distant point to intercept the enemy's retreat, while Campbell himself with two cruisers, carrying three companies of the Forty-first, was to come abreast of Kemmendyne by water. Hodgson's and Smith's columns, after a seven hours' march through the jungle, punctually met before the great stockade at noon, together sixteen hundred strong with two camel-howitzers and a rocket-tube-mortar. The howitzers opened fire with shrapnel, which was not very efficacious against a stout structure of bamboo and teak; the rocket-mortar likewise opened fire with a premature explosion which blew an unfor-

June 3.

[1] Wilson's *Narrative of the Burmese War*, p. 87.

1824. tunate follower to pieces ; and presently the flank
June 3. companies of the Hundred-and-Second advanced to the assault. The ground all round the stockade was thickly covered with jungle ; and, as they moved forward, these companies were greeted by a heavy and regular fire on their rear. Facing about, they returned it, until their commander, judging by the steadiness of the volleys that they were being fired upon by our own native troops, ordered them to lie down. This little mistake having been set right, they flew upon the stockade. It was fifteen feet high, loop-holed and heavily garrisoned ; but these gallant men without hesitation tried to storm it by hoisting each other over the top. They were shot down right and left ; but, still undaunted, they tried to pull the stockade asunder by main force. It was too stout for them ; and the Brigadier, seeing that without scaling-ladders the assault could not succeed, called the men off. They were re-forming for an orderly retreat when the cruisers from the river opened fire, at too great elevation, sending their shot right over the stockade into the middle of the rallying troops. In these circumstances the retirement was not at first too orderly ; but the Burmese made no attempt to counter-attack nor to pursue, contenting themselves with yells of triumph. Thus the force, having lost about one hundred and twenty killed and wounded, fifty of them Europeans, returned unmolested to Rangoon.

This was not a fortunate nor a well-managed affair ; and the loss of so many European soldiers was a more serious matter than the bare number would seem to indicate. That the British troops should have fired upon each other was nothing extraordinary—indeed in woodland fighting such mishaps are the rule rather than the exception. That the guns of the ships should have played upon their own men in such blind country was nothing very remarkable. But the neglect to provide scaling-ladders, when endless bamboo was to be had for the cutting, was unmis-

takably culpable, and points to a careless acceptance of unnecessary risks. Campbell wrote of the whole affair as a reconnaissance which might have developed into the capture of Kemmendyne but for "one or two mistakes," and whose result was little to be regretted "as it would tend to lull the crafty foe into a security that may soon be fatal to him." [1] The term reconnaissance in force, after more than a century of hard usage, still retains its value among the military reports of all nations to disguise the miscarriage of a deliberately planned attack. 1824. June 3.

On the 6th of June Campbell's losses were made good by the arrival of part of the Eighty-ninth; and he now planned an attack of Kemmendyne upon very different principles. On the 10th of June he again moved out from his lines against the place, this time with three thousand men, a sufficiency of scaling-ladders, four heavy guns and four mortars, by land; sending up simultaneously two divisions of the flotilla by water. "It was my intention," he wrote, "not to lose a man if it could be avoided." His ordnance could move but very slowly, for the eighteen-pounders, through want of draught-cattle, were hauled along by parties of European soldiers, and the ground was heavy. After five hours of tedious and weary progress the column had traversed two miles, when the way was found to be barred by a stockade stoutly built and fourteen feet high, which was covered on both flanks and in rear by dense jungle. The stronghold was invested on three sides, so far as the jungle permitted; two heavy guns and some field-pieces were brought up, and for nearly an hour the artillery hurled shot, apparently with no great effect, upon the barrier of bamboo and teak. Campbell then directed strong parties from the Forty-first and Hundred-and-Second to assault the stockade in front, and from the Thirteenth and Thirty-eighth to assail it in rear. The June 6. June 10.

[1] Campbell's despatch of 4th June, 1824, printed in Wilson's *Papers*, p. 57.

1824. position was carried with little difficulty or loss; one
June 10. hundred and fifty Burmese dead being counted, whereas the British casualties did not exceed thirty-two. The force then pushed on at the same snail's pace for another mile, and halted for the night in communication with the flotilla before the great stockade of Kemmendyne. Campbell made no attempt to surround it completely, alleging, apparently without accuracy,[1] that his force was too weak for the purpose; and he spent the night, under torrents of tropical rain, in throwing up batteries. As loud yelling resounded from the stockade throughout the hours of darkness, he felt fairly confident of a decisive affair on the morrow. With the first streak of dawn his guns and mortars opened with shot and shell a fire which was continued for two hours, when the storming columns advanced and found the stockade empty. The Burmese had evidently decamped during the night, leaving behind them yelling parties sufficient to deceive the British; and not a Burman, living or dead, was to be found within it. The only occupant was one old woman.[2]

The incident shows that Campbell was but an opportunist commander and had never set himself seriously to solve the problem—certainly no easy one — which was set to him by the Burmese leaders. The ease with which minor stockades had been carried misled him into the careless and somewhat costly attack on Kemmendyne on the 3rd of June; and he was considerably dismayed by his repulse. Experience had shown that, when once British troops had made their way into a stockade, they could slaughter the Burmese like sheep; but merely because on the 3rd of June they had failed to surmount fifteen feet of palisade without scaling-ladders — which was not a very astonishing circumstance—he went round to the opposite extreme and would not attempt an attack

[1] Butler, p. 38.

[2] Campbell's despatch of 16th June (Wilson's *Papers*, pp. 58-59), Doveton, pp. 68-70.

without heavy artillery. The mere labour of hauling heavy guns along marshy tracks at the rate of about four hundred yards an hour must have sufficed to send scores of the British to hospital, especially after exposure in their exhausted state to a night of incessant tropical rain. Moreover, it was found that—as might have been guessed, or at any rate ascertained by experiment—round shot produced little effect upon so elastic a substance as bamboo, the fibres merely expanding to allow for the passage of the ball and closing immediately behind it. Hence a battering which would have dashed masonry to ruin made a very poor breach in a stockade. Shell was far more efficacious, both in its moral and physical effects, and a few light mortars were therefore worth the trouble of their transport; but the true weapon against stockades, held by such an enemy as the Burmese, was the scaling-ladder. Campbell had plenty of scaling-ladders on the 10th, and, if he had depended chiefly upon them, he would have reached Kemmendyne in infinitely less time and with infinitely less exertion, would have stormed it out of hand, inflicted real loss on the Burmese, and put his men under cover of the huts within the stockades for the night. As things were, he inflicted upon his troops much unnecessary fatigue and exposure—far more costly in the long run than a well-planned assault—and left them with the mortifying impression that they had been outwitted and befooled. 1824. June 10.

The acquisition of Kemmendyne was, nevertheless, a solid gain, for it gave the British force at least some ground outside the line of its picquets at Rangoon; for, together with the actual town, an almost continuous chain of stockades, extending along the river for nearly a mile above the city, had been abandoned by the enemy. Kemmendyne itself was garrisoned by a native battalion and four companies of the Hundred-and-Second; and an unfortunate detachment of the latter regiment was also posted in the first stockade captured on the 10th. As has been told, nearly one

1824. hundred and fifty Burmese had been killed in it ; but
June. no pioneers were left with this detachment, nor was a single tool supplied to them to bury the dead. They were fain to burn or inter the corpses as best they could. The rain soon washed away such slight layer of earth as they had been able to throw upon the bodies ; and the troops were left to share the stockade with an unspeakable mass of corruption.[1] The result was, of course, an increase of sickness, of which there was already more than enough. Indeed, the only excuse for such scandalous neglect seems to be that all departments of the army were more or less paralysed by the excessive prevalence of disease.

The Burmese leaders were evidently well aware of this state of things, for the court of Ava now directed that a general attack should be delivered upon the British lines, and that the invaders should be driven into the sea. The Burmese were probably hastened to this resolution by the capture of Kemmendyne, which was the first indication that their tactics, however successful so far, might fail of their final purpose. They began to resume their old habits of harassing picquets and murdering sentries ; and at the end of June large bodies were seen crossing above Kemmendyne from the western to the eastern bank of the
June 25. river. On the night of the 25th they floated down a huge fire-raft, consisting of thirty or forty canoes linked together and piled up with faggots, which had been soaked in crude petroleum, for the destruction of the British shipping ; but this formidable engine of attack drifted ashore and burned itself out long before it reached Rangoon ; and the naval commanders, once aware of this danger, anchored beams in the river
July 1. to intercept any future fire-rafts. On the 1st of July the expected assault was delivered with such feebleness that it was beaten off easily by three weak companies of sepoys and two guns. The British, in fact, suffered not a single casualty.

[1] Butler, pp. 40-41.

Still the enemy's force continued to increase, and 1824.
Campbell, though the monsoon was at its height and much of the country was under water, decided to assail a strongly fortified Burmese post at Pagoda Point, the junction of the Hlaing with the Rangoon river. The main entrenchment was here thrown up on the tongue of land between the two streams ; and the access to it was protected by two stockades on either bank of the Rangoon river about half a mile below the confluence. Campbell himself, with eight hundred men, was to approach it by water, under convoy of the cruisers ; and Brigadier-general Macbean with twelve hundred more was to march upon Kamaroot on the Hlaing, about six miles from Rangoon city and a mile and a half above Pagoda Point, to cut off the enemy's retreat. On the 8th of July accordingly the two columns set July 8.
out. The cruisers easily made their way up to Pagoda Point; and, after a short cannonade, the troops landed, carried two stockades with little difficulty and found a third abandoned by the enemy. As it was impossible to communicate with Macbean owing to the floods, Campbell returned to Rangoon that evening. Macbean, for his part, struggled through the jungle with difficulty under pouring rain, and soon found himself compelled to leave all artillery, except a few light howitzers, behind. Emerging at length into open ground, he found a series of seven stockades before him. Two of them, though strongly manned, were quickly carried by escalade ; and the enemy fell back to a kind of citadel within three separate lines of entrenchments. Here a high Burmese commander had taken up his station ; but, though he set a fine example, his men would not stand by him and he was among the first to fall. Altogether the seven stockades were mastered with ridiculous ease and at trifling loss to the attackers ; and the Burmese really suffered heavily, for Macbean, in addition to the enemy actually opposed to him, had the good fortune to intercept a column of fugitives from Pagoda Point. It was reckoned that eight

1824. July 8. hundred of the enemy were actually killed in these two affairs ; and a more refreshing feature was that a combined operation by land and water had actually, for the first time, met with some fair measure of success.

In the lines of Rangoon, however, the situation was ghastly. An officer who had been left in Kemmendyne after its capture, found on returning to the main army, after no more than a week's absence, that the camp was one vast hospital. Europeans, sepoys and followers alike were creeping about like ghosts, one and all in the grip of malarial fever. Few seem to have died actually of this disorder ; but their strength was so much enfeebled that they fell easy victims to dysentery, scurvy and (though the name was as yet uncoined) no doubt to enteric fever. The mortality was aggravated by the want of the simplest articles of diet. There were no milk, no bread, no fish, no fresh meat, no vegetables—nothing but rice, mouldy biscuit and salt pork. The slightest wounds led to mortification—there is no mention of tetanus—and death. The sepoys, who suffered a trifle less from malarial fever than the Europeans, had their own peculiar trouble with leech-bite, which developed into hideous ulcers that frequently were only arrested by amputation. Each of the European battalions had from two to three hundred men in hospital, and each was burying from three to six men a day. The very business of interment was difficult, for the inflow of water forbade the digging of deep graves ; and the corpses had to be huddled into a shallow pool, and hastily covered with earth before they could float to the surface. Altogether, there were elements in this Burmese expedition of 1824 which provoke comparison with the worst epidemics of yellow fever in the West Indies, and even with the awful story of Carthagena.

Amid all these afflictions the force did not fall to pieces; and for this, whatever his failings may have been, Campbell deserves the greatest credit. If,

through no fault of his own, he could not stay the plague that devoured his army, he at least did his best by constant activity to make the men forget it. On the 19th of July he organised another expedition by land and water to Hlegu, twenty-three miles north of Rangoon, which, however, came to nothing owing to floods which prevented the land-force from reaching its destination. From this time forward until October, therefore, operations were confined to the water. On the 4th of August a flotilla took six hundred men to Syriam, east of Rangoon, where the Burmese had occupied an old Portuguese fort, from which they were promptly driven. On the 8th another small party was sent to the district of Dalla, on the western bank of the Rangoon river, and cleared a couple of stockades there. On the 20th a detachment, consisting of part of the Eighty-ninth and of the Seventh Madras Native Infantry, was despatched with some vessels of war to reduce the district of Tennasserim, far to the south. This expedition was absent for some three months, during which it captured the towns of Tavoy and Mergui with little difficulty, and, having left garrisons in these, returned in November to Rangoon.

1824.
July 19.
Aug. 4.
Aug. 8.
Aug. 20.

Meanwhile the main army of the Burmese had fallen back to Donobyu, about fifty miles north and west of Rangoon, evidently disheartened by their many defeats; and Campbell waited anxiously for October, when the rains should come to an end and the inundations should subside. In the course of September three more regiments[1] of native infantry joined him from Madras, doing something to make good his losses from sickness; and, hearing early in October that the enemy's troops in Pegu had moved westward to Hlegu, he sent eight hundred Madras sepoys, with two light howitzers, under Colonel Smith to attack them. On the 5th accordingly Smith moved off,

Oct. 5.

[1] 26th, 28th, 30th M.N.I. The 26th arrived on the 1st of October.

1824. through falling rain and amid intense heat, by a track
Oct. 5. which was in places two feet deep in water, came upon a stockade after five hours' march, carried it with the usual ease, and learned from a prisoner that in front of him were fighting men of a different description from any that he had yet encountered. Smith therefore halted, and asked for European reinforcements.[1] Campbell refused to send Europeans, despatching
Oct. 7. instead three hundred native troops. On the 7th Smith resumed his advance, and, after storming a succession of breastworks on the way, came before the main stockade of Hlegu in the evening. Smith being anxious to attack before dark, the place was hastily reconnoitred, without the slightest molestation from the enemy. Not only was no shot fired, but not a voice nor a sound could be heard ; and Smith, judging from the intense silence that the place must be abandoned, ordered the scaling-ladders and storming parties to advance without further delay.

Still not a sign of life came from the stockade, and the assailants were no more than fifty yards distant when the Burmese suddenly opened with grape and musketry, firing with such steadiness and regularity in salvoes and volleys as fairly took the stormers aback. The leading ladder-carriers and officers fell, and the sepoys, smitten with panic, lay down. Smith hurried up to the head of the column, and, judging that success was out of the question without fresh troops, ordered the men to file away quietly to the rear. This was done without noise or confusion, the howitzers continuing to play on the stockade with great steadiness ; but presently panic reasserted itself and the entire party rushed back in a huddled and ungovernable mass. Happily Smith had still a reserve of two hundred men, whose commander, having heard the bugles sound the retreat, had made dispositions to cover the retirement. The Burmese, as usual, attempted not to improve their success ; and, the fugitives having been rallied, Smith

[1] Butler, pp. 50-51.

fell back without further molestation to his halting-place of the morning. His men were more frightened than hurt, their casualties falling below one hundred, few of whom were killed ; but two excellent English officers were slain and six more severely wounded. 1824.

No sooner had this news reached Campbell than he sent out another force, of smaller numerical strength but containing four Europeans to every three natives, against Hlegu under Brigadier-general McCreagh. This officer marched on the 9th and came before Hlegu on the morning of the 10th ; but, preparing to assault on the following morning, found the stockade abandoned. The sight of twenty-three bodies of Sepoys and pioneers, barbarously mutilated, roused the fury of all ranks ; and McCreagh, learning from one or two captured stragglers that the Burmese had retreated to a much larger and stronger stockade, decided to follow them up. His way was obstructed by felled trees and breastworks, but his unexpected advance seems to have struck terror into the enemy, for they fired not a shot, but set fire to their stockade, and ran ; and McCreagh was fain to return, pursuit being hopeless. A raid by water, which started at the same time with Smith's column on the 5th, up the Hlaing river, met with equal success, two very strong stockades being taken with no greater loss than three men wounded. This result was the more remarkable since two of the highest officers of the state of Ava were present, and among the captures was a vast quantity of petroleum accumulated for the service of the fire-rafts. Evidently the Burmese were growing disheartened and more and more unwilling to face the British. They would fire at sepoys from behind a stockade, but they flew at the mere sight of the white man with his scaling-ladder. Oct. 9.

Altogether the prospect seemed to be improving ; and the experience of another distant expedition to Martaban, on the coast a hundred miles east of Rangoon, was still more satisfactory. The military opera-

1824. tions, which were committed to Colonel Godwin of the Forty-first with a mixed detachment of his own regiment and of sepoys, were of the usual stamp. The expedition sailed on the 13th of October and reached Martaban on the 29th. The naval officers, in spite of extreme difficulties of navigation, brought their
Oct. 30. ships alongside ; and on the morning of the 30th a seemingly impregnable fort was stormed out of hand by two hundred and twenty men with a loss of twenty-one killed and wounded. The Burmese garrison having disappeared, the inhabitants received the British with every appearance of gratification, showing indeed strong antipathy to the Burmese and offering to make common cause against them. The town of Ye, one hundred miles south of Martaban, was also occupied without resistance, and the British hold upon the Tennasserim Provinces was thereby made the stronger.

Meanwhile the court of Ava had likewise awakened to the need for dealing more energetically with the foreign invaders. For months past reports had reached Campbell that the victorious leader, Bundoola, was moving westward with his army to join a great concentration of Burmese troops at Donobyu ; and towards the end of November an intercepted letter from Bundoola himself to the governor of Martaban left no doubt that the British lines would be attacked in force. No news could be more welcome to Campbell, though his army was woefully weakened by disease. In October sickness was more prevalent and the number of deaths greater than in any previous month ; and an unusual return of violent rains at the beginning of November retarded the restoration of the convalescent. Scarcely thirteen hundred Europeans were fit for duty at this time, and the native battalions were also greatly enfeebled. On the other hand, since the country was still under water, and even Bundoola's army was moving to its point of assembly chiefly in boats, an advance of the British was held to be impossible until January.

It seems extraordinary that, though Rangoon is but six hundred miles from the mouth of the Ganges, and though the Government at Calcutta was, presumably, doing its utmost to supply the wants of the army, Campbell at the end of November was still without land-transport enough to move even a single company,[1] and, worse still, without proper food for his men. It appears, however, to be a fact that none of the natives in Bengal could be induced to offer themselves for service in Burma. The Bengali is not, at the best of times, distinguished by great courage, and he had been thoroughly terrified by the first mishap at Ramu. There was actually in November a mutiny in a Bengal regiment which had been ordered to the front; and, had not the mutinous spirit been very sternly checked, it might have spread far. Even private speculators did not reach Rangoon with provisions until the later weeks of November, which is some proof that the Government was not apathetic. The prices charged by these speculators were, naturally, far beyond the purses of any but the richer among the officers;[2] but none the less the bare arrival of ships containing such luxuries tended to hearten the troops. It gave them at least some hope that before long there would be something better to eat than the rice—for even the mouldy biscuit seems to have run short—and the salt pork or ham, which had frequently been their staple fare.[3] Moreover, five hundred boatmen had come in from Chittagong and were preparing boats for water-transport; and the mere prospect of a 1824.

[1] Snodgrass, p. 92. A company, it must be remembered, until 1914, did not exceed, as a rule, 100 men; and never kept even that strength for long on active service.

[2] 10 rupees for a fowl; 30 to 40 rupees for a sheep which had cost from 3 to 4 rupees in Calcutta. Butler, p. 58.

[3] See Doveton, p. 208. "During this excursion [a week's bloodless expedition to old Pegu] my party had literally nothing to eat but a half-boiled ham and rice for breakfast, dinner and supper, without even a morsel of biscuit." There are worse ways than this of contracting dysentery or enteric fever in the tropics.

1824. more active service tended to raise the spirits of the men.

Upon receiving certain intelligence of Bundoola's approach, Campbell hastened to strengthen his line by the construction of a series of small impregnable posts, fronting both to east and west. For Godwin's force was still absent at Martaban, and another party of the Hundred-and-Second had lately been sent on a bloodless excursion to Pegu, so that, between losses and detachments, his numbers were far too much reduced to enable him to hold two fronts, each two miles long, in any strength. The post at Kemmendyne also was strongly occupied, and was supported on the river by a cruiser and a flotilla of gun-boats, so that the enemy should have no convenient base for an attack on Rangoon by water, nor for floating down fire-rafts upon

Nov. 30. the British shipping. By the 30th of November the Burmese army, said to be fifty thousand strong, was assembled in the forest before the Shwe-da-gon Pagoda; and a curved line of smoke showed the extent of its bivouacs from the river above Kemmendyne in a south-easterly direction to the Pozundaung Creek. Major Yates of the Twenty-sixth Madras Native Infantry, who was in command at Kemmendyne, pushed out patrols to his front, and, concluding from their reports that his post would shortly be attacked in force both by land and water, made every preparation for defence. Judging it certain that he would be assailed on all sides simultaneously, he intermixed his Europeans—a mere eighty-seven men of the Hundred-and-Second—with his sepoys, to give the latter confidence, and posted his guns—two twelve-pound carronades and a field-piece—on the front towards the river. Before dark his dispositions were complete and half of his men were at their posts, while the others lay down, fully accoutred, and slept by their arms.

The night passed away without a sound, until just

Dec. 1. before dawn the river above Kemmendyne flared suddenly into light, and raft after raft came blazing

down the stream, making the jungle as bright as at noonday. The Company's cruiser, *Teignmouth*, which was stationed above Kemmendyne for the express purpose of checking any attempt to float down fire-rafts and frustrating any menace to the garrison by water, tripped her anchor and drifted down to Rangoon before the conflagration could reach her. The rafts, constantly fed by fresh fuel, glided on ; and close in their rear followed a flotilla of war-boats which opened fire upon the stockade, while, ashore, the Burmese swarmed into the jungle, which extended to within fifty yards of the stockade, and surrounded the garrison upon all sides. Few of them could be seen, and Yates was unable to turn his artillery upon them, needing all his guns to repel the attack of the war-boats. After a short time his fire compelled the Burmese flotilla to sheer off and retire up the river. The fire-rafts ran aground at a bend of the stream and there burned themselves out ; and about noon the *Teignmouth* re-appeared, having been ordered back to her station by Captain Ryves of H.M.S. *Sophie*. Meanwhile the Burmese troops ashore, despite of the constant fusillade from Yates's soldiers upon their working parties, had dug themselves in and invested the stockade upon every side, pouring a galling fire from their trenches upon the defenders. With sound instinct they had isolated this detached post, and seemed bent upon exterminating the garrison. 1824. Dec. 1.

But this was only the beginning of Bundoola's manœuvre. In the forenoon his columns were observed on the west bank of the river moving with great regularity over the plain of Dalla towards the water's edge. The leading division, on reaching its place, flung down its arms and began to throw up entrenchments ; and batteries opened fire upon the British shipping, while the main body of Burmese foot disappeared into the jungle in rear. There they too began to entrench themselves and build stockades, gradually reinforcing the first division, as the ground thrown up by it gave

1824. shelter to increasing numbers. Later in the day other
Dec. 1. troops were seen issuing from the forest a mile before the east front of the Shwe-da-gon Pagoda, from which they extended their line southward to the Pozundaung Creek, within long cannon-shot of the city of Rangoon. This Burmese host flung aside its arms, seized its tools and within two hours had vanished into the earth. Thus Bundoola's manœuvre was complete. With his right on the west bank of the river at Dalla, his centre stretching through dense forest from Kemmendyne to the Shwe-da-gon Pagoda, and his left from the Pagoda to the Pozundaung, he fairly surrounded the British force, leaving them only Kemmendyne, the space between their lines, and the channel of the Rangoon river in their rear, that they could call their own. His design was clear enough, namely, to drive the British shipping from the river and, having thus cut off all means of retreat, to overwhelm their army. It was an ambitious plan, perhaps, and was marred by the fault that the investing line was extended beyond the river, so that there was a dispersion of strength which practically forbade a secret concentration—otherwise easy owing to the jungle—of overwhelming force against a single point. None the less it seems to distinguish Bundoola as no ordinary commander ; and the rapidity, order and precision with which his troops took up their ground evoked the hearty admiration of the British staff.[1] No European army under the ablest of European commanders could, in their judgment, have done better.

Campbell, who had divined Bundoola's intentions, gladly allowed him to carry them out as the best hope of bringing him to decisive action ; and, beyond two highly successful little raids upon points of the enemy's lines near the Pagoda, he made no attempt to molest him. The night passed quietly about Rangoon ; but around Kemmendyne, as darkness fell, the sound of gongs summoning the Burmese troops was heard in all

[1] Snodgrass, pp. 101-102.

directions ; and at 8 P.M. the enemy advanced in great force and in perfect silence, to carry the stockade by escalade. The garrison held their fire until the assailants were within thirty yards, and with some trouble beat them off. No further attack was attempted that night, but firing at small parties, which hovered about to carry off the killed and wounded, continued without intermission till dawn, greatly exhausting the garrison. Moreover, fire-rafts were once again sent down the river, followed up by war-boats ; and for the second time the *Teignmouth* deserted her station and dropped down the river, leaving to the defenders of Kemmendyne the duty of defending the post on the side of the water as well as of the land. When daylight of the 2nd broke, the Burmese were found to have pushed their trenches to within fifty yards of the stockade, whence, safe under cover, they poured a very steady and accurate fire upon the British. Yates, now sorely pressed both from land and water, was presently somewhat relieved by the gallantry of Lieutenant Kellett of the King's sloop *Arachne*, who made his way, in the face of hundreds of Burmese war-vessels, up to Kemmendyne and, realising the situation, brought up three gun-boats which swept the assailants of the stockades away with showers of grape. The *Teignmouth* also returned, under orders, to her station, where she engaged the Burmese war-boats at some disadvantage, for their guns outranged hers. Yates then shifted one of his carronades into the remains of a small building on the front face; but the gunners had not fired more than two rounds before they were shot down, and he was obliged to withdraw them. There was in fact no safe shelter within the stockade even for the wounded, for the Burmese marksmen, ensconced in trees, commanded every corner ; and the fire from their entrenchments was incessant and steady throughout the day.

1824. Dec. 1. Dec. 2.

Soon after dark the enemy again attacked with the greatest courage and determination, carrying scaling-

1824. ladders and evidently bent upon mastering Yates's
Dec. 2. stockade. Twice they were beaten off, and twice they rallied and returned to the assault, but after a third repulse, having suffered very heavy loss, they would try no more, but merely harassed the garrison by constant feints with small parties. Simultaneously with this onslaught by land, a mass of fire-rafts again came down the river, followed by war-boats; and once more the *Teignmouth* dropped down the river, leaving Kemmendyne to its fate. Captain Chads, the senior naval officer, therefore, sent up H.M.S. *Sophie*, together with three gun-boats, as well as the *Teignmouth*, to ensure proper naval protection, and the
Dec. 3. *Sophie* took up her station early on the 3rd. The Burmese now brought their fire-rafts down close to the British vessels, with their war-vessels firing over them to keep the British boats at a distance, and did not set light to them until the last moment. Even so, however, they failed to touch the *Sophie*, and, though the *Teignmouth* was kindled[1] for a short time, the fire was extinguished before she had sustained any damage. In the course of the day the Burmese war-boats, finding that their guns were of longer range than the British, became very bold, and Captain Ryves thought it well to plan a surprise attack upon them. Accordingly at dawn three man-of-war's boats and six gun-boats under Lieutenant Kellett made a dash into the midst of them, captured seven, and drove the rest in panic up the river. This was a most gallant feat, for Kellett's craft were all of them small and his force did not exceed seventy men, whereas the Burmese boats were some of them as much as eighty feet long, were heavily manned, and carried a nine-pounder in the bows.[2]

In spite of their many repulses, however, the Burmese still pressed Kemmendyne hard. Their fire from the trenches was continuous and harassing,

[1] Report of Captain Chads, R.N., Wilson, *Papers*, pp. 90-91.
[2] *Ibid.*

and they brought up to their trenches two light guns which gave much annoyance. On the night of the 4th they once more attacked with as great resolution and daring as ever, returning to the assault again and again, but without success; and from that time forward, though they never intermitted their fire, they lost heart and energy, for, as must now be told, the Burmese had suffered defeat also before Rangoon. 1824. Dec. 4.

Though the detachment sent to Pegu had rejoined him on the 2nd, Campbell attempted no serious operation until the 5th, wishing, according to his own account, that the enemy should bring his full force and the whole of his reserves forward so that his defeat might be the greater. On the 4th he ordered Captain Chads's flotilla to enter the Pozundaung Creek and cannonade the enemy's left rear at daylight, and prepared two columns, the one of six hundred men under Major Walker, the other of eleven hundred men under Major Sale of the Thirteenth, to attack the Burmese centre and left respectively. The assault of the infantry, delivered at 7 A.M., was immediately and easily successful; and a troop of the Governor-general's bodyguard, which had arrived on the previous evening, made some havoc of the Burmese in the pursuit. Bundoola thereupon joined the remnant of his defeated left and left centre to the troops which were threatening the Shwe-da-gon Pagoda; and Campbell, to lull him with false security, ceased fire with his artillery and kept his infantry out of sight.

Encouraged by these signs, the enemy sapped up closer and closer to the British defences, with loud boastings of defiance. At 11.45 A.M. on the 7th Campbell suddenly opened a heavy fire from every gun that he could bring to bear on the hostile entrenchments, and at noon assaulted with four columns of infantry. The attack was instantly successful; and the Burmese were driven off with heavy loss, leaving over two hundred pieces of artillery—the bulk of them light swivel-guns—and a great number of muskets behind Dec. 7.

1824. them. The affair put an end to the Bundoola's grand design ; and his retirement was not so well executed as his advance, for, after the withdrawal of the main body, he still left his right detachment in isolation at
Dec. 8. Dalla, from which it was driven on the 8th with con-
Dec. 9. siderable loss. On the 9th the investment of Kemmendyne was raised, and the entire Burmese force was in retreat. The casualties of the British between the 30th of November and the 9th of December were under two hundred and fifty, of which not thirty were killed. There was, in fact, no very severe fighting except at Kemmendyne, where the little garrison was really hard pressed, beating off constant attacks and being continuously under fire with little rest or sleep for a week. The Twenty-sixth Madras Native Infantry[1] carries the honour of Kemmendyne upon its colours to this day ; and, though it is doubtful whether they would have lived to earn it without the help of the few score of the Hundred-and-Second who were intermingled with them, the defence of the stockade was creditable to both regiments.

For the moment Campbell was so confident that he had defeated Bundoola's army decisively that, on the evening of the 7th, he is said to have made the parole " victory " and the countersign " complete." From the pompous and bombastic tone of his despatches he was quite capable of such little theatrical displays as this ; but he very soon found out his mistake. Bundoola, as a matter of fact, retired no farther than to Kokein, four miles north of the Shweda-gon Pagoda, where he rallied his army and, having received reinforcements, entrenched and stockaded himself " with a judgment in point of position " (to use Campbell's own words) " such as would do credit to the best-instructed engineers of the most civilised and warlike nations." Moreover, his spirit was not in the least daunted, and he was resolved to resume the offensive. The information of a deserter led

[1] Now the 86th Carnatic Infantry.

Campbell to expect an attack on the 14th ; and in fact fire-rafts were sent down the river on that day, though to no purpose. On the same night the city of Rangoon was kindled in several quarters by Bundoola's emissaries, and great part of it, including the quarters of the Madras commissariat and several private stores, was destroyed. This blow was a shrewd one, for the army was just receiving proper supplies and transport for the first time, and wholesale destruction of this kind could not fail to throw all arrangements into confusion. 1824. Dec. 14.

Campbell responded by moving out on the 15th in two columns, the right of five hundred and forty men under Brigadier-general Willoughby Cotton, who had lately arrived, and the left eight hundred strong under his personal command ; the former being designed to work round to the rear of the Burmese army, while the latter should attack in front. The enemy's position was exceedingly strong, consisting of a large stockade upon either flank connected by a central entrenchment, and occupied, as was reckoned, by twenty thousand men. Upon coming up before it, Campbell fired signal guns, which being duly answered by Cotton, he launched his troops in two divisions to the assault of the stockades, while Cotton assailed the centre from the rear. In twenty minutes the position was mastered and the enemy in full flight. Bundoola was not present in person, but the Burmese, apparently, were so confident that they made no attempt to fire against the frontal attack until the stormers had reached the ditch before the stockade. Cotton's column was more severely tried, having several strong entrenchments to carry before they reached the main work ; and the Thirteenth in consequence lost eleven officers and fifty-one men slain or hurt, Majors Robert Sale and Dennie, afterwards famous in Afghanistan, being both of them among the wounded. But even so the total of the casualties did not exceed one hundred and thirty-six. During Dec. 15.

1824. the engagement the indefatigable Lieutenant Kellett attacked the enemy's flotilla by water, and by skilful manœuvring of the *Diana*, steamboat, captured thirty war-boats and several fire-rafts.

This action finally extinguished the Burmese hopes of driving the British from Rangoon. The remnant of the defeated army fell back to Donobyu, leaving posts only on the Hlaing and Panhlaing rivers to harass the British advance. For the character of the war was now to be changed. Transport both for land and water was at last arriving, and the British, after being cooped up for some eight months at Rangoon, were preparing to march to Ava.

CHAPTER XIV

With the retirement of Bundoola's army to Donobyu, 1825.
the entire aspect of Rangoon was changed. The wretched inhabitants, much thinned by forced labour at stockades and entrenchments, and by every kind of ill-usage, instantly swarmed back into the city. In a few days a bazaar was opened, and gradually fresh meat and vegetables made their appearance, at first in small quantities but later in abundance. Beef their religion forbade the Burmese to sell, but they had no such scruples as to live buffaloes. The men took service readily as servants and drivers with the commissariat, and also as rowers, though at first the number of boats was small and far from adequate to the needs of the army. The troops were cheered also by the arrival of transports with reinforcements. The Forty-seventh Foot, additional horse-artillery including the rocket-troop, more squadrons of the Governor-general's bodyguard and, best of all, seventeen hundred draught cattle, all came in during the last days of December and first of the New Year. The low ground of the delta was still so wet that it was not considered feasible to advance until February, nor was it expected that, in the few months before the monsoon should set in, the advance should be carried beyond Prome, less than half-way to Ava. But it was hoped that even the defeat of the army at Donobyu might suffice to bring the court of Ava to accept terms from the British.

For the operations of 1825 were not to be confined to the valley of the Irrawaddy. An army of some

1825. eleven thousand men, including two King's and six native regiments of infantry,[1] besides irregular levies, had been prepared and placed under the command of Brigadier-general Morrison for the invasion of Arakan; and a naval force of small vessels, including one steamship and some eighty gun-boats, was to accompany it. It was thought possible that Morrison might be able to cross the range of mountains that separates Arakan from the valley of the Irrawaddy, and join hands with Campbell. Yet again, a force of about seven thousand men, including six regiments of native infantry, had been collected under Brigadier-general Shuldham on the Sylhet frontier, with the idea that it should penetrate by Cachar into Manipur and thence threaten Ava from the north. Lastly, a corps of three thousand men, comprising two regular native battalions under Lieutenant-colonel Richards, had ever since the end of October been engaged in clearing the Burmese out of Assam.

With the operations of Richards, which, though most exhausting to his troops, amounted practically to the hunting down of cowardly banditti, we shall not concern ourselves. It must suffice that by the end of January Richards, thanks to the exertions of a few very efficient British subalterns, had well completed his task, though some of the wild tribes continued to give trouble during the summer.

Shuldham's operations, as may be supposed, were not so successful. He had nothing to dread from the

[1] Morrison's force:

2nd Local Horse	621
Artillery	667
1st Brigade—H.M. 44th, det. 26th B.N.I., 49th B.N.I.	1809
2nd Brigade—H.M. 54th, 42nd and 62nd B.N.I.	2416
3rd Brigade—10th, 16th M.N.I.	1062
2nd L.I. Bn.	1033
Native levy	553
Pioneers	649
7th, 14th, 39th, 44th, 45th, 52nd B.N.I.	2399
	11,209

enemy but much from the climate, and from the tangle of torrents, mountains and dense forests through which he was expected to advance. With immense labour his pioneers, covered by about a thousand native levies, in the course of January cut a rude pathway through the forest for a certain number of miles. In February the rain began to fall in frequent heavy showers ; the soil became miry and transport almost impossible. Hundreds of bullocks, many camels and even elephants were lost in the endeavour to keep only the advanced guard and the pioneers supplied ; and in March Shuldham gave up the enterprise as hopeless. The dethroned Rajah of Manipur then begged to be allowed to do the work alone with his own levy of five hundred men, armed by the British ; and after a march of three weeks from Sylhet he reached Manipur and drove out the Burmese with little difficulty. Thus the work was effectively done ; but all the expense of assembling and equipping Shuldham's force was absolutely thrown away. The Calcutta government had evidently decided upon this expedition without the slightest knowledge of the country.

1825. Jan. Feb. March.

The story of Morrison's expedition is far more tragical. His force was assembled at Chittagong as early as September 1824, but was detained until January 1825 by the protraction of the rainy season and the old difficulty of collecting transport and supplies. A road had been made from Chittagong to the mouth of the Naaf river, about one hundred miles to the south; and Morrison, leaving Chittagong at the end of January, began his march southward, his flotilla carrying his supplies parallel with him by sea. Upon reaching Cox's Bazar, about eight miles from Ramu, he had to decide whether he should bend eastward, turning the heads of several waters which lay between him and Arakan, and then wheel south upon the city, or whether he should pursue his way down the coast and cross those same waters where they became formidable obstacles, near their mouths.

Jan.

1825. As to the former course, it was extremely doubtful whether there were any road; and it was certain that the way led through a wild country of mountain and forest through which possibly men might penetrate, but loaded animals, or in other words ammunition and food for the men, certainly could not. Moreover, a great proportion of his transport-cattle had not even joined him. As to the latter, the traversing of broad estuaries —for such the waters became, whether Morrison knew it or not—might take a long time, but at least the supplies could accompany the force and the troops would not starve. Morrison accordingly decided to follow the coast.

Feb. 1. On the 1st of February he reached Tek Naaf, about eight miles from the river's mouth, and sent a detachment across it to Maungdaw, on the eastern bank, where no enemy was seen and the population was friendly. The main body was then likewise passed over the estuary, a distance of five miles; but this

Feb. 12. operation was naturally tedious, and it was the 12th of February before Morrison was able to move, even then leaving much of his baggage on the western bank and many of his cattle still on the road from Chittagong to Tek Naaf. From Maungdaw there was a road of some kind to Arakan, for the Burmese had retreated by it; but Morrison determined still to march along the coast, apparently for the old reason that he was still short of land transport. He therefore left one of his brigadiers at Maungdaw, with the equivalent of two batteries and two squadrons, giving him orders to follow him as soon as cattle equal to the conveyance of three weeks' supplies should have crossed the Naaf, while he himself pursued his way to the river Mayo, half of his force moving by land and half by sea.

Feb. 22. The former reached the Mayo on the 22nd of February, but the detachment at sea met with a violent storm which compelled them to return with the loss of some boats and baggage though of not a single life. Eventu-

Feb. 27. ally they reached the Mayo on the 27th of February;

and the force was gradually brought up a network of creeks to the mouth of the Arakan Branch, up which lay the way, navigable for the most part, to Arakan. These movements were not completed until the 20th of March, nor were the troops ready to resume their advance before the 24th. 1825. March. Mar. 24.

The line of march lay along the eastern bank of the river, the road plunging down constantly into the beds of tributary water-courses and up over low ridges parallel with them. The troops were healthy; the climate was not unfavourable; the people were friendly; supplies were abundant, and it seems that the transport-cattle had at last reached the army.[1] After two days spent in crossing these difficult tidal water-courses and reconnoitring the passes into the hills, the force was on the 26th distributed into three columns and a reserve, and began the ascent of the hills. Here at last the enemy appeared at the first crest, but they were easily driven from their entrenchments; and the passage up the river was opened for the flotilla, which, a month earlier, had been repulsed in an attempt to ascend it. On the 27th there was again some resistance, easily overcome ; on the 28th the force halted to allow the rear to close up, and on the 29th the enemy's main position came into view on a range of rugged hills, strongly entrenched, and held by about nine thousand men with several pieces of artillery. One pass alone led through these hills to Arakan; and at this point Morrison attacked with eight light companies supported by six battalion-companies. So steep was the ascent, however, that the assault was beaten off, chiefly by large stones rolled from the summit ; and, after several officers of the storming column had fallen wounded,[2] Morrison called off his troops and abandoned the attempt. Mar. 26. Mar. 29.

[1] I infer this from the fact that Brigadier-general Richards, who had been left at Maungdaw to bring forward the transport cattle, had rejoined the army.

[2] Morrison in his despatch says that all the officers were wounded, but his casualty-list belies him.

1825. Having observed that the right of the enemy's position, being of great natural strength, was weakly held, he turned his attention to that quarter, and, after a day spent in bringing up his heavy artillery, began to construct batteries during the night of the 30th to play upon the defences of the pass. At daylight of
April 1. the 1st of April the guns opened fire, continuing all day; and at night the defences of the Burmese right were assaulted and carried without the loss of a man. With some difficulty a gun was brought up to the captured point to silence a troublesome Burmese piece, and then, upon the mere menace of an advance upon their right flank, the Burmese took to flight. They were pursued, but only one formed force, about three hundred strong, was overtaken and destroyed by the irregular cavalry, the remainder having dispersed. The British casualties from the 26th of March to the 1st of April were under two hundred, the number of the killed not exceeding twenty-three.

April 8. Having secured Arakan city, Morrison on the 8th of April detached the equivalent of three battalions under Brigadier-general Macbean by water to Ramree and Sandoway, off Cheduba Island, both of which places were occupied without resistance; and thus, so far as the deliverance of Arakan from the Burmese was concerned, Morrison had completed his work. There remained the far more difficult task of carrying his troops over the hills to eastward to form a junction with those of Campbell. Between Arakan city south-eastward to Dalet, at the foot of the mountain-chain which separates Arakan from Ava, lay some seventy miles of low jungly ground seamed by many waters, not wholly impracticable, perhaps, for the march of a small force, but difficult and uncertain. Of the country from Dalet eastward, little or nothing was known then and not a great deal seems to be known even now; but it was certain that the passage over the mountains, if possible at all, would be a most arduous undertaking, over rough and precipitous heights where baggage

and guns could not be brought forward without immense labour and much delay, where supplies did not exist and where even water was difficult to find. Moreover, the old difficulty of transport-cattle was still present. Even in June not a bullock had yet crossed the Mayo river, while some were still north of the Naaf; and, when Arakan fell, there can have been few that had reached even the Mayo. Lastly, the extremely slow progress of the force in its movement from Chittagong to Arakan left little time for operations before the breaking of the monsoon. 1825.

In these circumstances, Morrison decided to form a small exploring column[1] about one thousand men strong, which he placed under command of Major Bucke, and sent by water to Dalet. The regular trade-route between Arakan and Ava ran from An, about twelve miles to south-east of Dalet; and it is not clear why this was not selected, for the fact must have been known to the military authorities, and Bucke actually sent an officer to make inquiry in that direction.[2] However, he proceeded to Dalet, arriving there apparently on the 16th or 17th of May, and on the 19th made a short advance of four and a half miles, all the way up a steep ascent. On the following days the march was still more arduous, over range after range of mountains; and it is fairly evident that the road, or path, can have been traversable only in single file, occasionally widening to admit two men abreast; for, though the advanced guard reached its halting-place at 11 A.M., the main body and baggage did not come in until night. On the 22nd the little column was fain to halt. Many men had fallen sick; many cattle had perished; and both troops and beasts were enfeebled and fatigued to the last degree. On the May 19. May 22.

[1] Light companies of H.M. 44th and 54th.
16th Madras N.I.
3 cos. of 2nd Bengal L.I.

[2] See his report to Morrison, 27th May, 1825, in Wilson, *Papers*, pp. 140-141.

1825. May 23. 23rd another harassing march increased the sick-list; but there was now definite information that a hostile post lay upon the road at the next halting-place; and Bucke laid his plans for surprising it by a night attack. Before nightfall, however, his native scouts came running in with the news that the enemy lay astride the road only a few miles ahead. One of the guides had been shot, two more had been captured; and the Burmese were apparently in two distinct parties, their strength unknown and unascertainable. In the circumstances Bucke decided to retreat. His force was so much diminished by sickness, and those fit for duty were so much weakened by toil and hardship that they could hardly have withstood an attack, much less have delivered an assault after a long and exhausting march. It is probable that he did wisely. The rains had already begun, and were in full strength before he could return to Arakan; and it seems that the majority of Bucke's detachment fell sick of malarial fever and died.

The fate of Morrison's main body may as well be related at once, so that the operations in this quarter may be done with and dismissed. With the breaking May. of the monsoon in May, fever and dysentery broke out virulently among the troops in Arakan; and shaken as they were, by the fatigues and privations even of a few months of active service in the tropics, they fell down by hundreds. The climate, indeed, was sufficiently trying. During July, August and September the thermometer ranged from ninety-two degrees to seventy-eight degrees Fahrenheit; and no one who has not felt a sudden fall of temperature, even if only from eighty-five degrees Fahrenheit to seventy-eight, during tropical rains, can have any idea what it means. The rainfall, too, was terrific, amounting to one hundred and three inches in July and August alone; and this of course signified, for one thing, much confinement of the men within doors, with nothing to do, and, for another, perpetual steaming heat which took all

strength and energy out of them and played havoc with the biscuit and salt provisions upon which they subsisted. Not unnaturally they flew to alcohol, which seems to have been abundant, to kill the monotony and discomfort of such an existence, and thereby undermined such physical stamina as the climate had left to them. Between May and September the European soldiers, altogether about fifteen hundred strong, buried two hundred and fifty-nine men; and the native troops, out of a total strength of about eight thousand, lost nearly nine hundred. Furthermore, at the end of September there were nearly four hundred English and over thirty-six hundred natives in hospital. Officers suffered little, if at all, less than the men, and Morrison himself, being invalided home, died on the voyage. The end of the rains seems to have brought little change; and at last, after eight months' stay in Arakan, the remnant of the force was withdrawn and distributed among less unhealthy stations, to recover itself. In those eight months the Forty-fourth and Fifty-fourth, with an average strength of a thousand men, lost close upon six hundred dead; and not half of the survivors were alive at the close of another four months. 1825.

These losses, as also those at Rangoon, being incurred on active service in the course of a campaign of aggression, provoked greater attention than at ordinary times they would have attracted. They were not really more serious than the British garrison and the British navy had suffered in the West Indies for more than a century, with hardly a word said. As Sir George Beckwith had truly remarked, a British battalion in the West Indies even in peace required to be renewed every two years; and the fact was accepted as more or less inevitable. Nevertheless, the Government of India seems to have gone to work somewhat blindly in planning this invasion of Burma from the eastern shore of the Bay of Bengal, with either very imperfect knowledge, or very unwarrantable defiance

1825. of the nature of the country and of its climatic conditions. But the truth is that the chief authorities of the Company's service and the Company's army had little idea or experience of a campaign except one of the old-fashioned kind in the plains. The wars in Nepal and Central India had taught them something, but not much; and the occasion demanded a livelier imagination than is common, saving among really great statesmen or commanders. There seems to have been a tendency to blame Bucke for want of enterprise; but four days' march appears to have reduced his detachment to such a condition that another week's advance would have left it helpless to move either forward or back. Morrison, again, has been censured because he moved by water instead of by land upon Arakan; but his chief reason for so doing seems to have been that he felt uncertain of his ability to feed his troops if he moved by land; and it is difficult not to admit that it was cogent.

The only modern parallel that I can remember to the task imposed upon Morrison is the advance upon Manipur in March 1891, when some three hundred British troops,[1] having been brought up the Irrawaddy by water, entered the hills nearly three hundred miles north of Arakan, and made their way unopposed some fifty miles, as the crow flies, to the summit of the range. Their transport consisted of pack-mules, which are preferable to pack-cattle; they were dressed in khaki of sensible cut, and not in the red coatee with the oppressive cross-belts, in which the Forty-fourth and Fifty-fourth took the field, and they had good protective helmets. Their food was good biscuit and "bully-beef," and, their numbers being only one-third of Bucke's, the column was so much the shorter and the fatigue so much the less. Yet even so the men were sorely tried. The path was so narrow that they could rarely move except in single file, and that mules, losing their footing, fell over pre-

[1] 4 companies of 4/60th.

cipices and were dashed to pieces. The heat was so great that three men died in the first day's march, and water was so seldom to be found that the soldiers could not be kept from quenching their thirst from foul, stagnant pools. The natural result was much sickness; and indeed it should seem that nothing, even in these days, can prevent such campaigns from taking a heavy toll of human life. It is easy to condemn our ancestors for thoughtlessness and foolhardiness in undertaking such an adventure at all; but it must be remembered that they were a century younger in experience than ourselves. 1825.

For carrying the war to a successful issue, therefore, everything, though as yet he could not be aware of it, turned upon Campbell and the force in the valley of the Irrawaddy. In the course of January he had received as reinforcements the second battalion of the First Royals, and, apparently, a new battalion of Madras Native Infantry also.[1] His shortest route to Ava was by Pegu and Toungoo, on the line now taken by the Burma State Railway, a distance of from three hundred and fifty to four hundred miles. This would have enabled him to turn the whole of the Burmese positions on the Irrawaddy and upset all their plans of defence; but he had not even now land-transport sufficient for such a movement; and he accordingly resolved to make the river still his main line of supply and to advance in two parallel columns, the one by water, the other, even with it and at no great distance, by land. Since this left the parallel valley of the Sittang untouched, the Siamese, who were in name, at any rate, our allies, were requested to advance upon Toungoo, though there was no very sanguine hope that they would do so. The land-column, of which Campbell took personal command, was limited to thirteen hundred British infantry, a thousand sepoys, two squadrons of cavalry, one troop of horse-artillery and the rocket-troop. The land transport was insufficient Jan.

[1] 38th.

1825. Jan. even so to carry more than a fortnight's supplies, and then only through the sacrifice of every comfort by both officers and men.

This force was to advance parallel to the Hlaing river and, after driving away the enemy's posts that lay upon that stream, was to join the marine column at some point below Donobyu. This marine column, which was commanded by Brigadier-general Willoughby Cotton, was to pass up the Panhlaing channel, expel the enemy from their stockades at Panhlaing and then, entering the main stream, was to push on straight to Donobyu. It included only eight hundred European infantry, with a small battalion of sepoys and a powerful train of artillery, and was embarked in sixty river-craft, every one of which was armed with at least one gun. It was accompanied by an escort of boats, manned by one hundred seamen, from the men-of-war lying at Rangoon. A third column, consisting of the Thirteenth Foot and the Twelfth Madras Native Infantry, was embarked in transports under Major Sale for the reduction of Bassein, nearly one hundred miles west of Rangoon upon another branch of the river. It was hoped that, after the capture of Bassein, Sale might find land-transport enough to enable him to join the rest of the force at Donobyu or at Henzada, thirty miles to north of it. It will be observed that even now, ten months after the departure of the original expedition, Campbell could not collect transport enough, by land and water combined, to advance with more than four thousand men.

Feb. 11. On the 11th of February Campbell's column moved off through the jungle, passing, just beyond Kemmendyne, some miles of stockading which had been thrown up for the purpose of checking the British advance, and had been since abandoned. During the first three days not an inhabitant was seen, but on the fourth

Feb. 15. day a village of the primitive tribe of the Carians was reached and the people were found to be thoroughly

friendly. They gave information of a certain force of 1825.
the enemy five miles ahead; and Campbell laid his plans for surprising this party next day, but was disappointed by its immediate and precipitate flight. Progressing slowly, for his cattle were still weak, Campbell on the 23rd reached Hlaing, and halted to Feb. 23.
replenish his waggons from provision-boats which had followed him up the river. Here for the first time since leaving Rangoon the country was found to be well stocked with buffaloes, which afforded a good supply of fresh meat but were found useless for purposes of transport, being unable to endure the sun for the shortest march. Exhilarated by this novel experience, and by native reports that Bundoola had neither the troops nor the spirit to hold Donobyu against a resolute attack, Campbell seems from this moment to have abandoned his original idea of uniting with the marine column before that position. Instead of turning west, he headed north. His column now entered the great teak forest, and moving by easy Feb. 24.
stages struck the Irrawaddy at Tharrawaw, some thirty miles to north of Donobyu, on the 2nd of March. Mar. 2.
Practically not a shot had been fired so far; and the most trying experience of the troops had been weary night marches along narrow paths through dense, dark forests, the men in single file holding on to each other's clothes lest they should lose the track, which even the native guide could with difficulty follow.

On the 1st of March Campbell had received a message from Cotton that he had captured Panhlaing and was moving up the Irrawaddy. Campbell answered by a brief order to Cotton to send boats down the river to bring up further supplies for the land-column, and halted to expect the arrival of the marine column. For four days he waited with great and increasing anxiety. To his intense mortification he had reached Tharrawaw just in time to see the entire population landed on the other side of the river, the people having deserted the place and carried off

1825. March. practically all boats. Native reports agreed persistently that Bundoola had withdrawn his troops from Donobyu westward, some said towards Bassein, some towards Arakan, in either of which cases Campbell was on the wrong bank of the river and could not hope, with the few canoes that he had collected, to pass his division across it in less than a week. He had some idea, it seems, of marching direct upon Prome, which was the grand object of the campaign; and he might very likely have reached it with his own column, unaided, and with no more than trifling loss. But it was useless to advance to Prome unless he were sure that the navigation of the Irrawaddy were free and open behind him, for he depended upon water-transport for the subsistence of his troops. Lastly, he had filled up his waggons from his floating magazines for the last time on the 1st of March; and, since those waggons only carried fifteen days' supplies, he grudged every day's halt, for it compelled him to consume a day's food to no purpose, and every day's food so consumed diminished his chance of forcing a decision in the few weeks that remained before the breaking of the monsoon. Such are the cruel difficulties imposed upon commanders by governments which give them troops but no adequate means of moving them.

Mar. 7. At last on the morning of the 7th heavy firing was heard to southward. It lasted until 2 P.M., when it entirely ceased. Natives came in with report upon report of Bundoola's total defeat, and Campbell heard them willingly, for the news was that which he longed to receive. Every consideration dictated an immediate advance to Prome, the condition of his supplies, the importance of reaching it before Bundoola's defeated army, and the hope of doing so before the country on his immediate front could be laid waste. None the less, he thought it prudent to await yet another day some message from Cotton; and, since no such message arrived and accounts of Bundoola's retreat continued to stream in, he left a strong detachment at

Tharrawaw and on the 9th resumed his advance. On this day and the 10th he marched altogether twenty-six miles, finding all towns and villages deserted and everything that could be of use to him carried away. There was no sign of hurried or confused flight; on the contrary everything pointed to a pre-arranged and systematic denudation of the country such as Wellington had counted upon, under Portuguese law, in his retreat to Torres Vedras. Soon after dawn on the 11th the long awaited despatch from Cotton came in. His attack upon Donobyu had failed, and without strong reinforcements he could not hope to carry the position. 1825. Mar. 9.

The river column had duly embarked on the 16th of February and made its way up the river, destroying a few stockades as it went, and arriving before Panhlaing on the 18th. Here there were three stockades, two in advance, one on either side of the river, and the main stockade of Panhlaing itself a mile above them. In the course of the night the Burmese sent fire-rafts down the river, with no effect, and on the following morning Cotton reconnoitred the works and made his dispositions. As the ebb-tide forbade the armed vessels to come up until late, Cotton threw up a battery of four mortars and two field-pieces before the advanced works, and formed a column of assault upon each bank of the river. The bombardment aided by the fire of the rocket-battery speedily drove the Burmese out, and by evening the whole of the works, including the main stockade at Panhlaing, had passed into Cotton's hands at the cost of two casualties. He then proceeded to remodel the main stockade for his own purposes, to keep open the communication by the river. This detained him for five days, and on the 25th he resumed his advance up the river. On the 26th the flotilla reached shallow water, which necessitated the unloading of the heavier vessels; and, owing to the delay thus caused, it was not until the morning of the 6th of March that the armament cast anchor about two miles Feb. 18. Feb. 25. Mar. 6.

1825. Mar. 6. below Donobyu. Going forward by water to reconnoitre the place, Cotton found that he was confronted by a succession of stockades gradually increasing in strength until they culminated in a kind of citadel upon commanding ground, surrounded by a deep abatis and the usual accessories of Burmese fortification. The place appeared to be crowded with men and defended by several guns. At 1.30 P.M. Cotton sent in a flag of truce to summon the chief to surrender the place within an hour; and at 3.30 P.M. he received a civil but resolute message of defiance.

Two courses lay open to him: either a frontal attack parallel to the river upon the whole depth of the enemy's defences; or a landing above the citadel and an attack upon it from the rear. The latter was that which commended itself to him; the more so because there were good artillery-positions to cover the disembarkation of the attacking troops. But he judged himself to be too weak for such a venture. His battalion of native infantry had been left at Panhlaing; eight of his flat-boats had been sent down to the same place to bring up provisions, in compliance with Campbell's order; and it was therefore imperative to guard the river carefully, so far as that point, until the convoy should return. Small detachments and sickness had left but six hundred of his seven hundred and fifty Europeans at his disposal for action. If these could be kept together, it was nothing beyond their power to capture a fortified position defended by twelve thousand Burmese; but the naval commander was of opinion, no doubt correctly, that, if Cotton landed above Donobyu, one half of the force would be needed in the boats to keep open the navigation of the river below. Bundoola had been taking pains to train his artillery, and the fire from his river-batteries was steady and accurate. The Burmese war-boats were not by any means contemptible. On one occasion already they had dared, though unsuccessfully, to take the offensive; and Bundoola by his tactics in the past

had shown that he knew how entirely the invaders were dependent upon their communication by water for their hold upon Burma. 1825. Mar. 6.

Rightly judging that to divide his tiny force would be to ensure failure, Cotton had no alternative but to deliver a frontal attack, leaving the flotilla to defend the river. Accordingly on the 7th he landed five hundred bayonets a mile to south of the Burmese position, and advanced in two columns, the Eighty-ninth on the right, and detachments of the Forty-seventh and Hundred-and-Second on the left, against the outermost of the stockades, covered by the projectiles of two six-pounders and of a small rocket-battery. The enemy opened a heavy but not very destructive fire, which they maintained to the last with unusual perseverance. It seems that the two columns attacked the flanks of the work, or one of them the front and the other the rear, for after forcing an entrance they intercepted the retreat of many of the garrison and, besides killing many with the bayonet, captured nearly three hundred prisoners. The casualties of the British in this assault did not exceed twenty ; and Cotton prepared for the attack of the next stockade, which was five hundred yards from the first, and at about the same distance from the citadel. Two more six-pounders, four mortars and additional rockets were brought up ; and, after these had played for what was deemed a sufficient time upon the enemy's defences, two hundred men of the Forty-seventh, Eighty-ninth and Hundred-and-Second advanced in two parties to the storm. The Burmese opened a heavy fire which caused the columns to swerve from the designated point of attack, and the British found themselves in a ditch, filled with bamboo spikes and under the full blast of the Burmese shot. Officers and men did all that they could, but their losses were so heavy that Cotton called them off. Five officers and about one hundred men—that is to say at least one half of the storming party—had been killed or wounded, and Mar. 7.

1825. Cotton, realising that, even if he carried the second
Mar. 7. stockade, he would be too weak to capture the citadel, re-embarked his men without loss or molestation on the 8th, and dropped down the river to his position of the 6th.[1]

Such was the unpleasant story which reached
Mar. 11. Campbell on the 11th. He had no one but himself to thank for it; for it was he who had altered his original plan of meeting Cotton before Donobyu, and thrown upon Cotton the whole burden of forcing this strong position, the capture of which was essential to the maintenance of his communications. He had now only ten days' supplies for his column in hand; and he could not count upon the country to feed his troops even for a day. The people fled everywhere before him, and if by chance he caught some straggling inhabitant he could obtain nothing from him but the awe-stricken cry of "Bundoola." The truth was that the Burmese commander had outwitted Campbell. He had so terrorised the inhabitants that they would do nothing but by his order, and say nothing but that which he wished to be believed. There was nothing for it but to fall back and join Cotton before
Mar. 12. Donobyu, and on the 12th accordingly Campbell began his return march, reaching Tharrawaw on the 13th. Now came the task of passing his division across the Irrawaddy, which was both wide and rapid, with no better craft than a few small canoes. This operation took five days and nights of unceasing work;
Mar. 18. and it was not until the 18th that head-quarters were established on the western bank at Henzada. Here a report came in from Sale at Bassein. Sale had come before that place on the 3rd of March and found it burned and deserted, the garrison having retired up the river. Sale followed them up by boat with a small party; and Campbell, hearing that they were encamped fifteen miles away, detached a column under

[1] Cotton's report of 9th March 1825; Wilson, *Papers*, pp. 149-151; Butler, pp. 90-91.

Colonel Godwin at nightfall to surprise them. The 1825.
march of this column was instantly detected and reported by beacon-signals to the Burmese camp, and Godwin upon reaching his destination found that the enemy had vanished. Sale, therefore, returned to Bassein and took no further part in the operations.

Two days, the 19th and 20th, were consumed at Henzada in re-loading the transport-waggons; and on the 21st Campbell resumed his march southward. Mar. 21.
On the 22nd his pioneers had to cut a path for nearly Mar. 22.
ten miles through a tangle of tall grass and reed, from ten to twenty feet high ; and on the 24th he came within sight of Donobyu, about four miles distant. On the river above the stockade lay a fleet of war-boats, which promptly turned out to cannonade Campbell's reconnoitring parties ; and there was every sign that Bundoola was both ready and confident. On the 25th Mar. 25.
Campbell moved up within long cannon-shot of the main stockade, which we have called the citadel, and found that it extended along the river for nearly a mile, with a breadth varying from four to eight hundred yards. The stockading was of solid teak beams, from fifteen to seventeen feet high, planted firmly in the earth as close together as possible, strengthened by cross-beams, and provided with banquettes. Behind this wooden wall rose old brick ramparts ; and the ground was honeycombed with subterranean excavations for protection against shell-fire. A wide deep ditch, full of spikes, holes and other impediments surrounded the defences ; outside this again were several rows of strong palisades ; and outside this once more was an abatis thirty yards broad. The garrison was reckoned at fifteen thousand men, Bundoola's best troops, with one hundred and fifty guns and swivels.

Such a stronghold was too extensive for investment by Campbell's small force; and, the ground on the north-west face and most of the eastern face being open, he took up a position with his left on the river and his

1825. right curved round towards the centre of the eastern
Mar. 25. face. While the troops were in motion the enemy's guns fired continually, but, when once the camp had been pitched, they fell suspiciously silent. At 10 P.M., just as the moon was setting, Bundoola made a feint attack upon Campbell's left and centre, directing his principal effort to the turning of the exposed British right. The two battalions on the right of the line, changing front to their right, easily checked these Burmese attacks, which were finally beaten off at a cost of little more than twenty casualties ; and by midnight all was again quiet.

Mar. 26. On the 26th Campbell sent a detachment of three hundred men by a wide detour to open communication with Cotton. With the help of three elephants this party forced its way through the jungle without firing a shot, but, when it tried to return, it found the thicket strongly occupied by the Burmese and prudently remained with Cotton. On this same day the enemy's war-boats were driven from their anchorage by the discharge of a few rockets, and ground was broken at a convenient point about three hundred yards from
Mar. 27. the enemy's entrenchments. On the 27th[1] the British flotilla came up the river, passing by the stockade under a very heavy fire but suffering very little damage; and Bundoola promptly directed a sortie against Campbell's right, his cavalry and seventeen war-elephants, each of which carried a proportion of armed men, heading the attack. These were charged by the Governor-general's bodyguard. The Burmese cavalry were easily routed; and the drivers of

[1] Snodgrass (p. 157) says that on the 11th of March Campbell's column had not ten days' supplies left; he adds that the navigation of the Irrawaddy was so completely commanded that not a canoe could pass the stockade at Donobyu. He also says (p. 169) that no communication was opened with Cotton's column until the 26th, which can only mean that no boats came up the river. How Campbell's column was fed between the 20th and the 27th, therefore, seems to be something of a mystery. Presumably ten days' supplies means ten days' full rations, and the troops received but half.

most of the elephants were shot, with the result that the sagacious animals turned round and walked back with staid deliberation into the stockade. Bundoola, as was afterwards reported, was so furious at the failure of his artillery to sink the British flotilla that he cut down two of his gunners with his own hand. 1825. Mar. 27.

On the 28th the steamship *Diana* and some smaller craft succeeded in taking nine of the enemy's war-boats; on the 29th, Campbell, having already constructed his batteries, began to get his guns into them; and on the 1st of April his mortars and rockets opened fire. On the 2nd the breaching batteries likewise opened, at daylight; but almost immediately afterwards two Bengali lascars, who had been prisoners in the stockade, ran out bringing the tidings that Bundoola had been killed by a shell on the previous day, and that the entire garrison had dispersed during the night. Reconnaisance soon proved the news to be true. So instant and so hasty had been the flight of the Burmese that they had not removed a single gun nor even destroyed their stores of grain. Thus one lucky shot had given Campbell possession of Donobyu, together with over one hundred and thirty guns and over two hundred and fifty wall-pieces, at no dearer price than seventy casualties. Above all, it had delivered him from Bundoola. Mar. 28. April 2.

This chief, as it seems to me, is entitled to our respect. By sheer force of character he had kept his half-disciplined troops together, and had surrounded them not only with a circle of devastation but with a veil of impenetrable secrecy. As a tactician no doubt he failed before Rangoon; and, although his position and field-works at Donobyu would, in the opinion of Campbell's staff, have done credit to the most scientific engineer, it is objected with some force that he would have done better to hold the narrow channels of the Panhlaing and the Hlaing instead of the main stream of the Irrawaddy, where the ground was in part open plain, well suited to European

1825. manœuvres. Still, as regards the essential points of denying to his enemy supplies and land-transport and doing his utmost to drive the British from the water, he showed sound judgment; and his efforts, not wholly unsuccessful, to improve his artillery show that he could not only formulate a correct military policy but could think out the means of executing it. The mere fact that his men, deaf to the entreaties of his junior officers, simply melted away after his death, testifies to the strength of his will and the sway of his moral ascendency.

April 3. On the night of the 3rd Campbell left Donobyu with the Thirty-eighth and Forty-seventh, reached the bank of the Irrawaddy opposite Tharrawaw on the
April 7. 7th, and, with the help of the boats of the King's ships, passed them over the river before nightfall. The rest of the force followed on successive days, with the exception of the Hundred-and-Second and three hundred and fifty sepoys which were left to occupy
April 12. Donobyu; and by the 12th the whole were on the eastern bank of the Irrawaddy at Tharrawaw. On the 14th Campbell reached the point from which he had turned back a month before, heading for Prome,
April 19. and prosecuting his advance received on the 19th a Burmese messenger from that city, who represented the desire of the court of Ava to terminate the war by treaty. Campbell answered that he would be prepared to negotiate when he reached Prome, and
April 24. continued his march. On the 24th, when within eight miles of Prome, he received a second envoy, who suggested, in not too civil terms, that the negotiations should be opened in the space between the opposing armies. Campbell answered that the military occupation of Prome could not be dispensed with, but that he would be ready to meet the Burmese emissaries next day to arrange for the protection of the inhabitants
April 25. and of their property. Before daylight on the 25th his force was in motion, and on arriving before Prome found a very formidable line of defence prepared but

abandoned, and the city itself in flames. It appears that the negotiations had been opened only with a view to gain time; and, as Campbell had refused to halt, the Burmese had as usual destroyed everything that could be of use to him and had retreated, laying waste the villages on their way and driving the people into the jungle. 1825. April.

All hopes of ending the war before the rainy season now vanished. The Burmese troops, thoroughly demoralised it is true, were rallying at Minhla, some eighty miles farther up the river, and might possibly be again dispersed; but to reach Ava, over two hundred miles away, before the breaking of the monsoon was out of the question. Campbell therefore resolved to canton his troops at Prome and to use the few remaining weeks of the dry season in clearing the district of banditti, and in pushing a detachment as far as possible in the direction of Toungoo, a hundred miles to eastward. This column penetrated no farther than to the foot of the Galadzet mountains, about forty miles to east of Prome, when the rains compelled it to return. Meanwhile the troops settled down at Prome; and the inhabitants, receiving assurance of protection and of liberal payment for their produce, soon returned to the city and rebuilt it. The villagers also, no longer coerced by the defeated armies of Ava, streamed back into the deserted provinces to the south and settled down to work. In a very short time, thanks to the excellent discipline of the troops and the indulgent good nature which invariably characterises the British soldier, comfort and abundance reigned in Prome; and, more important still, it was possible to turn the place into an advanced base for the next campaign. Large fleets of canoes appeared on the water; droves of the finest oxen issued from the jungle; carts and drivers were readily forthcoming. The Burmese civil magistrates were reinstated, with some limitation of their authority; and the people settled down to order and prosperity. The troops were happy and fairly

1825. healthy. At any rate, if they fell sick they were not nourished on food which was as good as poison to them. It was a pleasing contrast to the last rainy season at Rangoon that at Prome there died not more than one man in seven of the British soldiers.

CHAPTER XV

THE court of Ava spent the rainy season in collecting troops from its northern states, and by the end of September had raised a new army of seventy thousand men, which at that time began to assemble at Meaday, about forty miles to north of Prome. Campbell earlier in the month had sent a letter to Ava setting forth the ruinous consequences to the King if war should be prolonged, and in October he received a conciliatory answer. Negotiations were, therefore, opened at a point half-way between Prome and Meaday; an armistice was declared; and, after many days of discussion, the negotiators parted with every appearance of a favourable issue. But the British had hardly returned to Prome when reports were received that predatory bands of the Burmese army had broken into the neutral zone demarcated by the armistice, and were laying waste the country up to the very gates of the city, cutting off supplies from Rangoon and threatening the vital communication of the British with the sea. The entire Burmese host then advanced upon Prome in three divisions, their right upon the west bank of the Irrawaddy, their centre on the eastern bank, and their left about ten miles to east of the river, on the farther side of a belt of dense forest, and therefore isolated from the other two. In addition to these there was a reserve of ten thousand men in a strongly fortified position at Minhla, and two detached forces, the one ready to oppose any movement from Arakan, and the other in the neighbourhood of old Pegu, more or less menacing Rangoon.

1825. Sept. Oct.

1825. Oct. The effective force at Prome at this time was six weak British battalions, numbering altogether about twenty-eight hundred of all ranks, and seven native battalions with a total strength of rather over three thousand of all ranks, besides a good proportion of artillery and a troop of the Governor-general's body-guard. At Rangoon there was a garrison of about three thousand, chiefly native troops, and at old Pegu were stationed the Hundred-and-Second and three battalions of sepoys. Donobyu had been evacuated in August, the defences having fallen to pieces in consequence of the rains, and the troops there had been brought up to head-quarters. On the whole, after providing a sufficient garrison for Prome itself, Campbell could count upon a field-force of about five thousand men, perhaps three-fifths of them Europeans.

About the 10th of November the left division of the Burmese army under Maha Nemiao, a veteran officer who had been charged with the general direction of the operations, took post at Wettigan, about sixteen miles to north-east of Prome, threatening to turn Campbell's right and to sever his communication

Nov 15. with the south. Campbell on the evening of the 15th accordingly ordered four battalions of native infantry, under Colonel Macdowell of the Madras army, to drive the enemy from this post; one battalion being designed to hold them in front whilst the three others assailed their left flank. The Burmese, having evidently been exactly informed of the plan of operations by their spies, came out to meet the column half-way, and engaged them in a running fight through the jungle, bringing forward cavalry to threaten them wherever the thicket gave place to open ground. Thereby Campbell's combinations were utterly upset. Two battalions seem to have blundered upon the stockades of Wettigan at different times from different quarters, but, being unsupported, were beaten off. It is impossible to understand the details of the confused fighting that ensued; but the general result was

that Macdowell fell early, shot through the head, that the entire enterprise went to wreck, and that the various battalion-commanders drew off their men as best they could. One column, being pursued, had to fight its way back through the jungle, harassed by musketry from three sides; and the four battalions returned to camp in the last stage of exhaustion, having lost over two hundred killed and wounded, and among them no fewer than twelve British officers. 1825. Nov.

This was a bad beginning for Campbell's new campaign; and Maha Nemiao, without abandoning his threats against the British communications, ordered a general advance upon Prome. Campbell was obliged to send out detachments to clear raiders away from the east bank of the river fifteen miles below that city, and to establish a post of two hundred men at Padaung, about eight miles to south of him on the western bank, with a division of the flotilla to support it. Maha Nemiao had evidently found out that Campbell was expecting reinforcements and treasure to join him, and was doing his best to intercept them. His attempts were, however, foiled by the resolution and gallantry of Captain Deane of the Royals, who was in command at Padaung, aided by the indefatigable Lieutenant Kellett of the Royal Navy; and in the last days of November a part of the Eighty-seventh, together with the rest of the convoy, arrived at Prome, having lost no more than two men killed and one officer wounded by the fire of the enemy from the bank.

The main body of the Burmese army had meanwhile been creeping steadily nearer, stockading itself anew at every mile of its advance. Maha Nemiao's division, opposite the British right, had reached its halting-place on the Nawin river, and, veiled by the jungle, was working assiduously to strengthen a position which could not be seen and about which nothing could be discovered. The central division was in full sight of the eastern bank, fortifying the heights of Napadi, no more than five miles away; and the right division was as busy

1825. upon the western bank. "Every day," to quote the words of a staff-officer,[1] "now produced a change in the Burmese line; each morning discovered to us some new work in front of where their advanced parties had been posted on the previous evening." Moreover, Maha Nemiao had with him eight thousand Shans from the Chinese border, who had never yet been beaten by the British, and were encouraged by the presence of three handsome young women, prophetesses endowed by magic with invulnerability, who had risen up among them with predictions of a speedy victory. In spite of all previous defeats there was still good spirit in the forces of the King of Ava. They did not realise, as the British staff had instantly perceived, that their three divisions were not within supporting distance of each other.

Having received his reinforcement, Campbell at
Dec. 1. once laid his plans for an attack on the 1st of December. The flotilla, now under command of Commodore Sir James Brisbane, was to open at dawn a cannonade upon the enemy's posts on both banks of the river, and a body of sepoys was at the same time to advance along the margin of the river upon Napadi. This feint was to draw the enemy's attention to his right and centre, and meanwhile the true attack was to be delivered upon his left. Accordingly, at daylight the force, less four battalions of sepoys which were left to guard Prome, moved out in two columns, the right under Cotton, taking the direct road north-eastward to Simbike, a few miles up the Nawin river, while the left, under Campbell in person, crossed the stream lower down, and worked up its right bank in rear of the hostile position. They were hardly under way before the sound of Brisbane's cannon told that the flotilla had begun its work; and Cotton, upon reaching the enemy's line, found that even their picquets had been withdrawn to meet the expected attack upon Napadi.

As usual the Burmese position was well chosen and

[1] Snodgrass, p. 229.

very strong. The stockades were erected upon an open space with dense jungle upon either flank, and were skilfully designed to bring a cross-fire to sweep the front, by which alone they could be approached. Cotton divided his column into two parties, one consisting of five light companies[1] and the other of the Forty-first, and launched them straight at two different points. The Shans stood firm until the British entered the stockade and closed with them; and then all resistance collapsed and gave place to wild panic. Old Maha Nemiao and a few grey-haired chiefs stood nobly and fought to the last, but their men rushed away to the rear of the stockade, where, the outlets being too few and narrow, they were bayoneted by scores. So speedy was the British success that Campbell's column had not time to get fairly into the rear of the fugitives, though his horse-artillery was able to work great havoc among them as they crossed the ford of the Nawin, and effectually to head them back from joining the centre division, if indeed they ever thought of such a thing. Maha Nemiao was found dead, and the corpses of his faithful attendants, who had tried to carry him away, lay by his body. One of the prophetesses was mortally stricken; another was either wounded or frightened out of her senses by a shell while fleeing across the ford; and the third was not. The left division of the Burmese host had been utterly defeated and dispersed. 1825. Dec. 1.

Losing no time, Campbell, after giving his troops two hours' rest, brought them back to the ford of the Nawin which he had crossed in the morning, and from which a path led to the position of Napadi. He also sent orders to Brisbane to be ready to co-operate in the projected attack of the morrow. The last of his troops did not reach their bivouac until after dark, worn out after some fourteen hours on foot in tropical heat. At dawn on the 2nd they were in motion again, Campbell's detachment filing along a narrow path through the Dec. 2.

[1] Of H.M. 1st, 41st and 89th; and of the 18th and 28th Madras N.I.

1825. Dec. 2. jungle, and Cotton's seeking a way farther to the north by which he might strike the flank and rear of the Burmese position. Cotton was instructed that he should attack at whatever point he might reach in the enemy's defences, and that the sound of his firing should be the signal for Campbell's men to assail them in front.

After two hours' march Campbell's column debouched upon a plain by the river, opened communication with the flotilla, and halted before the stockaded heights of Napadi. The Burmese position was peculiarly formidable. So far as can be ascertained by description, it lay in a bend where the river turns from a southerly to a south-easterly course. Within this bend stood three ranges of hills, the foremost commanded by the second, and the second by the third. The enemy's right flank was securely covered by the river, his left flank as securely by dense forest. At the foot of the foremost hill, itself very steep and rugged, and fortified at the base by three stockades, was a belt of jungle overlooking a strip of beach nearly a mile long—evidently a former bed of the river—and beyond the beach ran the river itself. The only possible ground from which the main position could be attacked was this same beach; and it was necessary to seize it without delay. Six companies of the Eighty-seventh therefore fetched a compass through the forest, came in upon the flank of one of the stockades and of the belt of jungle, swept the enemy out of it, and cleared the beach to the base of the foremost hill. The troops then occupied the captured ground; the flotilla moved up the river, firing heavily upon both banks; and Campbell waited anxiously for the sound of Cotton's musketry to launch his assault.

He waited long in vain, so long that at last he formed his troops for the frontal assault in despair of any help from Cotton, first detaching the Forty-seventh Foot and the Thirty-eighth Madras Native Infantry under Colonel Elrington to penetrate, if possible,

through the jungle on his right and effect at least some diversion on the enemy's left flank. Just as the storming column was moving off, Elrington made his presence felt; and the Thirteenth, Thirty-eighth and Eighty-seventh first captured the two stockades at the base of the foremost hill, and then very deliberately marched up the hill itself, without deigning to answer the enemy's fire by a single shot. Having scoured this hill with the bayonet, they proceeded to clear the next and in due time the third also, until they had mastered the entire position, nearly three miles in depth. The flotilla, meanwhile, seized the opportunity to push up the river past the defences, and captured all the boats and stores of the Burmese army. Cotton's column had found it impossible to make its way through the forest and had been compelled to return, but Campbell's alone was sufficient for the work. Thus the enemy's centre was routed and dispersed with heavy loss, and the whole of his guns, supplies and stores were taken or destroyed. 1825. Dec. 2.

There remained the right division on the western bank of the Irrawaddy; but so closely were the Burmese hidden from observation that it needed forty-eight hours to discover whether they were still holding their ground or whether they had retreated, leaving only a rearguard in the stockades. Having satisfied himself that they were still in position, Campbell on the night of the 4th established a mortar-battery and a rocket-battery on an island within good range of the stockades. On the morning of the 5th these opened fire upon the riverward front of them, while the infantry, landing higher up the stream, fell upon the left flank and rear. Disheartened by the defeat of their comrades of the central division, the Burmese after a feeble resistance evacuated the first line of stockades, and retired to a second in the jungle. The British followed up their first success, and totally unaware of the existence of this second line, suddenly blundered upon it and immediately kindled a panic Dec. 4. Dec. 5.

1825. among the enemy. Hundreds of the Burmese were
Dec. 2. bayoneted as they tried to escape, and the right division, even as the other two, was completely broken up.

So ended the last offensive movement of the Burmese army, in rout and disgrace. The operations of the five days from the 1st to the 5th of December cost the British little over one hundred and fifty killed and wounded; but the merit of the troops must not be judged merely by the casualty-list. Fighting in close, steaming heat under a fierce tropical sun is very exhausting work, especially to Europeans who are not properly clothed for it; and we have no knowledge of the numbers which went into hospital in the course of these five days. The men were worn out on the night of the 1st, yet they stormed the Napadi position on the 2nd; and there is something rather pathetic in the picture of this handful of weary soldiers, hardly one of them unweakened by previous sickness, toiling slowly for nearly three miles up and down rugged ridges with an occasional pause to clear out a stockade, taking no more notice of the enemy's bullets than if they had been rain-drops, but pressing on under the impetus of sheer discipline with the bayonet only, until the last entrenchment had been carried and the last wretched fugitive within reach had been despatched. By that time every stitch of their shabby scarlet must have been dripping with sweat as, choking with thirst, they threw themselves down to rest. And then, when they fell in to march away to camp, the reaction would set in, and first one and then another would drop down with his teeth chattering, and there would be many cases for hospital next morning and possibly a grave or two wanted by the next night.

Dec. 6-8. But the worst was yet to come. Between the 6th and 8th of December, Campbell's division encamped on a plain eight miles north of Prome, with Cotton's at some distance to its left upon a road parallel to the river. The next objective was Meaday, and the enemy was known to have fortified a succession of

positions between Napadi and that place. Campbell was therefore to advance somewhat wide to eastward so as to turn all their positions, while Cotton, starting three days after him, was to follow the river with the flotilla, and meet him at Meaday. Campbell had still some hopes that Morrison would join with him from Arakan and Richards from Assam, not yet knowing that the one was paralysed by sickness and the other by want of transport. In Burma itself Campbell ordered Colonel Pepper, who was in charge of the garrison at Pegu, to advance upon Toungoo and distract the enemy upon that side ; but Pepper, despite of the utmost exertion, could not obtain the transport that was essential to his movement. Campbell, therefore, whether he realised it or not, had to march to Ava alone. 1825. Dec.

On the 9th his column started, and for three days made its way northward along execrable roads without seeing a sign of man or beast. On the night of the 11th and during the whole of the 12th rain fell heavily, and the wretched paths through the jungle became impassable. The transport and the artillery were unable to move, and the way was choked with dead and exhausted cattle. Quantities of biscuit and rice were destroyed or damaged by the downpour, and the men, toiling painfully through dripping elephant-grass fifteen and twenty feet high, would have been no wetter if they had waded neck-deep in water. When the march ended, no open ground could be found but the dry bed of a rivulet surrounded by rank water-plants. Next day cholera broke out, striking down the British right and left ; and it should seem that for twenty-four hours the column was paralysed. On the 14th Campbell marched on, and emerging upon healthier ground halted for a day, when the plague began to abate. On the 16th he found traces of a hasty and disorderly retreat of the Burmese, and on the 17th he sent a cavalry patrol seven miles forward to reconnoitre Meaday. The patrol found the Burmese Dec. 9. Dec. 13. Dec. 14. Dec. 16. Dec. 17.

1825. rearguard in the act of evacuating the last stockade;
Dec. 18. and on the 18th Campbell halted to await the junction of Cotton's column, which punctually arrived and brought cholera with it.

Dec. 19. On the 19th the army entered Meaday, and then for the first time Campbell realised what was meant by a Burmese army in rapid retreat. Alike within and without the stockades the ground was strewn with the dying and the dead, wounded soldiers who could drag themselves no farther, and helpless villagers, first driven from their homes to make a desert before the invaders and now left to perish of sickness and want. Newly made graves showed that the British advance had interrupted the work of burial; and the hideous remains of crucified victims gave grim evidence that the Burmese were enforcing their ruthless discipline to the last.[1] The only sign of life came from huge packs of dogs and vultures, snarling and screaming at each other in the struggle for dainty morsels; and the stench was appalling. Campbell moved forward two
Dec. 20. miles on the next day in the hope of escaping from these horrors, but in vain. For fifty miles up the river and along the road by which the enemy had retired, the track of their retreat was marked by the same hideous tokens, and the air was tainted by the same foul breath of corruption. The very camping-grounds had to be cleared of corpses before the tents could be pitched. The villages had been burned or destroyed; the cattle had been driven off; no living men were seen except the dying; the once populous country was a solitary place. The Burmese host, like the Greeks before Troy, had become a prey for dogs and for the birds of the air.

Dec. 21. On the 21st Campbell's division was obliged to

[1] Crucifixion with the Burmese signifies that the victim is tied hand and foot to bamboo formed into a St. Andrew's cross, that a splinter is thrust through his tongue to keep his mouth open, and that he is then left to the tender mercies of the flies. Examples were seen and photographed during the Burmese War of 1884–1885.

halt, the supply of fresh beef for the Europeans having failed; and he continued the advance with the sepoys alone, moving painfully over infamous roads at the rate of six or eight miles a day. On the 26th, when about fourteen miles below Minhla, Campbell received a flag of truce from Ava; and, after moving forward for another ten miles, the column halted, while two officers went forward to that place to meet the Burmese negotiators. As these last showed a disposition merely to gain time, Campbell broke off the parley and, having been joined by the flotilla on the 27th, moved up to Patanago, immediately opposite to Minhla, from whence he reconnoitred the Burmese position. It seemed to consist of a principal stockade, about a mile square, filled with men and mounting a number of guns, with outworks covering a total front, towards the river, of about two miles. Under the stockades lay a large fleet of boats at anchor; and at the appearance of the British the crews rushed hastily to these craft and began to move them up the river. The British flotilla had not yet come up, being delayed by the intricacy of the navigation, but a few shots from the guns sufficed to stop the fugitives; and presently the *Diana* steamed up, passed by the stockade without the firing of a shot upon either side, and was received with honour by two gilded war-boats. These escorted her up the river and suffered her and her escorts to drop their anchors at some distance up the river, completely cutting off the retreat of the enemy by water. Campbell accepted these conciliatory demonstrations with alacrity. The troops were halted; a truce was proclaimed; and it was arranged upon the suggestion of the Burmese, who can never have heard of the raft at Tilsit, that negotiators from both sides should meet in a boat moored in mid-stream between the two armies. "I earnestly hope," wrote Campbell on the 31st, "that this is the last military despatch which I shall have to write upon the war in Ava"; and he sent down orders to

1825. Dec. 26. Dec. 27.

1825. the force at Pegu, forbidding for the present any further operations.

1826. The conference began on the 1st of January 1826;
Jan. 1. and after three days of hard bargaining a treaty was accepted and signed by the Burmese emissaries. Fifteen days, ending on the 18th of January, were allowed for ratification by the King of Ava, for the surrender of all British prisoners and for payment of an instalment of the indemnity, all of which formed part of the preliminary conditions. During this interval Campbell's Europeans came up; and there was friendly intercourse with the enemy, though it was noticed that the Burmese, despite of Campbell's remonstrances, persisted in strengthening their defences under cover of night. The reason for this soon became apparent. On
Jan. 17. the 17th the Burmese emissaries reappeared to represent that, owing to some unknown accident, the ratification, the prisoners and the indemnity had not arrived from Ava. Campbell thereupon denounced the armistice. Hostilities began anew at midnight of the 18th, and
Jan. 19. before 10 A.M. on the 19th twenty-eight pieces of artillery were in battery ready to play upon the enemy's defences at Minhla. At 11 A.M. they opened fire, and the troops were embarked, three-fourths of them being designed to land above the place and attack the northern face, while the Thirteenth and Thirty-eighth under Sale should disembark below the defences and assault the south-western angle. Owing to the strength of the current and a strong northerly breeze Sale's party reached its point of attack long before the other brigades; but, though Sale was himself wounded while afloat, his handful of men attacked without hesitation, entered the place by escalade and drove from ten to fifteen thousand Burmese before them. The other troops landed in time to strike in upon their retreat; and in a very short time the British were in possession of the stronghold of Minhla with all of its military supplies and stores, at a cost to the flotilla and the troops of some forty casualties.

As it happened, the enemy had suffered a sharp defeat in another quarter, during the armistice. Colonel Pepper at Pegu, having with much difficulty collected transport, began his advance towards Toungoo on the 23rd of December. Crossing the river at Myitkyo, where he had seized a number of native boats by surprise, he left there a post of one hundred and fifty men, and on the 3rd of January 1826 reached Shwegyin, about fifty miles north-east of Pegu, which, though strongly fortified, had been abandoned by the enemy. This done, he, on the 6th, sent down a detachment under Lieutenant-colonel Conroy of the Third Madras Light Infantry to capture the stockaded post of Sittang, about thirty miles down the river, so as to open communication by water between Shwegyin and Martaban. Conroy, proud of his sepoys, refused to take with him the Europeans that were pressed upon him by Pepper, and attacked the stockade on the 7th in full confidence of success. The Burmese, however, held their fire until their assailants were close upon them; and the sepoys, seized with panic at the first volley, ran back and would not be rallied. Conroy and another officer were killed, two more officers were wounded, and then there was a rush to the boats, and a hasty retreat by water to Myitkyo. The casualties, save in the matter of European officers, were trifling, not thirty men having been killed or wounded out of some five hundred present; and it is evident that the regiment behaved very ill.

1825. Dec. 23 1826. Jan. 3. Jan. 6. Jan. 7.

The news of this mishap reached Pepper on the 8th, simultaneously with Campbell's letter announcing the armistice of the 30th of December and the consequent interdiction of further operations. Pepper ignored the letter, and on the 9th set out with some three hundred and fifty men, including eighty Europeans from Myitkyo. Here he spent the 10th in collecting boats, and embarking before dawn on the 11th came at 9 A.M. before the stockade of Sittang. This stronghold was situated on a knoll of steep ascent, built of stout teak

Jan. 8. Jan. 9. Jan. 11.

1826. timber from twelve to fourteen feet high, with square
Jan. 11. bastions to give a flanking fire, and was accessible only by fording a creek. Pepper opened fire from his two pieces of artillery—a six-pounder and a light howitzer—and landing his little force, distributed it into three columns for assault at three different points. By 2 P.M. the tide had fallen low enough to enable the creek to be passed, though even so the men waded neck-deep, holding their ammunition-pouches over their heads; and at a given signal the three columns escaladed simultaneously. Once again the enemy held their fire until the last moment, and even the veteran flank companies of the Hundred-and-Second staggered for a moment before their first volley, while the native pioneers dropped the scaling-ladders and ran for their lives. But recovering themselves instantly, the white men climbed into the stockade; and then there was an ugly slaughter. The troops had seen the corpses of Conroy and of their dead comrades hung, naked and foully mutilated, by the heels from a cross-beam, and were not inclined to be merciful. Over three hundred dead bodies were found within the stockade alone after the action, and it was reckoned that as many more had been carried off or hidden away. The loss of the assailants exceeded seventy, twenty-eight out of the seventy-two Europeans present having been killed or wounded—sufficient evidence that without them the attack would have failed once more.

The news of this affair, whether it reached the Burmese army in the north or not, seems to have pro-
Jan. 25. duced little effect upon it. On the 25th of January, Campbell again moved forward by the worst roads and through the barrenest country that he had yet encountered. He was in fact approaching the district of petroleum wells, which do not make for fertility, and his cattle and horses were weak for want of forage. In fact it had been found necessary to mount the troopers of the bodyguard upon ponies and privately owned animals, and to use officers' chargers to drag the

guns of the horse-artillery.[1] On the 31st he was relieved by the arrival at his head-quarters of six British prisoners, who brought messages praying for peace and asking for the lowest terms that the British would grant. Re-stating the conditions which he had laid down in the negotiations before Minhla, Campbell continued his advance, and on the 8th of February was within a day's march of Pagan. Here he received certain information that the enemy was preparing to fight him under the walls of that city. Having been compelled to detach two brigades to gather in forage, he had no greater fighting force than about thirteen hundred men; but this was sufficient; and he made his dispositions to attack on the morrow. 1826. Jan. 31. Feb. 8.

The march lay through jungle; and the advanced guard for some miles was constantly engaged in a running fight with small parties, until it debouched into an open plain, and came upon the Burmese army, perhaps ten thousand strong, drawn up in the form of a crescent with the wings advanced. Campbell promptly attacked the two wings, on his right with the Thirteenth and four guns, supported by the Eighty-ninth; on his left with the Thirty-eighth and two guns, supported by the Forty-first; while his single sepoy battalion advanced on his extreme left by the river, to parry any turning movement of the enemy in that direction. The resistance of the Burmese troops was feeble; but their general showed tactical insight, for he struck at once at Campbell's centre, which, to all appearance, was uncovered and was certainly very weakly held; and he made several attempts with his cavalry to turn Campbell's right. The spirit of his troops was, however, so poor that they were easily driven from their ground, and their counter-attacks were as easily checked. They appear, after losing their first position, to have rallied upon a second, for the fighting, such as Feb. 9.

[1] Havelock, p. 314.

1826. it was, lasted for five hours and carried the British over
Feb. 9. some four miles of ground; but, as the British casualties amounted to no more than eighteen killed and wounded, the combat cannot have been very severe. On the other hand, a party of three or four hundred Burmese who took refuge in a field-work was exterminated; and the bulk of the hostile army was utterly dispersed. The Burmese commander, returning to Ava with the tidings of his defeat, was by the King's order immediately put to death.

Feb. 13. This action was decisive. On the 13th two liberated British prisoners came in to the camp to announce that the King of Ava accepted Campbell's terms. As, however, there was still a disposition to haggle and to evade them, Campbell continued to advance, now entering, for the first time, a populous and well-cultivated country. He had arrived at Yandabo, within forty-five miles of Ava, before a fresh embassy came in, bringing with them all British prisoners and twenty-five lacs of rupees as earnest of their good faith in conceding the British demands;
Feb. 24. and on the 24th of February the definitive treaty was signed. Arakan and the Tenasserim provinces were surrendered for ever to the British government; and the King of Ava agreed to renounce all right of interference with Assam, Cachar, and Jaintra, and to recognise the reinstatement of the former Rajah of Manipur if that potentate should desire it. The King further consented to pay an indemnity of one million sterling; and it was covenanted that, upon discharge of one-fourth of this sum, the British troops should retire to Rangoon, and, upon the further discharge of the like proportion, should evacuate the Burmese dominions. It was stipulated finally that the King should receive a British minister at Ava and send a Burmese minister to Calcutta.

Fortunate it was that the court of Ava gave way when it did. Had it remained resolute in its determination to defy the British, abandoned Ava and fled

to the north, the position of the Indian government would have been to the last degree embarrassing. The occupation of Arakan and of Burma from Ava southward, under constant menace of an attack from the north, would have been a burden in men and money too heavy to be borne, and, even if taken up for a time, must inevitably have been thrown off. Then the evacuation of the country would have meant not only that the effort spent upon the expedition had been wholly fruitless, but that the Burmese were unconquered and invincible. 1826.

In truth this first Burmese war went perilously near to be a disastrous failure. It was, beyond all question, forced upon the authorities at Calcutta; but it must be confessed that they were utterly outwitted by the court of Ava. Indeed the foresight and calculation shown by the Burmese leaders in formulating their military policy, and the tenacity with which they adhered to it, were very remarkable. In principle that policy was nothing new, being exactly that which was followed by Wellington in Portugal from 1810 to 1812, and by Alexander in Russia in 1812; but never in the history of the world has it been more thoroughly enforced; and that it was so enforced, at untold sacrifices to the wretched villagers, is a high tribute to the court of Ava. That the government of that court was to the last degree tyrannical and ruthless is, of course, not to be denied; but there is none the less something grand in its strength and resolution. The authorities at Calcutta had left such power and constancy of will in an indigenous enemy completely out of their calculations; and perhaps they may be pardoned, for these qualities are not commonly seen in such perfection. Who the moving spirit at Ava may have been, we know not. It may well have been that one and all of the dominant class were inspired by the same high contempt for the invaders and the same determination at all costs to drive them into the sea.

1826. In any case, the result was the same. The government at Calcutta was flustered and frightened. In its dread of the plagues that guarded for the Burmese the valley of the Irrawaddy, they sought to shorten the war by sending, upon very imperfect information, little columns to break into Upper Burma from the west and north, where the country was infinitely more difficult and the climate even more pestilential. Whether the authorities justly lie open to the old reproach of frittering away their force at several points instead of concentrating it at one is not so simple a question as might at first sight appear. It is doubtful whether Campbell could have fed or transported a larger army, even if it had been furnished to him; and the case stands as a parallel to that of the Peninsular War in 1809, when Wellington frankly confessed that, if the troops despatched to Walcheren had been sent instead to Lisbon, he would have been unable to use them in the field. But the landing at Walcheren did at least stir Paris to its depths, whereas the diversion in Arakan and Manipur merely destroyed troops at great expense without contributing in the least to the relief of Campbell's difficulties. Moreover the authorities, at any rate in Madras, continued to deal carelessly and neglectfully with the troops to the end. The remnant of the Hundred-and-Second, twelve officers and about two hundred men, together with over four hundred native followers, were all crowded upon a single transport of four hundred and fifty tons' burthen, for the return voyage, which, the south-west monsoon being at its height, occupied six weeks from Rangoon to Masulipatam. Hanging would have been none too severe punishment for the persons responsible for this wanton wickedness.

As to Campbell himself, it has already been remarked that he was not a man of sufficient originality or imagination to devise the means of meeting the Burmese tactics without a sharp lesson or two in the school of defeat. It must now be added that his

despatches were absurdly magniloquent, and that they 1826.
were not regarded by, at any rate, some of those who served under him, as very accurate.[1] Lastly, although in the absence of fuller information it is unwise to pass final sentence, the deviation from his original plan, which brought about Cotton's reverse before Donobyu, does not appear to indicate a commander of sound and orderly judgment. But there is another side to the question which shows Campbell in a far more favourable light.

He was sent out with a very imperfectly equipped force to execute an extremely difficult task. For months his troops not only lacked every comfort, but were half starved and half poisoned, and were pent up within the lines of Rangoon. The mortality among them in those lines was appalling; and, even when they were at last set in motion, fever and dysentery accompanied them everywhere, giving place occasionally to the more terrible scourge of cholera. The five British regiments which originally landed at Rangoon[2] numbered, exclusive of officers, something over thirty-five hundred; and of these there died over thirty-one hundred, not one in twenty of them from the weapons of the enemy.[3] Of their officers, sixteen out of one hundred and fifty were killed or died of wounds, and forty-five succumbed to disease. The officers were

[1] See Butler, p. 87. Butler's criticism must be discounted, as he was evidently sore because Campbell had not given to his regiment (the 102nd) the credit which Butler considered to be its due. Such things happen in every campaign, and too much must not be made of them. But in the copy of Wilson's *Papers* which I have used there are marks of exclamation against several passages of Campbell's despatches, evidently made by some one who knew the facts, which lend some countenance to Butler's comments.

[2] H.M. 13th, 38th, 41st, 47th and 89th.

[3] The actual figures are: strength, 3586; deaths, 3115. I have been unable to discover whether these regiments received any drafts. Possibly they may, at the very outside, have received 1000 men partly from home, partly from other regiments in India. The 102nd (Doveton, p. 373) lost 600 out of 900 by action and disease, and certainly received no drafts.

1826. obliged to dispense with all the little luxuries—really not far removed from necessities—which alone make life in the tropics bearable by the white man. It was not until the winter of 1825–1826 that they were able even to procure themselves ponies to ride upon the march, and transport sufficient to give them some little comfort. Of course it is easy in theory to lay down the proposition that the officers should fare exactly as their men; but this ignores the fact that officers have to see to a great many things during the day's march and after it which, at the best of times, keep them continually on the move and abridge them of much of their rest. In this expedition, where the majority of the marches lay through jungle along narrow and tortuous paths, not unfrequently in pitchy darkness, the physical exertion required from unmounted officers in keeping the column together must have been excessive. Moreover, it must be remembered that one officer in every three was always on the sick-list, which of course threw the more work upon the survivors and broke them down in turn. Practically every failure of the sepoys in an attack may be traced to the fact that, after the fall of the two or three British officers who were with him, there were no others to take their place. Never, probably, has the British officer been subjected to more long-continued hardship, privation and discomfort than in this campaign ; and this he had to bear, not only without hope of glory, which he could easily have endured, but with little prospect of prize-money, which was the great attraction of Indian warring in those days.

The same, of course, is true of the men. Few British soldiers can have spent a more miserable year than those who landed at Rangoon in May 1824. Unsuitably clothed, vilely fed, imperfectly tended, drenched with rain when they were not bathed in sweat, eaten up by mosquitoes, leeches and the manifold other plagues of a tropical delta, they had literally nothing but misery and death before them. Active

operations were their only relief; yet even here they were set to haul guns through marshes, and to do such heavy work as should not be demanded of white men in the tropics. Moreover, their arms were not much better than those of their enemies, whom they were required to drive from jungle, stockades and entrenchments, which were all to their own disadvantage. It was solely through their discipline that they could meet the Burmese at odds of one against five; and that discipline never failed in the field or in garrison. When the inhabitants, free from the iron yoke of their masters, began timidly to creep back to Rangoon and to Prome, they were heartened not only by the perfect behaviour of the troops but by that irresistible good nature which the British soldier carries with him to every country and every climate from the Arctic circle to the equator. Of course, as invariably happens and as was, in the circumstances, inevitable, they formed attachments closer than were warranted by mere good nature. Many a little Burmese girl dressed herself as a man and tried to sail to India in the transports; and not a few men, rather than forsake their too faithful mistresses, deserted and took service with the Burmese when the time came for them to leave the country. Nevertheless, on the whole, the conduct of the British soldier during this most trying campaign seems to have been exemplary. 1826.

We have seen British expeditions in the past fall to pieces when subjected to a similar ordeal. But this Burmese field-force, despite of all misfortunes, epidemics, hardships and privations, was never demoralised, always ready for action and full of dash and spirit in the field. For this, Campbell, as it seems to me, deserves no ordinary praise. It must be remembered that the Calcutta government, though itself mainly responsible for the prolongation of the war, was always clamouring for Campbell to end it. No doubt he himself was as anxious as the government itself to be quit of it; and frequently, even so

1826. early as December 1824, he flattered himself that his enemy would sue for terms. Yet it was not until he reached Prome that the court of Ava condescended even to play at negotiation; and from that time, September 1825, until February 1826 he was kept on tenter-hooks of expectation, and again and again disappointed. The advance from Prome must have been a most anxious operation. The country was almost impassable; his line of communication was long; his transport-cattle dwindled steadily from overwork; disease inexorably dogged his footsteps; every day saw his force grow weaker and weaker. Upon leaving Meaday for the fifty miles' march through devastated country among the dead and dying villagers, the troops could with difficulty throw off the depression of their environment. "We appeared," wrote a staff-officer,[1] "to traverse a vast wilderness from which mankind had fled; and our little camp of two thousand men seemed but a speck in the desolate and dreary waste that surrounded it." They were but a handful, daily growing fewer, in the heart of a hostile country, marching upon a capital still two hundred miles distant, in defiance of an enemy that outnumbered them by ten to one and without hope of further reinforcement. To conduct such an enterprise, to keep all that share in it of good heart, and to carry it to a successful issue demands peculiar qualities in a leader; and no one, I think, can deny to Archibald Campbell an iron nerve, a strong will, high moral force and abundant moral courage.

Authorities: Documents illustrative of the Burmese War, edited by H. H. Wilson (Calcutta, 1827). I found little of importance in the MS. records at the India Office which was not printed in this volume. *Narrative of the Burmese War, 1824–1826*, by the same author; Snodgrass's *Narrative*, etc. (1827); Doveton's *Reminiscences of the First Burmese War* (1852); *Sketch of the Services in Burmah of the Madras European Regiment*, by an officer of the corps (1836); Havelock's *Memoirs* of three campaigns in Ava; Stubbs's *History of the Bengal Artillery*. There is a series of coloured aquatints of the principal engagements, one set of which is hung on the walls of the United Service Institution.

[1] Snodgrass, p. 255.

CHAPTER XVI

While the war in Burma was following its slow and tedious course, the turbulent spirits of Central India perceived, as they thought, an opportunity of reviving the anarchy which the rigour of Moira had recently suppressed. More than one predatory leader collected a band of ruffians for the plunder of his neighbours, with the greater ease owing to the panic which the first successes of the Burmese had aroused in Calcutta; and these required to be put down with a strong hand. Disputed successions to petty sovereignties were another source of disturbance; every usurper being always able to gather adherents of some kind to support his claim. An incident of this kind, in the Mahratta country immediately to east of Goa, compelled the Madras government in October 1824 to send a force of some five thousand men under Colonel Deacon to besiege and capture the fort of Kittoor; and, though the fort was captured with trifling loss, and the insurrection easily quelled, little expeditions of this kind were a constant strain upon the military and financial resources of Madras. 1824.

At about the same time more serious trouble arose in Central India. Lord Lake, after his four failures to carry Bhurtpore by assault, had made a treaty with the rajah which had been faithfully observed, with mutual increase of confidence, by both sides. At the beginning of 1824 this rajah, Baldeo Singh the chief of the Jats, feeling the approach of death, desired to secure the succession to his son, Bulwant Singh, a lad

1824. of six, and, mistrusting the ambitious designs of his nephew, Durjan Sal, resolved to do so by placing his son under the immediate protection of the British government. With this object he appealed to Sir David Ochterlony, the British resident at Delhi, who willingly consented to invest Bulwant Singh with the ceremonial dress which signified that he was the heir-apparent. About twelve months later Baldeo Singh died, and Bulwant Singh was installed as rajah, with one of his uncles as his guardian to conduct the government. Within four weeks Durjan Sal gained over the young rajah's soldiery, forced his way into the citadel, slew the guardian uncle, and seized the person of Bulwant Singh. Ochterlony promptly issued a proclamation denouncing Durjan Sal as an usurper, calling upon all Jats to uphold their legitimate sovereign, and undertaking to support them with a British force. Durjan Sal thereupon pretended that he desired only to act as regent during Bulwant Singh's minority; but Ochterlony, requiring earnest of Durjan Sal's pacific professions, insisted that he must either come in person to the British cantonments or entrust the young heir to British custody. Both alternatives being rejected by Durjan Sal, Ochterlony promptly collected all the troops that were within reach and prepared to march upon Bhurtpore without delay, when he was suddenly stopped by an order from the Governor-general countermanding his directions in terms of unmitigated censure.

Deeply hurt, Ochterlony resigned his command, and shortly afterwards died, his end being doubtless accelerated by this undeserved insult. He had served the Company well for fifty years, and deserves to be remembered as almost the only general of really conspicuous ability produced by the Indian Army. When confronted with the difficult problems of the Gurkha war, the first and possibly the most arduous of all our hill-campaigns, he thought out the means for its solution and applied them from the first. Too

often Indian generals, both before and since his time, have advanced blindly into the hills, as they would among the plains, landed themselves in difficulties and then cried out for all the resources of the Empire to extricate them; yet, by a strange irony, they have ended their days with ill-earned honour, whereas Ochterlony died in unmerited disgrace. 1824.

The consequences of Lord Amherst's ill-timed interference were immediate. Durjan Sal at once threw off the mask and claimed possession of Bhurtpore as legal heir. Military adventurers began to swarm into the famous fortress in the hope of again making a living by pillage; and, as if to assure them of that happy prospect, a younger brother of Durjan Sal broke away from him and established himself as a rival potentate in the fortress of Deig. A revival of anarchy in this quarter was, therefore, certain; and this was not all. Bhurtpore, the inexpugnable, the scene of four British defeats, was a name for the enemies of the British to conjure with. To all appearance the great British Raj itself was afraid of it, for the advance of British troops upon the fortress had been first ordered and then countermanded. It seemed as if the reduction of the place were beyond the British power, at any rate while the Burmese war lasted. The hopes of every adventurer, of every malcontent, of every ambitious little chief and of every prince who had been defeated and despoiled, ran high. From Bhurtpore as a centre disorder might radiate forth until it swept the white invaders out of the country; and then once again there would be a chance for the strong arm and the sharp sword, for the fighter and the plunderer. Above all, the Mahrattas, masters of all India in the predatory arts, and Scindia, the sorest and the most powerful of the Mahrattas, might come by their own again.

Amherst had no sooner committed his blunder than he became dimly aware of it, and called to his counsel Sir Charles Metcalfe, who had been appointed to succeed Ochterlony at Delhi. "We are bound,"

1824. wrote Metcalfe, "not by any positive engagement to the Bhurtpore state nor by any claim on her part, but by our duty as supreme guardians of general tranquillity, law and right, to maintain the right of Bulwant Singh to the raj of Bhurtpore, and we cannot acknowledge any other pretender." There spoke the disciple of Wellesley and Moira to the feeble follower of Barlow; and the eyes of Amherst were opened. "A much greater degree of interference than was formerly called for appears to have resulted from the situation in which we were placed by the pacification of 1818," was his comment. Why he should have taken more than two years to discover this fact is not very clear; but he did master it at last; and, while instructing Metcalfe to endeavour to settle the trouble by negotiation, he gave orders for military preparations to be pressed forward with all possible activity.

Meanwhile Sir Edward Paget had yielded place as Commander-in-chief to Stapleton Cotton, Lord Combermere, Wellington's best cavalry-officer in the Peninsula; this appointment being due, apparently, in great measure to Wellington's advice. Two regiments of British and six of native cavalry, with four troops of horse artillery, two battalions of British and sixteen of native infantry, were assembled at Agra and Muttra under the command of Major-generals Jasper Nicolls and Thomas Reynell respectively;[1] and

[1] AGRA COLUMN: Major-general Jasper Nicolls.
1st Cavalry Brigade. Brigadier-general Murray.
H.M. 16th Lancers; 6th, 8th, 9th Bengal L.C.
2 troops of Horse Artillery.
2nd Infantry Division—
3rd Brigade. Brigadier-general Edwards.
H.M. 59th; 11th, 31st Bengal N.I.
2nd Brigade. Brigadier-general Adams.
33rd, 36th, 37th Bengal N.I.
6th Brigade. Brigadier-general Fagan.
15th, 21st, 35th Bengal N.I.
1 troop of Horse Artillery.
1 battery of Field Artillery.

by the 25th of November, when Metcalfe finally announced the British intention of dispossessing Durjan Sal by force of arms, their concentration was complete. The proportion of European troops was unusually small owing to the number of British battalions already employed in Burma; but infantry before Bhurtpore was of less importance than artillery, of which there had been collected one hundred and twelve heavy pieces, besides the fifty lighter guns attached to the cavalry and infantry.[1] The principal cause of Lake's failure had been the inadequacy of his siege-train. 1824. Nov. 25.

On the 1st of December Combermore reached Agra, and, after a week spent in inspection of his troops, set the bulk of his infantry and cavalry in motion on the 8th, leaving the field-artillery to follow on the next day. From Agra to Bhurtpore the distance is not above thirty-two miles as the crow flies, and from Muttra no more than twenty, so that the objective was within easy reach. On the 10th strong advanced Dec. 1. Dec. 8. Dec. 10.

Muttra Column: Major-general Thomas Reynell.
2nd Cavalry Brigade. Brigadier-general Childers.
H.M. 11th L.D.; 3rd, 4th, 10th Bengal L.C.
2 troops of Horse Artillery.
1st Infantry Division—
1st Brigade. Brigadier-general McCombe.
H.M. 14th Foot; 23rd, 63rd Bengal N.I.
4th Brigade. Brigadier-general Whitehead.
32nd, 41st, 58th Bengal N.I.
5th Brigade. Brigadier-general Paton.
6th, 18th, 60th Bengal N.I.
1 troop of Horse Artillery.
1 light field-battery.

[1] Siege train for Bhurtpore:
16 twenty-four-pounders.
20 eighteen-pounders.
4 twelve-pounders.
12 eight-inch howitzers.
46 eight-inch mortars.
12 ten-inch mortars.
2 thirteen-inch mortars.

Field and Horse Artillery:
14 twelve-pounders.
10 five-and-a-half-inch howitzers.
26 six-pounders.

1824. parties, chiefly of cavalry, were pushed forward to
Dec. 10. seize an extensive swamp and mere about two miles to north-west of the fortress—the ground which Lake had found covered with water upon his first arrival before the place, and which had been suddenly dried, as he discovered later, by the draining of all the water into the ditch of the fort. The enterprise was completely successful. The enemy was driven from the post that guarded the sluices, and the flow of water, which had already begun, was arrested by the engineers, who first sank a boat at the mouth of the sluice, and then blocked it up with brushwood and any other materials that lay to hand. Thus, though a certain amount of water had already entered the ditches, there was not enough seriously to hinder a besieging force. A party of some nine hundred Jat cavalry was also intercepted and cut up, and the villages in the vicinity were cleared. Combermere then halted for the night just to east of the swamp, and prepared his dispositions for the investment of the fortress.

Bhurtpore, which had been extended and enlarged since Lake's attack, was about eight miles in circumference, and lay in the midst of an almost level plain, being bounded on the west by a ridge of low rocks. The fortifications consisted of a citadel and an outer enceinte of thirty-five lofty semi-circular bastions connected by curtains, the whole built of mud, held together by straw and in many places strengthened by rows of tree-trunks buried upright. The enceinte was surrounded by a water-course from twenty to thirty feet wide, with perpendicular banks, which had been converted into a ditch. In itself it was an awkward obstacle, but was rendered less so by numerous tributary water-courses which enabled it to be approached under shelter. There were nine gates, each of which was covered by a semi-circular earthwork. The citadel, which was on elevated ground, completely commanded the body of the place. Its ditch, fifty yards broad and nearly twenty yards deep,

had its counterscarp faced by a revetment of stone. 1824.
From the bottom of the scarp rose a perpendicular Dec. 10.
stone wall, eighty feet high, which formed a fausse-braye, flanked by forty semi-circular towers; and within this was another stone wall, seventy-four feet in height and flanked by eleven conical bastions. Defences of such dimensions must have been hard to match in the world. The whole fortress was surrounded by a belt of jungle at a distance varying from five to eight hundred yards from the walls, with but one open space about a mile wide opposite to the south-western angle; and the outer perimeter of this belt was not far from twenty miles.

It was the extent of this external circuit which constituted one of Combermere's principal difficulties, for it rendered close investment impossible except by a force far stronger than that which he commanded. He, therefore, occupied only about six to seven miles of ground on the north-east side with his infantry, and distributed his cavalry at wide intervals to cover the rest, except towards the south-western angle, where, the belt of jungle being deep, he erected for about a mile a chain of fortified posts connected by an abatis. For the rest the construction of the ramparts presented to the engineers some awkward problems. First, the shape of the bastions made them in most cases difficult to enfilade. Secondly, whereas the masonry of ordinary fortifications could be battered to pieces and brought down in ruin by round shot, the mud walls of Bhurtpore admitted those same shot with so trifling resistance as to suffer slight damage beyond the making of a hole and the fall of a little loose dust. What was needed was shell, and shell was as yet projected not by horizontal but by high-angle fire. Shell could only be dropped upon a surface, not driven into the heart of an obstacle to burst within it. Thirdly, even after the mud had been reduced to powder, there remained still the huge palisade of tree-trunks buried inside it, which

1824. made the battering of practicable breaches almost impossible.

Dec. 12. By the 12th the preliminary arrangements were complete, and on the 13th and 14th the siege-train arrived. The chief engineer, Brigadier-general Aubry, after due reconnaissance, decided to attack the north-eastern angle where the flanking defences were weakest;

Dec. 22. and on the 22nd the village of Kuddum Kundi opposite the middle of the eastern front, and Baldeo Singh's garden, about a mile to north of it, were occupied, and trenches were thrown up to connect the two posts. The guns of the fortress poured a very hot fire at long range upon the working parties, but caused little loss;

Dec. 23. and on the evening of the 23rd the first parallel was opened, and two batteries were thrown up, one of eight eighteen-pounders before Kuddum Kundi, and the other of twelve eight-inch and four ten-inch mortars before Baldeo Singh's garden. These pieces opened fire at about six hundred yards' range on the

Dec. 24. 24th, silencing the enemy's guns over against them and driving their sharpshooters, who had been persistent and troublesome, behind the shelter of the parapet. The trenches were then pushed forward

Dec. 25. from these batteries. On the 25th the second parallel was opened, and a new battery of five twenty-four pounders and as many eighteen-pounders was built within two hundred and fifty yards of a prominent bastion, known to the army as the Long-necked Bastion, immediately to south of the north-eastern angle of the fort. This battery opened fire on the

Dec. 26. 26th, and wrought such destruction on the eastern face that the enemy attempted two or three sorties,

Dec. 27. which were easily repulsed. On the 27th the enemy's fire suddenly became extremely accurate, especially about Combermere's head-quarters at the edge of Baldeo Singh's garden, one of his servants being hit when in the act of removing a chair from the table. The mystery was presently explained by the disappearance of an artilleryman, Sergeant Herbert, who

had deserted to the enemy on the previous night, 1824.
and was now seen directing the Jat gunners, heedless Dec. 27.
of the projectiles that hummed all round him, with the greatest coolness and self-possession.

On this night a party of the Jat horse contrived to penetrate through the lines of the cavalry, but a second party was intercepted and almost to a man cut down or captured. These attempts to escape showed that things were going ill with the besieged; and the works were pushed forward with all possible energy. As evidence of the scale of the preparations, it may be mentioned that over five thousand fascines and over six thousand gabions had been used in the first week of the siege. Fresh batteries were thrown up between the 28th of December and the 4th of January until the 1825.
north-eastern angle was enclosed in a ring of seventy- Jan. 4.
eight pieces of heavy calibre, which fired continually with the greatest effect. The nearest approaches were now within forty yards of the ditch; and by the 5th Jan. 5.
the breaches were already so forward that the storming parties were actually formed. But the experience of Lake was not forgotten, and it was considered wiser to improve the breaches, if possible, by the action of mines. These were not at first successful. The difficulty was precisely the same as that which had confronted Lake. It was easy to pound the ramparts to powder; but, as they were constructed not of masonry but chiefly of mud supported by logs of wood, the breaches were simply gaps among bristling lines of timber, and very steep hillocks of dust, into which a man sank waist-deep. The chief engineer, therefore, still asked for time to drive four more mines before the assault should be delivered, two of them under the breaches made by the guns, a third beneath the Long-necked bastion, and a fourth immediately under the north-eastern angle of the post. The third was successfully sprung on the 16th; the remainder were Jan. 16.
reserved as the signal for the storm on the 18th.

The main breaches made by the batteries were

1825. three in number. The right-hand breach, on the
Jan. 18. northern face of the north-eastern angle, was called, after the name of the nearest gate, the Jagina breach. This being a minor attack was committed to two companies of the Hundred-and-First, a part of which regiment had joined Combermere on the 9th, the Fifty-eighth Native Infantry and one hundred Gurkhas under Lieutenant-colonel Delamain. The centre breach, at the north-western angle itself, was made over to Major-general Reynell, with the brigades of McCombe and Paton. Each of these brigades consisted of two native battalions stiffened by four companies of the Fourteenth. McCombe's was to lead the way, with the grenadiers of the Fourteenth at its head, and to turn to the right when it reached the ramparts; and Paton's was to follow and turn to the left. The left breach, at the salient of the Long-necked bastion, was entrusted to three native battalions, strengthened by the Fifty-ninth Foot, under Brigadier-general Edwards. Two more native battalions under Brigadier-general Adams were to assail the Muttra gate immediately to south of the left breach; and lastly, a small column of two companies of the Hundred-and-First, two native companies and one hundred Gurkhas, under Lieutenant-colonel Wilson, was to escalade the re-entrant angle of the Long-necked bastion immediately to the right of the left breach.

Every possible precaution was taken by Combermere to ensure success, for the consequences of failure might be very serious to British rule in India. The escalading party was regularly practised in the handling of ladders. The Fifty-ninth was carefully trained in the use of hand-grenades, a weapon which was already nearly obsolete, but had been now employed with success. For the actual assault, however, the grenades, though provided with fuzes, were not loaded; for General Jasper Nicolls had a theory that a grenade with a burning fuze had the same moral effect upon the enemy as a loaded one, and was far less dangerous

to friends, or indeed to the actual throwers, who were frequently injured by the premature explosion of their missile. The troops themselves were assembled in the third parallel, so as to incur the less peril from the springing of the mines. The utmost care was taken that they should enter the trenches unperceived; and not a whisper was heard, nor a bayonet's point seen, when they filed into their places at 4.30 A.M. of the 18th. Nevertheless, the Jats seemed to be suspicious; and from 4 till 6 A.M. they poured in a heavy fire which, their guns being incapable of much depression, fell chiefly upon the third parallel. Chafing under the loss thus caused, the troops began to creep forward, pushing the storming parties dangerously close to the ditch. At 8 A.M. the mines were reported ready, and Combermere gave the order for them to be fired. The lesser mines, to right and left of the north-eastern angle, were first sprung, and there was a short lull, during which an engineer officer strove anxiously to force back the men, who had been crowded into the foremost approaches, while there was yet time. He was too late. The great mine, charged with nearly a ton of powder, exploded; the doomed bastion rocked and fell into ruin; a dense cloud of dust and smoke arose, streaked with human bodies, limbs, stores and timber; and masses of earth leaped whirling into the air. 1825. Jan. 18.

Then the wreckage came down in a hideous shower, and much of it fell upon the heads of the storming party. McCombe and Paton, two subordinate officers, and nearly a score of the Fourteenth were struck down, killed or wounded, and Combermere himself had a narrow escape, for McCombe fell at his side, and two sepoys just behind him were killed. There was a moment's hesitation. Combermere himself would have sprung to the leading place, but was forcibly held back by his aide-de-camp. Then Reynell came up and gave the word "Forward," and the storming parties of the Fourteenth and Fifty-ninth rushed

1825. Jan. 18. simultaneously into the breaches. The Fourteenth crowned the summit very speedily, meeting with little resistance until they turned to their right along the ramparts, when the enemy, recovering from the first shock of the explosion, rallied gallantly to meet them. The defence of the north-east bastion had been entrusted to eight hundred Pathans; and, although nearly half of these had been blown into the air, the survivors fought desperately. They could not stand, however, against the bayonets, and were driven back to a narrow gorge, sixty feet deep, which could only be descended by a narrow flight of steps. At the edge of this gorge the fugitives perforce turned; but, as they reached it, another hapless band appeared on the opposite edge, with Delamain's party in hot pursuit. Delamain had carried his breach with some difficulty, but his men would not be denied; and for a few minutes there was a savage contest hand to hand on either lip of the abyss, the British stabbing fiercely with the bayonet, or firing at such close range that the flash kindled the cotton-padded clothes of the Jats. The gulf became fuller and fuller as one after another of the hapless Jats was hurled down; and presently it was choked with a writhing mass of some two hundred of them, all wedged tightly together, all burning and all crying out, amid a constant crackle of explosions as the fire reached their ammunition, for a merciful shot to put an end to their torture.

But the stormers had other work to do. The united columns of McCombe and Delamain still pressed on along the ramparts to the Kumbher Gate, three-quarters of the way along the western face of the fort, where they halted and signalled for ammunition and reinforcements. A small party, however, taking a wrong turn, found themselves in the town, and blundered on to the northern bridge that led across the inner ditch into the citadel. The terrified garrison closed the gates, shutting out a party of about a hundred fugitive Jats, among whom was Khoosial Singh, brother-in-law

to Durjan Sal and one of his leading supporters. This chief turned to bay like a tiger and, when summoned by Major Hunter, the senior officer present, to surrender, answered by a terrific cut with his sword. Hunter raised his scabbard to parry it, but so true was the cut that it shore through the scabbard and nearly severed Hunter's left arm. The brave Jat was instantly bayoneted, together with every one of his followers; and the British party then regained the ramparts and rejoined their column. 1825. Jan. 18.

Meanwhile the Fifty-ninth, though met by a heavy fire, scaled the left breach without firing a shot, drove the enemy with heavy loss from the bastion before them and turned to their left along the ramparts. The Jats fought bravely; and within a few minutes Brigadier-general Edwards and five other officers were killed, and five more officers wounded. But the advent of Paton's column speedily relieved the pressure, and Wilson's party, having successfully accomplished the escalade, plunged down into the town to suppress the flanking fire from the houses. The united columns of Edwards and Paton then fought their way round the ramparts till they met the Fourteenth at the Kumbher Gate; and meanwhile Adams had forced the Muttra Gate and also penetrated into the town. There was still desultory fighting in the streets and wild firing by some of the sepoys; but the fate of Bhurtpore was decided. Combermere, who had followed up the storming parties closely, came upon the glacis of the citadel just after the death of Khoosial Singh, and, receiving no answer to his summons to surrender, sent at once for a couple of twelve-pounders. These were dragged up the breach, and by 3 P.M. were in position to blow in the gate. Then the citadel surrendered, and Bhurtpore, the invincible, was taken. Some fourteen thousand Jats had fallen killed or wounded during the siege or in the assault, and of those that fled from the fortress every man, to the number of some seven thousand,

1825. was swept up by the cavalry. Durjan Sal himself,
Jan. 18. with his wife and children, was thus intercepted; and his capture gave the finishing touch to Combermere's success.

The casualties on the British side throughout the operations little exceeded one thousand; the assault costing no more than five hundred and sixty-nine killed and wounded. Of this number one hundred and thirty-six fell upon the Fourteenth, one hundred and twenty-two upon the Fifty-ninth, and fifty upon the two companies that were engaged of the Hundred-and-First. From these figures it is very clear that without the British foot, who numbered about two thousand out of the twelve thousand infantry present at the siege, Bhurtpore would not have been carried. The Fourteenth, in particular, did its full share of the duty, for the brigadiers, McCombe and Edwards, had both been taken from it to command their brigades, and Jasper Nicolls also had for long been an officer of the same regiment.

Thus cheaply was gained the vaunted fortress of Bhurtpore within twenty-seven days of the first ground broken. The truth is that Lake's quadruple failure before it, wholly due to insufficient means, had given the place a fictitious renown. The stronghold was undoubtedly formidable, the huge walls of sun-dried clay being difficult to destroy with cannon, and the ditch, broad and deep enough to float a line-of-battle ship, a very serious obstacle. The ordnance mounted on the walls was also not altogether contemptible, for it numbered some two hundred pieces of various calibres, including one monster gun, over fifteen feet in length and six feet in circumference at the muzzle. But Combermere disarmed the ditch of half of its terrors by cutting off the water-supply; and with a really powerful siege-train, such as he had under his hand, he had little trouble in overmastering the Jat artillery. There is a story that Wellington's recommendation of Combermere for the command-in-

chief in India was questioned upon the ground that difficult operations were in prospect, and that the Duke answered, "At any rate he can take Bhurtpore." The remark was perfectly just. In truth, the most remarkable point in the siege was that three British soldiers, all of them of the artillery, deserted to the enemy. Two of them, bearing Irish names, were men of the worst character, capable of any infamy, and unfit to wear the King's uniform. The third, Herbert, on the contrary, was well spoken of by his officers, and was believed to have supported his mother out of his pay. He had fought as a gunner at Waterloo; and it is difficult to imagine what can have induced him to desert unless it were a fit of partial insanity. All three of them were captured at Bhurtpore and brought to trial. The two worthless Irishmen escaped, to the great indignation of the army, with fourteen years' transportation, and presumably found their way to Botany Bay. Herbert, who was at least a brave man, was hanged on the ruins of the north-east bastion. 1825.

The effect of the conquest of Bhurtpore upon India at large was profound and salutary. The prolongation of the Burmese campaign had produced, as Metcalfe afterwards confessed, an expectation of the immediate downfall of the British. "If the siege had failed," said Sir John Malcolm, a most competent judge, "it would in all human probability have added to the embarrassments of the Burmese war that of hostilities with almost every state in India." Scindia was eagerly biding his time; the Rajput States were awaiting their opportunity, and Rohilkhand would have risen to a man. Another disputed succession at Alwar, which promised to give some trouble, was abruptly ended by the submission of the usurper immediately upon the fall of Bhurtpore. The Calcutta government made the most of its success. Durjan Sal was sent a state-prisoner to Allahabad; Bulwant Singh was solemnly installed as rajah in his place by Combermere and

1825. Metcalfe; and the fortifications of Bhurtpore were blown up and destroyed as a warning to all that presumed to defy the British authority.

Happy it was that peril so threatening could be averted by operations so simple. The campaign, in fact, was an ideal one for the troops. Former failures had made the authorities careful to supply the Commander-in-chief with everything that he needed. The march to the objective was short; the weather, at the height of the cool season, was perfect; and every officer had his full tale of servants and every comfort and delicacy that he might fancy. The cavalry, which was responsible for the investment of the greater part of the perimeter, had the pleasing excitement of constant petty combats, invariably victorious, with the enemy's horse; the horse-artillery from time to time made feint attacks, galloping up close to the walls, sweeping them with grape and shrapnel and galloping off, before the enemy could find the range; the sappers were sure of making a reputation before a fortress which had repulsed four British assaults; the gunners had plenty of guns and unlimited ammunition; and the infantry, generally averse from trench-work, was gratified by the speed with which the approaches were pushed forward, by the constant little sallies which had to be repulsed during the process, and finally by a spirited little fight, spoiled by no excessive casualties, in the final assault. The whole affair, from the first to the last, occupied just forty days, and the army divided prize-money to the sum of four hundred and eighty thousand pounds sterling, sixty thousand of which fell to the share of Combermere.[1] Small wonder if Archibald Campbell made desperate search for treasures in the great pagoda of Rangoon. Small wonder if his troops cursed the luck which exposed them for two years to a pestilent climate, in every circumstance of hardship and privation, and to constant conflict with a dangerous and elusive enemy in a

[1] He was robbed of the whole of it by a dishonest banker.

country where there were many gilded pagodas but little gold.[1] 1825.

Authorities: Creighton's *Siege of Bhurtpore*, a poor book by a stupid man, but with some useful sketches and plans; Lady Combermere's *Memoirs and Correspondence of Field-marshal Viscount Combermere*—the best account of the siege, but with many careless slips; Stocqueler's *Old Field Officer*; Seaton's *From Cadet to Colonel*.

[1] "I have gained scarce anything by my Ava campaign. . . . Our prize-money will turn out trifling; and here is Lord Combermere's *luck*—gets himself and his army an immensity for six weeks' *champagne* campaign in the trenches." Sir Willoughby Cotton to Sir Herbert Taylor, June 19, 1828. *The Taylor Papers*, p. 223.

CHAPTER XVII

The reader's attention must now be diverted for the first time to a new field of operations, of which, but for petty attacks and captures in the long struggle for empire against France, he has so far heard nothing. The British settlements on the West Coast of Africa had been originally established for the promotion of the slave trade; and the Royal African Company, together with its successor the African Company of Merchants, had ever since the seventeenth century sucked thereout no small advantage. The so-called settlements were simply fortified depots, and the jurisdiction of the governor or factor or chief (whatever his title) of each settlement extended no further than to the limits of his depot. There were tiny garrisons composed, since the end of the eighteenth century, of detachments of West India regiments and of the Royal African Corps, which latter was made up partly of coloured soldiers, partly of Europeans who had been relegated to its ranks lest a worse punishment—if a worse punishment existed—should befall them. Nevertheless, there was no question of territorial dominance over any continuous strip of the coast. Other nations, French, Dutch and Danes, had likewise their forts intermingled with those of the British; and it should seem that in all alike the officials had to seek for emolument in private trade rather than regular salary. Herein, therefore, was a frequent ground for petty quarrels, which were generally ended by the death of one party or of both; or if not, were healed by the bond

of common vitality, which could not but be potent in so deadly a climate.

The first attempt at true colonisation on the West Coast was made by a company of philanthropic men who subscribed large sums for the foundation of a settlement of liberated slaves at Sierra Leone, with a capital called by the name of Freetown. Zachary Macaulay, father of the historian, who had been an overseer in a Jamaican plantation, was the first governor; and though, within twelve months of his arrival, Freetown was destroyed and sacked by a squadron of French Sansculottes in September 1794, he set the ruined settlement upon its feet again by sheer industry and resolution, and did not resign his post until 1799. A few years later Freetown became the military and administrative head-quarters of the West African settlements.

In 1807 the Slave Trade was abolished; the occupation of the African Company came to an end; and after some years of hesitation their forts were in 1821 transferred to the British Government. The principal of these, which lay from eight hundred to a thousand miles east of Sierra Leone, were, from west to east, Cape Coast Castle and Accra. Immediately at the back of the Dutch settlement of Elmina and of Cape Coast Castle lay the country of the Fantis, and behind them again that of the Ashantis; and it so happened that at the beginning of the nineteenth century there had arisen a precisely similar situation to that which we have seen in Nepal and Burma. The Ashantis, like the Gurkhas, had established themselves as a formidable military power which, having subdued their immediate neighbours, threatened to come into collision with the British. 1821.

The Ashanti army had raided the Fantis and reached the coast for the first time in 1807. They had stormed a Dutch fort in 1808; they had made a second invasion in 1816, and a third in 1817, dragging off thousands of Fantis to slaughter at their capital, Kumasi, and

1820. blockading Cape Coast Castle. The trade with the Ashanti country being valuable, the British government had endeavoured to adjust all differences by negotiation. The authorities at Cape Coast had advanced money to the Fantis to buy off imminent danger, and in 1817 a Mr. Bowditch had actually concluded a treaty with the King of the Ashanti. But a savage host in the flush of conquest is not likely to be stopped by words. The King, having brought to subjection another rival tribe remote from the coast, sent emissaries among the Fantis to report the fact, and to demand from them a tribute which should help to adorn his triumphal entry into Kumasi. The Fantis in general complied, but the people of Cape Coast Castle refused; and on the 5th of January 1820, an Ashanti mission arrived at Cape Coast to repeat the King's demand with threats. Almost simultaneously a British envoy, Mr. Dupuis, proceeded to Kumasi and there concluded a new treaty, wherein it was declared that the natives of Cape Coast Town were subjects of the Ashanti King and must accept the consequences of this fact. Meanwhile the Ashanti mission remained at Cape Coast, though the natives there attempted to answer their claims by again borrowing the money required of them from the British. The situation became difficult and dangerous. Some would have it that the governor of Cape Coast had violated the treaty, though he himself threw the responsibility for the breach upon the Ashantis. To hold the balance between them is impossible, and any attempt to do so unprofitable. It must suffice that the government of Cape Coast Castle and the King of Ashanti were sharply at variance.

Meanwhile, to the great discomfort of the settlement, the Ashanti King rigidly interdicted all trade with Cape Coast; and his emissaries, still refusing to depart for Kumasi with the tribute that they had extorted, put forth further demands of jurisdiction over the natives of that settlement. Finally, in April 1821, one of these natives was murdered at Mori, to

east of Cape Coast Castle. Thereupon the troops of the fort were turned out and marched to Mori, where they dispersed a mixed force of Ashantis and of Fantis friendly to them, with a loss of some fifty killed; and the King was then given to understand that he should not be suffered to interfere in any matters within the cognisance of the British government at Cape Coast Castle. For the moment he seemed to accept the rebuff, but he still forbade any commerce with that particular place, and in January 1822 sent a message to the British governor which could only be construed as an insolent defiance. 1821. 1822.

At this juncture arrived Sir Charles Macarthy, with a commission to be governor-in-chief of all the settlements on the West Coast and to take them under the control of the Crown. He was sprung from an Irish family which had taken refuge in France; and he himself had sought service with the British Army after the Revolution. His career had led him first to the West Indian campaigns of 1795 and 1796, then to a captaincy in the Fifty-second when Moore was training the Light brigade at Shorncliffe, then in 1804 to a majority in the New Brunswick Fencibles—a fine corps of backwoodsmen—and lastly in 1811 to the lieutenant-colonelcy of the Royal African Corps. In 1812 he was appointed governor of Sierra Leone; and in 1820 he received the honour of knighthood. He was a zealous friend of the negroes, and seems to have been extremely popular among them. Probably no better man could have been found to reconcile the sulky agents of the extinct African Company to the rule of the Crown.

His visits to the various forts occupied the greater part of the months of March, April and May, 1822, when he returned to Sierra Leone well satisfied with all that he had seen. In November he was rudely shaken by the news that a sergeant of the Royal African Corps, a mulatto, belonging to the fort of Anamabo, a little to east of Cape Coast Castle, had been kidnapped

1823. by Ashantis and carried away into the interior. In February 1823, it was ascertained that the sergeant had been murdered; and Macarthy lost no time in proceeding first to Anamabo and thence to Cape Coast Castle. On the 21st of February intelligence arrived that the Ashantis who had murdered the sergeant were at Dunkwa, twenty miles to northward; and, without any notice to the regular troops, the local levies of Cape Coast were armed and hurried off to the scene of action at nightfall. Whether by accident or the treachery of their guides, they blundered into an ambuscade, and, though they had at their head a few of the Second West India Regiment and at least three regular officers, they were fain to retreat, having lost about fifty killed and wounded.

The result could not but be encouraging to the Ashantis; and the next message from the King, delivered to the Dutch governor of Elmina, was that the British would do well to enlarge Cape Coast Castle, as he intended to drive them into the sea. The next incident was the arrival of a party of Ashantis at Danish Accra to buy gunpowder, which party was intercepted by the British and dispersed with a loss of over fifty killed and some thirty prisoners. In June and July, Ashanti forces twice entered Fanti territory, but fell back upon the advance of British troops; and these last finally took up advanced positions at Nyankumasi, about twenty miles to north-east of Cape Coast Castle, and at Jukwa, about twelve miles to north-west of it, the latter station being occupied to prevent the Ashantis from penetrating to Elmina and obtaining from thence ammunition.

Throughout the closing months of 1823 Macarthy roamed from end to end of his government, heartening the waverers and encouraging the loyal among the native tribes, and finally returning to Cape Coast Castle at the end of November. His energy was indefatigable. He visited all the camps, walking most of the way on his own feet, presented colours to the

Royal African Corps, and finally, upon the news that 1823.
the Ashantis were marching in great force upon the coast, set out for Jukwa with the Royal African regiment, a small detachment of the Second West India regiment, and some native levies which passed under the name of the Cape Coast Militia. During the next few days he drilled his men in person, training them by sound of bugle to the work of forest-fighting, as became an old light infantryman and commander of backwoodsmen. Had he been as efficient in the business of transport and supply as in the theory of combat he might have gone far, for he was full of confidence in himself and knew not the meaning of doubt or of fear.

In the first week of January, 1824, his position was 1824.
as follows. The enemy was understood to be advancing on a broad front in twelve parties. To meet them, one column, composed chiefly of native levies, under Captain Blencarne of the African Corps, lay at Accra, fifty miles to eastward. In Macarthy's own sphere of operations a part of his force, chiefly native levies under Captain Laing, was at Manso, having moved thither northward from Nyankumasi; and the main and principal body, of the composition already described, was at Jukwa. A large body of the enemy was reported to be advancing southward into what was called the Wassaw country, west of the Pra, which river runs into the sea about twenty-six miles west of Cape Coast Castle; and the King of Wassaw had massed his warriors near the east bank of the Pra at Ampon, about twenty-five miles to north-west of Jukwa. Macarthy's orders were that Blencarne should advance northward from Accra, and Laing from Manso, to make diversions, while the main column from Jukwa should move to Ampon, whither he had already ordered one of his senior officers, Colonel Chisholm, to repair from Cape Coast Castle. He then designed to cross the Pra and strike in upon the left flank of the Ashantis' advance. For transport he depended

1824. upon native carriers, the only form of transport possible in a country where horses, mules, asses and oxen alike cannot live; and here he met with his first great difficulty. The natives asked an exorbitant price as carriers, alleging that their fellow-clansmen would despise them unless they shouldered a musket. Macarthy declined to pay these extravagant wages, with the natural result that at every favourable opportunity—and of these there were many during a march along narrow paths through tropical forest—the carriers threw down their loads and vanished. The reserve of ammunition, under Mr. Brandon, the ordnance-storekeeper, was sent round by sea to Sekondi, a little to the west of the mouth of the Pra, with orders to move up thence to Asamanka, some twenty-two miles to north-westward. Macarthy thought that he could venture to take this liberty, because his front to the west was covered by the friendly tribes of the Wassaws and Dinkeras; but it was hardly a sound arrangement to establish an advanced depot without a guard in a country which lay fully open to the enemy.

The bulk of the troops at Jukwa began their move-
Jan. 4. ment upon Ampon on the 4th of January 1824, marching in small bodies, owing to the difficulty of finding shelter and victuals. Macarthy himself was
Jan. 9. delayed by want of carriers until the 9th, when he set out on foot for Banso, a village seventeen miles to south-west, leaving eighty black recruits of the Royal African Corps, under an English ensign, one hundred and seventy black militia, officered by merchants of Cape Coast, and a rabble of two hundred natives under their own captain, to follow him. The troops and militia got into Banso the same evening, much fatigued; but the rabble did not arrive until late the next day; and the advance could not be continued until the 11th. By that time all the carriers who had come from Jukwa had disappeared; and the unfortunate brigade-major, Major Ricketts of the Royal

African Corps, who was in command of the rear-guard, was obliged to impress carriers, male and female, and drive them along at the bayonet's point. There were a good many carriers and loads missing at the end of the day's march. 1824.

However, on the evening of the 11th the little column reached the Pra at Himan, and on the 12th descended the left bank over precipitous hills and across swamps more than knee-deep to the village of Daboase, eight miles distant as the crow flies. This place the troops reached late in the day, worn out with fatigue, while the rabble straggled along a considerable distance in rear. On the morning of the 13th, the troops crossed the Pra in eight canoes, each carrying one paddler and two passengers; and Macarthy caught up the company of Royal Africans, as soon as they had passed the water, and pressed on some fifteen miles to Akisuma, which, however, they and the militia reached not until the afternoon of the 15th. Here Macarthy halted to allow the rabble to join him; and, learning that the Wassaws and another friendly tribe, the Dinkeras, were retreating before the Ashantis from want of victuals, he on the 17th summoned Chisholm to join him with his whole force from Ampon without delay. He also sent his colonial secretary, a Mr. Williams, westward to rally the Wassaws and Dinkeras and to mark out a camp for them. Williams found both tribes very unwilling to arrest their flight; and Macarthy was obliged on the 19th to send off, at a moment's notice, Ricketts with the company of regulars and the militia to stay them. After a terrible march of twenty miles, under heavy rain and through mud waist-deep, Ricketts reached Williams early next day on the bank of the Adomanso. He arrived just in time to prevent, forcibly, with his militia the flight of the Wassaws westward across the river; and presently an alarm was given that the Ashantis were advancing. The Wassaws took up their position; messengers were despatched to warn Macarthy; but

Jan. 11.

Jan. 13.

Jan. 15.

Jan. 17.

Jan. 19.

1824. darkness came down without further sign of the enemy, and, as the Ashantis never fought at night, the weary host lay down to rest.

Jan. 21. Early on the 21st Macarthy came up to the Adomanso, without his rabble, but with a body-guard of two hundred Fantis which had been sent to him by one of the chiefs. He was absolutely incredulous as to the reported proximity of the Ashantis, and was in conference with the Wassaw chiefs when once again the alarm was given. The line was promptly formed, Macarthy's body-guard taking care to remove itself as far as possible from him; and at 2 P.M. the Ashantis were heard to be within half a mile of the array. They were evidently in great force, for a native in Macarthy's army was able to certify the presence of many chiefs by the distinctive calls sounded on their horns. Macarthy ordered the band of the Royal African Corps to play "God Save the King," and immediately afterwards the Ashantis lined the opposite bank of the river, which was but twenty yards broad, and the action began. The enemy attempted to cross the water by trees which had been felled to serve as bridges, but they were driven back with great slaughter, until at about 4 P.M. Macarthy's ammunition began to fail. He rushed to Brandon, who had arrived in the middle of the fight in advance of his stores, but could learn only that they had not come up; and in fact, despite the efforts of the escort, the carriers had thrown down their loads and disappeared. Furious with rage, Macarthy threatened to hang Brandon on the spot, and the unlucky storekeeper only saved his neck by incontinently concealing himself. The Wassaws by this time were in full flight; but the Dinkeras with the little party of regulars and militia were still fighting bravely, and Macarthy attempted to organise an orderly retreat. He was too late. The river had fallen until it was fordable, and the Ashantis, being four or five to one, were able to throw forward both wings and surround the few brave men who still held out. Macarthy,

already wounded in two places, was speedily despatched, and with him eight other white men, either colonial or military officers, including Brandon. Williams was disabled and taken prisoner. Ricketts, and the ensign of the African Corps, though severely hurt, contrived to reach the Pra with a certain number of the fugitives; and there, meeting an advanced party of European soldiers from Chisholm's force, they found themselves in safety. Of the handful of militia and regular troops with Macarthy, one hundred and seventy-seven were killed or missing and ninety were wounded, many of whom died later at Cape Coast Castle of hardship and privation. 1824. Jan. 21.

Altogether the victory of the Ashantis was crushing; and they deserved it. They had completely outwitted and outmanœuvred Macarthy, giving out that they were advancing in small divisions, whereas they were concentrated in one mass. Williams, while a prisoner in their hands, observed that their discipline and regularity in the performance of their duties was astonishing. There is no need to point out the faults committed by Macarthy. It is possible that some of them were forced by circumstances upon him; but perhaps his most striking lapse from military duty was that he sent but one single messenger on the 17th to summon Chisholm, and made no attempt to repeat his orders until the 21st. Both letters reached Chisholm on the 22nd, within an hour of each other; when, realising the danger of the situation, he took a short cut by a bad path to the Pra. Since, however, he had but one small canoe in which to cross the river, the passage occupied the whole of the 23rd. On the 24th he made a forced march of twenty-one miles; and then, hearing of the disaster, he decided to retire to Cape Coast Castle lest the Ashantis should reach it before him. They had, of course, Macarthy's reserve of ammunition at Asamanka to replenish their stores, and would therefore be well equipped for such a venture. On the 25th, therefore, Chisholm re-crossed the Pra upon such Jan. 22. Jan. 24. Jan. 25.

1824. frail rafts as could be improvised on the spot, thereby
Jan. 25. incurring the loss of yet more ammunition and a great quantity of arms, and reached Cape Coast Castle late in the evening. The British officer in command of the advanced guard died of fatigue before the march was well begun, which may give some idea of the ordeal undergone by Chisholm's force during these four arduous days.

On his arrival Chisholm found that Laing, having heard of Macarthy's disaster before him, had already brought back his troops to Cape Coast Castle; whereupon he decided that a force must be pushed out to meet the enemy farther from home. The native levies were, however, thoroughly scared; and it was with difficulty that some three hundred of them were induced to follow Laing, with a detachment of the African Corps, to Jukwa. Happily, the Ashantis seem to have been so much overjoyed through the capture of the depot at Asamanka that they lingered there for several weeks, and, so far as could be ascertained, meditated no advance until the 1st of March. There was therefore time to collect from Accra militia and native troops to the number of six to eight thousand muskets, and dispose them to defend the passage of the Pra, the right bank of which appears to have been occupied by the Ashantis from the vicinity of Asamanka to the sea. The British force, after passing in a few weeks from the command of Laing to that of Ricketts, now finally, owing to the sickness of these two officers, found itself under the orders of Blencarne.

March. Skirmishes—or rather, abortive waste of ammunition—occurred almost daily across the Pra; and the native levies, anxious to return to their homes, talked big of an attack upon the Ashanti camp, and began cutting paths through the forest in order to approach it. Blencarne endeavoured to dissuade them from so rash a venture, but, finding them inexorable, prepared to support them. The natives accordingly moved forward within striking distance, the enemy

being quite unconscious of their presence, and seem to have been in a position to surprise the Ashantis completely. At the last moment, however, they were seized with panic, swam back over the Pra, losing several men, two thousand muskets and a large quantity of ammunition in the course of the passage, and dispersed. The Ashantis, awakened by the clamour, advanced; and Blencarne, finding himself alone with his few regulars and militia, was fain to retreat on the 2nd of April to Cape Coast Castle. Such was the prevalence of sickness among the British officers on the Pra, that one only had strength to visit the outposts; and upon him accordingly the whole of this anxious duty was thrown. 1824. March. April 2.

On the 10th, by Chisholm's order, Blencarne moved out again to Afutu, eight miles north-west of Cape Coast Castle, pushing on such native levies as he could collect to Dompin, about the same distance to westward. There the Ashantis made a false attack upon them on the 25th of April, drew them forward by a feigned retreat of their centre and then, wheeling both flanks upon them, destroyed many and scattered the remnant in flight. Blencarne advanced at once to the sound of the firing, but arrived too late; and, hearing that the enemy was cutting paths in every direction towards Afutu, he decided to retreat forthwith. Before the last of his troops had left the village, the Ashantis entered it and very nearly cut off a British officer and a few European soldiers in one of the houses. These, however, escaped, and forming a rear-guard, which apparently had not until that moment been thought of, beat the enemy back with some loss. April 10. April 25.

The advanced parties of the Ashanti army then moved to within five miles of Cape Coast Castle, and there halted to await the arrival of the main body. Chisholm arrayed such troops as he had over against them; and with much difficulty a force of six thousand men, chiefly natives, was assembled. Designing to attack before the Ashanti reinforcements should come

1824. up, Chisholm began to cut paths towards the enemy's
May 18. position; and on the 18th of May he was heartened by the arrival of the King's ship *Driver* with reinforcements from Sierra Leone. Marines were landed to garrison the castle so that every soldier might be released to take part in the coming fight. The action
May 21. began at 1 P.M. on the 21st of May, when the attackers emerged from the paths in many columns in single file, to find that the Ashantis had cleared the ground before their line so as to obtain a good field of fire, and had massed themselves in the forest beyond. They made repeated attempts to turn the British flanks, but were beaten off at all points with heavy loss, and after five hours' fighting retired. But three thousand Fantis, who had stood out resolutely for the post of honour before the battle, had fled away in panic at the first shot, carrying tidings of disaster with them. The victorious troops were obliged to fall back for some distance in order to obtain water; and under the influence of this double discouragement the whole of the native auxiliaries dispersed. It was, therefore, impossible to renew the attack next day, as had been intended; and Colonel Sutherland, who had arrived with the troops from Sierra Leone, now took over the command from Chisholm, and withdrew his whole force, except a small party of observation, within the Castle.

May 28. On the 28th the main body of the Ashanti army reached Afutu. Their old King was dead, but his brother and successor sent a message to Cape Coast that he meant to drive the English out and throw every stone of the castle into the sea. It was not until the 21st of June, however, that he advanced, and
June 23. not till the 23rd that he displayed his whole force within sight of Cape Coast Castle. There was wild alarm in the fort. Five thousand native women and children, refugees from the neighbouring villages, came in and amid frantic confusion squeezed themselves through the wicket with piteous cries. Seamen and

marines were drawn from the King's ship *Victor* and from the merchant-vessels in the roads to man the guns; and every preparation was made to meet a general attack. But on the 24th the enemy drew back to their old position four or five miles to north-westward, and thence threw out strong parties in every direction to lay waste the country and destroy the villages even as far as Anamabo. In that settlement also there were terrible scenes. Women and children came flying into the castle, and there were soon more mouths than could be fed. Famine, dysentery and smallpox made havoc among them; but still the castle yard was so densely crowded that a man could not cross it without treading upon human creatures. The filth and stench were appalling; and heavy rain swept the foul matter into the tanks of drinking water. The troops were little better off than the natives. The very officers had neither meat nor flour, and but little rice. The men of the little garrison died daily from exhaustion, want of food and contaminated water. Had not a ship come in from Sierra Leone with provisions, every soul must have perished. 1824. June 24.

Yet the garrison of Cape Coast Castle could do nothing to prevent the devastation by the Ashantis. It numbered, besides a few militia and a very small unorganised native force, but three hundred and sixty men, of whom one-third were in hospital. However, on the 4th of July the King's ship *Thetis* arrived from England with a draft of officers and men for the Royal African Corps; and therewith the enemy called in their detachments and on the 7th once more concentrated before Cape Coast Castle. The King's tent was plainly visible, and even his movements could be observed through a telescope, while his officers flaunted themselves in the uniforms of British officers and men who had been slain. It was an anxious moment, for ball was scarce, and every scrap of pewter from the houses, and of lead from water-pipes, roofs and ships had been taken to make bullets and slugs. However, July 4. July 7.

1824. on the 6th five thousand natives had arrived from Accra and other points to leeward, who were armed as well as the circumstances permitted, and set to work to cut paths towards the enemy's position. On the afternoon of the 11th a skirmish led to a general engagement with no advantage to the enemy, who made further demonstrations of attack on the 12th and 13th, and kept their watch-fires burning all through the night
July 14. of the 13th. But in the morning of the 14th it was found that they had retreated. They also had suffered from famine, smallpox and dysentery until discipline had failed and many whole bodies had deserted. The demonstrations on the 12th and 13th had in fact been made by marching the same men round and round a hill, from the forest into the open, from the open into the forest, and from the forest once again into the open. The Ashantis needed no instruction in the stratagems of war.

Even now they retreated no farther than to a distance of six miles, in order to purchase fresh supplies and stores from the Dutch settlement of Elmina. Accordingly Colonel Grant of the Royal African Corps, who had arrived from England on the 18th with a few gunners and rocket-men, approached the Dutch governor with a request to land troops there. The governor professed to accept the offer with thankfulness, but at the last moment declared that his natives would not permit the British to land, and that he could not control them. The fact was that, since the blockade of Cape Coast Castle, all the Ashanti trade had gone to Elmina, and the Dutch had made much profit of it. So with the connivance of the Dutch, the Ashantis kept a safe base on the coast for their operations at Cape Coast Castle; and the war dragged on. Officers and men continued to die. Chisholm, who had served on the coast since 1809, succumbed to the climate at last in October, when on the point of returning home; and his death, lamented by all classes and all nations, threw a deep gloom over Cape Coast Castle.

In March 1825, there at last arrived what seemed 1825.
to be a formidable armament, no fewer than three transports, containing European soldiers of the Royal African Corps from England, and two hundred men of the Second West India regiment from Sierra Leone, the whole under command of Major-general Turner. This officer, who enjoyed a great reputation for being able to handle the most intractable men, issued a proclamation to the effect that the Dutch at Elmina had better be careful, and that he would never make peace with the Ashantis till they ceased to claim tribute or subjection from the surrounding natives. This done, he sent the men of the Second West India regiment to the West Indies, no doubt by order, landed a few of the African Corps at Cape Coast Castle and took the rest back to Sierra Leone, where, within twelve months, he died.

However, the threat to Elmina was evidently potent, for the Ashantis did not again threaten the coast for a year, and then not at Cape Coast but at Accra, where the Danish governor had from the outset seconded cordially the British in their contest with their formidable enemy. The force assembled to meet this invasion included a detachment of the Royal African Corps, with three British officers; four disciplined bodies of natives each about one hundred and twenty strong under four European merchants of Cape Coast Castle and Accra, and a fifth body under a native chief. These, with one or two small guns and a party of rocket-men, formed the centre, numbering in all three hundred and eighty muskets, with some five thousand native levies upon either flank; the whole being under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Purdon.

Advancing twenty-four miles north-east of Accra, 1826.
Purdon met the Ashantis, about ten thousand strong, on an open plain, near the village of Dodowah; and a general action began at 9.30 A.M. on the 7th of August. Aug. 7.
The plan of the Ashantis seems to have been to isolate, if possible, the little body of white men in the

1826. Aug. 7. centre and envelop them, according to their usual tactics, on both flanks. They were partly foiled by a vigorous and successful onslaught by the natives on the British right, but they succeeded, by means of taunts, in tempting a part of the centre to advance four hundred yards, when breaking through the natives on its left, they poured a galling fire on its left flank and compelled it to fall back. Purdon, however, who had kept a small body in reserve against any such mishap, now threw it into action. A few rockets, fired at the right moment, spread terror and confusion into the ranks of the Ashantis, and some rounds of grape, poured upon the victorious enemy on the left, checked their onslaught. The native levies rallied, and the whole line, advancing, bore the enemy back beyond recall. The fight was savage on both sides, the combatant natives pressing furiously to close quarters with the knife, and inflicting frightful wounds alike on the able and the fallen. The allies of the British had many wrongs to avenge, and they avenged them after their kind with unspeakable mutilation. By 1 P.M. all was over. Five thousand of the Ashantis had fallen, or had been taken. Their camp with all their gold and baggage was plundered by those who had been most backward in the fight; and their captives were hurried away beyond British jurisdiction to be sold as slaves. The loss of the British and their native allies was reckoned at eight hundred killed and a thousand slightly wounded; one European officer alone being hurt. Such a battle-field had never been witnessed by British troops before, nor is likely to be seen again, with its wild turmoil of savages, mad with bloodshed, cutting, stabbing, ripping, with the scorching sun overhead, and acres of dry grass, kindled by the rockets, burning under foot. Night fell at last; and the British lay on their arms, lest the King of Ashanti should yet again try his fortune on the morrow. All through the hours of darkness was heard the wailing of the Ashanti women over their

dead; and when the light came the enemy was gone. 1826.
The Ashantis had been decisively beaten at last.

In September they sent envoys to sue for peace. The British stipulated that they should pay four thousand ounces of gold as indemnity and send two persons of high rank as hostages to Cape Coast Castle. The negotiations were prolonged for months and years, but were terminated at last in April 1831, when the King of Ashanti sent his son and nephew as hostages, together with six hundred ounces of gold as security for good behaviour towards the Europeans on the Gold Coast; and so, in the language of the Old Testament, the land had rest forty years.

It may perhaps be objected that this campaign, carried on by a mere handful of British troops, and those of the worst description, together with a horde of African tribes, hardly deserves to find a place in the history of the British Army. Yet it was carried to a successful issue by a few British regimental officers; and it is the British regimental officer who has conquered the British Empire. The Royal African Corps beyond question did not include, as a body, the choicest of his kind, nor were the men—outcasts on account of crime from other regiments—ideal representatives of the British private soldier. Yet there was such an officer as Chisholm, who was loved and respected by all, and there were others, such as Ricketts, who, having lived long on the coast, must have been sober, clean-living, self-respecting men to have for so long eluded death. When, after Macarthy's defeat, Ricketts, exhausted by wounds and fatigue, staggered up to the two men of his regiment by the Pra, and asked them if they knew him, they could not recognise the ghastly face until he told them his name. And then they took it in turns to carry him on their backs for some miles to a village; and when, even then, Ricketts could not rest until he had found Chisholm, they made a rude basket, impressed a black man as guide, and made shift to carry him on their heads,

1826. slashing away the branches that impeded their passage. And this was in the stifling gloom of the West African forest, where white men are better accustomed to be carried themselves than to carry others. Yet even there the sense of duty made the wounded and prostrate officer persist in finding the superior to whom he must make a report which was vital to the safety of the force and of the settlement. And the men, as usual, cheerfully fell in with the desire of their officer. They may have been, both of them, criminals; they may have been doubly-dyed incorrigible scoundrels, with backs scarred by the lash and consciences seared with a red-hot iron. But when the time of trial came they did their duty, and more than their duty, as British soldiers.

CHAPTER XVIII

From India, Ceylon and West Africa I turn to the old gate of India, the Cape of Good Hope. It will be remembered that the Colony had been twice wrested from the Dutch in the course of the great war, once in 1795, when the British occupied it until the Peace of Amiens, and again and finally in 1806. Yet strangely enough, it was during the first brief occupation that the British, quite unwittingly, called up against themselves an enemy whose power, after disturbing the peace of South Africa, directly or indirectly, during two full generations, was not finally broken until 1879. 1795–1828.

The Dutch settlers, ever since the foundation of Capetown in 1652, had inevitably come into conflict with the native tribes, and were bound under a quasi-military organisation to assemble, when called upon, for defence. Some of the natives, the Hottentots, they had so far tamed as to employ them as servants and even to form them into regiments of disciplined soldiers; but the Bantu tribes, known by the generic name of Kaffirs, as was natural, resented the intrusion of the white men upon their land; and the bickering and quarrelling between the two was incessant. The white population of the Colony was but scanty. In 1819, when British immigrants had somewhat swelled its numbers, it little exceeded forty-two thousand souls; and these, even when eked out by some twenty-five thousand Hottentots and thirty-five thousand negro slaves, neither of them of unshakable loyalty, were but a handful with which to hold the tip

1795–1828. of a vast continent against an unknown number of Bantu. Nevertheless the Dutch settlers had spread wide in the course of a century and a half. The boundaries were vague and ill-defined ; but in 1800, when the British for the first time made an effort to determine them, the eastern marches extended to the Fish river, nearly five hundred miles, as the crow flies, from Capetown, and the northern to the Büffles river, three hundred miles from the same capital; the extreme width between the two rivers being some six hundred miles. Of the more important townships, Swellendam, a hundred miles east of Capetown, had been founded in 1746, and Graaf Reinet, some three hundred miles farther to north and east, in 1786. But the settlements in the far east lay at the mercy of Kaffir raids ; and the problem which baffled both the Dutch and the British was that of coming to a neighbourly agreement with tribes which could not resist the temptation of cattle-lifting, nor find place in their rude political philosophy for such an idea as that of an inviolable frontier.

In such circumstances it was inevitable that a garrison of some strength should be maintained in the Cape Colony, though it was quite impossible that this should be numerous enough for the effective watching of some five hundred miles of frontier. While the war against the French Empire lasted, a regiment of dragoons was maintained at the Cape ; but this was withdrawn in 1817 and replaced by a small Colonial Corps, of mixed cavalry and infantry, composed of Hottentots and half-breeds, which, though it grew ultimately into the very efficient force known as the Cape Mounted Rifles, was not at the outset of any great worth. At the same time a Hottentot regiment of infantry was disbanded, and made way for the Royal African Corps, which, as we have seen, was to all intent a disciplinary battalion, made up of captured deserters and of men who had commuted heavy penal sentences for this particular service. The African

Corps, therefore, unless commanded by an officer of peculiar gifts, was not to be rated at a very high military value. Besides these, there were three battalions of the Line, generally very weak, and two companies of artillery; so that practically the garrison amounted to about two thousand five hundred regular European troops of all descriptions. Had the Kaffirs remained unchanged in their primitive methods of fighting, namely, sallying out as an undisciplined mob for raids lasting only a few days, this handful of battalions might have sufficed to protect the Colony, if not to subdue the savage tribes; but, by a curious chain of circumstances, the disciplined British troops by their mere example raised up against themselves a most formidable rival, whose sudden emergence altered the whole course of history in South Africa. We have seen how in India Hyder Ali, the Mahratta chieftains and the Nepalese imitated the European military training and organisation, and succeeded in producing only an indifferent copy of the original. In South Africa a man of genius, rejecting merely superficial features, adapted the essence of the European principle to the character of his own people and became a mighty conqueror. 1795–1828.

In 1799 the settlement called the Zuurfeld, lying between the Fish and Bushman rivers and bounded to south by the ocean, was invaded by a horde of Kosas —the tribe inhabiting the district immediately to east of the Fish river—and the settlers were put to flight. It so happened that a small party of British troops, under command of Brigadier-general Vandeleur, was in the district, charged with the duty of suppressing a petty insurrection of the Dutch burghers. The general had no intention and no desire to fight the Kosas, but they were foolish enough to attack him, and were beaten off with very heavy loss. Among the combatants in the ranks of the Kaffirs was Dingiswayo, chief of a tribe called the Abatewa, who took the lesson to heart, formed his warriors into regiments, and trained and disciplined both men and officers for the business of

1795–1828. war. Among his recruits was a young refugee from the Zulus, then an insignificant tribe on the Umvolosi river, by name Chaka, who, upon Dingiswayo's death in a skirmish, was chosen by the army to succeed him. Chaka then took up Dingiswayo's work and carried military discipline and organisation to the highest pitch of perfection. To question, or even to reflect before executing, an order, signified instant death; and nowhere in the world was obedience so prompt as in Chaka's army. If one regiment hesitated to undertake some desperate task, others were eager to destroy the laggards and to do the work in their place. Not even in Prussia was so wonderful a fighting machine to be found; and it was governed by the sole will and pleasure of its creator. No one dared to approach him unless unarmed and in a crouching posture; and so jealous was he of rivalry among members of his own family that he allowed no son of his to live. His military tactics were simple. His army was drawn up in two divisions: the advanced division in the form of a crescent, so as to make an enveloping attack; the rear in a solid square, so as to act as a reserve. Together his warriors numbered some forty or fifty thousand, one and all of them devoted to their leader, whom they rightly recognised to be a man of genius.

With this host Chaka swept down upon the tribes between Delagoa Bay and the Umzimvubu river, whose mouth lies about one hundred and fifty miles south of Durban, and pursued a war of extermination. No conquest was to him complete unless his enemies were utterly destroyed. A few of the comeliest girls might be spared as spoil of their conquerors, and a few lads to act as slaves. Occasionally a clan or two saved themselves by begging to be incorporated with the Zulu power, and to be subjected to the Zulu rule. All others, male and female, young and old, were slaughtered. Such was the chief's command, and it was obeyed. The result was that the district which is

now called Natal, together with a tract as large again to north of it and a considerable area to south of it, once densely populated, was turned into a desert. The threatened tribes, fleeing from the wrath to come, fell upon each other and fought furiously in the effort to find a haven of safety. Theirs was a hard fate, for they lay between the hammer of the Zulus on the east and the anvil of the European settlers on the west. Small wonder that until the Zulus were finally brought to account, not without difficulty and indeed moments of deadly peril, there was no settled peace for South Africa. 1795–1828.

It must be said for the British administrators that they did their utmost to conciliate the Kaffirs, and to enable them to live at peace with their white neighbours on the border-land of the Zuurfeld, but always in vain. In 1812 Governor Sir John Cradock, whom we saw last in Portugal, was obliged to call out eight hundred burghers and, joining them to twelve hundred regular troops, to drive the Kaffirs back over the Fish river. The troops being under the actual command of Colonel Graham, their headquarters were called by the name of Grahamstown, a name of which we shall hear much in the years before us. This petty campaign is dignified by South African chroniclers with the name of the Fourth Kaffir War, that of 1799 being the Third. At its close the Zuurfeld received the name of Albany; and Cradock tried in 1814 to secure it by offering land on liberal terms to settlers. One hundred and five families accepted the offer; but within three years ninety of them had abandoned their farms in despair. Despite of a chain of military posts on the Fish river, marauding parties of Kaffirs were continually crossing the water and stealing their cattle; and, upon such terms, the making of a livelihood was hopeless. Then, in 1817, Cradock's successor, Lord Charles Somerset, sought an interview with the heads of the principal clans west of the Kei, and above all with Gaika, nominally the paramount chief of many of them; and a formal agreement was made whereby

1795–1828. Europeans were permitted to follow stolen cattle over the Kaffir borders, and, upon tracing it to any Kaffir kraal, to call upon that kraal to make good the damage. Cattle-lifting, however, went on as usual; and the next complication was that Gaika, being defeated in a great battle by a native enemy, Ndlambe by name, appealed to the British for help. A small force of burghers, with a handful of regular troops,[1] accordingly crossed the Fish river in December 1818, fell upon Ndlambe in concert with the Gaikas, defeated him utterly, and then returned and was broken up, its work having apparently been done. Ndlambe, however, recovering himself, took his revenge upon the Gaikas, and turned in wrath upon the Colony, driving the settlers from their property and murdering every white man, including two British officers, that he could lay hands upon.

Accordingly in March 1819 a strong burgher force was called out; but, before it could be assembled, Ndlambe, on the 22nd of April 1819, attacked Grahamstown in great force. The place was held only by some three hundred and thirty men, chiefly of the native Cape corps, with a small leaven of the Thirty-eighth; but these, at no greater loss to themselves than three killed and five wounded, sufficed to beat off the enemy with great slaughter. Preparations were then urged forward for invasion of the hostile territory; and a force of some thirty-four hundred men, one-third of them regular troops,[2] was assembled on the frontier under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Thomas Willshire of the Thirty-eighth. Seven hundred of the Europeans and one hundred and fifty

[1] Of the 38th and 72nd.

[2]

38th, 72nd, Royal African Corps	1100
R.A.	32
Cape Corps	220
Hottentot levies	150
Mounted Burghers	1850
	3352

of the Cape Corps were left to guard the posts on the frontier; and the remainder crossed the Fish river in three columns between the 22nd and 31st of July. Within a fortnight they had broken the power of Ndlambe, driven his warriors with heavy loss to the Kei and captured thirty thousand cattle. In October Lord Charles Somerset met as many of the chiefs lately in arms against him as would consent to be present, required them to acknowledge Gaika as their head, and with Gaika concluded a verbal agreement, whereby the Kaffir boundary was pushed back to the Keiskamma river; the new frontier running up that river to its head and thence westward along a branch of the Winterberg range, which forms the watershed between the Kat and Keiskamma rivers. There was further an understanding that the tract between the Fish and the Keiskamma should be occupied not by settlers but by soldiers only, so that it should be in the nature of what is called a buffer-state, with no cattle grazing upon it to attract the Kaffirs. 1795–1828.

This was annexation pure and simple, though it was masked by the name of a concession; and the act was denounced as a cruel wrong by philanthropic societies in England. At this period the question of the emancipation of the slaves was very prominent in the mother-country, and had evoked a great deal of sentiment, chiefly just and honourable, but not wholly unleavened by faction, nor even by personal spite, in favour of native races. Specious half truths and complete untruths promulgated by ambitious and unscrupulous missionaries did not help to make matters easier between the settlers and the Kaffirs. It is quite impossible for the colonist, who sees the fruit of years of intense toil and hardship swept away in a single night, to look upon the black man who has ruined him with the benevolent eyes of the well-fed, well-clothed, well-warmed and well-housed philanthropist of London, who, during his entire life, has never lacked a meal, never slept out of a bed, never seen

1795–1828. wife and children in danger and never had a debit balance at his banker's. To hold the scales evenly between two such parties is out of the question, and to attempt to do so is not merely hopeless but childish. Somerset's action must, therefore, be treated purely as a military measure, and as such must be commended. The lower course of the Fish river was so densely clothed with thicket as to afford an ideal hiding-place for cattle-thieves ; and the work of clearing this bush during the late campaign had been so arduous as to convince military officers that it should not be allowed again to fall into the possession of the Kaffirs. A permanent post of stone, Fort Willshire, was built on the Keiskamma river at the narrowest point of the ceded territory ; and so ended what is called the Fifth Kaffir War.

In 1819 the Imperial Treasury granted £50,000 for the expense of transporting emigrants from the United Kingdom to the Zuurfeld ; and in 1821 Sir Rufane Donkin, who administered the government during Somerset's absence on leave, gave grants of land in the same district to disbanded officers and men of the Royal African Corps, laying out a village which he named Fredericksburg, in honour of the Duke of York. To this same period belongs the foundation of the village of Bathurst, called after the Secretary of State, and Port Elizabeth, which Donkin christened after his deceased wife. After many vicissitudes and not a few removals the immigrants finally settled down; and commercial traffic under strict regulation grew up between them and the Kaffirs. But meanwhile Somerset, for some unknown reason, in 1821 broke through his own resolution to allow none but soldiers to occupy the ceded territory, and permitted Makoma, a son of Gaika, with a considerable number of followers, to seat themselves in the valleys of the Kat river. Other chiefs with their clans followed Makoma, and very soon cattle-stealing from the white settlers revived with all its pristine vigour. There were, of course,

counter-raids to recover the lost property, some carried out according to regulations which seem to have been changed by each successive governor during his tenure of office; others, about which history is silent, that were probably governed by no other rules than the angry impulse of the settlers. In fact, the situation was one of constant menace and danger. 1795–1828.

The policy of the British Ministry in the administration of the Cape Colony, as indeed towards the Empire in general, was dictated by two leading principles, economy and humanity; and, so long as the guidance of those principles be followed with understanding, it is not possible to better them. To lighten the burden of the British taxpayer, to protect the native tribes against cruelty or oppression, and to cultivate peaceful relations with them were and are most laudable objects in themselves. But economy must not be degraded into subservience to the clamour of fanatics at Westminster, nor must humanity be governed by the bray of fanatics in Exeter Hall. If white men shrink from dealing out hard measure to black men, they should abstain from foisting themselves upon the black man's country. It is true that, in theory, the white man may convert the black man to his own way of thinking, principally, according to the view of many excellent and earnest men, by carrying to them the gospel of Jesus Christ. But let a missionary be never so intelligent, sympathetic and saintly, it is a task beyond his powers, even if perchance he can reconcile it to his conscience, to persuade black men to yield up their territory peaceably to white men. It is useless to blink the fact that to found white settlements in a black man's country must sooner or later signify war, or something indistinguishable from it. This truth is unwelcome to many Englishmen, who accordingly try to salve their consciences by ensuring that, wherever his countrymen may go, the authorised English version of the Bible shall follow them, and by taking the part of the black man against the white whenever a dispute

1795–1828. or a quarrel may arise between them. But the truth it is; and it was a fault in British Ministers that they did not face it.

There was some excuse for them. The Cape was a new and a distant colony, about which little was known and exact information was difficult to obtain. Tribal institutions, whether in South Africa or elsewhere, had been little studied ; and much knowledge, which is now common property, was then unattainable. It was difficult to check the statements of local missionaries and local journalists with which political and religious fanatics were primed; and it saved Ministers a deal of trouble to yield to their clamour and to assume them to be right. The organisation of the humane party was extremely good, and its agents—it would perhaps be truer to say, its masters—in the Cape Colony itself were very unscrupulous. The most conspicuous of them was a Scottish Independent Minister of humble origin, named Philip, a man of some parts, intense energy and insatiable ambition. He was one of those individuals, not uncommon at all times and particularly abundant at the present, who had learning enough to fill him with conceit, but too little to inform him of the plenitude of his ignorance ; who was too fond of power to have any love to spare for truth ; who could conceive of no divine verities excepting his own opinions; and who held it righteous to exalt these by all the resources of human guile. Whether any good was interred with Philip's bones, when his long life closed in 1851, is doubtful; but it is certain that the evil which he did continues to this day.

Lastly, it must be borne in mind that the lesson of the American rebellion had sunk deep into the hearts of British political students. Not only had the old dream of Empire been rudely dispelled, but the citizens of the young Republic, belying their professed love of liberty, had actually joined the tyrant of Europe in arms against their own kin. A new Empire had

been conquered, but the conquest was far from welcome. 1795–
Colonies were a burden and an expense, costing money 1828.
alike for administration and defence; and, when they should have been with much trouble nurtured into maturity, they would presumably go the way of America, sever themselves from the mother-country and perhaps turn against her. The best that man dared hope for from them was a friendly parting; the utmost that men prayed for was that the parting might be not only friendly but speedy.

In such circumstances it was inevitable that the Colonial Office should incessantly enjoin upon the governors the retrenchment of military expenditure and cultivation of friendship with the Kaffir tribes. By a strange irony the governors selected for this duty were invariably military men, Lord Charles Somerset, Sir Rufane Donkin, Major-general Richard Bourke and Sir Lowry Cole, the last named familiar to us as the former commander of Wellington's Fourth Division; and at least they fulfilled their instructions with strict military obedience. In 1825 a local levy for the defence of the Zuurfeld, now better known by its name of Albany, was disbanded, and the British settlers were placed on the same footing for purposes of defence as the Dutch burghers. In 1827 the infantry of a regular Hottentot regiment was disbanded, and the cavalry was converted into the Cape Mounted Rifles, two hundred and fifty strong, which, so far as they went, were a very efficient local constabulary, though far too weak for so vast an extent of frontier. The older chiefs, Gaika and Ndlambe, had died in 1828, but Gaika had left a youthful son, by name Sandile, during whose boyhood the chieftainship was held by an elder son. This was Makoma, whose name has already been mentioned, a brave and powerful warrior, who loathed the white man with his whole soul and welcomed all restless and adventurous Kaffir spirits to his kraal between the Tyumie and the Keiskamma rivers. Tyali, his half brother, lay to

1834. east of him on the Mankazana, and yet another chief, Eno, to south-west of him on the middle Keiskamma. Cattle-lifting had never ceased; and Sir Benjamin D'Urban, who came governor to Capetown in January 1834, brought with him instructions from the Colonial Secretary to foster amity with the Kaffir tribes by stationing residents among them, and to bribe the chiefs with small annual presents to restrain their followers from cattle-stealing. This recommendation seems to have been based upon a mixture of East Indian and North-American experience, the idea of residents echoing Lord Wellesley's policy towards the Mahratta chieftains, while the annual presents recall the renewal of the covenant-chain with the Five Nations at Albany on the Hudson. Such is the official mind, at all times and in all countries. If, instead of official precedents, the clerks had studied the ways of cattle-raiders and the family history of the Elliots, the Kerrs and the Rutherfords, they might have arrived at a juster estimate of the situation.

However, D'Urban, a veteran whom we have known in the Peninsula, rightly thought it his duty to obey orders. Soon after his arrival he intimated to the Kaffir chiefs that he hoped shortly to visit them and to come to a friendly agreement with them, and that meanwhile he hoped that they would show the like amicable disposition by preventing their people from stealing the cattle of the settlers. This done, he sent instructions to the officers on the frontier prohibiting the employment of force against the Kaffirs. Military patrols were indeed permitted to follow the traces of stolen cattle and of their thieves, but were forbidden to use their arms except for purposes of defence in the last extremity. The result of this order, and of other regulations, equally foolish, for the preservation of peace on the marches by sparing the feelings of the Kaffirs, was to increase cattle-stealing to an unprecedented degree. D'Urban found too much business awaiting him at Capetown to allow him to proceed to

the frontier. The tribes began to think that the British were afraid of them; and Makoma and Tyali, having a grievance against the government, made every preparation for war. The troops on the border were harassed to death, for as fast as they drove back a raiding party, it returned again. There was no reason why it should not, considering that the soldiers were forbidden to fire upon it. Moreover, as though this were not folly enough, the Colonial Office had deliberately denied to the settlers the right of combination for self-defence. In 1833 an ordinance had been passed to provide for military organisation of burghers and settlers in case of danger; but, in spite of the urgent representations of the governor, Sir Lowry Cole, it had been disallowed by the Colonial Office at the instance of Philip and of the well-meaning but foolish men who suffered themselves to be controlled by him in England. Philip's argument was that such an enactment would enable any field-cornet to levy war upon the Kaffirs; and it seems not to have occurred to Mr. Stanley, who then reigned at the Colonial Office, that its disallowance would enable any Kaffir chief to levy war upon the settlers. The logical course would have been to increase the regular forces in the Colony; but this extremely inconvenient conclusion was avoided by the false hypothesis that the Kaffirs were a harmless and inoffensive people. And thus it was that the once famous Reform Ministry of Lord Grey deliberately courted the mishap which of all others it wished to avoid, a little colonial war. 1834.

At last, on the 2nd of December, a small armed party, which was in search of some horses carried off by Eno's people, was attacked by Kaffirs on its return journey, and an officer was wounded. Colonel Somerset, a son of Lord Charles, who had for years been commandant upon the frontier, at once called Eno to account, and by skilful management, with no more than the threat of force, obtained from him the restoration of cattle and horses recently stolen. On Dec. 2.

1834. the 10th another small party proceeded from Fort
Dec. 10. Beaufort to drive Tyali's people from forbidden ground between the Mankazana and Gaga rivers, west of the Tyumie. The Kaffirs were defiant; but their huts were burned, and some oxen, the personal property of Tyali himself, were driven off. The capture of a chief's cattle, though not one of the British had any inkling of the fact, was equivalent by Kaffir custom to a declaration of war; and the patrol was obliged to fight its way back to the post of Fort Beaufort, losing all their captured cattle by the way. The casualties upon both sides were trifling, but a brother of Tyali was wounded; and to shed the blood of a chief of so high descent was to the Kaffirs a very serious matter.

Dec. 11-12. During the night of the 11th and 12th beacons were aflame upon every hill from the Keiskamma north-eastward for a hundred miles to the Bashee,
Dec. 21. summoning the warriors to war; and on the 21st of December from twelve to fifteen thousand of them began to cross the border along the whole front of nearly one hundred miles from the Winterberg to the sea. Makoma's men led the way, passing the Kat river just below Fort Beaufort. Tyali's people followed, keeping farther to the west; and towards the sea many clans under different chiefs crossed the Fish river at various fords. The force at the disposal of the commandant upon the marches was, for so long a line of frontier, quite inadequate. It numbered in all under eight hundred men,[1] little more than a fourth of them mounted, or fewer than ten men to a mile; and even these were dispersed among a number of military posts. There was, thanks to Mr. Stanley, no machinery for assembling the settlers under arms;

[1]

Royal Artillery	27
Royal Engineers	20
H.M. 75th	482
Cape Mounted Rifles	226
	755

and the result was that the savages had free play for mischief. 1834.

Somerset exhausted his few mounted men and their horses within a few days in a vain attempt to hurry them to every threatened point, and of course effected nothing beyond the killing of a score or two of Kaffirs. Little parties of burghers and settlers grouped themselves together, and in not a few instances fought manfully in defence of their homes. Many were cut off and slaughtered before they could escape. Others fled with all speed to the nearest village, and there tried to organise themselves for defence, the bulk of them taking refuge at Grahamstown. There were some very fine examples of bravery and self-devotion among the settlers, both British and Dutch, but there was, not unnaturally, widespread panic among the white population at large. Colonel Somerset, unable to allay it, soon began to partake of it, and to tremble for the safety of his advanced posts. On the 27th he withdrew the garrison from the post on the Gualana to Kaffir's drift, and on the 28th he openly stated at Grahamstown that the Kaffirs were attacking in such strength as to forbid any effectual resistance with the force at his disposal. This declaration was followed by the abandonment of Fort Willshire, a step which was strongly condemned by Colonel Harry Smith when, as shall presently be related, he came up to the front to take command. How far this censure was justified it is not now easy to determine. Somerset's position must have been to the last degree difficult and distracting; and he was heavily burdened by the faults of the Colonial Office. Certainly he did not spare himself nor his men; but his proceedings suggest rather the zealous constable who, at a time of crises, can think of no better expedient than to multiply his wonted energies by ten, than the trained soldier who is prepared for the worst that may happen and has thought out some principle of action to meet it. Such a trained soldier, however hampered by lack of

Dec. 27.

Dec. 28.

1834. authority, would, from the sheer force of his personality, have been resorted to for guidance by the settlers at large, and would have diffused the spirit of helpfulness which swiftly develops into confidence. Whether he should be blamed for it or not, it seems certain that Somerset had not the ability nor the force of character to rise to the occasion.

The first reports of the Kaffir invasion did not reach Capetown until the 28th of December, nor the details until two days later. Upon receipt of the news, Sir Benjamin D'Urban at once ordered the Seventy-second regiment to the front, half of it by land in waggons and half of it by sea to Algoa Bay, and directed his chief staff-officer, Colonel Harry Smith, to proceed at once to Grahamstown and take command upon the frontier. Harry Smith waited for two days to make all preparations, and started before dawn of
1835. New Year's Day on his ride of six hundred miles
Jan. 1. through the intense heat of the South African midsummer. For six days he flogged grass-fed horses forward, along execrable roads, across flooded rivers and over rugged mountains, meeting everywhere with
Jan. 6. signs of panic and tales of disaster; and on the 6th he rode into Grahamstown, having accomplished his journey at the average rate of fourteen miles an hour—a feat unequalled even by the speediest of Napoleon's despatch-riders. By that time over a fortnight had elapsed since the Kaffirs had crossed the frontier, and they had laid waste practically the entire country from Somerset eastward, to the sea southward, and westward to the skirts of Uitenhage, destroying homesteads by the hundred and sweeping away horses by thousands and sheep and cattle by hundreds of thousands.

The state of affairs at Grahamstown showed how urgent was the need of a true leader. The general direction of affairs had been assumed by a committee of safety. There were defences of all kinds, trenches, barricades and the like, in some places

three deep; yet these had been thrown up upon no reasoned plan; and, as Harry Smith observed, an alarm at night would inevitably have set the defenders shooting at each other. The Seventy-fifth regiment lay half a mile away in its barracks, which had been carefully fortified; but the officer in command was averse from detaching a man for the defence of Grahamstown. His reluctance was intelligible; yet very obviously such aloofness did not promise well for repulse of the Kaffir invasion. For the rest, the civil population was thoroughly cowed, not altogether without reason, for such an alliance of Kaffir tribes against any one enemy was absolutely without precedent. Yet their danger had not taught the settlers discipline; and a corporal of the Grahamstown Volunteers, upon receiving an unwelcome order from his sergeant, did not hesitate to answer that he would see the sergeant damned before he would obey. Such was the team which Harry Smith was suddenly called upon to drive. 1835.

In less than twenty-four hours he had taken the reins firmly in hand. Very early on the morning of the 7th he proclaimed martial law, and dissolved the committee of safety. He was assailed by angry protests, which he met by the threat to try the disobedient by drum-head court-martial, no matter who they might be, and to punish them within five minutes. He then formed the male inhabitants into four companies of infantry and one troop of horse. The trouble with the colonel of the Seventy-fifth was speedily adjusted. The barricades about Grahamstown were thrown down; the defences were properly organised; alarm-posts were duly appointed; and by evening every vestige of panic had disappeared. The settlers had regained confidence and no longer spoke of flying to Capetown, but rather of advancing and taking vengeance upon the Kaffirs. They had now at their head a man.[1] Jan. 7.

[1] *Autobiography of Sir Harry Smith*, ii. 20, confirmed by *Narrative of the Irruption of the Kaffir Hordes* (Grahamstown, 1836), p. 59.

1835. Jan. Taking stock of his force Harry Smith found that he had rather over seven hundred regular troops and eight hundred and fifty civilians, divided between Grahamstown, Fort Beaufort, Hermanus Kraal, a small post intermediate between these two, and Fort Adelaide, some sixteen miles north of Fort Beaufort. In addition to these, a further civil detachment of burghers from Graaf Reinet was expected hourly, and the first parties of the Seventy-second within a few days. Not content with this, Smith immediately set about raising two battalions of Hottentots, people whom he describes as almost peerless in their natural aptitude for military training. Meanwhile, he determined to establish his moral superiority by taking the offensive without further delay. In one sense his position was very remote from secure, for to south of him the enemy was far in his rear, interrupting his communication with Algoa Bay. It was therefore necessary to reopen this line; but, apart from this, he was fully alive to the fact that the chief object of the Kaffirs was not so much to occupy the territory that they had devastated as to drive their captured cattle back into a place of safety. Nothing was so likely to hasten their return as an attack upon one of their own kraals. Accordingly Colonel Somerset was detached south-westward with about a hundred of the Cape Mounted Rifles to Bushman's river, where a detachment of burghers from Graaf Reinet was to join him; and a little column, less than two hundred strong, was placed under command of Major Cox, now of the Seventy-fifth but formerly a brother rifleman of Harry Smith in the Peninsula, to attack in succession the kraals of Eno and Tyali.

Somerset did his work well, killing some sixty Kaffirs and recapturing cattle and horses. Cox's
Jan. 10. detachment, starting before dawn of the 10th for the Fish river, made its way through dense bush to the stream, crossed it at noon, and at sunset, after a weary march over rugged and wooded country, halted.

At 11 P.M. the march was resumed, and before sunrise 1835.
Eno's kraals came in sight. The surprise was com- Jan. 11.
plete. A few of the Kaffirs only showed fight, and about thirty of them, including Eno's son and two of his brothers, were shot down. Eno himself narrowly escaped capture, and the rest of his people fled into the bush. At noon the column turned northward to Fort Willshire, where it halted for the night, and after two days' rest marched before dawn of the 13th for Jan. 13.
Tyali's kraal, reaching Block drift on a branch of the Tyumie river, only ten miles from it, at noon. Before dawn of the 14th, Cox's troops were again in motion, Jan. 14.
but on reaching the kraal, which was of exceptionally good construction, found it deserted and in flames.[1] From a purely military point of view these operations are trifling, yet their effect was very great. Whereas it had been the white man who had fled from the Kaffir, it was now the Kaffir who fled from the white man. A mere handful of men, hardly one-third of them even soldiers, under the leadership of an old Peninsular officer had by sheer hard work and endurance threaded their way silently and stealthily through most difficult country to the very doors of two of the most formidable Kaffir chiefs, and had forced them to fly for their lives. Less than a week earlier these same men had walked trembling about Grahamstown and, if patrolling around it, had seen a Kaffir in every bush. Now, without any drill or special training they were ready and eager to face the whole host of Kaffirs, merely because Harry Smith had told them that there was nothing to fear. The success of the whole undertaking should not blind us to the extreme moral courage of Smith in taking the risk of possible disaster. Had he not felt sure of the vigilance and capacity of his old brother officer of the Light Division, even Smith might have shrunk from the hazard.

During the week consumed by these operations the

[1] *Narrative of the Irruption, etc.*, pp. 65-68.

1835. post at Kaffir's drift was re-established, and Fort Willshire was reoccupied upon the arrival of the
Jan. 20. Seventy-second from Capetown. On the 20th D'Urban himself, having embarked on the 8th and landed at Port Elizabeth on the 14th, arrived at Grahamstown and took over the supreme command. During the rest of the month nothing of any note occurred except the rescuing of a few missionaries by a flying column, and the annihilation of a corporal's guard which had strayed too far from Fort Willshire. Reports, however, came in that the Kaffirs were falling back to the woody fastnesses between the Great Fish and Keiskamma rivers, evidently designing, as in 1819, to allow the British to advance into Kaffir territory, and then to make mischief in their rear. D'Urban accordingly detached Lieutenant-colonel England of the Seventy-fifth with three hundred men to clear this track; but this officer, after two days of vain groping about
Feb. 6. the bush, left his command, and on the 6th of February returned to headquarters to report that he required more men. According to Harry Smith's account, England's bearing was not that of a victorious soldier; but for D'Urban it was quite sufficient that an officer should have presumed, without leave, to quit his troops when in presence of the enemy. He therefore sent England back to his regiment and bade Harry Smith take such troops as he thought necessary to clear this rugged and difficult tract of country. On the same afternoon reinforce-
Feb. 7. ments marched for the Fish river, and on the 7th Smith followed them. The river being in flood, he was detained for four days until the water subsided, and not until the 11th was able to begin his advance.

Feb. 11. The enemy occupied a chain of lofty wooded heights clothed with nearly impenetrable bush, and seamed with deep *kloofs* or ravines, which afforded excellent concealment both for the Kaffirs and for the cattle which they had stolen. Smith had distributed his force,

about eleven hundred men, all told,[1] into three columns. 1835.
The right column, which included four hundred horse and one gun, was entrusted to Colonel Somerset; the centre, about one-third regulars, he took under his own command; and the left, which was of similar composition, with one troop of Cape Mounted Rifles, he made over to Major Gregory[2] of the Ninety-eighth. Somerset was to cross the river at Kaffir's drift, Smith twelve miles as the crow flies farther up the river, at Trompeter's drift, and Gregory still farther up stream at Commatty's drift; and the general idea was that the flanking columns should close inward and do their best to cut off the enemy's retreat.

On the night of the 11th, Smith with the centre division crossed the river, and, while he himself with the main body climbed to the summit of the heights and took up a position in rear of the enemy, he pushed out two detachments, the one to a distance of a mile and a half, the other to a distance of four miles to his left, with orders to lie on their arms till dawn. As soon as it was light, the Kaffirs took the alarm and Feb. 12.
hastily drove their cattle from the open ground into the bush, whereupon Smith opened fire with a six-pounder and a howitzer upon the ravines, while his two detachments, entering the thicket, drove Kaffirs and cattle steadily before them. Not a few of the Kaffirs had firearms, so that this was no mere contest of muskets against assegais; but under such a leader as Smith the result was certain. Somerset, accomplishing the passage of the river and the ascent from Kaffir's drift with great difficulty, advanced with

[1] Detachments R.A. and R.E.
200 72nd Highlanders.
250 75th Regt. (50 mounted).
250 Cape Mounted Rifles.
250 Hottentot in Infantry.
Burghers and civil troops, etc.

[2] This officer belonged to the 98th, which formed the garrison of Capetown, but happened to be at Grahamstown on leave when the war broke out.

1835. equal vigour on the right ; and Gregory played his part with the like energy on the left, both reaching their posts in time to prevent the cattle from being driven off. When the action ended, seventy-three dead Kaffirs were counted, and over two thousand cattle—dearer almost than life to the enemy—besides large flocks of sheep and goats, were captured, at no greater loss than five of Smith's men killed and eight wounded. Four of the killed and three of the wounded were men of the Seventy-second who had fallen by each other's shot during a false alarm. Considering the invariable tendency of troops, who have little experience of woodland fighting, to shoot one another, it is a wonder that the casualty list should have been so light.

The work, however, if not very dangerous, was very trying. The heat was intense, water was not to be found, the labour of bringing even two pieces of artillery over a flooded river and through the forest was most arduous, and the captured cattle were a sad encumbrance. But the troops were in great spirits ; and
Feb. 14. Smith, recrossing the Fish river on the 14th, proceeded to comb out the bush farther up the stream. The infantry passed the water at Trompeter's drift, but moved northward for some distance before entering the bush, while the mounted troops made the passage still higher up at a narrow and rugged inlet known as
Feb. Sheffield's pass. After a long night's march the troops
14-15. reached their appointed positions, and the firing of a field-gun gave the signal for a general advance. The enemy fled at once, the troops pursuing as well as they could through a terribly rough country, and gathering in some eleven hundred cattle and two enormous flocks of milch-goats. It was reckoned that, in the operations between the 11th and 14th, over one hundred Kaffirs were killed ; but over and above these casualties and the loss of their cattle, the moral effect of the expulsion of the tribes from fastnesses, which they had deemed impregnable, was very great.[1]

[1] *A Narrative, etc.*, pp. 98-107. Theal, *Documents*, pp. 60-65, 68-69.

The Kaffirs having been thus driven from British territory, there was a lull to allow for the arrival of reinforcements and for the preparation of a column to carry the war into the enemy's country. Harry Smith joined D'Urban at Grahamstown, and watched with mixed feelings the arrival of the burgher-yeomanry which were presently to pass under his command. One detachment comprised sixty-two fighting men, fifty non-combatants and twenty-eight waggons; another one hundred and eighteen fighting men, eighty non-combatants and thirty-six waggons; yet even so every individual was short of some needful article of equipment, shoes, shirt, bridle or saddle. Though brave and patriotic men, they had not the slightest idea of the meaning of continuous military operations; and Harry Smith was obliged to compile and issue a code of regulations, under twenty-one heads, for the guidance of officers and men in the most elementary duties in camp and on the march.[1] 1835. Feb.

As usual, however, the subalterns of the regular regiments proved themselves ready learners in the school of savage warfare; while the fifty mounted men of the Seventy-fifth—perhaps the first modern example of mounted infantry—seem to have taken to their new duties with great keenness. Smith, moreover, had now his two battalions of Hottentots, each four hundred strong; and, though these included "every loose vagabond that he could lay his hand on," their natural aptitude for the work made them good soldiers in an incredibly short time.[2] These two battalions were complete in every respect by the 7th of March, 1835.[3] The human material at hand was, therefore, promising enough, though the variety in its equipment made it startling to the eye. The Boers, with their huge white slouch hats, slovenly clothes and miserable saddlery, though uncomely were eminently workmanlike. The mounted detachment of the Seventy-fifth March.

[1] Theal, *Documents*, pp. 76-80, 89-91.
[2] *Autobiography of Sir Harry Smith*, ii. 25. [3] Theal, *Documents*, p. 94.

1835. March. had discarded their trews in favour of brown buckskin trousers, known, in colonial parlance, as "crackers," and had added to their wide-crowned forage-caps large red leather peaks, which made every man "look exactly as if he had sore eyes." The Hottentots were clad in little low-crowned hats, black jackets and trousers; and lastly the native guides and levies were of course in full savage costume. It was a motley assembly; but Harry Smith had imbued it with the right spirit; and, though he deplored the huge mass of waggons, each drawn by eight oxen, which formed his cumbrous commissariat-train, he soon found that they could keep up with the troops over easy country. For the rest he designed to move swiftly and strike hard. The war, as he put it, was neither more nor less than cattle-raiding forays. "You gallop in and half by force, half by stratagem, burn their homes, lift their cattle, and return home quite triumphant."[1] The only danger was that small isolated and unwary detachments and patrols might be surprised and cut off; and Smith endeavoured to avert this by laying down the rule that such parties should not only observe the utmost vigilance, but should not be subdivided, nor move beyond reasonable distance of support. For the rest, Smith's principle was to attack any body of Kaffirs, that could be located, as speedily as might be with such troops as he could collect, taking, however, every possible precaution against surprise. He admitted that the system was not without risk; but, as he contended, "the great science of war is to adapt its principles to the enemy that you have to contend with, and to the nature of the country. If you do not, you give him so many chances of the game."[2] In a word, he had no idea of yielding the initiative to the Kaffirs, but designed so persistently to harry them that they should never lie down to sleep without dread of an attack.

[1] *Autobiography of Sir Harry Smith*, ii. pp. 347-348.
[2] *Ibid.* ii. 352.

D'Urban, on the other hand, who numbered fifty-eight years to Harry Smith's thirty-eight, could never wholly divest himself of the procedure of great war, as he had known it when chief of Beresford's staff in the Peninsula. Any little inroad of a small party of Kaffirs made him tremble for his communications; and he dreamed of a great concentration of Kaffirs in his front, to be followed by a like concentration upon his own part, and by a general action in due course. Hence he would halt his left and centre because the right wing, detached after some party of marauders, had not yet come up; though it was not really of the slightest importance where his right wing might be, or indeed whether he had a right wing at all, so only he had a mobile column ready to dash at any body of the enemy that might be within reach. Harry Smith, who knew and admired his talent as a scientific soldier and was, moreover, genuinely attached to him as a man, was often much tried by D'Urban's arrangements and combinations, redolent as they were of the quartermaster-general's department in Portugal. But though plain-spoken he handled his good old chief with tact; and it is fair to add that Sir Benjamin, after some delay, generally gave way to his subordinate's opinions. Still, that same delay fretted Smith to the very soul. He loved to take a handful of choice mounted men, Highlanders, burghers, and Hottentots, and lead this patrol with masterly skill into the heart of the Kaffir swarms, attacking without hesitation whenever an opportunity presented itself, and keeping the enemy in deadly fear of his activity. Nevertheless, upon the whole the union of D'Urban's skill in organisation with Harry Smith's eager enterprise worked not amiss.[1] 1835. March.

The base for the invasion of Kaffirland was Fort Willshire, whither Harry Smith repaired from Grahamstown on the 7th of March to prepare for the concentration of the invading force. On that same morning a patrol of forty civilians, encamping carelessly Mar. 7.

[1] *Autobiography of Sir Harry Smith*, ii. 339, 341, 343, 347, 349, 351.

1835. on the right bank of the Great Fish river at Trompeter's drift, was surprised by a large party of Kaffirs. They had neglected to make themselves a defensible post with abatis and waggons, behind which they could have repelled any number of the enemy, and were caught at a disadvantage. The majority jumped on their horses and galloped away; and eight men, including an old soldier of the Blues who had been wounded at Waterloo, alone stood fast and accounted for nine Kaffirs before they were overpowered. The waggons and their contents, of course, became the spoil of the savages, who burned what they could not carry off and retired eastward. Another raiding party, which had crossed the river about Commatty's drift, was followed up and dispersed with loss on the same day by a patrol under Field-commandant Rademeyer; but the mishap at Trompeter's drift raised the liveliest fears that a second Kaffir invasion of the Colony was at hand. The transport of supplies from Grahamstown to Fort Willshire was stopped, and parties were hastily sent southward, some to follow up the advance of the enemy, and others to head him back. Rademeyer, while returning with one hundred and seventy-five men from patrolling towards Trompeter's drift, was beguiled into pushing forty of them upon the track of cattle into the forest, where they fell into an ambush and were surrounded. The little band, however, fought stoutly until reinforced by twenty more men, when they finally beat off the Kaffirs, over fifty of whom were left dead on the ground. The forty burghers themselves lost six killed and five wounded, so that the affair was sharp; but the enemy were so much discouraged that they broke up and retired to their own territory, losing not a few more of their number from the pursuit of Smith's patrols.

Mar. 27. On the 27th of March Smith himself led a strong patrol of three hundred burghers and a few of the Cape Mounted Rifles across the Keiskamma at Willshire drift, and after a march of fifteen miles northward attacked the

enemy in the woody valley of a tributary river. The Kaffirs, owing to the nature of the country, were able to escape without many casualties; but twelve hundred of their cattle and considerable flocks of goats were captured, and their huts were burned. This done, Smith returned to camp with his booty, the last man of the rearguard arriving exactly thirty-two hours after the first man of the advanced guard had started on the foray.[1] This was an extraordinary feat of marching, for the force, apart from the thirty miles which it had to traverse, had crossed a difficult and flooded river twice, fought an action, and brought back with it some two thousand head of cattle and goats. 1835.

On the 31st of March D'Urban reached Fort Willshire, and all was ready for an advance into the enemy's country. The force consisted of some fifteen hundred regular troops and rather more of burghers, making in all about thirty-one hundred men,[2] two- Mar. 31.

[1] *A Narrative, etc.*, pp. 121-122, gives the time at twenty-three hours, 2 A.M. to 1 A.M. Harry Smith (*Autobiography*, ii. 29) states it at 1 A.M. on the 27th to 9 P.M. on the 28th.

[2] Return of the invading force.

	Guns.	Mounted.	Infantry.	Total.
REGULARS:				
Royal Artillery	3 3-prs. 2 6-prs. 1 5-in. (howitzer)	...	25	25
72nd Highlanders	...	...	371	371
Cape Mounted Rifles	...	358	...	358
1st Hottentot Bn.	...	...	411	411
2nd Hottentot Bn.	...	...	350	350
	6	358	1157	1515
BURGHERS:				
George	...	310	...	...
Graaf Reinet	...	242	...	...
Somerset	...	532	...	...
Swellendam		453	...	...
Beaufort	...	42	...	...
Corps of Guides	...	40	...	...
Total	6	1977	1157	3134

1835. thirds of them mounted, with six guns. Two thousand more, one-fourth of them regulars, were placed under command of Lieutenant-colonel England to guard the line from the Winterberg to the sea,[1] and a second line of defence about Uitenhage was entrusted to Colonel Cuyler. The field-force was organised into four divisions: the right under Lieutenant-colonel Somerset, all mounted men; the right centre, two-thirds infantry, under Lieutenant-colonel Peddie of the Seventy-second, who had lost an arm at Salamanca; the left centre, four-sevenths infantry, under Major Cox; and the left, all mounted men, under Field-commandant Van Wyk.[2] Somerset was stationed opposite Line drift, Peddie at Fort Willshire, Cox at Fort Beaufort, and Van Wyk about the Klip-Plaat river. The main depots of supplies and the hospitals were established at Fort Willshire and Fort Beaufort. The general idea was that Peddie should advance due eastward upon the Buffalo river, that Somerset should move rapidly to the lower Buffalo, cross it and sweep

[1] Return of troops on the first line of defence.

	Guns.	Mounted.	Infantry.	Total.
REGULARS:				
Royal Artillery	3 5-prs. 1 howitzer	...	3	3
Sappers and Miners	...	...	21	21
75th Regt.	...	48	413	461
Cape Mounted Rifles	...	20	11	31
	4	68	448	516
BURGHERS:	...	620	865	1485
Total	4	688	1313	2001

[2] *Somerset's Column*: Burghers, Cape Mounted Rifles. 715 mounted men with 2 guns.
Peddie's Column: 72nd, 1st Bn. Hottentots, detachment Cape Mounted Rifles, Swellendam Burghers, Guides. 434 mounted men, 837 infantry, 2 guns.
Cox's Column: 2nd Bn. Hottentots, detachment Cape Mounted Rifles, Burghers. 309 mounted men, 438 infantry, 2 guns.
Van Wyk's Column: 500 Mounted Burghers.

northward up the Gonubie river, that Van Wyk should likewise range forward along the line of the Kabusie river to the Kei and turn southward, and that Cox should hold a central position midway between the Keiskamma and the Kei to protect the rear. In principle, D'Urban was attempting a great enveloping movement, though for the purpose of catching cattle rather than men, with one mixed column held in reserve in case the enemy should double back. He was fighting savages upon the old system pursued by Monk in the Highlands, namely to march up to them and destroy their worldly goods and means of subsistence—in Monk's case, provisions; in the present case, cattle. 1835. March.

On the 31st of March the centre division crossing the Keiskamma made two short marches eastward to the Deba, where on the 1st of April it was joined by Somerset's column. At midnight of the 2nd there began a general advance in a northerly direction, Somerset on the right towards the sources of the Buffalo, the centre division up the line of the Keiskamma, and Cox, on the left, upon the Tyumie river. Few of the enemy were encountered, and it was evident that they had fallen back to their fastnesses at the head of the Buffalo; but the work thrown upon the troops was very arduous. The mounted men at the head of the centre division were in the saddle with little intermission for twenty hours, having hardly anything to eat; and by the time that they had returned to their camp on the Deba they had traversed from forty to fifty miles.[1] After a couple of days' halt to refresh the horses, for they were low in condition and forage was scarce, the forces again advanced on the 6th, the centre division moving to the foot of the Buffalo mountains, Somerset striking up the Buffalo river to clear the ground to westward of it, and Cox and Van Wyk closing in towards the centre division, the former from the right, the latter from the left, about the April 2. April 6.

[1] Alexander, ii. 72.

1835. sources of the Keiskamma. Van Wyk had met with some success in his advance so far, having killed a few Kaffirs and taken over two thousand cattle. At 2 A.M.
April 7. on the 7th Harry Smith started with four hundred men, Highlanders, burghers and Hottentots, to intercept any of the enemy that might be retiring eastward before Cox and Van Wyk. Coming upon a party of six hundred chosen warriors under the son of a chief, which had ensconced itself in a natural fortress of scarped rock at the summit of the hills, he had, for once, some sharp fighting. The Kaffirs had but few firearms, but they had good cover, with plenty of assegais and stones, and for some time they resisted all the efforts of a company—perhaps fifty men—of the Seventy-second. Indeed, Captain Murray, who commanded the company, seems to have done the best of the work alone, having gained a point of vantage from which, though wounded by an assegai in the side, he fired at every Kaffir head that he could see, as fast as the men could hand him their muskets. This citadel was at last cleared, whereupon the Hottentots entered the forest and drove the cattle down the slopes to eastward; and, when night fell, over four thousand head had been secured, and a considerable number of Kaffirs had been killed and wounded.

April 8. On the evening of the 8th the columns were again sent out to make a like concentric attack; and on the
April 9. 9th the guns opened with round shot and shrapnel upon the principal valleys, and one lucky shell struck down a group of seven warriors round the chief Eno. The bullets of the shrapnel, and the splinters smitten from the rocks by the round shot, struck dismay into the Kaffirs; and another thousand head of cattle were taken from them. The casualties of the British were, as usual, trifling, though the forest was dense and in many quarters trackless, and the fighting was of the blindest. But the hardship borne by the troops was extreme. The centre division, when darkness fell, had been on foot for twenty-four hours, and were

obliged to rest on their arms without sleep or food all night, being unable to extricate themselves till daylight should come again. Indeed, even in a fairly comfortable camp there was little rest for any one after a successful day, from the incessant lowing of the captured cattle.[1] 1835.

On the 10th D'Urban granted the troops a much-needed halt, and on the 11th he ordered Cox to remain upon the scene of the recent operations in order to break up any straggling parties of Kaffirs that might remain there. He himself started with the centre division for the Kei, from forty to fifty miles farther to eastward; Somerset was sent to sweep the courses of the Buffalo and of the Gonubie, some miles further eastward, to the sea; and Van Wyk was moved up to the Tyumie to drive westward the Kaffirs' cattle between that river and the Keiskamma. It seems that only with great difficulty was D'Urban persuaded thus to divide his force. Indeed, he appears first to have braced himself to do so, then to have lost courage and cancelled his orders, and finally, after an energetic discussion with Harry Smith, to have yielded to that officer's remonstrances and heartened himself to carry out his original plan. After two short marches, however, he halted on the 13th in order to allow Somerset to come forward; but on the 15th he allowed himself to be again spurred on by Harry Smith, and, in fact, gave Smith a free hand to push on and do as he would. The force was now approaching the territory of Hintsa, the paramount chief of the Xosa tribe, on the eastward bank of the Kei. It was thither that the captured colonial cattle had been driven; and a mission had already been despatched to Hintsa calling upon him to restore the beasts or declare himself an open enemy. So far he had proclaimed himself a neutral, though his actual conduct had been extremely ambiguous; and D'Urban had accordingly issued orders that April 10. April 13.

[1] Theal, *Documents*, pp. 126-127; Alexander, ii. 76-87; *Narrative*, pp. 133-134; *Autobiography of Sir Harry Smith*, ii. 348.

1835. the troops, after crossing the Kei, should treat the
April 15. country as a friendly one. Upon reaching a ford of the Kei with an advanced guard, Smith was challenged by a Kaffir sentinel from the other side of the water; and the tops of the hills beyond were seen to be covered with warriors. A parley ensued, Harry Smith insisting that, as Hintsa had not come down to the ford to meet the governor, his troops should march on, always as friends, until the chief should present himself in person. D'Urban, coming up, fully approved of this decision, but hesitated to act upon it immediately, and was still discussing military precautions when Harry Smith gave the order, "Mount," and plunged forthwith into the ford. "General," he said, "you will see every fellow fly before me. Then pray send the whole army on."[1]

Smith was perfectly right, and D'Urban was too sensible to interfere with him. The advanced
April 16. guard on the 16th encamped seven miles east of the Kei, without the slightest molestation; and Smith gave Hintsa's people to understand that, unless Hintsa in person, or a direct emissary from him, should present himself within thirty-six hours, he would attack them
April 17. without hesitation. On the 17th he advanced to the ruined missionary station of Butterworth; and there from the moment of their arrival the British were courted by the Fingos, a remnant of some eight tribes which had been destroyed or dispersed by Chaka, and had only purchased their lives by enslaving themselves to Hintsa. They were intelligent and industrious; and D'Urban, waking at once to the advantage of taking them under British protection, assigned to them land in the Cape Colony, and enlisted a certain number of them for immediate service. Harry Smith summed up their merits in the terse words, "They are real game fellows; and will drive more cattle out of the kloofs on the bed of the Kei in one day than we could in a week."[2] Meanwhile D'Urban,

[1] *Autobiography of Sir Harry Smith*, ii. 353-354.
[2] *Ibid.*, ii. 356-357.

less peremptory than Smith, had extended Hintsa's days of grace, and accordingly remained halted until the 20th. Messengers from the chief came in from time to time to announce that he would arrive within a few hours; but he came not; and, as was afterwards discovered, he was using his brief respite to drive his stolen cattle farther eastward out of reach of the British. 1835. April 20.

The situation was not altogether pleasant to a general who could never quite remember that he was cattle-lifting and not carrying on regular warfare. Cox and Van Wyk had made several successful inroads upon the Amatola mountains, killing not a few Kaffirs and carrying off two thousand head of cattle; but small parties of Kaffirs continued to raid British territory in their rear; and Somerset's column, after descending the Buffalo to the sea and thence striking eastward across the Gonubie, had fallen to pieces. They indeed captured over two thousand cattle, but they suffered severely from driving storms of rain and sleet, which were too much for the burghers. Their horses likewise succumbed to hard weather; and at the end of the third day's march Somerset's force was, to all intent, entirely dismounted, both burghers and Cape Riflemen driving their exhausted beasts before them. Two more inclement days gave them the finishing stroke. The burghers took refuge in their waggons and refused to leave them; and on the 20th Somerset's column straggled into Butterworth by twos and threes, a mere disorderly mob of disheartened men. Harry Smith and D'Urban were much disgusted, and D'Urban held up Somerset's division to reprobation in general orders. Too much must not be expected from undisciplined settlers, under so poor a commander as Somerset seems beyond question to have been. But it was a pity that the House of Commons could not have been present in a body to witness the coming of Somerset's men, and to learn once for all that the function of military discipline is to

1835. steel men against hardship even more than against death.[1]

April 21. On the 21st a despatch-rider from head-quarters to the Colony was waylaid and murdered, chiefly thanks to his own carelessness, by Hintsa's Kaffirs; and on the 24th D'Urban sent back the chief's emissaries with the intimation that he had taken the Fingos under his protection and would begin hostilities at once.

April 24. At 10 A.M. Harry Smith started off with three hundred mounted men north-eastward, overtook the Kaffirs who were driving away their cattle, killed some twenty of them, and captured four thousand head of

April 25. beasts. At 2 A.M. on the 25th he was again in movement, shot a few more of the enemy, and brought back with him yet another twelve hundred kine to head-quarters, which by this time had advanced to the

April 26. Izolo. On the 26th he started off once more with detachments of the Seventy-second, Cape Mounted Rifles, burghers, Hottentots and Fingos, making for a kraal on the river T'somo where he hoped to pounce upon Hintsa himself. The chief, however, was warned in time to make his escape; and Smith, after burning the kraal, bade his infantry under Captain Murray cross the T'somo and follow its course, while he himself led his cavalry towards the mountain range that fills the ground between that river and the Kei. The mounted men drove four thousand cattle into the arms of the infantry, and descending a tributary ravine of the Kei swept the Kaffirs from the bush and captured twelve hundred head more. Being then twenty miles from his infantry, Smith pushed his herds in their direction until two hours before dark, and

April 27. bivouacked for the night. By 7 A.M. on the 27th he had joined his infantry on the T'somo, having first sent off his mounted men with their spoil to head-quarters; and, leading the infantry over rough and mountainous country to the head of the Accolomba

[1] *Narrative, etc.*, pp. 143-148; *Autobiography of Sir Harry Smith*, ii. 359.

ravine, he pursued his way down it to the Kei. After a most arduous march of twenty-five miles he came upon a herd of three thousand cattle, which the Kaffirs did not attempt to protect, flying in all directions and leaving him in peaceful possession. Then at length he granted his weary men a rest, and returned at his ease to his head-quarters.[1] 1835. April 29.

The British casualties in these affairs were trifling; and it may be objected that such cattle-lifting exploits are unworthy even of the briefest description. But this criticism overlooks the main point that Harry Smith had hit upon the right method of subduing the Kaffirs to his will, and that this method was practicable only for highly disciplined troops under a leader of boundless and infectious energy. The fatigue and privation imposed upon the men were intense. The heat was excessive by day; the dews were bitterly chilling by night; there was no sign of a road; the waggons were unable to keep up with the flying columns, so that there was nothing to eat but freshly slaughtered beef; and, as Harry Smith remarked, "killing and eating two hours after dark is rather a bore." He himself never shaved nor combed his hair for five days, though he was obliged to change his pantaloons, because his first pair had been torn off his legs in the bush. On the morning of the 27th he was so hungry that he was glad to accept a half-gnawed bone of goat, which was handed to him out of a filthy haversack by one of his escort. If the commanding officer fared thus, the plight of the men may be imagined. Yet all ranks bore their hardships not merely with cheerfulness but even with enjoyment. It is noticeable that for the supreme trial, the very trying march of twenty-five miles on the 27th, Smith selected his regular troops, detachments of the Seventy-second and of the Hottentot battalions; and he narrates that, when at last he came up with his enemies on the Kei, he hallooed

[1] Harry Smith's report in *Narrative, etc.*, pp. 245-246; Alexander, pp. 123-125.

1835. the Hottentots into the forest as a pack of hounds into covert, and that they crashed into the thicket as though they had just been unkennelled. Such dash at the end of a weary march speaks well both for the troops and for their leader.

The loss of some fifteen thousand cattle in five days had the desired effect upon Hintsa. He came into April 30. D'Urban's camp on the 29th, and on the 30th he agreed to peace upon the conditions that he should deliver fifty thousand head of cattle in two instalments, the first at once, the second within twelve months, and should cause the whole of his subordinate chieftains to surrender their arms. Thereupon hostilities ceased; May 2. and on the 2nd of May the first division of the army began to return westward. Before it could reach the Kei, however, D'Urban was compelled to halt it. The Fingos, on the strength of British protection, had at once begun to steal Hintsa's cattle, and Hintsa's people had retaliated by killing several Fingos. D'Urban interposed to stop the quarrel; and on the 10th he issued a proclamation annexing the country west of the Kei, and giving it the name of Queen Adelaide. The centre division then crossed the Kei, leaving only five hundred men on the western bank.

Meanwhile Hintsa had not yet delivered the first instalment of cattle, taking it apparently for granted that the robberies of the Fingos absolved him from his obligations. He now craftily proposed that he should be sent back to his own country, with a detachment of British troops, to collect the cattle payable by him, hoping in the course of the journey to slip away from his escort. D'Urban accepted the suggestion, and on the 10th of May Hintsa rode off with a party of five hundred men[1] under Harry Smith, who warned him frankly that, if he attempted to escape, he would be

[1] 50 Cape Mounted Rifles.
2 companies 72nd.
3 companies 1st Hottentot Battalion.
15 men of the Corps of Guides.

shot. In the course of the second day's march, on the 12th of May, Hintsa seized a moment when the entire detachment, excepting Smith himself, were leading their horses up a steep ascent, to spring upon his own animal and gallop off. He was pursued and shot dead; and Smith, pressing on to the Bashee river, perceived a number of cattle on the eastern bank, and before nightfall captured three thousand of them. On the following morning Smith pushed on twenty miles farther towards the Umtata, where he saw herds in large numbers being driven eastward, by Hintsa's order, as was afterwards discovered. Since it was hopeless to overtake them, and hostile Kaffirs were swarming round him, Smith retired from the Bashee once more to the Kei, bringing his captured cattle with him. He had traversed two hundred and eighteen miles in a rugged and mountainous country within seven days and a half.

1835. May 13.

Hintsa's son, Kreli, having been left as a hostage with the British, D'Urban on the 18th concluded with him a treaty whereby the British boundary was extended to the Kei, and Kreli was recognised as chief of the country between the Kei and the Bashee. The capital of the newly annexed territory was established on the site of D'Urban's entrenched camp, with the title of King William's Town. Harry Smith was placed in charge of the new province, and, as the inroads of Kaffir marauders still continued, he spent the first month in swooping upon these bands with strong patrols, destroying their cornfields, capturing their cattle and hunting them across the Kei. So swift were his onslaughts and such the terror of his name that the Kaffirs fled at the very sound of his approach; and yet so thoroughly was his work done that D'Urban published three of his reports at length for the instruction of young officers at large. As Smith himself wrote, "Though as an *united* enemy nothing could be so contemptible as the poor athletic barbarians, yet to inflict any punishment upon them

May 18.

1835. the most rapid and gigantic marches were requisite, and every patrol must be conducted on the most vigilant and scientific principles. Most enterprising men were watching every movement, ready to take advantage of inactivity or error. On one occasion a most desperate attempt, boldly planned and executed, was made on a redoubt near the frontier, and only repulsed by the soldiers of the Seventy-second, hand to hand." The most striking thing about Harry Smith's operations is that no mishap ever befell the troops under his immediate command nor detachments from his force, except in one or two cases where his fundamental instructions, as to the danger of subdividing small detachments, were deliberately neglected.[1]

There now remained only the Gaika tribes of Makoma and Tyali in the Amatola to be dealt with; and this duty Smith entrusted to Major Cox, reinforcing him for the purpose. In the course of the month of August, Cox, acting upon Smith's principles, reduced these chiefs to submission; and, though audacious cattle-raiding was maintained by the Kaffirs to the very last moment, a final treaty was concluded
Sept. 17. with the Gaikas on the 17th of September, which brought the war to an end. Harry Smith resumed the administration of the province of Queen Adelaide, and, though his methods were somewhat theatrical, he certainly worked strenuously for the improvement of the Kaffirs, while giving them clearly to understand that he would be master. The new frontier was protected by a chain of fortified posts; and, although no sensible men doubted but that cattle-stealing raids would recur from time to time, the colonists began to settle down once more with some sense of security.

Then everything was upset by the imbecility of the Secretary of State for the Colonies. This individual, Charles Grant, Lord Glenelg, was one of these intensely mediocre men, compounded of cleverness, cultivation,

[1] *Narrative, etc.*, p. 257; *Autobiography of Sir Harry Smith*, ii. 67.

piety, sentiment, and weakness,[1] who from time to time rise to high station in British Cabinets. With a strong lady-principal to guide him, he might have administered a ladies' college without discredit; but it fell to his lot to govern the British possessions beyond the sea at a very critical time; and his name, so far as it is remembered at all, is recalled only by its association with folly and failure. As has already been told, there was in the Cape Colony a small but noisy and astute party of ambitious men who chose to espouse the cause of the Kaffirs, to insinuate that they were justified in their attack upon the settlers, and generally to uphold the position that every white man, themselves and their partisans excepted, was in the wrong and every black man in the right. Such folks are always to be found at every such crisis. It would be unjust to say that they are insincere, but they are always vain and rarely scrupulous. They had already wrought much mischief in the Colony by belittling or actually denying the sufferings and losses of the ruined settlers, and by thus encouraging the Kaffirs to further aggression. They now shifted their operations to England, where a committee of the House of Commons was sitting to take evidence concerning the condition of the aborigines in British settlements overseas. The chairman, who bore a name that is honourably associated with many movements in the cause of humanity, was unfortunately something of a fanatic, and only too ready to receive testimony in accordance with his own opinions. As soon as the proceedings of this committee became known in Capetown, rebutting evidence was collected in the Colony and forwarded to England; but it arrived too late, for Glenelg, without waiting to hear both sides, had 1835.

[1] Sir Henry Taylor relates (*Autobiography*, i. 233) that Glenelg tried to shirk the unpleasant duty of getting rid of the Permanent Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies by shutting himself up in his house. He adds, "Glenelg was an amiable man and extremely averse from strong measures." In plain words, he was a moral coward.

1835. already taken action. So ardent was his philanthropic zeal that it had utterly consumed his sense of justice.

He began by writing to D'Urban a despatch in which he affirmed boldly that the Kaffirs had ample justification for hostilities, and that the claim of British sovereignty over the province of Queen Adelaide must be renounced, since it was the outcome of a war in which original justice was on the side of the conquered and not of the victorious party. He further sent out Andrew Stockenström, one of the most violent and unscrupulous witnesses against the settlers, as lieutenant-governor, who, taking his cue from his protector in Downing Street, made treaties with the Kaffir chiefs which placed them on perfect political equality with the King's government. Finally, Glenelg introduced and passed through the British Parliament an Act which became known in the Colony as the "Cape of Good Hope Punishment Act"; the preamble running to the effect that offences against the Kaffirs were frequently committed by His Majesty's subjects with impunity, and the enacting clauses purporting to correct this fault. To argue with the Secretary of State was useless. Petitions from the Colony for an impartial investigation of the charges against the settlers were refused. D'Urban, having remonstrated against the tone of Glenelg's despatches and proved that the Secretary of State had been
1837. misled by false representations, was recalled in most
May 1. uncomplimentary terms. It seems never to have occurred to Glenelg that, even if he overruled D'Urban, there was no occasion to insult a veteran officer, not less amiable and upright than himself, and incomparably his superior in knowledge of the world and in administrative ability. But the poor Minister imagined that he was showing strength and lofty principle, whereas in truth he was only proving himself to be that most mischievous and despicable of characters, a weak violent man.

Meanwhile the whole Colony was overset by quarrels

and disputes. Glenelg's first despatch was the signal 1837.
for an instant recrudescence of cattle-stealing raids by the Kaffirs. Every white man who had distinguished himself in the war was held up to abuse. The death of Hintsa was made the subject of a court of enquiry, nominally convoked upon the officer who had shot him, but really levelled at Harry Smith, who was denounced right and left by the local press as a bloodthirsty murderer. Stockenström, having once chosen the path of enmity to the settlers, pursued it with such intemperance of speech and action that he involved himself in a dozen libel actions. The whole Colony was full of dissensions and quarrels, and of bitterness against the home government; for Glenelg's censures had sealed up the fountains of British charity, and not a penny was forthcoming from rich England for the ruined settlers. The Kaffirs, who had been under Harry Smith's government, mourned his departure when he left them. The Boers, who were devoted to him, sadly made up their minds to leave a country where such injustice could be done, and to seek new land in the north-east where the Colonial Office reigned not yet. D'Urban reported their emigration with deep dismay, deploring the loss of a "brave, patient, industrious, orderly, and religious people." Glenelg retorted that "the motives of this emigration were the same as had in all ages impelled the strong to encroach upon the weak, and the powerful and unprincipled to wrest by force or fraud from the comparatively feeble and defenceless, wealth or property or dominion." It is pitiful to read the carefully elaborated periods, so redolent are they of the clever overgrown schoolboy. Glenelg, in common with all of his colleagues, wished no doubt to do what was right towards both Kaffirs and settlers, and to promote peace in the British Empire. Above all he longed, in common with all his colleagues, to reduce the British Army and to cut down the expense of the military establishment. D'Urban had strongly represented to him that, by adopting his policy and

1837. pushing the Kaffir boundary back to the Kei, the garrison necessary for the Cape Colony could be reduced from six battalions to five.[1] Glenelg, by reversing that policy, involved South Africa in two full generations of war. He was finally sent about his business in 1838, after doing as much and as serious mischief in the British Empire at large as a well-meaning man could do. For no administrator is so dangerous as the pedant, who makes lofty professions but will not face facts.

Authorities: Theal's *History of South Africa* and *Documents relating to the Kaffir War of 1835*; *Autobiography of Sir Harry Smith*; Alexander's *Colonies of Western Africa*; *Narrative of the Irruption of the Kaffir Hordes, 1834–1835* (Grahamstown, 1836).

[1] Theal, *Documents*, p. 234.

CHAPTER XIX

In 1831, immediately after the accession of Lord Grey's ministry, the state of the United Kingdom was as bad as it could be. Widespread distress led naturally to acts of violence, and Lord Grey himself declared in Parliament that the southern counties about London were in a state of open insurrection. As the year progressed, dangerous riots increased; and in October the mob of Bristol, owing to the timidity of the civil authorities and of at least one military officer, was allowed to get the upper hand and to indulge in an orgy of pillage and destruction. A few troops of the Fourteenth Light Dragoons restored order with ease when permitted to act; and an enquiry was rightly held as to the reasons why they had not been employed earlier. Before this inquisition had been concluded, the officer in command of the district, realising that the affair was turning to his disgrace, committed suicide. It should seem that he had not the nerve to do his duty; and it can only be said for him that, even in this twentieth century, an officer who has the courage to act with decision in aid of the civil power, still does so at his peril. To this day he cannot feel sure of the support of the civil authorities, but may find himself sacrificed to further the selfish ends of politicians. 1831.

So dangerous was the general state of things that the militia was called out to maintain order; and meanwhile Parliament worked with feverish energy at the measure which was proclaimed to be the remedy

1831. for all evils, the Reform Bill. Unfortunately, the framers of that bill, though they had advocated reform for years, had never thought out what they really meant by the word, and, when fairly set down to their task, were at their wits' end to deal with it. They, not less than their opponents, were firmly of opinion that the country gentry ought to rule England. They scouted the idea of really popular representation; and the very name of democracy was loathsome to them. In fact, when they meditated over the possible consequences of their own handiwork, they were not only puzzled but frightened. The problem before them was to reconcile extension of the franchise with retention of their own authority; and they trusted to solve it by so regulating the qualification for the vote as to include petty shopkeepers, but none lower in the social scale. Now, although under the old system there were many constituencies which could be bought and sold, the member being merely the nominee of the patron, yet there were others in which practically every adult man enjoyed the suffrage. No exception was made in favour of these last, so that the Reform Bill, while abolishing what were called rotten boroughs, disfranchised the humbler voters of boroughs where popular representation had existed for generations. But indeed the whole spirit in which the Bill was handled evinced the crude ignorance and thoughtlessness of the reformers. Joseph Hume proposed that every man balloted for the militia should have a vote, or, in other words, that any individual who undertook the duties should enjoy the privileges of a good citizen. But such a plea was beyond the understanding of the reforming clique, and was unceremoniously rejected. Again, Hume advocated the grant of representation in the Imperial Parliament to the British Empire over sea; India to send four members, Canada three, the Crown Colonies[1] one apiece or eight in

[1] Trinidad, British Guiana, Ceylon, Mauritius, Cape Colony, Gibraltar, Malta, New South Wales.

all, the old West Indian Colonies[1] three, and the Channel Islands one. Herein he was quite consistent, for under the old system wealthy gentlemen from the colonies had bought seats in Parliament, and could make their voices heard. The motion was negatived without a division. The cry was for "the Bill, the whole Bill and nothing but the Bill"; and the last clause of this sentence signified the banning of all imagination, foresight and statesmanship. 1831.

Meanwhile the advent of the reformers to power had, through no fault of their own, not only failed to bring about a reduction, but had actually produced an increase, of military strength. Wellington had allowed the Home establishment to fall to eighty-one thousand men in 1830; but in 1831 it was found necessary, owing to the situation, which shall presently be explained, in Belgium, to raise it once more to eighty-eight thousand. Moreover, Mr. Wynn, the Secretary at War, even went the length of deploring the reduction of the militia and yeomanry forced by Parliament upon the country in 1827; and, in fact, the Government was obliged to entreat the country gentlemen to revive and organise the yeomanry on its old footing.[2] The actual effective increase of the Army amounted to over ten thousand men;[3] and this was not the less unwelcome because it was absolutely necessary. In 1832 it was possible to make some reduction of expenditure in respect of the yeomanry, but none on account of the regular Army. A devastating hurricane had swept over the West Indies in the previous year;[4] and in the resultant confusion it was impossible to reduce the West Indian garrisons. In

[1] Jamaica, Windward Islands, Leeward Islands.

[2] Hansard, i. 804, 21st February 1831; xlii. 637 *sq.* Goulburn's speech, 27th April 1838.

[3] Hansard, x. 480. Mr. Hobhouse's speech, 17th February 1832.

[4] When the writer was in Barbados in 1882 the memory of this disaster was still fresh in the island, and upon any infinitesimal fall of the barometer below the normal, old planters hastened to close their shutters with hurricane-bars.

1831. the circumstances the opponents of military expenditure could find nothing to attack but the establishments for giving the cavalry instruction in equitation, and that favourite butt of the preachers of economy—the Waggon-Train. Both were for the present preserved; but in the background of the effective army there lurked the far more difficult question of the non-effective army of pensioned men and of unemployed and underpaid officers, which a Parliament, faced with a deficit of more than two millions sterling, could hardly be expected to treat in a sympathetic spirit.

First there was the case of officers on half-pay. Until 1828 such officers had been allowed to retain their half-pay if they filled civil offices; but in that year an Act had been passed to prevent it in the case of military, though not in the case of naval, officers. Sir Henry Hardinge strongly represented the injustice of this regulation, and cited the case of Sir Henry Fane, Surveyor-general of the Ordnance on a salary of £1200 a year. Fane counted forty years' service; he had spent £10,000 on his commissions; and he had been rewarded with the colonelcy of the King's Dragoon Guards, worth about £1000 annually. Yet he was not allowed to draw the pay of both offices, and therefore for his work at the Ordnance Office received no more than £200 a year, or the emolument of one of his own junior clerks. Reckoning the interest upon the money spent on his commissions at five per cent, he was receiving no more than £700 of the public money in his double capacity of a Lieutenant-general of thirteen years' standing and Surveyor-general of the Ordnance. The meanness of such emolument was obvious enough; and, though the reversal of the regulation which had created it was estimated to cost the country £73,000, Ministers consented ultimately to do justice to veteran officers at this not very extravagant cost.[1]

[1] Hansard, viii. 348 *sq.* Speech of Sir Henry Hardinge, 7th October 1831. *Ibid.* xiv. 1247. Speech of Mr. Hobhouse, 8th August 1832.

Next there came up the hard case of general officers. 1831.
Mention has been given in a previous chapter of the Duke of York's efforts to make due provision for them, by the grant of "unattached pay," and of the restriction of that privilege to a very small number owing to the protests of the House of Commons in 1818. Thereby, £212,000 had been saved to the country at the expense of the officers; and the House of Commons, doubtless grudging even the pittance of unattached pay which was still permitted, looked eagerly for steady diminution of the list of generals. When, therefore, it was proposed upon the coronation of King William the Fourth to issue the usual brevet, giving a step upwards not only to generals but to field-officers, there was loud murmuring in the House of Commons. Once again Hardinge came forward as the champion of his order, and seems to have shamed members into compliance with his views. But such an attitude towards the Army in Parliament was of evil portent at a time when the slightest false step on the part of the Foreign Office might have brought France and England to open war.

Lastly, there was the difficulty of pensions to the rank and file, which was not a little complicated by Windham's scheme of 1806 for enlisting men for a limited term, and granting them either a pension on discharge or an increase of pay after fourteen years' service. The measure had fulfilled two of Windham's main objects. It had reduced bounties at the time by two-thirds, and it had attracted a better stamp of man to the colours. But it was expensive; and, upon the coming of peace, the country writhed under the burden. The first steps taken to modify the evil consequences of Windham's extravagance were effected by Royal Warrant in 1818. It had been the rule that two years' service in the East and West Indies should count as three. It had also been laid down that a soldier discharged after seven or fourteen years' service, with or without his pension of sixpence a day, might return home, register his name and, after

1831. residing there twice as long as was necessary to complete fourteen or twenty-one years' service, might claim a pension of one shilling a day. Windham's intention had no doubt been to build up a national reserve of veterans for any emergency; but it is extremely doubtful whether, after a long interval of civil employment, these men would have been of any great military value; and, at the close of the war, the scheme obviously was not worth its cost. In effect, it gave to any man who enlisted at eighteen, served with the colours for seven years—or even five in the East or West Indies—and vegetated at home for twenty-eight years more, the right to claim what would now be called an "old-age pension," when he was very little over fifty. These two regulations were therefore abolished; and it was laid down that a discharged soldier should never receive a pension exceeding his full pay, nor any pension at all for disability unless contracted on service.

Meanwhile the number of pensioners had risen between 1814 and 1825 from 31,000 to 82,000. Nor was this to be wondered at when, through the folly of the House of Commons, 22,000 men had been discharged on pension in 1822, and required to be replaced by the same number of recruits in 1823 and 1824. In fact, Hardinge, when he went to the War Office in 1828, found that he had to do with an effective army of ninety-five thousand men and an ineffective army of pensioners of eighty-five thousand. Further, the average annual casualties among the effective during the years 1823 to 1827 were three thousand; and the average annual increase of pensioners was three thousand five hundred. Consequently, after fourteen years of peace the net average annual increase of pensions was five hundred. It further appeared that there were twenty thousand pensioners who had begun to draw their pensions at an average age of thirty-one, and after no more than ten years' service; and it was a curious feature that, for every one man who received his pension

for twenty-one years' service, there were three who claimed it for physical disability. For this latter misfortune once again the House of Commons was primarily responsible, by keeping men too long abroad without relief, and facilitating their access to vile liquor for the sake of the paltry £50,000 a year derived from the canteen-funds. 1831.

Obviously the whole system was vicious and ruinously faulty; and Hardinge set himself to amend it by a new warrant of 1829. He began by laying down the principle that length of service and good character, not disability (unless the result of wounds or hardship on active service), should be the guiding elements in the grant of pensions. Disability through disease or excess was, he contended, not a merit but the reverse in the soldier. He, therefore, offered to every good old soldier, honestly worn out in the service, one shilling a day upon completing twenty-one years' service, and an additional halfpenny for every year over and above that term. And this reward was to be his of right, so that he should not be called upon to serve until he was utterly infirm before he could obtain his discharge. He also abolished all permanent pensions after fourteen years' service unless for permanent disability; granting only a temporary pension to disabled men until they recovered—a very wholesome provision against loose living and malingering. Next, he altered the rules as to purchase of discharge. The cost of such purchase had been fixed at £20, whatever a man's length of service. Hardinge graduated the amount according to the years spent with the colours, the lowest sum being £5. After fifteen years a man could receive his discharge free; after sixteen years he received, in addition to such free discharge, a bonus of six months' pay, and so on upon an ascending scale, so that after seventeen years a man could retire with a little capital to help him to emigrate or to settle down. The cost of his pension was thus saved to the country, and he was replaced in the Army by a recruit who

1831. would be entitled to no pension for a long time. Altogether Hardinge reckoned that six to seven hundred men of over fifteen and under twenty-one years' service would leave the Army upon these terms annually, saving the country between £50,000 and £60,000 a year, and making the service more popular as no longer binding men to it for life.

There was one point, however, upon which Hardinge resisted the demands of the pensioners, namely that their pensions should be commuted so as to enable them to emigrate. This he resolutely refused to do except in individual cases, wherein he could be sure that the soldier would benefit and the public would not suffer. He knew well enough that, in general, soldiers were the merest children in the matter of money, and were not to be trusted with any considerable sum in their own keeping. Moreover, he was opposed on principle to the commutation of pensions, and declined to permit it even in the case of officers. Half-pay was a different matter. That was in the nature of a retaining fee for an officer's future services ; and the State, by commuting it into a lump sum, discharged not only the officer but itself from all further obligation upon either side. But a pension to a soldier, in Hardinge's view, was a reward for past service without expectation of further service in the future—a means for support during the years when infirmity debarred a man from further work and further earnings—and therefore a soldier should not have the opportunity of squandering it, and then of throwing himself upon the poor-rates. Such commutation of pensions might help to lower the military estimates for the gratification of the House of Commons, but was really a false economy, since the community was put to the double expense first of paying an old soldier a given sum to maintain him during his old age, and, secondly, if he chose to throw his money away, of supporting him out of the rates as a pauper.

Now the Reform Ministry of 1830 was certainly

very unlucky. It had to deal, as shall presently be seen, with a very critical situation abroad, and with great distress, dangerous riots and a falling revenue at home. The temptation to save, or at least to appear to save, a little money was therefore very great; and the scheme of allowing men to commute their pensions became overpoweringly attractive. It so happened that, owing to the prevalence of desertion among the troops in Canada, regulations had been drawn up for making a grant of land to old soldiers of good character upon retiring from the service there, with a pension which was not to be paid until they had cleared the ground for cultivation. The idea was to discourage desertion by offering soldiers the prospect of settling on the land upon obtaining their discharge, whether by purchase or upon expiration of their term; and the plan was by no means a bad one. Under Lord Grey's administration it occurred to some person of stupendous unwisdom, either in the Government or in the War Office, that by combining the two nostrums of commutation and emigration they might reduce the vote for pensions by a considerable figure. Overriding, therefore, though without changing, the existing regulation as to settlement in Canada, they offered, in 1831, to commute pensions indiscriminately at the very mean rate of less than five years' purchase, and to give those who accepted these terms the further bounty of a grant of land. Hardinge predicted to the promoters of this scheme the consequences that must inevitably follow; but they would not hear; and Hardinge's prophecy was fulfilled with most disconcerting rapidity. 1831.

Between two and three thousand old soldiers at once availed themselves of the Government's offer. Of these seven hundred were over fifty years of age, one hundred over sixty, six or seven over seventy, and one over eighty. They paid for their passages, but most of them speedily consumed the rest of their capital in drink, either afloat or ashore, before they reached

1831. Canada. Great numbers of them never left England at all; and it was reckoned that captains of ships profited to the sum of £1500 by forfeited passages. These men remained at home to become abject suppliants to the War Office and a burden to the community. Of those that crossed the Atlantic—and between 1831 and 1833 there were some three thousand in all—the greater number arrived penniless, having spent all their money in drink. Others could not find their land, sold it for a trifle and doubtless expended the purchase-money in liquor. Not one-third of them ever settled on the land at all, and not one-sixth were to be found on the land fifteen years later. Many perished from want. The rest became beggars or casual labourers, the most unwelcome visitors that could possibly be disembarked in a new country.

Hardinge was very indignant, and justly so; for so disastrous a state of things could not fail to excite discontent in the ranks and to repel recruits from entering the Army. "The War Office," he said, "ought to be the guardian and protector of the rights of old soldiers, instead of making, as on this occasion, cheap bargains at their expense." This was an unpleasant way of stating the case; yet it was strictly true. It is charitable to suppose that, despite of Hardinge's warning, the authorities realised not what they were doing; but the plain fact is that they had traded upon the simplicity of ignorant, heedless and trusting men in order to free the country, as they supposed, of its obligations towards them by a transparently mean and, in its essence, dishonest device. Had they not been able to flaunt their false economy as sound, immediately and ostentatiously, in the pages of the Army Estimates, they would probably have abstained from a measure which was at once base and reckless. But there was a clamorous House of Commons to be appeased; and, if members could be deceived and silenced by so simple an expedient as the

defrauding of two or three thousand old soldiers, why should a politician hesitate for a moment? It is the weak point of representative government that, in times of stress, it drives Ministers to seek to remedy by injustice evils which are curable only by time and patience. 1831.

The new rules as to commutation of pensions had not been in force two years before they were summarily cancelled. The cry of destitute old soldiers became too bitter and the pressure upon the poor-rates too urgent to permit Hardinge's wise principles to be longer neglected. The Government tried to placate its victims by offering to restore their pensions, less the sum already paid for the four years' purchase thereof. As a matter of strict business, this proposal seems equitable enough, but it was too strict for unthinking and improvident men, who were accustomed to direction from superiors in all the business of their lives, and were unable to fend for themselves. In brief, the whole scheme of commutation was an infamous and expensive failure, as all schemes must be which decline to take account of human frailty.[1]

Meanwhile the first reformed Parliament had met in January 1833, full of zeal, very full of inexperience and excessively full of talk. The establishment of the Army was left, as a whole, untouched at the figure of one hundred and ten thousand men; but there were minor changes which showed the weakness and ignorance of the new administration. The last remnant of the Waggon-Train was swept away, and with it vanished all the accumulated experience of the last war in the difficult and vitally important matters of transport and supply. Added together, these two corps amounted to hardly five hundred men. They were retained each of them only as a substructure upon which to build in case of need; but the House 1833.

[1] Hansard, xi. 1188. Sir H. Hardinge's speech, 2nd April 1832. *Commission on Military Punishments*, pp. 306-307. Hansard xci. 710, De Lacy Evans's speech, 12th April 1847.

1833. of Commons saw no necessity for anything of the kind. Members remembered 1813 and 1814, but they forgot 1793 and 1794. They groaned over the huge debt that had been piled up in the struggle against Revolutionary France, but, to save a few miserable thousands, they hesitated not to assure to posterity a wasteful expenditure of millions. It need hardly be said that Joseph Hume, as usual, moved for a reduction of the establishment of the Army by nineteen thousand men, but was effectively answered by Hardinge that such a proceeding would only increase the number of pensioners. After the repetition of this argument for the fiftieth time the House of Commons was at last beginning to realise its soundness; and the irrepressible Joseph gained nothing by his motion. No expenditure so stank in the nostrils of members as the "non-effective vote," and none had done so much to swell it as the champions of economy.

Remembering this, the Secretary at War, who had not increased the good fame of his office by the commutation of pensions, resolved to attack that difficult question in a new way. A fresh warrant was issued in 1833 which ordained that the soldier's military pension after twenty-one years' service should be sixpence instead of one shilling a day, with an extra halfpenny a day for every year in excess of twenty-one years. It ordained likewise that the ordinary pension of a marine, on discharge after twenty-one years' service, should be one shilling. Here, upon the face of it, was one gross and crying injustice; but this was not all. The soldier was bound to contrast the new regulation with the old, and to perceive that, whereas under Hardinge's rule five-and-twenty years' service, with good character, assured him fourteenpence a day, the new rule granted him but eightpence. Now, as Hardinge truly said, it was always possible for a Government to enlist the worst class of soldier for a prospective pension of sixpence, twopence or even one penny a day. Such individuals do not peer twenty days, much less twenty

years, into the future. But the better stamp of man, 1833.
the recruit whom it was desirable to attract, after ten or twelve years' service looked forward anxiously to his pension, so that he might obtain the largest amount possible, and retire to his village before he was completely worn out. With a shilling or fourteenpence a day a steady old soldier could, by frugal living, maintain himself respectably. But sixpence or eightpence—and here Wellington entirely agreed with Hardinge—was insufficient to support a pensioner in comfort. Such a pension was but "a parcimonious description of poor-rate"; and this meanness must inevitably promote discontent in the ranks and increase the existing aversion from life with the colours.[1] It will be seen later that Hardinge proved, once again, to be a true prophet; but, as is usually the case with real prophets, he spoke to deaf ears. Ministers seemed bent not only upon reducing the Army to the lowest possible number for the present, but upon insuring the country against the possibility of increasing it in the future. In the circumstances it is hardly surprising that just at this time Palmerston should, as shall presently be told, have pressed Queen Christina of Spain to do the military work, which England desired to see done, against Dom Miguel.

By 1834 the reformed Parliament had got into its 1834.
stride; and a general onslaught was made upon every department of military expenditure, though always under a scathing fire of criticism from Hardinge, who, in virtue of his experience at the War Office, added to many years of military service, was equipped for defence at every point. First, Ministers announced an immediate reduction of nearly eight thousand men, one sixth of them from the cavalry and the remainder from the infantry, with a prospective gradual diminution of the Home establishment from eighty-nine thousand to seventy thousand men, all by the simple process of leaving vacancies unfilled. The officers,

[1] *Commission on Military Punishments*, pp. 306-307.

1834. however, were to be spared, for the House dreaded any augmentation of the half-pay list. By these means, and by cutting down the allowance for the Guards' mess at St. James's to £4000 a year, the Government hoped to save nearly £300,000. Under this arrangement the garrisons of the West Indian Islands, Canada and Nova Scotia were actually diminished to a slightly lower strength than in 1792, the year to which Joseph Hume and his school looked back continuously with fond though unavailing regret.

Of course, these economies were all of them made at the expense of the British soldier's health, strength and comfort. Members, who were frequent and unsparing in denunciation of the lash, cared not how much they multiplied the motives to desertion and other forms of military crime which made the punishment necessary. Hardinge, almost in despair, exclaimed that the limit of reduction had been reached, and that the relief of foreign garrisons had now become a more difficult problem than ever. In reality the limit had already been long over-stepped. No fewer than four regiments, which had returned home in 1829 after twenty-four years' service abroad, were already, after a bare four years in the British Isles, under orders for foreign stations. Even so, the egregious William Cobbett, who had himself served in the Army, actually advocated reduction of the private soldier's pay. Hardinge turned upon the vain old agitator and smote him hip and thigh. The Poor Law Commission, he reminded the House, had pronounced the soldier to be ill-paid compared with any other class. Moreover, whereas soldiers received only brown bread for their ration, paupers and convicted felons received white wheaten bread, and sneered at the redcoats for faring worse than themselves.[1] Cobbett's motion was of

[1] So far as I know, the prejudice against brown bread still prevails among the waged class, as strongly as it certainly did forty years ago. In my own country of North Devon I traced it without difficulty to the tradition of the bad black bread handed down from the many

course rejected; but it does not appear that the House was moved in the slightest degree by Hardinge's revelations. Soldiers might have their uses in war, but in peace they were simply an evil. What matter if they were worse paid than others of the same social standing, if they were shamefully overcrowded in their barracks, if their food were the derision of paupers and felons, if they were condemned to almost perpetual exile, for the most part in deadly climates, and, supposing that they survived twenty-one years' service, were turned loose on the world with broken health and a miserable pittance of sixpence a day? They were British soldiers, and must expect nothing better merely because they were soldiers. Of course, they might and did die; but dead soldiers drew no pensions; and dead officers not only paid the debt of nature but forfeited to the country the price of their commissions. 1834.

Hume, meanwhile, did not spare the officers in his zeal for economy. He attacked the "Prince Regent's allowance," even as he had previously attacked the Guards' mess at St. James's; but once again Hardinge was ready with figures to show that no contractor could conduct the Guards' mess properly for £4000 a year, and that, if the Guards received the same allowance as the Line, the cost would be £12,000 instead of £4000. Then Hume endeavoured to cut down the allowances of colonial governors, who, at that time, were for the most part general officers. Hardinge answered that recently a Governor of Barbados had begged permission to resign almost immediately after reaching the island, since he found that he could not maintain his rank and associate on equal terms with the planters upon the pay that he received. Such a difficulty had never occurred to

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lean years between 1793 and 1815. Now, the cottager no longer bakes his own bread, and cannot distinguish good bread from bad. He is content with the vilest stuff from the local baker—bread which no officer would pass for the consumption of his men—so only it be white.

1834. Hume; but it is always hard to make men of his type, who call themselves advanced thinkers, realise that the combination of real ability and real integrity is rare in men, and cannot be secured at a cheap rate. Of course, too, neither he nor any other man could at that time produce documentary evidence of the evils that arise from underpaying colonial governors.

Next, Ministers themselves laid violent hands upon some of the few sinecure posts, such as the governorships of Windsor Castle and of other obsolete fortresses, which, together with the colonelcies of regiments, constituted the sole sources of emolument open to general officers not on the staff. But herein, though the proceeding naturally provoked some grumbling, they dealt, as it seems to me, with equity and wisdom. These sinecures were worth, together, £30,000 a year. The Government reduced them to £18,000 and set this sum apart as pensions for good service to deserving generals. Moreover, a member, who was high in the counsels of the reformers, moved that the pay of all unattached general officers should be made up to £400 a year; and though the motion was withdrawn, being ruled out of order, the proposal was accepted, and the position of the unemployed general became less impossible than before. Thus, albeit some of the most coveted of rewards were abolished, to the disgust, beyond doubt, of aspiring individuals, the body of general officers as a whole was benefited by the change.[1]

The year 1834 may be said to mark the climax of the hostility of the House of Commons towards military expenditure and towards all ranks of the Army. The establishment was reduced, or in course of reduction, to its lowest figure since the Second Peace of Paris, and the first reformed Parliament could

[1] Hansard, vol. xxi. 963. Debate on Army Estimates, 28th March 1834. Speeches of Mr. Ellice, Mr. Stanley and Sir H. Hardinge, *ibid.* 1003 *sq.* Debate of 3rd March 1834; speeches of Hardinge, Hume and Lord Ebrington.

place this achievement among the foremost triumphs of its impatient inexperience. The situation, both abroad and at home, was eminently unpropitious to so dangerous an experiment, but men who are in a hurry to bring about the millennium rarely take thought for times and seasons. The principal legislative measures of Lord Grey's administration had been two, the emancipation of the slaves, passed in 1833, and the amendment of the Poor Law in 1834, both of them problems so thorny and so difficult that satisfactory solution at the first attempt was hardly to be hoped for. Emancipation, even if accomplished with faultless wisdom and foresight—much more if, as proved to be the case, the details of the Act were based upon false calculations—was bound to require for a time increase of the West Indian garrisons. The "new Poor Law," as it was called, if enforced as its framers intended that it should be, was equally bound in times of distress to produce riots with which the new police force was as yet too weak to deal. In the Empire, apart from the West Indies, there was serious trouble threatening in Canada, and a Kaffir war was inevitable in South Africa. Lastly, Ireland was, as usual, in disorder, and the Cabinet, as usual, was divided in opinion as to the remedy for the evil. As a consequence of this dissension Lord Grey resigned office in July, and Lord Melbourne, without making any change in his colleagues, succeeded him as Prime Minister. 1834.

In November the King suddenly dismissed Melbourne, and sent for Sir Robert Peel to form an administration. Parliament was dissolved, but, though the strength of the Conservatives in the Commons was greatly increased at the new elections, Peel was still too weak to carry on the government, and in April 1835 abandoned the attempt. Thereupon Melbourne again came in, with Palmerston for his Foreign Secretary, Charles Grant, later Lord Glenelg, at the Office of War and Colonies, and Lord 1835.

1835. Howick, afterwards the third Earl Grey, for his Secretary at War.

The estimates for 1835 seem to have evoked little discussion, looking to the policy of steady reduction announced in the previous year. In the department of the Ordnance it was announced that £59,000 had been saved by the gradual concentration of depots and abolition of offices in the civil side during the past four years; and, as shall presently be seen, there were great schemes of retrenchment on foot through the consolidation of the civil departments concerned with the administration of the Army. The principal military measure, however, was a Militia bill, which, in the words of the Duke of Richmond, finally destroyed the ballot and greatly reduced the permanent staff. Wellington, while not opposing the bill, deplored this diminution of the staff, recalling the good service done by the Militia in maintaining order during the troubles of 1830.[1] But it was very plain that the House of Commons was quite content, indeed positively eager, to allow England's second line of defence to perish.

1836. In 1836 there was no change in the Army estimates, though Howick, owing to the Kaffir War, was obliged to ask for a supplementary vote to defray the cost of three companies of mounted rifles and two provisional battalions—the Hottentots raised by Harry Smith—in Cape Colony. Hume, as usual, pleaded for a reduction of the establishment upon the ground that the creation of the police had done away with the need for maintaining a military force upon the old scale. Happily his arguments fell upon deaf ears, perhaps the more readily because they were perfectly logical.

Another question raised by Hume was that of the dismissal of officers from the service without trial and without reason assigned, the aggrieved officer in this case being the Duke of Cumberland, Colonel of the Fifteenth Hussars, who had violated the orders of the

[1] Hansard, xxx. 670, 19th Aug. 1835.

Commander-in-chief by attending lodges of Orange- 1836.
men. A second case of somewhat different nature was that of Lord Brudenell, better known later as Lord Cardigan, who had been removed from the command of the Fifteenth Hussars in consequence of unfavourable revelations, but had been appointed to that of the Eleventh Hussars. Upon this Sir William Molesworth moved for a select committee to enquire into the conduct of the Commander-in-chief himself. Brudenell had asked for a court-martial, which had been refused to him, but being a member of the House, he had now an opportunity of defending himself, which he did with great effect. The veterans Frederick Ponsonby, Vivian, and Byng, all of them supported him; and it was left to Hardinge to recall the House to common sense and to point out that it was no part of its functions to review cases of military discipline. Officers, as he pointed out, were already too fond of bringing their grievances to the notice of Parliament by way of petition, and the practice should not receive encouragement. The House responded to this appeal. Forty-two members only voted with Molesworth, whose motion was lost by a majority of eight to one.[1] Nevertheless, so long as officers are liable to dismissal without trial, without reason assigned, and without right of appeal except to the Sovereign—which is only another name for the judge who has condemned them—so long will they seek justice, not always in vain,[2] from Parliament; and the Admiralty

[1] Hansard, vol. xxxi. pp. 345-347, 12th February 1836; vol. xxxii. pp. 210 *sq.*, 10th March 1836; vol. xxxiii. pp. 533 *sq.*, 3rd May 1836.

[2] The reader will recall the case of Mr. Midshipman Archer-Shee, wrongfully dismissed and disgraced by the Admiralty, and reinstated after a desperate struggle with the Board in consequence of the action of the Commons. But there are at least two cases known to me in which military officers have been infamously treated, and have been denied the barest shadow of justice. The root of such cases is always the same. Some superior makes a foolish mistake—as any man may—and instead of confessing it covers it up with a worse, and that again with a still worse, and so on until he involves the whole

1836. and the War Office have only themselves to thank for it.

1837. The year 1837 brought with it, before the accession of Queen Victoria, a brevet which gave a step of rank to four hundred and forty officers of the Line, one hundred and twenty-nine of the Artillery and sixteen of the Royal Marines. This last was a concession granted for the first time to the Marines, where all promotion went by seniority and where consequently there were to be found lieutenants of eight and twenty years' standing in that rank. None the less, Hume fell furiously upon the brevet, declaring that the list had been based on partiality and not on merit, and moving for a nominal return of all the officers who had profited by it. The true reason for this outburst was that Lord Hill, the Commander-in-chief, was, in politics, a Tory, and that the Radicals could not be persuaded that he did not use his patronage and his influence against the government. The attack was easily repelled, for it was proved that the brevet was based upon seniority, the services of some officers included therein going back to 1774. But still Hume was not to be placated. He moved the reduction of the salaries of the Commander-in-chief and of his Military Secretary; and an individual named Roebuck, who enjoyed at one time a certain notoriety, protested that "the Army had been made the mere appanage of a family hostile to the popular cause." The natural conclusion of course was that the Army ought to be diminished, not because it was too large for the duties that were assigned to it, but because the Commander-in-chief happened to hold political opinions with which the Radicals did not agree. That such diminution might mean death to hundreds of British soldiers by prolonging their stay in unhealthy climates

hierarchy of his department, and of other departments, in such a confusion of suppressions, evasions and lies that, for reasons of State (as they aver), justice cannot be done. The very courts of law seem to become infected with the virus.

was nothing to such men as Hume and Roebuck. It 1837.
was no offence to the " popular cause " that a battalion or two should be annihilated by yellow fever. If there was at this canting time one form of cant more nauseous than another, it was the cant of the Radicals who, in the name of humanity and the popular cause, were always professedly striving to deliver the British soldier from the lash, and as steadily working in reality to condemn him to death.[1]

Happily, however, a new era in the career of the British soldier was now about to open. Recently there had been published a voluminous report by a commission which had been appointed to enquire as to military punishments in the Army. Hundreds of officers had been examined; and the opinion of nearly all, from Wellington downward, had been that flogging could not at present be dispensed with. The experiment of substituting other punishments, of a worrying and degrading kind, had been tried and in at least one case had resulted in mutiny; the men loading their muskets with their buttons and firing at the commanding officer. No one of the witnesses advocated frequent use of the lash. Every one looked forward to the time when it might be utterly abolished. But for the present there was general agreement that, without the terror of flogging in the background, minor punishments would fail to enforce discipline. Meanwhile the use of the cat had been sensibly diminished. Howick, in 1836, had limited the number of lashes that could be inflicted by sentence of a general court-martial to two hundred, of a district court-martial to one hundred and fifty, and of a regimental court-martial to one hundred. The total number of floggings in the Army at home had fallen from two hundred and forty-six in 1835 to one hundred and sixty-three in 1836. At this rate there was good ground for hope that employment of the lash would gradually become so infrequent as practically to abolish

[1] Hansard, vol. xxxvii. pp. 788 *sq.*, 5th, 6th, 7th April 1837.

1837. itself. As Hardinge said, the alternatives to flogging were three. The first was dismissal. This, in the case of the police, was effective, because the constables received good pay; but, since the formation of the force, it had been necessary to dismiss four thousand men; and it would be impossible to discharge the same proportion from the Army. The second alternative was penal companies. This had been tried on the West Coast of Africa and was equivalent to sentence of death, since the mortality, as has been already stated, varied from eighty to ninety in the hundred. Lastly, there was shooting; and the French in Algiers could only enforce discipline by shooting one man every month. For the present, therefore, there was no question but that the lash must be retained.[1]

But the report of this same commission brought to light the recommendations and expedients of all ranks of officers for diminishing crime by ameliorating the lot of the men, and encouraging them to good behaviour rather than discouraging them from bad. Howick seized upon these, and initiated at once a series of reforms which entitle him to the perpetual honour and respect of the Army. The first of these, set forth in a Royal Warrant of the 1st of September 1836, marked a new departure in our military history. No soldier enlisted from that day forward was to be entitled to extra pay in virtue of mere length of service; but every man who had served for seven years, and had kept his name off the defaulters' sheet for two clear years of that period, was to receive a mark of distinction — what is now called a good-conduct badge — and an additional penny a day. Fourteen years' service on the same conditions was to give him another badge and a second penny; and twenty-one years' service a third badge and a third penny; and his pension would then be proportionately

[1] *Report of Commission on Military Punishments.* Hansard, vol. xxxvii. pp. 868 *sq.*, 7th April 1837.

augmented.[1] Thus tardily were born the institutions of good-conduct badges and good-conduct pay. 1837.

Next, Howick grappled with the difficult question of reliefs. Of one hundred and three battalions of the Line at this time eighty-two—more than four-fifths—were constantly abroad. Most of them were stationed in unhealthy climates; and it had been the practice to keep them in the West Indies for ten consecutive years. Now the entire system was to be altered. Regiments were to go in future first to the Mediterranean, then to the West Indies, then to Canada and were then to return home. Moreover, the troops in the Windward and Leeward Islands were to receive fresh provisions upon five days in the week and salt upon two days only; and in Jamaica no salt victuals were to be issued at all. Common sense was beginning to prevail at last in the matter of just treatment of the soldier.[2]

The year 1837, therefore, witnessed a great and beneficent change in the general attitude of Parliament towards the Army. In truth such men as Hume were often friendly rather than the reverse to the individual private soldier, but, being fanatics, and therefore unable to see more than one side of the question, had failed to perceive the very obvious fact that every battalion struck off the strength of the establishment—indeed every man struck off the strength of a troop or company—signified harder work for the battalions and for the individual men who were retained in the service. And, to do them justice, they had not confined their economic criticism to the numbers of the Army only. They had looked askance at the multitude of different departments concerned with the administration of the

[1] Hansard, xxxvii. pp. 778 *sq.* Howick's speech of 5th April 1837. The increase of pension was proportioned to the increase of pay which a man had received for five years. Thus if a man had received 1d. additional for five years and 2d. additional for two years, his pension was increased by 1½d. a day.

[2] Hansard, xxxvii. Howick's second speech, 5th April 1837.

1837. military forces of the Crown, and asked whether some saving might not be made by the consolidation of at least some of them. The list indeed was sufficiently long. First came two Secretariats of State, that for War and Colonies, and that for the Home Department, the latter being still in charge of militia, yeomanry and volunteers, and, of course, of the new police. Then there was the Commander-in-chief at the Horse Guards, ruling the cavalry and infantry; then the Master-general of the Ordnance, supreme over artillery, engineers, firearms of all descriptions and greatcoats; then the Treasury in control of the Commissariat, that is to say of supply and transport; then the Secretary at War, responsible for military expenditure of all kinds, and so far absolutely supreme over the cavalry and infantry; then the Army Medical Department; then the Audit Office; the Paymaster-general; the Board of General Officers for inspection of clothing and, incidentally, the regimental colonels who provided that clothing; and finally the Commissioners of Chelsea Hospital. In all there were ten departments, and until 1835, when the functionaries known as Comptrollers of Army Accounts were merged in the Audit Office, there had been eleven, all helping, or hindering, each other in the work of administering the government of the Army.

In 1833 a commission under the presidency of the Duke of Richmond was appointed to consider the expediency of consolidating the offices of the Secretary at War, Paymaster-general, Commissariat, and certain of the minor departments into a Board, with a Civil Commissioner, being a member of the Cabinet, at its head, and of placing the office of Ordnance under the Commander-in-chief. This commission prepared a draft report; but its recommendations took no final shape until they had been adopted by a second commission appointed in 1837. The two great objects of the latter body were, first, to centralise the civil administration of the Army, and

secondly, to ensure the absolute control of all military expenditure by Parliament. This latter purpose, first put forward and in some measure attained by Burke's economical reforms of 1783, had fallen out of sight under the stress of war; and there were large sums, classed as "Army Extraordinaries," the disbursement of which was left to the military without any express sanction of Parliament in detail. In 1836 "Extraordinaries" were abolished, and all charges defrayed from the money voted under that name were, so far as possible, classed and specified in detail in the estimates. 1837.

So much, therefore, had already been accomplished as a matter of mere departmental administration. But the transfer of the Ordnance Office to the control of the Commander-in-chief, and of the Commissariat to the Ordnance Office, and the placing of the Secretary at War, with a seat in the Cabinet, at the head of all, were changes that could not be so lightly made. The entire scheme was put forward on the plea of retrenchment; but behind it there lurked the ruling principles of the Whigs, intense jealousy of the Crown, and furious hostility to all jobs excepting their own. It would be unjust to say that they had no care for the public weal; but they looked forward to long tenure of office, and yearned for an increase of patronage.

The recommendations of the commission were submitted to Wellington, who criticised them in his most trenchant style in three different memoranda. The Sovereign (so ran his argument) is the head of the Army. He commands through the instrumentality of a military officer, the Commander-in-chief, who cannot move a man nor spend a penny except with the sanction of the financial officer, namely the Secretary at War. The patronage and discipline of the Army are vested in the Commander-in-chief, so that political influence may have no part in them; and for this reason it is undesirable that the Commander-in-chief should ever be a member of the cabinet.

1837. The Master-general of the Ordnance stands in a different position. His office is of great antiquity; he is concerned with the Navy as well as with the Army; he has considerable patronage; he is a responsible minister for finance, and he is generally in the cabinet, and is the adviser of the government in military matters. Lastly, there is the Commissariat under the superintendence and patronage of the Treasury. All of these it is now proposed to place under the Secretary at War, who is to be a Cabinet Minister. The Secretaries of State are no longer to have a voice in the political questions which arise out of the existence of the Army. The Secretary at War will be absolute. Everything relating to the political command, the pay, movement, equipment, quarters, barracks, stores, forage and provisions of the Army will be in his hands. The Commander-in-chief is supposed to retain his present position; but how can he stand his ground against a Minister supported by the House of Commons and the cabinet? Have we not seen, to our cost, a Secretary at War carry on the discipline of the Army and administer its patronage? Again, the Master-general of the Ordnance is supposed to remain in command of the artillery and the engineers; but his civil officers, considered to be a model of efficiency and economy, are to be placed under the Secretary at War. Above all, he ceases to be that which he has been, a responsible minister of finance. And how can such a Master-general withstand this great official any more than the Commander-in-chief? Lastly, the Commissariat is to be taken from the Treasury and likewise subjected to the Secretary at War. He will command the Army, and to whom will he be accountable? Who is to control his expenditure? There is only the House of Commons. Yet it has hitherto been understood that, the estimates of the Army once voted, Parliament ought not to interfere further in its arrangements. This measure will transfer the effective command of

the Army from the Sovereign to the House of Commons. 1837.

Such were Wellington's broad objections to the proposals of the commission of 1837; but he urged also certain further arguments in the matter of pure administration which were strongly supported not only by officers of wide experience, such as Hardinge and Kempt, but also by civilians. The most important of these was that, in a multiplicity of small departments, the chief could at least exert active control over every detail and could be held individually responsible for the same. Excessive consolidation, as they pointed out, makes for unwieldiness, and destroys those checks by which a department curbs itself, or should be curbed by some other department. To find the happy mean between centralisation and decentralisation is of course the problem which eternally besets those who are concerned with the government of men; and, as a rule, a solution is hardly found before it becomes obsolete.

Unfortunately also the purely administrative questions are invariably entangled with some political complication. Wellington, it is very plain, dreaded the transfer of supremacy over the Army from the Crown to the House of Commons. He gladly yielded to civil authority in all things lawful. He was quite content that he, a Field-marshal in most of the armies of Europe and with the greatest military reputation in the world, should, as Commander-in-chief, be powerless to move a corporal's guard from London to Hounslow without the authority of the Secretary at War. But he remembered what the discipline, or rather indiscipline, of the officers had been when the Secretary at War had controlled the patronage of the Army, and he shrank from the prospect of seeing those evil days restored and the great work of the Duke of York undone. It is easy to say that he was blind in not foreseeing that the control of the Army must sooner or later pass from the Sovereign

1837. to the House of Commons, and unwise not to give way with a good grace. It is very simple, with wisdom gained after the event, to dwell upon the advantage of placing all branches of the military calling under a single head, of training officers to financial administration, and of grasping that the responsibility for a waggon and for its load must rest upon a single individual, and not be divided between one official of the Commissariat and another of the Waggon-train. Wellington had to do with the England of 1837, an England heavily burdened with debt and with the responsibilities of a new Empire, distressed by continuous and seemingly irremediable depression, and bewildered by noisy charlatans and self-deceiving enthusiasts. The reformed House of Commons had shown plainly that it did not desire military efficiency. Wellington's care was less to improve the Army than to save it from destruction. He considered that to place it under the absolute control of a civilian responsible only to the House of Commons would be injurious to its discipline. Therein he was probably right. He did not see, as did another very remarkable man, forty years his junior, that power was passing away from the House of Commons itself, and that the Army might find itself under the control of a politician who was practically responsible to no one; but it is not likely that such a prospect, could his prevision have pictured it, would have made him change his opinion. Lastly, he had no faith that the proposed consolidation would make for economy. Upon this point he was well qualified to speak, being himself one of the ablest and thriftiest of departmental rulers, who had made the Ordnance the model of British administrative offices; and once again he was probably right.

In any case no action was taken upon the report of the commission; and Wellington's disapproval of its recommendations had probably much to do with the Government's decision. It shall be seen in due time that this question was again brought forward in 1849,

and that once again Wellington, then eighty years of age, firmly set his foot upon it. Hence it was that when the country embarked upon an European War in 1854, the organisation of the military departments was much the same as in 1815, and was in 1855 suddenly and violently altered. The fact might be construed as absolutely damnatory of Wellington's judgment; but it would be imprudent to accept this inference too hastily. It sounds, for instance, a comparatively simple matter to merge the Board of Ordnance into the War Office, or at any rate to place the men of the artillery and engineers under the Commander-in-chief, and to allow the Board to remain in charge of the material of war only. But it is forgotten that the artillery and engineers did not obtain their commissions by purchase, and that they were clothed, not by their colonels, but by the Board. Here at once an administrative difficulty would have presented itself in the shape of cavalry and infantry, governed by one rule of admission, promotion and clothing, and artillery and engineers by another. As a matter of fact the amalgamation of the Ordnance Office and War Office led instantly to the abolition of the old system of clothing, and to the compensation of colonels of regiments for the loss that they had sustained. This, of course, signified cost to the public, as did also the later abolition of purchase in 1870. Meanwhile, however, not only had war schooled the nation to pay such expense cheerfully, but the discovery of gold in Australia and California had relieved the economic situation. In 1837 it would have been quite impossible to ask the nation to bear the expense of reform in the matter of clothing, much more to stand the cost of doing away with the purchase of commissions. 1837.

Lastly, it shall be seen in due time that the fusion of War Office, Ordnance Office, Commissariat and other minor departments in 1855 by no means led to the greater ease and economy that had been expected

1855. in military administration. Until then there had been the Horse Guards—the purely military department—under the Commander-in-chief, and the War Office—the purely civil department—under the Secretary at War. Each had its clearly defined function; and the civil department, having financial control, was so far supreme. After the fusion there was for half a century perpetual friction between War Office and Horse Guards; and the authority of the Commander-in-chief was slowly worn away by successive encroachments of the Secretary for War until the very title was abolished and the Civil Secretary, a politician, became supreme over all things, both civil and military. Being a politician he is subject to political pressure alike in private by intriguers and in public by the House of Commons, a body which for a full generation has steadily and justly fallen in the respect and estimation of the community. Such an arrangement would certainly not have commended itself to Wellington, who, it must be repeated, was not only a great soldier but in the very first rank of departmental administrators. Whether he were right or wrong in principle, time alone can show.

CHAPTER XX

In 1830 the revolutionary forces of Europe once again broke out into remarkable activity, and the year was one of tumult and disorder in many quarters. In France, Charles the Tenth, who had succeeded his brother Lewis in 1824, was, thanks to his own folly, driven from his throne and country by an insurrection in Paris; and the crown was given by the provisional government, which had seized power upon his fall, to his kinsman, Louis Philippe of Orleans. 1830. July.

A month later Belgium revolted against the domination of Holland, to which she had been joined by decree of the powers at the close of the war; and by November she had won, through force of arms, her independence. From Belgium the spirit of insurrection spread first into the Rhenish provinces, and thence into the heart of Germany and to Austria. There were serious disturbances in Hanover and in Hessen-Cassel. In Saxony the King was actually driven from Dresden; in Brunswick the Duke was hounded out of his dominions to find a refuge in England; and the danger in Germany would have been far more serious had not the troops remained loyal to the constituted authorities.

In Russian Poland the patriots actually expelled the Russians for a time, and maintained themselves in the field for many months, fighting many severe and not a few successful actions before they were finally vanquished by the genius of Paskiewitch. In Hungary a revolt was averted mainly by the accident of an

1830. epidemic of cholera. In Switzerland popular outbreaks compelled the grant of more liberal constitutions in almost every canton. In Italy there were formidable risings in Parma, Modena and the Papal States, which were put down by the Austrians. In Spain the Liberals sought to make their principles prevail by persuading the old King to alter the line of the royal succession. In 1829 he had married Princess Christine of the Neapolitan house of Bourbon, who had borne him a daughter, Isabella; and upon this infant he had settled his crown, to the prejudice of the male heir, his brother Don Carlos—a source of woes unnumbered to Spain in the years to come. In brief, the European settlement of 1815 was everywhere threatened where not actually overthrown; for a general peace, being little more than the temporary sign of general exhaustion, contains in itself the seeds of future wars. If the British government desired to countenance and encourage popular movements in foreign countries, it certainly had a large field for its energy.

But the situation was far too serious for any trifling. The revolutions in France and Belgium raised the whole question of the fate of Antwerp, and this is one with which the most bigoted of English philosophic liberals dares not play. Wellington, who was still in power when Louis Philippe became King of the French, made no difficulty about his recognition by England as such, believing the arrangement to be for the peace of Europe. Austria and Prussia, though greatly shocked, also acknowledged the new monarch, and even the Tsar Nicholas of Russia, after some semblance of menace and some weeks of delay, consented to do likewise. The rising in Belgium was a far more complicated matter. The King of Holland called upon the great powers of Europe for military assistance, and his brother-in-law, King Frederick William of Prussia, seemed disposed to respond. Happily, Louis Philippe, despite of the sympathy of the democratic party in Paris with the Belgians,

declared at once that he would abstain from any intervention in Belgium. For one thing he knew that the powers would not permit it, and for another he could not forget that the flower of the French army was already committed to the conquest of Algeria. But, in return, he required that, if he abstained from interference, all other powers must do likewise; and he gave Frederick William clearly to understand that military invasion of the Low Countries by Prussian troops would be treated by France as an act of war. This practically banished all immediate fear of military intervention. The British government proposed a conference of the powers upon the whole question, to be held in London. The idea found favour in the eyes of all; and Louis Philippe had already given proof of his wish to co-operate heartily with England by sending Talleyrand as his ambassador to the Court of St. James's. So far, under the guidance of Wellington and Aberdeen, had matters advanced towards an amicable settlement when, in November 1830, these two gave place to Lord Grey and Lord Palmerston. 1830.

The conference, holding its first meeting on the 4th of November, proceeded rapidly with its work. An armistice was at once imposed upon the contending parties. The independence of Belgium and the definition of its frontiers were settled before the end of January 1831. The provisional government at Brussels, however, made much trouble over accepting their appointed boundaries, and still more over the choice of their king. In fact, they actually chose the Duke of Nemours to wear their crown, although Grey had said without hesitation that, if a son of Louis Philippe became King of the Belgians, England would treat it as an act of war, and although Louis Philippe had expressly disavowed any such intention. Moreover, neither Dutch nor Belgians observed the armistice, the former holding the citadel of Antwerp and closing the navigation of the Scheldt, while the latter, as reprisals, blockaded Maastricht. The difficulty Nov. 1831. Jan.

1831. over the kingship was cleared away by the Belgian acceptance of Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg for their sovereign; but the other problems, owing to the recalcitrance of both parties, were less easily solved, and the troubles in Italy did not help matters forward.

Aug. 1. On the 1st of August the Dutch general, Chassé, who held the citadel of Antwerp, denounced the armistice, and on the 4th the Dutch advanced against the Belgians. Leopold thereupon appealed to France and England for help; fifty thousand French troops under Marshal

Aug. 20. Gérard marched to his assistance; and by the 20th the last of the Dutch had been pushed out of Belgium.

Thus the French were now in complete possession of the debatable land, which was the very situation that British diplomacy had striven to avert. Moreover, the French Foreign Office declared that Gérard must continue to occupy Belgium until a definite treaty of peace should have been concluded between that country and Holland. The fact was that the barrier of fortresses, which, after 1815, had been constructed at the cost of the Allies and under Wellington's direction for the protection of the southern frontier of the Low Countries, was regarded by France as a menace, and that she hoped to come to a separate agreement with Leopold, irrespective of the great powers, for their demolition. The British government, however, was determined to oppose any such arrangement even, if necessary, to the point of war.

Thus the state of affairs became most critical. Happily, however, the governments of France and England both remained cool. The French agreed to

Sept. withdraw their troops from Belgium; the arrangements for the settlement of the frontier were determined by the five great powers and accepted by

Nov. 15. Belgium, though not by Holland, on the 15th of November; and a convention respecting the demolition of the fortresses was agreed to by Great Britain, Austria,

Dec. Russia, Prussia and Belgium in December 1831. This last step caused some irritation in France, but, with a

little management, this was allayed, and, thanks to the tact and firmness of Palmerston, by the 4th of May 1832 the agreement of the 15th November had been ratified by all the powers concerned. 1832. May.

All of this was very satisfactory for Belgium, but very remote from pleasing to Holland, which steadily rejected the settlement of the 15th November. Since Dutch troops still occupied the citadel of Antwerp, the Dutch government looked at any rate for some minor concessions, which, so long as these involved no violation of principle, the five powers were disposed to grant. But the Dutch were proud, and the Belgians, forgetting the lesson of their recent defeat in the field, were arrogant; and on the 10th of July the five powers sent their final proposals to the Hague with an intimation that, if these were not accepted, the settlement of the 15th of November must stand unaltered. Palmerston laboured indefatigably, and with some apparent prospect of success, for an amicable adjustment of the difficulty, but in vain; and on the 22nd of October France and England signed a convention to regulate the conditions under which Holland should be compelled by military force to submission. On the 4th of November the British and French fleets set sail for the mouth of the Scheldt, and on the 16th sixty thousand French troops crossed the frontier and laid siege to the citadel of Antwerp, the Belgian army having been first warned that it must take no share in the operations. The Dutch general, Chassé, made a gallant defence, being specially anxious to earn the approbation of Wellington, but on the 22nd of December surrendered. A little more diplomatic pressure, combined with the blockade by the Allied fleets, brought the Dutch government to terms, and on the 21st of May 1833 Holland agreed at any rate not to begin hostilities against Belgium and to leave free the navigation of the Scheldt. Meanwhile, Belgium retained the districts of Limburg and Luxemburg until 1838, when, the Dutch having at length determined to July. Oct. Nov. Dec. 1833. May.

1833. recognise her independence, this territory was restored to Holland.

Thus through the skill and resolution of Palmerston, backed by the loyal and steady co-operation of Talleyrand, this thorny and dangerous Belgian question was amicably settled between France and England. But more than once the peril of war drew very near, and, had it not been that the cream of the French army was already employed in Algeria, and that the French troops in the Low Countries were consequently of inferior quality, the pressure of the party in Paris, which desired to make good at least some of the conquests gained and lost by Napoleon, might have been greater than Louis Philippe could have withstood. In such a case England, thanks to the steady reduction of all military establishments, would have been powerless. But, during the course of the negotiations, Palmerston realised that Austria and Prussia were, as yet, less formidable than their outward semblance might give reason to believe; while even Russia, though immensely powerful, was necessarily slow and clumsy in action. He therefore hesitated not to use bold language to each and all of them; and, in fact, the foreign policy of England for the next twenty or thirty years was conducted mainly by big words and by steady and ostentatious countenance of what was called the liberal party in all foreign countries. This sympathy with the advocates of constitutional government on the British model, with the aspirants to what is termed political liberty, and, to be brief, with political revolution in every quarter, appealed strongly to the sentimental element among the population of the British Isles. Every smooth citizen could plume himself upon the consciousness that, at the cost of a small pecuniary subscription, or the still cheaper price of a few verbal platitudes, he was potentially a liberator. He did not perceive that he was really a pawn in Palmerston's hand, and that Palmerston's policy of abetting disaffection in all the absolute governments of

Europe was really in the nature of a military diversion —a means of giving these governments so much to occupy them at home that they could spare no strength for any enterprise abroad. It is possible, indeed, that Palmerston himself would not have confessed, in so many words, that such was his object. On the contrary, he would almost certainly have disclaimed any such idea with scorn, and have cloaked his repudiation in a few sounding phrases about liberty. But, none the less, as it seems to me, he, like Canning before him, sought to make good England's military weakness by what were, in substance, nothing less than methods of war in full time of peace. 1833.

This aspect of the question has, I think, been too much overlooked. The differences between Castlereagh and Wellington on the one side, and Canning and Palmerston on the other, are commonly narrowed down to the formula that the two former were in favour of absolute government and oppression, and the two latter of constitutional government and liberty. But this is only half of the truth. Castlereagh and Wellington held that the open encouragement of political disaffection towards the established authority of a neighbouring state was practically an act of war; and they disliked such a policy as being unfriendly and, consequently, unless backed by sufficient military strength, as dangerous. Nor were they altogether wrong. High language, backed by such clandestine acts of war, may prevail for a time, but it misleads those that employ it into the delusion that words alone have brought about the desired effect. The injured neighbours are not thus deceived. They soon realise that the lofty speeches are but bluster, and they disregard them with one of two results, either that England drifts unwillingly into such a war as that of the Crimea, or is fain to look on in impotent indignation while two neighbours, as in 1864, violently despoil a third neighbour with a view to an ultimate challenge of England's very existence.

1831. The tension over Belgium had hardly been relieved by the French evacuation of the country before startling tidings came in from the East. Mohammed Ali, Pasha of Egypt, noting the military weakness of his suzerain, the Sultan, after the exhaustion of the war with Russia, had sent an army under his son Ibrahim to invade Syria in November 1831 and to open the campaign with the siege of Acre. The famous fortress was stubbornly defended, and was not carried by storm
1832. until the end of May 1832. But, after its fall, Ibrahim's progress was formidably rapid. Enforcing strict discipline upon his troops, he conciliated every section of the inhabitants; and, after a succession of victories over the Turks, he entered Damascus in
July. June, Aleppo a month later, and by the end of July was master of the Taurus mountains and of the gates of Asia Minor. In consternation the Sultan besought Stratford Canning, the British ambassador at Constantinople, for British help, and, in particular, for naval assistance on the coast of Syria; and, had Palmerston been possessed of sole authority in the matter, he would probably have returned a favourable answer and sent an armament, at any rate, of some description. But at this moment, the beginning
Nov. of November 1832, the Belgian question was still unsettled; and the majority of the cabinet not unreasonably shrank, meanwhile, from entangling themselves in further adventures. Moreover—and this was the really significant point—the British naval establishments had been reduced to such weakness that the Mediterranean squadron could only with the greatest difficulty have been reinforced. In the circumstances the British government replied to the effect that it was much touched by this mark of the Sultan's confidence, and would not fail to let Mohammed Ali know that it was pained by his misconduct. By a strange irony this vapid message reached Constantinople simultaneously with the news that Ibrahim had utterly overthrown and dispersed the Turkish army in a

decisive battle at Konieh on the 21st of December, 1832.
and that there was nothing to stay his advance westward to the Bosporus.

A few days earlier, the Russian general, Muravieff, had suddenly arrived at Constantinople, bearing a letter to the Sultan from the Tsar. It was not difficult to divine the purport of his mission, namely, to make an offer of military help to the Turks, for it was now a principle of Russian policy that it was better to maintain Turkey as a weak neighbour than to displace her and incur unknown dangers. The proposal was gratefully accepted by the Sultan. Mohammed Ali undertook, in deference to Russian protests, to arrest Ibrahim's advance westward for the present; and a small Russian squadron entered the Bosporus. Mohammed Ali, none the less, insisted that every part of Syria should be subjected to his rule before he would consent to withdraw his army from Asia Minor; and, notwithstanding the arrival of a second Russian squadron and of a detachment of Russian troops, he was as good as his word. On the 4th of 1833.
May 1833 Count Orloff arrived as ambassador extraordinary to the Sublime Porte; and from that moment Russian influence was supreme in Constantinople. On the 8th of July, Turkey and Russia concluded the treaty of Ankiar-Skelessi, providing for their mutual succour in case of need, with a secret article whereby the Porte engaged itself, in lieu of giving military assistance, to close, upon Russia's demand, the Dardanelles to ships of war of all nations; or, in other words, to grant to the Russian navy only the right of passage from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. Russia's next step was to negotiate a treaty with Austria and with Prussia, affirming the right of every independent sovereign to call to his aid another sovereign, and agreeing that, if such action were opposed by any other power, the three courts should treat such opposition as an act of hostility against them all. Finally, on the 18th of September 1833 Austria

1833. and Russia signed a secret convention to combine for
Sept. the preservation of the Ottoman Empire, and to check any attempt of Mohammed Ali to extend his authority over the European provinces of Turkey.

Thus astutely and without offence did Russia both make herself mistress of one of the main gates from Europe into Asia, and secure her southern frontier, while pushing her advance eastward. France and England could only watch the proceeding helplessly; and Russia counted upon their jealousy to keep each other's hands off the second main gate, Egypt. Yet England could not complain, for the Sultan had made his first offer to her, and had only fallen back upon Russia owing to England's default. Military weakness, deliberately self-imposed, was the true motive that inspired, if not dictated, the policy of the British Ministers. Had they been in a position to support Turkey, then Russia, with her southern flank insecure, would have been more cautious in her movements towards the East, and there need have been no Afghan war, nor conquest of Scinde. There, however, the matter was; and Ministers could only hope that Mohammed Ali would observe strictly the limits of his authority over Syria, and give no further occasion for Russian intervention on the Sultan's behalf.

Meanwhile, trouble had broken out afresh in the Iberian Peninsula. Dom Pedro had been compelled by a revolution in Brazil to take refuge in England,
1831. where he arrived in July 1831 together with his daughter, Maria de Gloria, who had likewise been driven from Portugal by the usurpation of her uncle, Dom Miguel. The fallen Emperor eagerly took up the task of reconquering Portugal for his daughter, and received open encouragement from France; a French fleet having lately been sent to the Tagus to exact reparation for injuries done to French subjects in Lisbon by Dom Miguel's followers. Lord Grey, who had fully consented to this action of the French navy, likewise tacitly countenanced the fallen Emperor's

efforts. A British naval officer, Captain Sartorius, 1831.
took command of Dom Pedro's fleet; and by July
1832 the Emperor's forces had captured Oporto. 1832.
There, however, his success in recovering the country
ended; and, though the French cabinet pressed the
British ministry hard to join with France in thrusting
Dom Miguel out of Portugal, Palmerston was unwilling
to consent. He was as anxious as any man to see the
usurper expelled, but, dreading the extension of French
influence in Portugal, was still more anxious that
France should have no share in the business. He
therefore bethought himself of turning to Spain, where
King Ferdinand likewise was supporting a daughter
against Don Carlos. In each case the pretender had
at his back the reactionary and clerical party, while
the legitimate sovereign stood for what might be called
the constitutional party. It seemed, therefore, possible
that Ferdinand might come to the help of Pedro in a
cause which was common to them both.

With this object in view, Stratford Canning was
sent to Madrid at the end of the year and arrived
there in January 1833. Very soon he found that his 1833.
mission was hopeless. There were many in high
station in Spain who hated the clericals, but few who
believed in representative institutions. The deadlock
was, however, solved by Charles Napier, the successor
of Sartorius in the command of Pedro's fleet, who
boldly sought out Dom Miguel's superior force and
destroyed it off Cape St. Vincent on the 5th of July July.
1833. Three weeks later Lisbon was occupied by
Pedro's troops; and Pedro installed himself in the capital
as Regent for Queen Maria de Gloria. The British
government recognised her sovereignty and undertook
to protect her against the possible aggression of Spain;
and in September any chance of further trouble with
King Ferdinand was ended by his death. Thereupon
Queen Christina assumed the government of Spain in
the name of her daughter Isabella; and on the 7th Oct.
of October the northern provinces proclaimed Don

1833. Carlos to be King of Spain. It so happened, however, that Carlos, having been practically exiled from Spain, was at the moment at the head-quarters of Dom Miguel, who, though he had lost Lisbon and Oporto, had by no means given up the struggle for the Portuguese throne; and this fact brought home to Christina that the fortunes of Isabella were in great measure bound up with those of Maria de Gloria. Palmerston, therefore, returned to the idea of Spanish intervention in Portugal, for which the levying of war by Don Carlos
1834. against Spain from Portuguese territory gave ample justification. After some trouble a Quadruple Treaty between Great Britain, France, Spain and Portugal was signed, under which it was agreed that England and Spain should send, the one a fleet and the other an army, to the assistance of Dom Pedro. On the
May. 16th of May, Miguel was decisively defeated in Tras-os-Montes; and a week later both he and Don Carlos surrendered. Miguel agreed to retire to Italy upon an exceedingly modest pension; Carlos was shipped off to England on a British man-of-war; and everything seemed to be satisfactorily settled. Had England possessed even a semblance of an army, Miguel might have been disposed of with much less trouble, and not much greater expense, full eighteen months earlier, for, as shall now be seen, the boasted principle of abstention from interference in the internal affairs of other states counted for very little, either with French or with English statesmen, when it conflicted with their prejudices or their desires.

Within less than a fortnight after his arrival in London Don Carlos slipped away to France, passed through it undiscovered to Spain, and reappeared at
July. the head of his partisans in Biscay on the 8th of July. After deliberation upon the measures necessary to
Aug. meet this new move, an addition was made in August to the Quadruple Treaty, under which the French undertook to prevent warlike stores from reaching the Carlists through France; the British agreed to supply

the Christinists with arms, ammunition and, if necessary, with a naval force; and Pedro of Portugal pledged himself to furnish such military assistance as he could. The motives of Pedro in consenting to this arrangement are intelligible enough, for, apart from the danger of civil war just across his borders, the defeat of Don Carlos would take all remaining heart out of the partisans of Dom Miguel. Palmerston, it seems, was governed mainly by antagonism to France.[1] In his judgment, despotic monarchies were those most easily swayed by foreign influence. Spain had for long been particularly open to the diplomatic pressure of France; wherefore the establishment of a constitutional monarchy in Spain would render that country the more independent. Louis Philippe, on the other hand, would much have preferred Don Carlos as absolute king for a neighbour, fearing lest, under the liberal rule of Christina and Isabella, the Peninsula should become the resort of all the revolutionists and republicans in Europe. But he dreaded the diplomatic isolation of his country, and he shrank from appearing illiberal in the eyes of his own subjects. He therefore submitted to bind himself to Palmerston's chariot-wheels; though Palmerston knew that he had done so unwillingly. Such being the case, the British Minister took great and unnecessary risks in acceding to the treaty. 1834.

Events soon brought home to him the peril of his proceedings. An able military leader, Zumalacarregui, was found among the Carlists, and the cause of Don Carlos prospered in the field. The war between the contending parties was carried on in the most savage fashion, neither side giving nor expecting quarter, and both systematically slaughtering alike wounded and unwounded prisoners. The struggle was in full blast when the Whig government of Lord

[1] Hall, *England and the Orleans Monarchy*, p. 183. I must gratefully acknowledge my obligations to this author, upon whom I have depended greatly for the story of our diplomatic relations with France at this period.

1834. Melbourne gave place, in December 1834, to a new administration under Sir Robert Peel; and Wellington took over the Foreign Office. The Duke had not changed his opinions as to the inexpediency of intervention in the domestic affairs of a foreign country; but he saw a possibility of ending the strife by invoking the joint action of France with England to press the combatants to observe the ordinary rules of war, and by using the communication thus opened with Don Carlos to persuade him to abandon the contest. Louis Philippe, however, hesitated to commit himself to such a measure, alleging that Don Carlos would almost certainly reject the proposed overtures, and that public opinion in France might then dictate the invasion of Spain to compel him to accept them by force. The English envoy therefore proceeded to Don Carlos's head-quarters alone, arranged without difficulty a convention that both parties should conduct the war with greater humanity, but found Don Carlos immovably resolute to assert his claim to the Spanish crown. Wellington's attempt to adjust the difference was therefore a failure; and Melbourne's return to
1835. power in April 1835 brought Palmerston back once more to the Foreign Office.

He came in at an awkward moment. Queen Christina, upon learning the miscarriage of Wellington's good offices, resolved to apply to France for military assistance against Don Carlos. Palmerston thereupon represented that a settlement of the quarrel by French and British bayonets would be discreditable to Queen Christina's government and, from its nature, could not be accepted as legitimate and final by the Spanish nation. If this were so, it is difficult to understand why England or France should have mixed themselves up in the quarrel by the Quadruple Treaty at all. Louis Philippe, however, decided to consult the British government before answering Queen Christina's appeal; and Palmerston of course was ready with countless objections to the march of a

French army into Spain. As a compromise, it was 1835.
suggested that the Foreign Legion in the French army of Algeria might be transferred to the Spanish service; and, this proposal being eagerly accepted by Christina, the British government, on its side, suspended the Foreign Enlistment Act and encouraged officers and men to enter the service of the Queen of Spain. Some eight thousand unlucky persons were duly enlisted, most of them, it should seem, under false ideas of the conditions of service. Colonel de Lacy Evans, the radical member for Westminster, took command of them; and the whole were duly conveyed to the seat of war.

No doubt the more generous spirits among the poor creatures flattered themselves that they would be welcomed as the liberators of Spain. They were rudely undeceived. Don Carlos, on hearing of their coming, issued a proclamation setting forth that he would not permit the recent convention to apply to foreigners, and that any person, not of Spanish nationality, taken in arms against him would be shot. Palmerston used blustering language of protest against this proclamation; but Don Carlos rejoined that it was within his rights—as undoubtedly it was—to issue it; and he absolutely refused to withdraw it. He was strengthened in his resolution by the action of the French government, which declined to associate itself with Palmerston's protest, and would not be moved from its determination for a moment by any number of arguments from the British Minister. Altogether the whole incident was humiliating to the British government and did not make for cordial co-operation between France and England.

Very shortly afterwards another point of contention arose between the two countries. Dom Pedro of Portugal had died in September 1834; and the Cortes had thereupon declared Maria to be of age, though she was only fifteen years old. The young Queen presently married Augustus, Duke of Leuchtenberg, who, however, survived his marriage only for a few months,

1835. departing this life in March 1835. The Cortes lost no time in pressing her to marry again; and the lady, nothing loth, presently announced her intention of espousing one of the sons of Louis Philippe. Once again the British Foreign Office protested. Louis Philippe averred with emphasis, though not, it should seem, with truth, that he had never dreamed of such a thing. The ambitious house of Saxe-Coburg saw its opportunity. A nephew of the King of the Belgians was selected to be the happy man; he was duly married to Maria in April 1836; and thenceforward there was steady waning of French influence at the court of Lisbon.

Here, therefore, Palmerston triumphed; but Louis Philippe had plenty of opportunities to thwart him in Spanish matters. Among the constitutional followers of Queen Christina there were two schools, the one and the more moderate deriving its ideas from France, and the other and more advanced from England. The English faction prevailed; and Louis Philippe, much piqued, abandoned all attempt to prevent supplies and stores of war from reaching the Carlists, and assured Don Carlos that henceforward he should observe absolute neutrality towards the contending parties. The Spanish Prime Minister then appealed to the British envoy at Madrid for a loan; and a secret treaty was signed whereby, in return for an advance of a million and a half sterling, the Spanish government agreed to reduce the import duties upon the principal articles of British manufacture. But the secret leaked out. The French ambassador at Madrid protested; and Palmerston was fain to withhold ratification of the treaty. The situation had, therefore, in effect reduced itself to this—that Great Britain and France, instead of working together, were upholding each of them one of the contending parties in the Spanish civil war, and that, whereas France had rendered some service to Don Carlos, Great Britain had failed to give corresponding assistance to Queen Christina.

Then in the summer of 1835 fate dealt a heavy blow to the Carlists. Zumalacarregui died, not without suspicion of foul play, of a slight wound received before Bilbao, and with him perished the soul of the Carlist army. Still, the Christinists seemed unable to take advantage of their good fortune, from lack of funds. The British Legion, moreover, had suffered cruelly from privation and sickness, and even from Spanish treachery. Scores of men had been poisoned by a dishonest or traitorous contractor. The pay of officers and men was in arrear, and all ranks were disillusioned, disheartened and discontented. To hasten the fall of Don Carlos, Palmerston now instructed the British squadron on the north coast of Spain to take an active part in the operations of Queen Christina's armies, and asked the French government to send troops across the Pyrenees. But Louis Philippe had lately made overtures to Austria, hoping to gain the hand of an Austrian archduchess for his eldest son; and he declined to alienate the absolute court of Vienna by giving countenance to the constitutional party in Spain. The confusion among the Christinists became worse confounded. The Queen changed her advisers, which involved a dissolution of the Cortes and a general election; and it was soon evident that she had changed them for the worse. The Carlist bands showed increased activity and boldness. De Lacy Evans on the 11th July 1836 suffered a reverse at Fuentarabia, and the British prisoners taken in the action were shot. The advanced faction carried everything before them at the elections, and a military revolt at La Granja imposed a member of that faction, Calatrava, as chief Minister upon the Queen. The outlook was in the highest degree alarming and uncertain. 1835. 1836.

For a moment there was a sudden gleam of hope. The imperial house of Austria rejected Louis Philippe's matrimonial projects; and M. Thiers, who had guided him towards this attempted connection with Austria, thought to avenge himself for his failure by taking up

1836. the cause of Queen Christina. Preparations were therefore begun for reinforcing the French Legion in the Spanish service, when the news of the revolt of the soldiery at La Granja caused Louis Philippe to put an abrupt stop to them. Never, he declared, would France give help to the Jacobin powers in Madrid. Thiers resigned; and Count Molé, who succeeded him, practically renounced all future partnership of France in the Quadruple Treaty. In vain Palmerston urged that the most effectual means of combating anarchy and the Jacobin spirit in Spain would be to expel Don Carlos from the Peninsula. In vain he contended that the stability of Louis Philippe's own monarchy was bound up with the triumph of the constitutional cause in Spain. Louis Philippe was deaf to all argument. Possibly it occurred to him that, if Great Britain were so anxious for military intervention in Spain, she might take the trouble to maintain an army and execute her military measures for herself, instead of seeking to palm off the duty upon her neighbours. For if Great Britain thought it no wrong to order her fleet to give active help to the Christinists, then logically she might order her army to do likewise. But the difficulty was that she had no army, and that recruits by this time had learned better than to join the British Legion of De Lacy Evans.

Then came a period of strange vicissitudes. Calatrava, who was something very remote from a Jacobin, contrived to frame a constitution which avoided all extremes, and, more important still, he showed some vigour in the prosecution of the war. A competent leader was found in General Espartero, who, with the help of blue-jackets and marines from the British squadron, gained a brilliant victory in
1837. Biscay at the end of 1836. In the ensuing year the wheel suddenly turned. Don Carlos, who had received subsidies from the Tsar and from the Kings of the Netherlands and Sardinia, contrived to elude Espartero

and to march south with the certainty that no force could stay his entry into Madrid. The movement was fatal to Calatrava. A new military revolt drove him from office; the Cortes were again dissolved, and a new election produced a decided majority of the Moderates. The country was sick of war; and it was the general hope that the advent of this party to power might lead to the intervention of France. But Louis Philippe was not disposed to alter his resolution; and the hope was vain. 1837.

Meanwhile, when the capital lay at his mercy, Don Carlos suddenly halted, recrossed the Ebro and retreated to the northern provinces. It is supposed that his advance southward had been concerted with the Queen Regent, with the intention that he should be welcomed into Madrid, that his marriage with Isabella should be announced, and that peace should be forthwith proclaimed. It is supposed likewise that the fall of Calatrava forbade Christina to fulfil her part of the contract. In any case the Carlists retreated, with the inevitable result of bitter quarrelling among themselves; while the Christinist army, unpaid and unfed, broke out into open mutiny, murdered a couple of generals and, though presently reduced to some kind of order by Espartero, was quite unfit for service in the field. The British Minister at Madrid attempted to break up the Carlists by offering to mediate between the disaffected among them and the government of Queen Christina; and the negotiations seemed to promise success, till France, when invited to participate in them, declined to have anything to do with the matter. Notwithstanding their internal dissensions the Carlists continued to gain successes in the field, chiefly, it was supposed, because the Queen Regent's government was too jealous of Espartero to provide him with the necessary resources. At the end of 1838 the cause of the constitutional party in Spain seemed to be desperate. All sympathy with it in England had disappeared. The men of the British Legion had 1838.

1838. returned home; and both in the press and in Parliament they were loudly ventilating their grievances. Meanwhile, though they were not to blame for it, they were held not to have enhanced the reputation of the British soldier in the field; and the nation felt both sore about them and ashamed of them. People, in fact, were thinking at last, as they ought to have thought at first, that the government had no business to encourage British subjects to enter the service of Queen Isabella.

1839. In the early spring of 1839, however, news came that Don Carlos had conspired against his own Commander-in-chief, Maroto, who, in revenge, had headed an insurrection against him. The constitutional cause, too, was on the rising hand. Espartero was now all powerful and able to carry on the war unhindered. In France, Molé had fallen and given place to Soult, who, immensely flattered by his reception in London at Queen Victoria's coronation, was full of good-will towards the British. He, therefore, resumed the obligations imposed by the Quadruple Treaty, cut off all supplies to the Carlists from France, and issued orders to the French squadron on the north coast of Spain identical with those already given to the British admiral on that station. Through this latter in July Maroto opened negotiations with Espartero. By August the bulk of the Carlist army had fraternised with Queen Isabella's troops. By the middle of September, Don Carlos and a few thousand men with him were driven over the frontier and disarmed, and their leader detained under strict supervision; and by

1840. July 1840 the last of the Carlist bands was finally extinguished. A quarrel between the Queen Regent and Espartero, which for a time threatened serious political disturbance, was ended by the abdication of Christina, who dreaded exposure of the scandals of her private life, and by the appointment of Espartero as Regent in her place. And so for the present the Spanish trouble came to an end, not without humiliation to the British government. The moral would seem

to be that, if one nation must meddle with the internal affairs of another, it should keep troops enough to make its intervention prompt and effective—a truth which though concealed from Palmerston was fully realised by Wellington. 1840.

But, before the final scene of Christina's abdication, England and France, reconciled over the Spanish question, were most seriously at variance over affairs in the East. Ibrahim Pasha no sooner took over the government of Syria than, by introducing conscription for military service, he roused the whole country to resentment. By the beginning of 1834 the discontent had manifested itself in a general rebellion, which needed an arduous campaign of sixteen months to repress. The Sultan, seeing his opportunity to make good his former reverses, prepared at once for war. Mohammed Ali on his side was inclined to provoke aggression by proclaiming his absolute independence; and strong pressure from the European powers was needed to keep the two rivals within bounds. As usual, however, those European powers were not too cordial in their relations towards each other, Great Britain in particular being still in the highest degree suspicious of Russia's designs upon Turkey. It was apprehended that the Tsar might have some secret understanding with Mohammed Ali; and the British government was already uneasy lest the power of the Pasha, controlling as he did one of the gates of Asia, should become excessive. Palmerston, therefore, was inclined to encourage the Sultan to husband his resources and improve his army against a coming war, while at the same time he did his best to multiply embarrassments for Mohammed Ali. France, on the other hand, was pushing her conquests in Algeria, and was so resolute against even the semblance of Turkish interference that her government had instructed the French admiral on the station to prevent any Ottoman squadron from entering the Bay of Tunis, if necessary even by force. Thus France, actually, as 1834.

1834. well as Russia, hypothetically, was working in antagonism to England in the near East.

1838. In 1838 the whole question of the British communications with India and of the safety of India itself was thrust upon the British government in its most pressing form. From the beginning of the year Mohammed Ali urged forward his military preparations with the greatest activity. He had for some time past been engaged in the conquest of Arabia, and before half the year was past he was master of Nejd, the great central district extending from Medina and Mecca to the Persian Gulf. His empire now embraced the whole region from Khartum to the Taurus range; and, whether the development of steam-navigation and of railways was to make the main route to India along the stream of the Euphrates, or across the Isthmus of Suez, or even by the valley of the Nile to the Red Sea, Mohammed Ali controlled them all. Moreover, when questioned by the foreign consuls in Cairo as to the intent of his armaments, he answered boldly that he was determined to proclaim his independence. He declared that he was in no hurry; but that his resolution was unalterable. There was every likelihood that France would befriend him. She was the acknowledged protector of the Catholics in Syria. She was imbued, ever since Bonaparte's expedition of 1798, with a strong sentiment that French influence should by right preponderate in Egypt. She had already wrested Algeria, and might presently wrest Tunis, from the suzerainty of the Sultan. With Don Carlos for her puppet on the throne of Spain in the west, and with Mohammed Ali for her friend in the east, France might realise her dream of turning the Mediterranean into a French lake.

So much for the route to India and for France. But on the very border of India there was equally serious danger. A Persian army, as shall be told more fully in another place, had marched at the end of 1837 and

laid siege to Herat, unquestionably by Russian advice; 1837.
and a Russian agent, Captain Witkewitch, had reached Cabul, charged with the duty of tempting Dost Mohammed, the ruler of Afghanistan, into alliance with Russia and Persia. From Cabul it was no long journey to Peshawur, which was in the hands of Ranjit Sing; and if the Sikh chieftain likewise were drawn into the net, whether by craft or by intimidation, Russian troops might before long appear upon the British frontier on the Sutlej.

Very shortly, as shall be seen, the situation brought about the first Afghan war. For the moment Palmerston met it, in October 1838, by diplomatic 1838.
remonstrance at the court of St. Petersburg. The Russian Chancellor, Nesselrode, met the protest in a friendly spirit. He undertook to recall the Russian envoy at Teheran, Count Simonitch, who was responsible for despatching Witkewitch to Cabul, and he disavowed the action of Witkewitch himself, who, in deep chagrin at finding his good service repudiated, incontinently blew out his brains. The immediate danger on the north-west marches of India appeared, therefore, to be averted.

The route to India demanded more decisive action. By a fortunate coincidence a quarrel had arisen between the Indian government and the chief of the port of Aden, owing to his ill-treatment of certain shipwrecked British subjects. An officer of the Bombay navy was sent to make protest, and he, early in 1838, was able to report that the Sultan of Aden had ceded the port of Aden to the East India Company from friendly motives and of his own good-will. An expedition was accordingly sent to occupy the place, consisting of a wing of the Hundred and Second (then the First Bombay Fusiliers) and a battalion of Bombay native infantry, under the escort of two of the Queen's ships and a squadron of the Indian navy. Upon its arrival the Arabs refused to allow the troops to land or to furnish them with supplies and water;

1838. whereupon the men disembarked under cover of fire from the ships and occupied the town. The Arabs took refuge in one of the forts, which presently hung out the white flag, and, but for a misunderstanding which cost the British sixteen casualties while disarming these Arabs, the capture of Aden was bloodless. In November 1838, and again in 1840, half-hearted attacks were made upon the fortress which were easily repulsed, since which, until the German war, the British possession of this arid and forbidding stronghold has been unchallenged.

Thus the southern gate of the Red Sea was secured, whatever might happen in the immediate future. And matters were rapidly coming to a crisis. Sultan Mahmoud was stricken by mortal disease; but what strength was left in him he devoted to preparations for war against Mohammed Ali. His sole claim to the Khalifate of Islam rested on his protection of the holy cities. These had been reft from him by the rebellious Pasha; and, if Mohammed Ali were to declare his independence, Mahmoud's supremacy over the faithful was gone. The ambassadors at Constantinople pressed the Sultan again and again to keep the peace, and none more urgently than the British, for Palmerston conceived that the Turkish forces were not yet in a
1839. position to assure success. All remonstrances were
May. fruitless; and in May the Turkish army under Hafiz Pasha crossed the Euphrates and invaded the territory of Mohammed Ali.

Upon the outbreak of war England and France began by working heartily together. The sympathies of the majority of Frenchmen were undoubtedly with Mohammed Ali; but Soult was chief minister and, as has been told, friendly to the British. It was agreed that both the British and the French squadrons should proceed to the Levant, their admirals being instructed to do their utmost to persuade the rival commanders to suspend hostilities. It was further agreed that, lest the Tsar should invade Turkey under pretext of pro-

tecting Constantinople, the Porte should be asked to admit the two squadrons through the Dardanelles to the Sea of Marmora, if the Sultan should invoke the aid of Russia, or if a Russian fleet should sail into the Bosporus. 1839.

Events soon upset the seeming cordiality of the two western powers. On the 24th of June Hafiz was utterly defeated by Ibrahim Pasha at Nezib; and on the 14th of July the Turkish admiral, under the very eyes and, seemingly, with the connivance of the French admiral, Lalande, carried his fleet to Alexandria and surrendered it to Mohammed Ali. Before the tidings of these disasters could reach him, Sultan Mahmoud was dead; and his successor, Abdul Medjid, at once sent an envoy to Cairo to make pacific overtures to Mohammed Ali. The five great powers, however, now took matters into their own hands and presented on the 27th of July a collective note to the Porte, urging that the terms of peace should be settled by them. The proposal was gratefully accepted; and the business of negotiation began. It was protracted for the greater part of a year, for France's sympathies with Mohammed Ali were stronger than ever; and, moreover, her government believed in his military strength. Russia, on the other hand, unexpectedly supported Palmerston; wherefore France worked unkindly with the other powers, and did her utmost to bring about, by her own mediation, a peace between the Sultan and the Pasha. The result was that Great Britain, Austria, Prussia and Russia on the 15th of July 1840 signed a convention for the pacification of the Levant. Hereby it was agreed that Mohammed Ali should receive hereditary dominion over Egypt and the pashalik of Acre for his life; and that, if he should refuse these terms, the four powers should assist the Sultan to reduce him to submission. Since France would never have consented to such coercion of Mohammed Ali and, if consulted, would certainly have warned the Pasha of the measures that were in July. 1840. July.

1840. concert against him, Palmerston gave no information of this convention to the French Ambassador until forty-eight hours after it had been signed. Thereby he ensured that the Cabinet's orders to the naval commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean should reach him before Mohammed Ali could gain any inkling of what was going forward; and, since the severance of maritime communication between Egypt and Syria, which had risen in rebellion against the Pasha, was in question, this was a matter of the highest importance.

The conclusion of the treaty caused dangerous excitement in Paris, and actual panic on the Bourse; and matters were not improved by the publication of a Royal Ordinance, on the 1st of August, for a considerable increase of the French army and navy. In fact, to all appearance, war was dangerously near. But with all this parade of military preparation M. Thiers, who was now again Louis Philippe's chief Minister, had no intention of proceeding to extremes. He did, indeed, cover his floor with maps, after the Napoleonic fashion, and plan, unconscious of his own absurdity, great campaigns on paper. The French journals likewise talked loudly of war; and the mob of Paris, being thrown out of work by a series of strikes, marched through the streets singing the Marseillaise after the fashion of 1792. But in secret Thiers left no stone unturned to secure the re-admission of France, without loss of dignity, to the concert of Europe.

Meanwhile the demands of the Sultan, as formulated by the four powers, had been communicated to Mohammed Ali, who answered by invoking the protec-
Sept. tion and mediation of France. Thiers tried the effect of actually threatening the British ambassador at Paris with war, but failed to shake his nerve, much more that of Palmerston, for one moment. The Sultan declared Mohammed Ali to be deposed. The Allied squadrons battered down the fortifications of Beyrout. A Turkish division landed, together with detachments of Austrian and British marines, under whose shelter arms were

distributed to the mountaineers in rebellion against the Pasha; and all the time the redoubtable Ibrahim, who lay not many miles away with the main Egyptian army, watched the proceedings helplessly but made no attempt to interrupt them. Once again there was wild excitement in Paris; but Palmerston remained unmoved. Nervous colleagues worried him in the Cabinet; intriguers worked strenuously to displace him. The funds fell, and the Stock Exchange showed symptoms of serious alarm; but Palmerston trusted in the correctness of his own view of the situation and was not to be shaken, least of all after Ibrahim's military impotence had been so clearly demonstrated. Throughout October the relations between France and England continued to give anxiety to all except to the chief of the British Foreign Office. He ordered the British admiral to attack Acre, which surrendered after a few hours' cannonade on the 5th of November; and then Mohammed Ali realised that his position was desperate. Thiers, having talked loudly of war without the slightest intention of levying it, resigned office in the middle of October, and gave way to a new administration whose declared object was peace. 1840. Nov.

In December Mohammed Ali made his submission and threw himself upon the Sultan's mercy. He was permitted to retain the hereditary dominion of Egypt, but he evacuated all other possessions and surrendered the Turkish fleet; nor did the French government move a finger to interfere. In January 1841 Palmerston himself called in the French ambassador to the discussion of the further problem of the near East, and, after some preliminary difficulties, the plenipotentiaries of the five powers signed on the 13th July 1841 the convention of the Straits, binding them to uphold the principle of the closing of the Dardanelles and of the Bosporus to their ships of war. Thus the isolation of France, which was entirely the fault of Thiers, came to an end, and with it all danger of hostilities. Dec. 1841. July.

1841. Palmerston has never been forgiven by the French, nor even by a certain school of English politicians who, being the slaves of a phrase, were horrified that he should have leagued himself with the absolute powers for the humiliation of liberal France. But the question, as Palmerston saw, was not one of political theory, but of hard military fact. Mohammed Ali in possession of Syria and the Taurus mountains was master of the navigation of the Euphrates. Mohammed Ali in possession of Arabia, with a fleet of his own and the Turkish fleet added to it, could control both the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. This in itself was a menace to our communications with India; and if the resources of France, whose fleet at this time was remarkably efficient, had been added to those of Mohammed Ali, the menace would have become a very serious danger.

Incidentally, it is worth while to note that Palmerston's firmness throughout the entire dispute was based upon sound military insight. Thiers, the historian of Napoleon's campaigns, counted not a little upon the fighting excellence of Ibrahim's army in Syria, and judged that it could not easily be defeated except by a serious military expedition. Palmerston perceived at once that, since Ibrahim's troops could only be reinforced by sea, the presence of the Allied fleets on the Syrian coast was sufficient to reduce him to impotence, while the capture of Acre practically cut off his retreat even by land. As a matter of fact, Ibrahim, though the Allied forces made no attempt to molest him, suffered heavily during his retrograde march to Gaza, and would have brought back little remnant of his army had he defied the powers. Moreover, Palmerston took the true measure not only of Ibrahim's but of Louis Philippe's army. He never rated the military strength of France at the value set upon it, not only by the French themselves, but by the nations which had felt the strength of Napoleon's arm; and he refused to be daunted by the fame of the great captain. Thiers,

on the other hand, absolutely lived upon Napoleon's name, and talked so rashly of the vengeance which would be taken by France upon her nearest eastern neighbour among the four powers, as to awake strong national feeling in Germany.[1] The events of 1870 proved Palmerston to be right and Thiers to be wrong. After that sad humiliation, France ceased to trade upon the name of Napoleon and quietly set her military house in order. England also, somewhat earlier though none too soon, awoke to the fact that she was trading far too much upon the name of Nelson, and began to look to her navy. But in 1840 both nations were still living upon the glories of the past; and, though Palmerston saw through the military weakness of France, Thiers had not gauged the naval weakness of England. The whole incident, serious though it was, has long ago been forgotten. There is some vague memory of operations on the coast of Syria, but no more. Yet to those who feel interest in the building up of the Empire, it will be recalled by one pregnant fact, namely, the occupation of Aden—the gate of the Red Sea. 1841.

[1] Sir John Hall aptly points to the popularity at the period of Becker's Song of the Rhine, "Sie sollen ihn nicht haben, den freien deutschen Rhein." It was answered by the superbly insolent, "Nous l'avons eu, votre Rhin allemand."

CHAPTER XXI

1838. The year 1838 may be said to mark, roughly speaking, the time when the British Parliament, chiefly from force of external circumstances, began to realise that there was a British Empire, and that an imperial policy, not merely military but administrative, must be considered and formulated. It would be unjust to blame our forefathers for waiting so long before they took this duty in hand. The truth is that they were terribly overworked. In the first place they had to overtake almost a generation's length of administrative arrears at home, and in the second they were confronted with new problems of every description, towards the solution of which they lacked the only help in which the English really confide—experience.

So far as we have seen, Parliament after 1815 was governed chiefly by the reactionary emotions which always follow a great war. The first of these was a general revolt against war at large, with all its apparatus. Another was a futile straining to recall the irrevocable conditions of the old days of peace. All parties without exception succumbed in one form or another to this hopeless yearning. High Tories declared the old Parliamentary system to be perfect; advanced Radicals maintained that the military establishment of 1792 was sufficient for 1838; and if the former are to be written down blind fools, as they commonly are, the latter cannot escape the like condemnation. As a matter of fact, both fell into the same error of endeavouring to restrict progress, or the changes which

are commonly called by that name, to the particular lines which were favoured by themselves; and indeed there never yet was a faction, claiming the championship of progress, that did not strive, at any rate in some degree, to set back the hands of the clock of time. There was, however, one point upon which all parties were agreed, namely, that the burden of taxation was intolerable and that it must be lightened. In the circumstances, national prejudice dictated that money should be saved mainly by the old and crude expedient of paring down naval and military expenditure to the lowest possible figure. 1838.

Such vague impulses, for they were no more, went not far towards the construction of an imperial policy. Moreover, the public, oppressed by heavy imposts, bad trade and general distress, could spare no thought for anything but its own unhappiness. There was no such spirit of adventure, enterprise and speculation as had filled the records of James the First's reign with countless schemes for the opening up of the new world. The United States, no longer the American Colonies, seemed to present a sad warning against a new birth of such feeling. There was much vague talk of emigration, and a helpless acquiescence in the general flow of emigrants, whether from Great Britain or Ireland, to those same United States. No one seemed to draw any distinction between the colonist who crosses the sea to make a home and the emigrant who does likewise to make a living or a fortune. There were millions of square miles of British territory to be occupied, yet no plan for occupying them. The crude experiments of the War Office in Canada, being designed less for colonisation than for reduction of the pension-list, had failed ignominiously. The obvious conclusion was that such things had better be left alone.

The truth is that the English had not yet shaken themselves free of the idea that an empire was mainly a question of commerce, that is to say of pounds,

1838. shillings and pence rather than of men and women. India existed mainly for purposes of trade, and was nominally governed by a trading company. The West Indies and other possessions within the torrid zone were tropical gardens, of immense wealth, and therefore good customers to England. Apart from these, Canada was indeed a country of fairly old settlement; but the nearer portion of it was French, not English. The Cape Colony was at present little more than an expense. Australia and the beautiful island, formerly known as Van Diemen's Land, now as Tasmania, were penal settlements, decidedly costly, though useful at least as an empty space upon which the refuse of the mother country could be deposited. In brief, there were some colonies which, on the whole, were commercially profitable, and others, chiefly of recent acquisition, which absorbed much money and gave little or no return. The instinct of business and the passion for acquiring land occasionally tempted men to dream, and to seek to realise their dreams, of forming vast estates on the other side of the world. Land, according to the prevalent policy, was to be had for the asking, and this was sufficient allurement for the thoughtless, who forget that acres without men to till them are naught.

Side by side with the hard commercial temper ran a curious soft vein of sentiment, which was known by the name of humanity. The humane school had already brought about the abolition of slavery, in itself a stupendous change in imperial policy, giving a shock to all tropical settlements from which they have even now not recovered. The same school had since devoted itself to championship of the rights of native races. No one will question the excellence of some of their services nor the purity of their intentions; but it must be admitted that these enthusiasts for humanity were apt to indulge their passion chiefly at the expense of those who were too weak to resist. Despite of the twenty million pounds voted as compensation to slave-

owners, the freeing of the slaves was accomplished at 1838.
the cost of the West Indian planters. So likewise the "humane" settlement of the first Kaffir war was decreed at the expense of the South African colonist. It was assumed that he was a knave, because it was not realised that Glenelg was a fool. But the humane party could spare no sympathy for men of their own colour. They did not rally, as might have been expected, to the help of the Tory Lord Ashley when, in 1833, he sought to regulate the employment of English children in factories. In brief, the humane party was governed by tender hearts with little modification of hard heads.

For the rest, colonial administration proceeded upon the old lines. In the penal settlements and in the crown colonies, gained by recent conquest, the governor was absolute, though there was an increasing tendency to put some restraint upon him through a nominated legislative council. In the older colonies there was everywhere the old-fashioned constitution upon the English model of the seventeenth century. There was a legislature composed of an elected lower house, without whose consent no taxes could be levied; of an upper house, nominated by the Crown; and of a governor, appointed by the Crown as the Sovereign's representative, who distributed all public patronage, looked to the expenditure of the money voted by the legislature, conducted all administrative business and often tried, with or without success, to initiate legislation. Quarrels between the governor and one or both chambers were of frequent occurrence, not always through the governor's fault. The childishness of some Acts of colonial legislatures in those days must be seen to be believed; and the Crown freely, and most rightly, exercised its right of disallowing them not merely singly but in batches. The entire system was clumsy but might have been worse. The Imperial Parliament from time to time passed Acts to impose upon the colonies certain regulations

1838. of imperial policy. The Imperial Treasury contributed largely in many cases to the expense of administration, and practically bore the entire burden of the cost of defence. On the whole it should seem that the mother-country was not unmindful of her duty towards her children, not ungenerous in discharging it, not grudging in the concession of a large measure of self-government. Moreover, the world was large in those days; and possessions which are now within easy reach by sea, and in immediate communication by electric telegraph, were then very remote. Even maps were scarce, expensive and inaccurate. Knowledge of the Empire was lacking in England, and not only knowledge, but imagination.

Suddenly the man of imagination presented himself. Three years' imprisonment for the abduction of a school-girl had given Edward Gibbon Wakefield the leisure first to examine the penal code, which had led him on to the subject of transportation; and this had lured him in turn to the whole question of colonisation. His first principle was that the waste lands in the colonies must not be given away, but sold, and that the proceeds of sale must be devoted to immigration, so that the division of the soil might go hand in hand with the advent of men to till it. Neglect of this principle, and the Crown's indulgence of land-hunger by the grant of huge tracts to any man who asked for them, had led to disastrous failure in an experimental settlement on the Swan River—what is now called Western Australia—in 1829. Next, Wakefield pointed out the unprofitableness of planting a fair country, such as Australia, only with the noxious weeds that were cast out of the garden of England. Free emigration to New South Wales had begun in 1818; and the free settlers were delighted to have privileged convicts to work for them, for so they could be sure of at least a certain supply of labour. But it was not thus that true colonies could be founded. "If," wrote Wakefield, with delightful irony, "for

every acre that may be appropriated in New South Wales, there should be a conviction for felony in England, our prosperity would rest on a solid basis; but, however earnestly we may desire it, we cannot expect that the increase of crime will keep pace with the spread of colonisation." 1838.

For this reason, when planning the foundation of a colony upon his own principles in 1834, he expressly interdicted the transportation of convicts thereto. This settlement, now known by the name of South Australia, was established by an Act of Parliament, which probably would never have been passed had not Wakefield submitted his scheme to the Duke of Wellington, who examined it with the conscientious attention that he gave to every subject and declared it to be deserving of trial.[1] And there were still more cogent reasons against the increase of penal settlements. "It should never be forgotten," said Cobbett, speaking of New South Wales, "that the Adam and Eve of that country came from Newgate." From such parentage too much could not be expected of the progeny. Governors might and did attempt to raise the moral standard of released convicts by treating their past offences as washed away and raising them ostensibly to the level of free men; but thereby they not only incurred the mortal hatred of the free settlers, but offered a dangerous temptation to the troops. It was not uncommon for bad soldiers, weary of the service, to commit some offence which relegated them for a time to the convict-gang, since, on the expiration of their sentence, or upon earning a ticket of leave, they found a liberty and a social status which, while they wore the red coat, was denied to them. The fact remained that New South Wales was saturated with crime, the vilest, foulest and most dangerous, and was only held in check by the troops

[1] Wakefield's intention had been to call the capital by the name of Wellington; but he was prevented by some sycophant colleagues who substituted the name of Adelaide.

1838. and by a mounted constabulary, recruited from the very best characters among the regiments quartered in the Colony. This corps, first formed in 1825, was of peculiar excellence; and its members, when they retired, furnished a nucleus of good honest settlers to strengthen the respectable squatters who were making fortunes with sheep and cattle. But, as a whole, the community was eminently undesirable and unlikely to attract good citizens.

Moreover, the convicts were carrying the taint of crime with them over Australia as fast as it was opened up by exploration. Port Phillip, when first occupied, was within the boundary of New South Wales and therefore liable to be overrun by convicts. Further, escaped and liberated criminals had wandered over the water to the fairest country of the South Seas, New Zealand, the Italy of the Southern Ocean; bringing with them all that was worst in human nature and in western civilisation to injure and corrupt a singularly fine race of natives. On New Zealand Wakefield also had his eye. By the founding of a company in 1839 he practically forced the British Government to take it under British sovereignty; and the South Island was presently to be the scene of one of his most interesting experiments. Developing his theory of colonisation, he advocated the establishment of settlements which should include all classes of the population; and, studying the early history of the American colonists, he conceived, though himself very remote from being a religious man, the idea of founding them upon a sectarian basis. The emigrants of the *Mayflower*, in his view, fled to America not so much to escape persecution as to find a place where their own should be the dominant religion. Religious colonists were respectable colonists, with a high standard of duty and conduct; and therefore they attracted other respectable colonists; and therefore the communities throve. The reasoning was, upon the whole, sound; and it was perhaps permissible to ignore

the fact that the early settlers of New England upheld the dominance of their religious tenets by shameless persecution. Proceeding, therefore, from these arguments, Wakefield designed to transplant the British parish bodily to the Antipodes, squire, parson, and labourer, who should touch his hat to both. Canterbury and Otago, the one representative of the Church of England, the other of the Presbyterian Kirk, represent his experiments in the sectarian domain; and they cannot be called wholly failures, though, if there be any touching of hats, it is certainly not done by the labouring man. 1838.

Such, very briefly, were the new ideas introduced by Edward Gibbon Wakefield. First and foremost he desired that the Briton seeking a new home across the seas should do so not as an outcast but as a citizen, and that he should find such a home as one of many good men, who were minded not to rob their neighbours and return wealthy to the mother-country, but to work together to build up a new England which might, in time, vie honourably with the old. He desired further that, to train them the more perfectly to good citizenship, they should be left, so far as possible, to develop their own future without the interference of the Colonial Office. The problem of their relations with foreign powers and with native races he left very much to solve itself. Indeed, it is probable that he did not realise the full extent of its importance, much less of its difficulties. This was the weak point and the dangerous element in all of his plans, showing him to have been a visionary rather than a thinker. Moreover, he was so anxious to manage matters in his own way, not from greed of gain but from lust of authority, that he was apt to ignore any part in affairs that was not his own. His name having been stained by imprisonment, he was obliged to employ others as his puppets; and his dexterity in handling them was marvellous. His ability was very great, his tongue was suasive, his pen was ready and forceful, his energy

1838. infectious, and his activity not only indefatigable but wholly unimpeded by scruple. The narrative of his career leaves the reader full of admiration for his patience, perseverance and resource, but also full of thankfulness that he had not to do with the living Edward Gibbon Wakefield.

In 1838 there by chance occurred three events of the highest imperial importance. First, the system of apprenticeship, under which it had been hoped that the slaves in the British Empire might pass gradually from enforced to voluntary industry, was abandoned as an utter failure. Unqualified freedom was granted to the black man; and almost from that moment the volume of tropical produce poured from the West Indies into England began steadily to decline. It was the beginning of the ruin of the richest possessions of the Empire; and the consummation was not far off. Ruin might be expected to bring with it disorder, and work for the British soldier.

Next, as a consequence of enquiries instituted by Parliament, through the unseen influence of Wakefield, into the matter of transportation to New South Wales, it was resolved to discontinue the traffic to that settlement; and accordingly it ceased altogether in the following year. Transportation was indeed continued to Tasmania and to other settlements for another thirty years; but from 1838 it was practically doomed to a more or less speedy end. Even in New South Wales, however, the change was not likely to do away with the need for an imperial garrison for some time to come. Concentration of criminals once achieved requires time to do its evils away. Death alone can abolish them, more or less; and, till death comes, they must be held in check by the terror of death.

The third important event was a rebellion in Canada; but before touching upon it, the condition of the United Kingdom itself must first be noticed. The year 1838 was one of the worst through which the country has ever passed. Bad seasons for agri-

culture had begun in 1836; and in January 1838 there came a winter of abnormal severity followed by a summer and an autumn of continual rain. The price of wheat rose; and from a curious chain of external causes—chief of which was the reduction of the United States to bankruptcy by the wild measures of President Jackson [1]—there was a drain of gold from Britain, a general fall in wages, a dangerous run upon the Bank of England, and everywhere unspeakable distress, with its usual concomitants of industrial strikes and disorder. Ireland, after much agitation for the repeal of the Union and against the Irish Church, had fallen back into the periodic anarchy which is otherwise termed domination by secret societies. Crime, the result of suffering, was rampant in all three kingdoms, and was not the less dangerous after all the wild talk of repealers and reformers. Since the Reform Act had not brought with it the millennium, it must now be sought peacefully by clamour for the People's Charter, and, where not peacefully, by immediate violence. To the vast majority of men the millennium signifies little else than possession of their neighbours' goods. The Chartists, by advocating universal suffrage and other measures for the degrading of all men to the same level, sought to accomplish the necessary transfer of property by the simple process of counting heads. The more impatient anticipated the age of gold by helping themselves in advance to that which was one day to be their own. Agitators of a different and superior stamp leagued themselves together to compel the abolition of the protective duty on corn, designing to cheapen bread. Astute manufacturers, realising that cheap bread would mean low wages, threw themselves heart and soul into the movement. That free trade, as it was called, would ruin British agriculture was no affair of theirs. The rural labourer would become a workman in their factories at so much the cheaper rate if driven from 1838.

[1] Andrew Jackson, the victor of New Orleans.

1838. his old work; and the downfall of the country squire was a thing to be welcomed. That the new policy would compel the maintenance of a very strong and costly navy, to ensure the country against starvation, they did not perceive, or, perceiving, were resolute to deny. Altogether the community was not only distressed by divers ailments, but bewildered by the discordant cries of the many charlatans who were ready with infallible remedies; and when men's heads are thoroughly disordered and their bodies are suffering from insufficient nourishment, they are apt, especially when promises of coming prosperity have been belied, to seek relief in breaking the heads of others.

It was this very moment that Lord Melbourne's government chose for disbanding many corps of yeomanry; and, very characteristically, it took occasion to be particularly severe upon such troops and regiments as were commanded by Tories. It is extremely probable that, from the public point of view, it may have been right in so doing, particularly when single troops were concerned, for such small bodies are rarely worth the trouble and the expense of their maintenance. Ministers were also most correct in dealing sternly with a noble lord who told his yeomen that he would resign rather than serve the present government and advised them to do likewise. On the other hand, it was not courteous to put down the Hampshire Yeomanry without consulting the Lord Lieutenant, who happened to be the Duke of Wellington; and it can hardly have been wise to do away with the best part of two regiments in the heart of the Welsh mining districts. The truth is that the yeomanry were still the constabulary upon which the rural, and even some of the manufacturing, districts depended for the maintenance of internal order; and for this reason, as also because its officers were mainly country gentlemen, the force was detested by the Radicals. To curry favour with these last, the Whigs were perpetually meddling with the yeomanry. Thus in 1827 Lord

Lansdowne had reduced them; but in 1831 the Reform Ministry had been obliged to implore noblemen and gentlemen to reorganise the yeomanry as before. Now the Whigs were playing their old game once again; and it is not surprising that they were held to be gambling as freely with the internal security of the country as they were with the general safety of the Empire. 1838.

Examples of this kind at home are rarely lost upon the colonies. Just as the wild speeches of the King's opponents had heartened and stimulated the rebellion of the American colonies, so did the general unrest, the weakness of government and the clamour of orators encourage discontent in Canada. For all that the British public could see, the two provinces had no ground of complaint. They had their representative institutions after the model that has been described; and thus the French, who preponderated in Lower Canada, possessed a far greater measure of self-government than they had ever enjoyed under the crown of France. Yet for this very reason that the French element necessarily preponderated in the assembly, or lower house, the Crown was careful to redress the balance by nominating a majority of English settlers to the upper chamber. The officials, too, were chosen mainly from among men of British descent, and there was a general tendency to exert all authority in favour of the English and to the prejudice of the French. Considering that Canada had become British by conquest, this was not altogether unnatural. Had it been a British colony which had passed to France by conquest, it is not probable that the French government would greatly have considered the feelings of the British settlers. None the less, the result was altogether evil; for the French and British elements, instead of working cordially together, were each striving to dominate the other; and little progress was to be hoped for so long as they remained, as they were, divided by mutual antagonism. The immediate

1836. political result of these feelings was that the assembly of Lower Canada stood out for an elective upper chamber, and, when the government declined to agree to a bill for this purpose, refused to vote any supplies except—and the exception shows the essential meanness of the moving spirits—for the salaries and expenses of their own members. The British Ministry thereupon recalled the governor and sent out a new one at the head of a commission to enquire into the grievances of both the Upper and the Lower Provinces, and, so far as possible, to redress them.

It then appeared that the assembly of the Upper, or English province, desired control over the public monies and accounts, in fact the main voice in the spending as well as in the voting of supplies. There was little discontent, but there was distress, for President Jackson's follies had reacted upon Canadian finance and had compelled the suspension of cash payments. In the Lower Province, the grievances already stated were put forward by the assembly; and an elective upper chamber was recommended as the remedy, the idea having doubtless been borrowed from Daniel O'Connell, who, in sundry attacks upon the House of Lords, had maintained with irresponsible and unconsidered eloquence that that chamber ought to be elected by the people. As a result of these remonstrances, the new governor conceded to the assemblies of both provinces the right to control the public expenditure; but that of Lower Canada persisted none the less in withholding supplies, and now claimed not only that the upper house should be elective, but that the chief officials should be responsible, as in England, to the legislature. The matter was long debated in the House of Commons, and the Canadian claim was rejected by a large majority. Sir Robert Peel summed up the matter with strong good sense when he asked whether it would be reasonable to allow a population of half a million to establish a French republic in command of the mouth of the

St. Lawrence, the great northern gate of the American Continent. 1836.

Upon hearing of this decision of the House of Commons towards the end of 1836, the Lower Province, with much parade of freedom wounded and the rights of man trampled under foot by the tyranny of Britain, made instant and open preparation for a rising in arms. Sinister influences had been at work, the influences of foolish priests, mischief-loving Irish and mischief-seeking Americans. The party of revolution, under the leadership of one Papineau, went through all the childish mummeries of swearing oaths under the cap of liberty, and such like, which had rendered the French Revolution so infinitely ridiculous. The government made no attempt to check them, having indeed no sufficient force for the purpose without calling out the local militia, and being inclined, perhaps rightly, to allow the revolutionists to take the initiative in violence. All detachments of regular troops were, however, called in, and every precaution was taken to secure vital points. In August 1837 the assembly met, pre- 1837.
sented a long address of complaint against the Imperial Parliament, and resolved to transact no further business until their claims in general, and the elective constitution of the upper house in particular, were conceded to them. This was virtually a declaration of war; and both parties, interpreting it as such, began to make their preparations. The loyalists at Montreal formed themselves into regiments of volunteers. The governor of the Upper Province, feeling confident of the fealty of his people, sent down to Lower Canada every man of his regular troops; and thus there was under the hand of the Commander-in-chief a total force of eight weak battalions, namely, the second battalion of the Royals, the Fifteenth, Twenty-fourth, Thirty-second, Forty-seventh, Sixty-sixth, Eighty-third and Ninety-third.

Fortunate it was that the command was in the hands of one of the best officers in the Army, and perhaps the

1837. worthiest of the pupils of Moore and Wellington, Sir John Colborne. With his meagre force he had to hold securely not only Montreal and Quebec but the posts that guarded the communication between them along a line of one hundred and fifty miles, as also the stations that connected Montreal eastward with the river Richelieu—one of the gates into Canada from the United States—besides further posts upon that river itself. It was on the right bank of the Richelieu at the villages of St. Denis and St. Charles that a body of insurgents finally assembled in August, when the government at last decided to take action. Five companies from Sorel in the north and as many from Chambly in the south[1] accordingly moved upon these two villages, and, though the former force was repulsed
Aug. 23. before St. Denis on the 23rd, the latter successfully
Aug. 25. stormed St. Charles on the 25th. Therewith the insurrection in that quarter fell to pieces instantly, the leaders, including the egregious Papineau, taking flight to the United States. Colborne, thereupon, turned upon the main body of the revolutionists, which was strongly entrenched at the village of St. Eustache, on the left bank of the Ottawa, about forty miles west of Montreal. The bulk of them ran away at the mere
Dec. 14. report of his approach; but four hundred resolute men barricaded themselves in some buildings and fought bravely for a couple of hours till they were driven out by the Royals with a fourth of their number killed. This was on the 14th of December; and meanwhile, a week earlier, there had been an unexpected rising—or rather an unexpected appearance of a gang of banditti—in the Upper Province. Under the leadership of a cowardly ruffian, who curiously enough bore not an Irish but a Scottish name, Mackenzie, this gang committed a murder or two, and burned a few houses; but the whole country rose against them and within four days effectually extinguished them;

[1] Sorel force: Detachments of 24th, 32nd and 66th.
Chambly force: 4 companies of 2/1st, one company 66th.

their leader, as usual, taking flight to the United States. 1837.

Thus easily was the so-called Canadian rebellion suppressed at a cost of about fifty casualties. Of itself, being the enterprise of a few vain, vicious, feather-brained men, it had neither spirit nor substance, deriving what poor strength it had from enemies of England, calling themselves sympathisers with the Canadian patriots, in America. A party of these drew arms and ammunition from the arsenals of the United States Government, the American authorities being apparently powerless to prevent them. They then seized a British island on the Niagara river and began to cannonade the British village of Chippewa. Unfortunately for them a hard-headed Scottish colonel of militia, named McNab, who had taken the lead in suppressing Mackenzie, was at hand and competent to deal with the trouble. The sympathisers on the island depended for their supplies on a schooner which, when not employed, lay moored on the American shore. On the 28th December a party of McNab's militia boarded and captured her, set her on fire and sent her downstream over the falls of Niagara. Instantly there was a howl of indignation from end to end of the United States, which was quieted by a proclamation of the President threatening these pirates—for they were nothing less—with the utmost rigour of the law. None the less, the "sympathisers" continued to make demonstrations about the western end of Lake Ontario; and, in the spring of 1838, they actually occupied an island on Lake Erie, from which they were not expelled without the loss of some thirty killed and wounded to the British. These ruffians were, however, so sharply dealt with that the incident put an end, for the present, to the like incursions. 1838.

Colborne had early summoned reinforcements from New Brunswick; and the Thirty-fourth, Forty-third and Eighty-fifth had been hurried down in horsed sleighs through three hundred miles of dreary

1838. forest to Quebec under a temperature of twenty to thirty degrees below zero. But this did not abate the alarm which the news of the rebellion excited in England. Two battalions of Guards[1] were ordered to sail in line-of-battle ships without delay; two regiments of the line, the Seventy-first from England and the Seventy-third from Gibraltar, were also directed to Canada, and finally the King's Dragoon Guards and Seventh Hussars were likewise embarked. Howick announced that the whole of the cavalry was to be raised to the old establishment, as also the regiments that were serving or about to serve in Canada, making a total augmentation of eight thousand men. He further gave out that the troops in Canada had been reinforced without interfering with the course of reliefs. This was not true; for the Fifteenth should by right have returned to England in 1837 and were still detained at Quebec in 1838. Moreover, the Seventy-first, now hastily ordered back to the St. Lawrence, had only left it in 1834. Lastly, it appears that at least one of the battalions in Canada was only brought up to strength by drafting into it one hundred men of another battalion which had recently returned, of course a mere skeleton, from the West Indies. It was evident that this petty rising of a few hundred fools, headed by a handful of contemptible knaves, was straining the military resources of the country to breaking point.[2]

However, the insurrection appeared for the moment to have come to an end. The assembly of Upper Canada had presented an address to the governor testifying to the loyalty of the six hundred thousand British colonists in Canada, and had further suggested that, as the solution of all difficulties, all the British provinces in North America should be incorporated in a single legislative Union, and should send ten

[1] 2/ Gren. Guards, 2/ Coldstream Guards.

[2] Hansard, vol. xli. 786, 12th March 1838; Cannon's *Records of the 15th Foot*, p. 75.

representatives to the House of Commons. Here was a foundation upon which to work ; and Ministers sent Lord Durham to Canada as Governor-general to make a comprehensive report upon the colony. Arriving there in May, Durham found many of the ringleaders of the insurrection in custody, and was at a loss how to deal with them, for he could not try them by court-martial, while, if he tried them by civil law, their acquittal by French juries was certain. He therefore passed a special ordinance to banish them to Bermuda. The British government, represented at the Colonial Office by the deplorable Glenelg, had not the strength nor the courage to support him. The banishment was declared illegal. The prisoners returned from Bermuda to Canada ; and in November 1838 the insurrection broke out afresh in Lower Canada. 1838.

Once again it was suppressed in a few days, and would have ended there and then, but for the renewed efforts of the Americans in Upper Canada. On the 12th of November a party of five hundred of these, with artillery, crossed the St. Lawrence at Prescott, about one hundred and twenty miles above Montreal, and there established themselves in British territory. They were soon driven into a stone building, but were there able to hold their own until reinforcements of the Eighty-third and Ninety-third came up with three guns, when they were dispersed with considerable loss, and one hundred and sixty of them, mostly American citizens, were taken prisoners. Even so these American banditti needed one more lesson, for on the 4th of December four hundred of them landed at Sandwich, in the strait of Detroit, set fire to the barracks, in which two men perished, and murdered a military surgeon. Canadian militia promptly attacked them, and, though the majority at once took to their heels, the Canadians very properly killed twenty-five on the spot and brought away only the same number of prisoners. Two of the French Canadian leaders were subsequently executed, and nine of the Nov. Dec. 4.

1838. Americans; and some forty more of the insurgents were banished or transported. The ease with which this foolish and futile outbreak was crushed was due entirely to the vigilance and promptness of Colborne.

Meanwhile Lord Durham had returned home, deeply mortified; but with the help of Mr. Charles Buller and Edward Gibbon Wakefield, both of whom he had taken on his staff, his work was none the less
1839. done. Early in 1839 his famous report was sent in to the government, and, while Ministers were still hesitating over it, Wakefield characteristically forced their hands by sending a copy to the *Times* newspaper. The report recommended the fusion of the whole of the North American provinces into a single legislature, with Ministers responsible to that legislature; and, though this was too great a change to be at once
1840. accepted, yet in 1840 it was accomplished, so far as concerned the Upper and Lower Provinces. No attempt was made to give Canada representation in the Imperial Parliament, and so to remedy one of the worst evils wrought by the Reform Bill of 1832, whereby a great opportunity was lost. But, on the other hand, Canada was none the less within fifteen years transformed into a loyal and prosperous community.

For the moment, however, it was necessary to keep a large force in Canada, not only to overawe the disaffected, but also in view of a dispute with America
1838. about the frontier on the side of Maine, arising out of a dubious interpretation of the Treaty of 1783. The matter was referred for arbitration to the King of Holland, who, in effect, proposed a compromise not greatly favouring the British contention. The British government was willing and even anxious to accept the award; but the United States refused it on the ground that the arbitrator was called upon to decide whether the line claimed by the British or that claimed by the Americans was the correct one, not to suggest a third line of his own. The truth was that the

Americans knew perfectly well the military impotence of Britain, and very naturally scrupled not to take advantage of it. Not only was there trouble in Canada; not only were very serious operations, of which more shall presently be said, contemplated on the north-west frontier of India, but there was not even a British squadron on the coast of North America. Owing to outrages upon French subjects in Mexico the French government in November 1838 had sent a squadron to Vera Cruz to demand reparation; and the British North American squadron had been ordered to follow it. The question of the Maine boundary was settled in 1842 by absolute surrender to the United States of all that they desired. But in 1838 the contention was still hot, the Americans were disposed to be aggressive, and the British government was inclined at times to be defiant and immediately afterwards to be submissive. In New Brunswick, said Sir Henry Hardinge in the House of Commons, the commanding officer, Sir John Harvey, was ordered by government to repel aggression by force. He had one battalion of three hundred and fifty men. Opposed to him were the Maine Militia, forty-two thousand in all, of which number ten thousand had been called out and equipped. The British Minister at Washington, however, cancelled the government's warlike commands, thereby placing Harvey in a most humiliating position. The next decision was that Canada should be reinforced at once by a battalion from the West Indies. But there was no ship of war to carry these troops, the British North-American squadron being before Vera Cruz; and, even if there had been, a battalion brought from the tropics and landed in Canada in mid-winter would have been useless owing to the sudden change from a temperature of eighty degrees above zero to twenty degrees below. Moreover, at this very moment, when Palmerston was adopting a bellicose attitude towards America, the important naval station of Bermuda was left with no more garrison than a

1838.

1838. single battalion of four to five hundred men. Well might Charles Buller exclaim in this same debate, "Our whole military arrangements are utterly at variance with our foreign relations."[1]

1839. For the moment Howick seized the pretext of the Canadian rebellion to restore to every troop and company the five men and the eight men which had been taken from them since 1837, making a total increase, upon the establishment of that year, of nine thousand four hundred men. He also agreed to augment the regiments in India, at India's expense; but as yet he would go no further. Hardinge as usual set the facts ruthlessly forward. There were now fifty thousand British rank and file in the colonies, of which thirteen thousand were in Canada and thirty thousand in India. At home there were only twenty-one battalions out of a total of one hundred and three, and fifty-six depots. Nominally the infantry of the Line at home were twenty-six thousand; actually they were twenty-one thousand, and of these but seventeen thousand were really soldiers. Adding to these twenty-one thousand foot of the Line, three thousand Guards (for sixteen hundred even of the Guards were in Canada) and five thousand seven hundred cavalry, there were but thirty thousand men left in the British Isles to do the work of the garrisons there and to meet all imperial demands. Apart from Canada there were the projected operations in the East, which shall presently be brought more strongly to light, and which, as Hardinge ominously observed, promised to be very difficult. Moreover, the native army in India was weaker by eighty-six thousand men than in 1826; and though of course the British garrison might be reinforced at the pecuniary expense of the Indian government, yet the drain of men must fall upon the regiments in the mother country. It has always been the fatal error of the British Parliament to appraise the

[1] Hansard, vol. xlvi. Speeches of Sir H. Hardinge and Mr. C. Buller, 22nd March 1839.

military resources of the Empire in terms of cash only, and not also of flesh and blood. 1839.

Meanwhile, though, in the matter of the strength and organisation of the Army, Parliament was reluctant to move a step forward, this same year witnessed an important advance in the armament of the infantry. Since Waterloo there had been practically no change in the weapons of the Army except the restoration of the lance, which between 1816 and 1823 had been served out to the Ninth, Twelfth, Sixteenth and Seventeenth Light Dragoons. But 1839 marked the dawn of the new era when improvements in firearms were to succeed each other so rapidly that every fifteen or twenty years placed a new and superior weapon in the hands of the foot-soldier. The old flint-lock, which, having itself superseded the match-lock, had held its own for nearly two centuries, was now, in its turn, to be supplanted by the percussion-cap. It is difficult at once to realise the full meaning of this reform. In the first place, the wear and tear of flints was such that, for the ordinary routine of peace, their place in the hammer of the musket was taken by pieces of bone. In fact, if a magistrate had entered a barrack-yard, found a battalion on parade and summoned it at once to the aid of the civil power, there would have been many minutes consumed in taking the bones out of the hammers, pocketing them, taking flints out of the pouches and fixing them, before a musket could be discharged; and even then the chances were that one weapon in every ten would miss fire. In the event of rain, moreover, the musket was practically useless as a missile arm, for the priming powder in the pan (the kindling of which by the spark of the flint ignited in its turn the charge within the barrel) soon became damp and refused to explode. With the percussion-cap, which set fire to the charge by a flash through a hollow nipple, there was no longer need for any priming, and so the entire process of loading was made, not only shorter, but surer. It was of course always

1839. possible that the passage through the nipple might become clogged and require to be cleared with a picker; but so also the channel from the pan to the barrel of the old musket far more frequently needed the like removal of obstruction. Heavy and continuous rain told also after a time upon the percussion-cap, but the cap could be sheltered in great measure by letting down the hammer to half-cock;[1] and at worst a new cap could be substituted for the old one in a few seconds. This change in itself amounted to a revolution.

The improvement did not end there. It was something that the average number of miss-fires in a thousand shots was reduced from four hundred and eleven with the flint-lock musket, to four and a half with the "detonator," as it was called. But the new weapon was also much superior in the matter of accuracy, the average of hits on a target being raised from two hundred and seventy to upwards of three hundred and eighty-five in a thousand shots. Lastly, for the first time in the history of the Army the calibre of muskets, carbines and rifles was made uniform, so that one pattern of ammunition served for the whole. There were of course many objections on the part of old officers to parting with the faithful "Brown Bess"

[1] This was the rule in the days when muzzle-loading fowling pieces were fired with percussion-caps; and, having begun my own shooting days with a muzzle-loader, I was duly instructed to this effect. Many careful old sportsmen never brought their guns to full cock until they actually raised them to fire; and long practice, as I have myself seen, made them astonishingly quick in the operation. In Marryat's *Masterman Ready* the old sailor instructs his pupil never to come to full cock until about to fire. I may perhaps add that the first military weapon that I ever had to do with, as an officer of yeomanry in the year 1877, was the Westley-Richards carbine, loading at the breech but fired by a cap. The charge was five drams of black powder, and, the conical bullet being very heavy, the carbine kicked like a horse. The Martini-Henry carbine, which would astonish recruits of the present day, was an easy weapon in comparison with the Westley-Richards. To the best of my recollection it was far commoner for a muzzle-loader, fired by a percussion-cap, to "hang fire" than a breech-loader, loaded with a cartridge.

of their youth; but cavalry, infantry and riflemen alike welcomed their new weapons with joy and alacrity.[1] The old-fashioned flint-lock was still to do duty in at least two campaigns, in Afghanistan and in China. Could the new musket have reached India when it was first issued to the troops in England, the course of the first of these two wars might possibly have been different. But, broadly speaking, from 1839 the detonator begins to take the place which, saving the superficial change that the cap and its anvil have been transferred from the weapon to the cartridge, it still holds in the armament of the British soldier. 1839

Howick's feeble augmentation of nine thousand men, the adoption of the new musket and a beginning of better treatment of the British soldier were hopeful signs that the British government was beginning to wake to its military responsibilities. But the administration declined to meditate upon Charles Buller's warning that the country's foreign relations were utterly at variance with its military arrangements. Indeed, no administration, either before or since that of Lord Melbourne, has ever consented to admit, in practice, that foreign affairs have anything to do with military policy. Military men have said for years, "Tell us for what purposes you keep an Army, and we will tell you of what strength it should be and in what manner it should be trained"; but they have never yet received an answer, and it is not likely that they ever will. Such Ministers as really understand the enormous problem of the defence of the Empire would probably fear to say what they really thought; and, if they had the courage to speak, they would be silenced by the vast majority of their countrymen, who cannot and will not grasp that England is something more than a small island in the extreme west of Europe. The operations of diplomacy are mainly conducted in secret. The experience of generations shows that

[1] Hansard, xlvi. 1228, 27th March 1839. Speech of Sir Hussey Vivian introducing Ordnance Estimates.

1839. this is the best and safest method; and even the House of Commons, respecting the system, has so far loyally and wisely refrained from meddling with it. But, unfortunately, British governments, while rightly silent over their diplomatic measures in the present, have never taken the slightest pains to enlighten the public as to the course of diplomatic history in the past.[1] The result is that a few individuals only have any idea of the infinite ramifications of our foreign policy, or of the bearing of the same upon our military organisation. Hence Parliament does not hesitate to dictate its will as to the curtailment of the military establishments, without the slightest heed to possible danger in many foreign quarters.

There can be no doubt that even the most peaceful diplomacy gains force and influence from the consciousness that military power stands ready, though not aggressive, at its back. There is no need to bluster, nor to threaten, nor indeed to be otherwise than courteous, considerate, reasonable and firm. The mere fact that an efficient and formidable army exists to support, in case of need, diplomatic pressure is sufficient. British diplomacy has never been sure of such backing since Cromwell's day; and foreign governments, being fully aware of the fact, are tempted to presume upon it. British diplomatists are therefore compelled to give way upon point after point, or to use high language which they hope may be construed as the presage of high action. Both methods are dangerous and may lead to the very end which it is desired to avoid, namely, war. It was, further, no small complication that, until the establishment of telegraphic communication all over the world, there were two Foreign Offices

[1] In France the government has for years past issued volumes containing the instructions and the most important despatches to and from French ambassadors at foreign courts, since the 17th century, all edited by the best men to be found. In England this work has lately been undertaken by a private and impoverished body of students called the Royal Historical Society.

in the British Empire, the one in London, the other in Calcutta, and that they by no means always worked heartily together. 1839.

So far, since Waterloo England's diplomatic troubles had been chiefly with France, both in the West and in the East; and those troubles were not yet wholly ended. Nevertheless, in the twenty years now before us, England's principal, though not always most ostentatious, business lay in the East and was concerned mainly with the consolidation and security of India. To say this is not to ignore the vital changes which, within the same period, overtook the economic and the social order at home. Assuredly it is not a small matter when a country reverses the whole of its commercial policy, and risks—indeed almost courts—the ruin of the industry upon which its physical life depends. However, though no man can foresee the full results of any important legislation, it is true, at least within certain limits, that what is done by one Act of Parliament may be undone by another. But the work of the sword, whether for good or for evil, can never be undone; and though it may make but a small figure in the records of Parliamentary debate, though it fill no newspapers and be celebrated by no poets, it is this that tells upon the destiny alike of conqueror and of conquered.

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Scale, 1:15,000,000

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English Miles

200 100 0 200 400 600

Boundary of German Confederation (Deutsche Bund)
Hanover
Kingdom of the Netherlands 1815-31
Prussia
Austrian Empire
Kingdom of Sardinia

ANH. - Anhalt H.C. - Hesse-Cassel LCHT. - Liechtenstein
L.D. - Lippe-Detmold O.,OLD. - Oldenburg WLD. - Waldeck
S.L. - Schaumburg-Lippe S.S. - Schwarzburg-Sondershausen

Meridian 0° of Greenwich

H.W.C. IV.22.

THE NETHERLANDS
1815-43

Scale, 1:3,000,000

Kilometres
0 10 20 30 40 50 100

English Miles
0 5 10 20 30 40 50

Boundary of United Netherlands 1815-1831
French Frontier 1814-15
Dutch-Belgian & Belgian-Luxembourg Frontiers (Boundary Treaties of London 1831, 1839 Hague 1842, Maestricht 1843
D.B. - Deutsche Bund

Longitude E. 5° of Greenwich 6°

a Irregular Force, night of the 14th b Hamilton and Lidlie, morning of 15th c Grenadiers, morning of 15th
d Thompson, morning of 15th e Lawrie, morning of 15th f Bowyer, morning of 15th g Showers, morning of 15th
Stockades Villages Stone Redoubts

VIEW OF THE MALAON RIDGE, April 1815, looking S.W.

NEPAL CAMPAIGN, 1814-15

Western Sphere

(Ochterlony, Gillespie, Mawbey, Martindell)

Scale, 1:1,000,000

Kilometres 10 5 0 10 20 30 40 50

English Miles 10 5 0 10 20 30 40

Contour intervals and Heights, in feet

Routes of Columns

Ochterlony's movements and the attack on Malaon

Scale, 1: 200,000

Kilometres 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

English Miles 1 0 1 2 3 4 5

Contours at 250 feet interval, every 1000 accentuated

Mule and Foot-paths ..... Stockades

Forests and Jungle Routes of Columns

a Irregular Force, night of 14th of April, 1815

b Hamilton and Lidlie, morning of 15th

c Grenadiers, morning of 15th

d Thompson, " " "

e Lawrie, " " "

f Bowyer, " " "

g Showers, " " "

THE GANGES VALLEY AND NEPAL

Scale, 1: 6,000,000

Kilometres 100 50 0 100 200

Miles 50 0 50 100

Longitude East 78° of Greenwich

H.W.C. VIII 21

NEPAL CAMPAIGN, 1814-15 Central Sphere (John Wood)

H. W. C. VI. 21


NEPAL CAMPAIGN, 1814-16
Eastern Sphere
(Marley, George Wood, Ochterlony)
Scale, 1:1,000,000
Kilometres
English Miles
Roads
Mountain Passes
Forests
Contour Intervals & Heights in feet.
Land above Snow Line
Routes of Columns
The Second Stockade
Section of Second Stockade
Sketch of the Stockades covering the CHURIAGHATI PASS
Scale of Yards
Channel of dry Nullah
3rd Stockade
Summit of Range
4th Stockade (unfinished)
2nd Small Stockade
Spring
Commencement of Ghat
2nd Stockade
Lookout Post
Small Stockade
1st Stockade
Katmandu
Rapti
San Kosi
Hataura
Old Mukwanpur
Mukwanpur
Hariharpur
Churiaghati Pass
Suktikhola Pass
Stockades
Bichhakoh
Jurjuri
Ramnagar
Semrabasa
Pursa
SIBLEY JAN. 1 1815
Bharagarhi
MARLEY JAN. 1815
Baghmati
KELLY
Samanpur
JAN. 1 1815
BLACKNEY
Bowanipur
G. WOOD FEB. 1815
Janakpur
Bijapur
From Dinajpur
Bettiah
Dapôt
1814 15
Sagauli
Amwa
Cantonments
1816
Pachrukha
MARLEY DEC. 1814
Ghorasahan
OCHTERLONY
NICOLLS
BURNET
Gandak
OCHTERLONY, 1816
MARLEY, 1814
Gogra
Ganges
Patna
MARLEY NOV. 1814
N E P A L
I N D I A
Longitude E. 85° of Greenwich
H.W. CRIBB. IV. 1921

KIRKEE AND POONA
November, 1817

Scale, 1: 30,000

Metres 500 100 0 200 400 600 800 1000 Kilometre

Yards 500 100 0 500 1000 1500 1 Mile

0 ¼ ½ ¾

N

To Bombay

To Chakan

Bopkhel

Dapuri

CANTONMENTS

FORD

Mula

Sangwee

Bopori

Kirkee

2 COS 6TH BOMBAY NATIVE INF

BURR morning of Nov 5

NATIVE HORSE

1ST BOMBAY NATIVE INF

6TH NAT. INF

7TH BOMBAY NATIVE INF

½ 103

To Chakan

To Ahmadnagar

To Bombay

Gunniskund Hill

Temple

SMITH Nov 13-16

Yerowda

Piquet Hill

SMITH morning of 16th

Wari

Mula

Ford

Mula

MILNE morning of 16th

MILNE night of 16th

Residency

Ford

To Koregaon & Sirur

Ghorpuri

Muta

POONA

H.W.C. III.22

SITABALDI AND NAGPUR

November - December 1817

Scale, 1: 30,000

Kilometres 0 1 2

English Miles Yards 1000 500 0 ¼ ½ ¾ 1

1 Gond Rajah's Fort 2 Bhonsla's Palace 3 Tulsi Bagh
4 Juma Darwaza 5 Budwar Darwaza 6 Etwa Darwaza
7 Bundar Darwaza 8 Umur Darwaza 9 Gate
10 Tulsi Bagh Gate 11 Bhutia Gate

H.W.C. IV.22

PINDARI AND MAHRATTA CAMPAIGNS, 1815-19 (Northern Sphere)



Scale, 1: 3,000,000 Kilometres 50 0 50 100 English Miles 50 25 0 50 100

Heights in feet ·3576 *Roads* *Forests* *Routes of Columns* 1817 1818

Contours in feet above Sea level at intervals of 250 500 1000

H.W.C. XII. 21

PINDARI AND MAHRATTA CAMPAIGNS, 1815-19 (Southern Sphere)

H.W.C. I. 1922

Scale, 1:3,000,000

Kilometres 50 40 30 20 10 0 50 100

English Miles 50 40 30 20 10 0 50 100

Heights in feet ▲2719 *Roads* *Forests*

Contours in feet above Sea level at intervals of

Routes of Columns 1817 1818

CEYLON
1815-18
Scale, 1:1,000,000
Kilometres
English Miles
Roads
Land above 3000 feet
Contour intervals and Heights in feet
Forest and Jungle
Tanks
British-Kandyan Frontier before the War
Routes of Columns
HAMPSHIRE AND THE ISLE OF WIGHT
Same scale
Basingstoke
Aldershot
HAMPSHIRE
Winchester
Southampton
Portsmouth
ISLE OF WIGHT
PALK STRAIT
Jaffna
Mullaittivu
Pali Aru
Parangi Aru
Nay Aru
Adam's Bridge
Manaar Island
Manaar
GULF OF MANAAR
NORTHERN PROVINCE
Aruvi Aru
Yan Oya
Trincomalee
Mogaragam Aru
Anuradhapura
Calpentyn (Kalpitiya)
Kala Oya
EASTERN PROVINCE
NORTH WESTERN PROVINCE
Mi Oya
Maduru Oya
SEVEN KORALES
Dedura Oya
MATALE
Batticaloa
Mundeni Aru
Chilaw
Kornegalle (Kurunegala)
Matale
Narangasheina Pass
Narammale
Galagadara
DUMBERA
BINTENNE
Dambadeniya
Giriulla
Girihagama
Katugastota
Kandy
Bintenne (Alutnuwara)
Maha Oya
Welihinda
Halpe
Negombo
8th Column DE BUSSCHE
FOUR KORALES
HEWAHETTA
Col Oya
WELLASSE
Ruwanwella
Colombo
1st and 2nd Columns HOOK, O'CONNELL JANUARY, 1815
Kelani Ganga
Avisawella
THREE KORALES
SABARAGAMUWA PROVINCE
Pidurutalagala
Nuwara Eliya
Badulla
Alupota
UVA
Adams Peak
Haputale Pass
Wellawaya
PANOWA
Kalu Ganga
Weylanga
Kumbakkan Oya
Merik Ganga
Walawe Ganga
Gin Ganga
SOUTHERN PROVINCE
Hambantota
4th Column
Galle
3rd Column KELLY
Matara
Dondra Head
80°
81°
82°
9°
8°
7°
6°
Longitude East 81° of Greenwich

H.W.C. V. 22

BURMA
1824–26
Scale, 1: 4,000,000

Kilometres
20 10 0 20 40 60 80 100
English Miles
25 20 15 10 5 0 20 40 60 80 100

Contours in feet above Sea level at intervals of
Roads — Forest and Jungle — Swamp
Routes of Columns
British Frontier before the war
Territory surrendered by Burma, 1826

88° 90° 92° 94° 96° 98° 100°
24° 22° 20° 18° 16° 14° 12° 10°

INDIA
BENGAL
ASSAM
BURMA
CHINA
SIAM
BAY OF BENGAL
Mouths of the Ganges
Sundarbands
Gulf of Martaban
Cape Negrais
Ramree Island
Cheduba Island
Shahpuri Island
North Andaman

Dinajpur
Murshidabad
Cossimbazar
Dacca
Comilla
CALCUTTA
Fort William
Sylhet
Cachar
Manipur
Kohima
Bhamo
Mandalay
Amarapura
Ava
Yandabo
Pagan
Sandoway
Arakan (Myohaung)
Cox's Bazar
Ramu
Teknaaf
Maungdew
Chittagong
Akyab
Sambyugyun
Salin
Yamethin
Magwe
Minbu
Dalet (Talak)
An (Aeng)
Minhla (Melloon)
Patanago
Meaday
Allanmyo
Thayetmyo
Pyalo
Wetugan
Simbike
Prome
Padaung
Toungoo
Shwegyin
Sittang
Tharrawaw (Sarrawa)
Henzada
Donubyu
Kyakloo (Hlegu)
Hlaing
Pegu
Panhlaing
Kemmendyne
Rangoon
Syriam
Bassein
Martaban
Moulmein
Tavoy
Bangkok
Mergui
Tenasserim

1826
Annexed, 1852
Ceded 1826
Khasi Hills
Jaintia Hills 1835
Naga Hills
Kachar 1830
Arakan Hills
Lushai Hills
Pegu Yoma (Hills)
Tenasserim Mts

Brahmaputra
Surma
Ganges
Jamuna
Hooghly
Mahanuddy
Irrawaddy
Sittang
Salween
Pakun
Hlaing
Panhlaing Channel
Rangoon R.
Pegu R.
Chindwin
Arakan Yoma
Tenasserim R.

Tropic of Cancer

Sketch of the LOWER IRRAWADDY
Rangoon to Sarrawa
Scale, 1: 500,000
Kilometres 5 4 3 2 1 0 5 10 15 20
Miles 5 4 3 2 1 0 5 10 15

HEIGHTS OF NAPADI
December 1-2, 1825
0 1 2 3 Miles
Contours (Approx.) at intervals of 50 feet

Heights of Napadi
Simbike (Sinbeik)
Prome
COTTON
CAMPBELL
Irrawaddy
Nawin

Sarrawa
Henzada
Donubyu
Hlaing
Pakun
Irrawaddy
CAMPBELL
MARCH 2, 1825
MARCH 13
MAR 18-21
MARCH 24
MARCH 25 1825
MAR 7
MARCH 6
NAVAL BATTERY

CAMPBELL, MAY 5, 1824
Port Cornwallis
Mouths of the Irrawaddy
McCREAGH MAY, 1824
WAHAB MAP
SALE MAP 1827

Panhlaing
Panhlaing Channel
Kamaroot
Kokein
Kemmendyne
Rangoon
DALLA
Pagoda Point
Hlaing
Rangoon R.
Pegu R.
BREASTWORK taken OCT. 9
STOCKADE destroyed OCT. 9
STOCKADE & VILLAGE taken OCT. 11
STOCKADE destroyed OCT. 6
ENEMY FIRE FROM JUNE 10
COTTON FEB 4

England, Land's End to Lowestoft; same scale.
England, Land's End to Berwick-on-Tweed, same scale.

Longitude East of Greenwich

H.W.C. III. 22

BHURTPORE
(BHARATPUR)
1826
Scale, 1:25,000
Metres
500 0 250 500 1000
Yards
500 0 250 500 1000
0 220 440 880 ½ Mile
1st parallel opened December 23, 1825
2nd " " " 24 "
Breaches stormed January 18, 1826
Reference to Batteries
A Eight 18 pounders
B Twelve 8 in. and four 10 in. mortars
C Five 24 and five 18 pounders
D Light 24 and eight 18 pdrs
E Five 18 and five 24 pdrs
F F Two 12 pdrs
G Ten 10 in mortars
H Right m.b. eight 8 in. and two 10 in.
I Centre m.b. eight 8 in. and two 13 in.
K Two howitzers
L Three 24 pdrs
M Two 18 and two 12 pdrs
1 Right or Jagina breach
2 Centre or main breach
3 Left breach
Engineer Park
Artillery Park
Tontpora
Bamupora
Budakhor
Munderpur
Noh
Gondwa
Kunjowli
Ukud
Murwara
Gulpara
Anah
Jheelra
Mallye
Jatowli
Kuddum Kundi
Mota Jheel
BUND
REYNELL, 1st Division
6th N.I. 60th N.I. 23rd N.I. H.M. 14th 63rd N.I.
COMBERMERE Headquarters
NICOLLS, 2nd Division
Advanced Headquarters End of Dec. 1825
Buldeo Singh's Garden
Heavy Artillery
11th Dragoons
4th Lt Cav.
E.I. Cos European Reg. 101st
½ Skinner's Horse
½ Skinner's Horse
6th Lt Cav.
31st N.I.
16th Lancers
½ 18th N.I.
½ 18th N.I.
9th Lt Cav
2 Cos 31st N.I.
8th Lt Cav.
3rd Lt Cav.
10th Lt Cav.
5 Cos 11th N.I.
2 Cos 11th N.I.
3 Cos 11th N.I.
Cav. Picquet
Cav. Picquet
Cav. Picquet
Faithful's Post
Abbatis
Abbatis
Abbatis
To Kumbher and Deig
To Sonkh and Muttra
To Jagina and Muttra
To Muttra
To Agra
To Fatehpur Sikri
To Halena and Jaipur
To Uchen and Bayana
GOVERDUN GATE
KUMBHER GATE
ANAH GATE
NIM GATE
ATALBUND GATE
BINARAIN GATE
MUTTRA GATE
SURAJPUR GATE
ASUDDAN GATE
Palace
N

DEVONSHIRE
on same scale
Barnstaple
Tiverton
Exeter
Newton Abbot
Plymouth
ASHANTI
COUNTRY
Kumasi
DENKERA COUNTRY
ADANSI
COUNTRY
Dompoase
Ansa
AKIM
COUNTRY
AKWAPIM
COUNTRY
Akropong
Dodowa
(Danish coffee plantations)
Plains of Dodowa
SEP 19
1826
Salt Lagoon
Akim Pk
1200 ft
Aburi
Danssam
Akonfodo
TUFEL COUNTRY
AGONA COUNTRY
Asikuma
Manso
Abodum
Ampon
WASSAW
COUNTRY
FANTI
COUNTRY
Dunkwa
Nyankumasi
Jukwa
Aburtu
Himan
Daboase
Dompin
Assamanko
(Ashanti)
JAN 21
1824
Adamanso (Ashanti)
Mori (Dutch)
Cape Coast
Castle
1664
Salt pond
Ammabo (1782)
Nakwa
Apam (Dutch 1697)
Mumford (1824)
Frantum (1824)
Winneba (1664)
Barekuu (Dutch 1640)
Accra (Danish 1690)
Accra (Danish 1730)
Accra (Ft James 1664)
Teshi (Danish 1740?)
Prampram (1740?)
Ningo (Danish 1741)
Adda
(1736?)
GULF OF
GUINEA
OCEAN
ATLANTIC
Axim (Dutch 1725)
Cape Three Points
Dixcove (1691)
Takrondi (Dutch 1680)
Sekondi (1685)
(Dutch 1642)
Komfenda (1681)
Chama (Dutch 1640)
Birnina (Dutch 1637)
Akim
Volta
Afram
Birrim
Pra
Ofin
Anhobro
Densu
Ayensu
Nakwa
Ankobra
Prah
Offin
Oyan
Monsi
Ahobre
Adamanso
Ofin
Ahobre
Densu
Ayensu
Nakwa
Prah
Birrim
Afram
Volta
Onyim
Wom
Ankobra
Offin
Pra

THE EASTERN FRONTIER AND KAFFRARIA
Scale, 1: 1,250,000
Kilometres
English Miles
Roads
Contour intervals and Heights in feet
Routes of Columns
Eastern Frontier, 1806
" " 1848
British Kaffraria, 1848
K A F F R A R I A
British
Kaffraria
I N D I A N
O C E A N
QUEEN ADELAIDE
SOMERSET
ALBANY
ZUURFELD
UITENHAGE
FORT BEAUFORT
VICTORIA EAST
Queenstown
Butterworth
Umtata R.
Bashee R.
Kabusie R.
Kwenugha R.
Kwelegha R.
Gonubie R.
Buffalo R.
Great Kei R.
Great Fish R.
Kei R.
Black Kei R.
White Kei
Thomas R.
Thorn R.
Kat R.
Keiskama R.
Debe R.
Tyumie R.
Kabusie Post
Kamastone Hoek
Hogsback
Katberg
Katberg Pass
Kunap R.
Kunap Post
Fort Adelaide
Fort Beaufort
Fort Hare
Fort White
Fort Willshire
Fort Murray
Fort Peto
Fort Grey
Fort Glamorgan
Fort Wellington
Fort Warden
Fort Waterloo
Fort Jackson
Old Kei Drift
Kaffir Drift
Kaffir Drift Post
Lower Kaffir Drift
Frankfort
Hanover
King Williams Town
East London
Stutterheim
Seymour
Alice
Bedford
Adelaide
Somerset
Graham's Town
Fredericksburg
Bathurst
Peddie
Salem
Sidbury
Theopolis
Port Frances
Alexandria
Olifants Hoek
Uitenhage
Port Elizabeth
Fort Frederick
Algoa Bay
Bird Is.
C. Recife
Zwartkops R.
Sunday R.
Bushman R.
Kowie R.
Kariega R.
Gualana R.
Keiskama R.
Buffalo Mts
Amatola Mts
Kat River Settlement
Lt. Winterberg
Gt. Winterberg
Katberg
Kunap R. Fs
Great Fish R.
Kap R.
Baviaans R.
Daggaboer Nek
Slachters Nek
Roode Wal
Estcharhuy Poort
Krugers Post
Cookhouse
Jagers Drift
Little Fish R.
Brak R.
Kaffir Berg
Tomlinson's Post
Junction Dr.
Commadagga
De Bruins Fc. & Drift
Fish River Berg
Riebeeck
Zuurberg
Zuurberg Pass
Bosch Berg
New Years R.
New Years Dr.
Rautenbachs Dr.
Howison's Poort
Somerset Drift
Double Dr.
Hermanus Kraal
Commadagga Drift
Sheffield's Pass
Eno's Kraal
Wesleyville
Wesleyville Dr.
Line Drift
Gualana Post
Sona Dr.
Kaffir Drift
Lower Kaffir Drift
Ft. Albert
Ft. Peace
Addo Dr.
Jagers Dr.
Coega R.
Coega Kop
St. Croix I.
Zwartkops R.
Bethelsdorp
To Humansdorp
Olifants R.
Kariega R.
Bushman R.
C. Padrone
Sunday R.
Great Fish R.
Umzimvubu R.
Umtata R.
Xora R.
Nabacha R.
Shixini R.
Kogha R.
Ikuka R.
C. Morgan
Komgha Hill
Gt. Kei R.
Old Kei Drift
Thomas R.
Gt. Kei R.
Black Kei R.
Kei R.
Kabusie R.
Kwenugha R.
Kwelegha R.
Gonubie R.
Buffalo R.
Keiskama R.
Debe R.
Tyumie R.
Kabusie Post
Kamastone Hoek
Hogsback
Katberg
Katberg Pass
Kunap R. Fs
Great Fish R.
Kap R.
Baviaans R.
Daggaboer Nek
Slachters Nek
Roode Wal
Estcharhuy Poort
Krugers Post
Cookhouse
Jagers Drift
Little Fish R.
Brak R.
Kaffir Berg
Tomlinson's Post
Junction Dr.
Commadagga
De Bruins Fc. & Drift
Fish River Berg
Riebeeck
Zuurberg
Zuurberg Pass
Bosch Berg
New Years R.
New Years Dr.
Rautenbachs Dr.
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Somerset Drift
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Hermanus Kraal
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Sheffield's Pass
Eno's Kraal
Wesleyville
Wesleyville Dr.
Line Drift
Gualana Post
Sona Dr.
Kaffir Drift
Lower Kaffir Drift
Ft. Albert
Ft. Peace
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Coega R.
Coega Kop
St. Croix I.
Zwartkops R.
Bethelsdorp
To Humansdorp
Olifants R.
Kariega R.
Bushman R.
C. Padrone
Sunday R.
Great Fish R.
Umzimvubu R.
Umtata R.
Xora R.
Nabacha R.
Shixini R.
Kogha R.
Ikuka R.
C. Morgan
Komgha Hill
Gt. Kei R.
Old Kei Drift
CAPE COLONY
1806 - 1854
Scale, 1: 14,000,000
Kilometres
English Miles
Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, 1806
Territory annexed, 1824-1829
" " 1847.
" " 1853-1854.
British Kaffraria, 1848
Roads
District Boundaries, 1848
1 THE CAPE
2 STELLENBOSCH
3 SWELLENDAM
4 WORCESTER
5 GEORGE
6 CLANWILLIAM
7 BEAUFORT
8 UITENHAGE
9 GRAAF REINET
10 SOMERSET
11 ALBANY
12 FORT BEAUFORT
13 VICTORIA EAST
14 CRADOCK
15 COLESBERG
16 ALBERT
ATLANTIC OCEAN
INDIAN OCEAN
Bechuanas
Griquas
Basutos
Natal
Zulus
KAFFRARIA
Cape Town
Table Mt.
Cape of Good Hope
Port Elizabeth
Algoa Bay
Beaufort
Great Karoo
Little Karoo
Graaff Reinet
Colesberg
Victoria West
Calvinia
Clanwilliam
Worcester
Swellendam
Caledon
George
Uitenhage
Somerset
Cradock
Albany
Queenstown
Butterworth
Great Kei R.
Great Fish R.
Orange R.
Limpopo R.
Tropic of Capricorn
Delagoa Bay
Port Natal
Durban (Port Natal)
ENGLAND on same scale
Longitude E. 27° of Greenwich
H.W.C. V. 22

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